Moral Standing

Moral standing is a concept that relates to what ethicists call “moral considerability.” Here, the moral status of an entity is determined by considering whether that entity deserves to have their well-being taken into account within the context of moral decision making. To ask if an entity has moral standing is to ask whether that entity should be considered in the moral judgments that people make and the moral decisions that they take, and whether that entity should count as a morally valued being and whether it can make moral claims on other moral beings. Hence, this concept has to do with the value or worth that is bestowed on an entity. Whether the entity under consideration is determined to have intrinsic or instrumental value will often play a role in how that entity is morally treated or regarded by people. The question of moral standing is one that has been raised primarily within the context of the philosophical debate about animal rights, although it has had a role to play in other ethically controversial areas (Does or should a fetus have moral standing?). The moral standing of animals is important to determine; if they don't have any moral standing or worth, then it would be permissible to treat them in whatever ways one wishes. If animals do have moral standing, though, then perhaps using them in medical experimentation or eating them may be ethically problematic.

Ethicists have taken several positions about how to determine the moral standing and inherent worth of an entity. Aristotle set a tone that still reverberates today with his teleological view of nature that sees the world as a hierarchy where the lower levels of plants and animals have value only in relation to the purposes of humans. Kant later held a similar view when he claimed that we have no moral duties to animals. This view has been called an “anthropocentric view” because it puts humans above all other entities and holds that all and only humans are morally considerable.

There are two kinds of anthropocentrism that ethicists have recognized. “Strong anthropocentrism” argues that only humans have intrinsic value and all nonhumans have only instrumental value as determined by human ends. “Weak anthropocentrism” holds that while humans count most in moral matters, nonhumans do have some moral status and humans do have certain duties to animals to reduce their suffering and treat them humanely.

Others have objected to anthropocentrism and have offered their own positions. It is often claimed that anthropocentrism commits “speciesism,” a form of bias toward the human species that unfairly discriminates against other species. Some have appealed to the concept of sentience to determine which entities have or should not have moral standing. Sentience is often defined as having the quality of awareness or the state of consciousness and self-consciousness. Some define it as relating to sensation, perception, ideation, or feeling. [Page 1446]In this account, then, a sentient, self-aware being possesses and has moral value, while nonsentient ones do not. Still others suggest that a “biocentric view” is even more plausible in that it gives moral status to both human and nonhuman entities alike. Finally, “environmental holism” has been suggested by those who want to see moral standing granted to species and ecosystems such that it would be morally culpable to engage in activities that are environmentally degrading.

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