Motives and Self-Interest

Voluntary human actions—those actions with which ethics is primarily concerned—typically arise as an agent seeks to satisfy a desire. Satisfying desires, moreover, is typically in an agent's interest. Thus, there seems to be a rather straightforward connection between identifying an action as voluntary and identifying that [Page 1448]action's motivation (i.e., the desire for the sake of which the action is being pursued) as self-interested.

Additional support is lent to this line of thought by considering that human agents are, on the one hand, members of a species that seeks to secure its own survival and, on the other hand, social creatures. Insofar as humans seek to secure their own survival, they are motivated to act in ways to satisfy their desires for food, shelter, and security. Insofar as humans are social creatures, they are motivated to act in ways to secure their position within their group, primarily by engaging in behavior that others will regard as praiseworthy and by avoiding behavior that others will regard as shameful or otherwise blameworthy.

Sophisticated versions of this line of thought distinguish between agents'consideration of their short-term and long-term (or rational) self-interest. In terms of both what is introspectively available to each of us and how we best understand behavior we observe in others, the evidence suggests that voluntary agents often act out of a consideration of long-term self-interest. Thus, such agents often pursue courses of action that generate no immediate results, calculating that a short-term sacrifice is acceptable in the pursuit of some greater goal. For example, businesses invest significant capital in research and development, where the returns on these investments are realized later, if at all.

The strongest version of the line of thought that links action to the pursuit of self-interest claims that all human action is motivated by some consideration of what is in the agent's own best interest. This position, known as psychological egoism, asserts that every action—from the most obviously greedy act to the most apparently altruistic act—ultimately must be understood in terms of an agent's pursuit of self-interest. This is often cited in support of the normative position known as ethical egoism: If the only acts that are psychologically possible are selfish acts, then—given the plausible principle that ought implies can—the only acts that an agent ought to perform are selfish acts.

While the self-interested motivation of actions is clearest with respect to actions avowedly undertaken to satisfy the agent's desires, questions arise when attempting to identify the self-interested motivation of apparently selfless acts. For example, employees who blow the whistle on corruption within the firm often face significant harm: reputational losses, difficulties maintaining employment with the firm, and so on. Moreover, such employees often assert that their decision to blow the whistle was motivated simply out of a sense of duty (to shareholders, to the public).

When confronted with an agent who has just performed an apparently selfless act, and who insists that the act was done with absolutely no consideration of self-interest, psychological egoists often respond by positing some subconscious motivation for the act. In the case of a whistle-blower, for example, it might be suggested that the decision to act was motivated by a subconscious desire to be regarded as a hero, to secure a lucrative book deal, or even just to sleep contentedly, free of the pangs of conscience.

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