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Moral luck seems to appear when circumstances beyond a person's control influence our moral attributions of praise and blame. For example, consider the apparent role of moral luck in some of the worst failures in corporate history. If not for a run-up in resource prices, corrections for overpriced technology stocks, and the specter of terrorism, they might never have occurred. Deceptive accounting, employed to give the illusion of steadily increasing profitability, might have been unwound. It is possible, if not probable, that such improprieties occur with some regularity in more forgiving external circumstances, rendering them almost harmless. One executive, imprudent though fortunate, presides over relatively inconsequential misconduct. Is this executive any less blameworthy than another, whose similar inattentiveness is exacerbated by chance circumstances beyond the executive's control, resulting in corporate failure, unemployment, and loss of investor capital? Both executives may be held formally responsible for their action or inaction, but only the latter becomes the object of public disgrace and faces comparatively severe legal charges. How is it possible to reconcile the widely shared intuition that morality and moral judgments involve responsibility for our own actions with the undeniable fact that the moral life is vulnerable to luck for which we cannot be held responsible?

Types and Illustration

That there could be such a thing as moral luck challenges modern moral theory, which has tended to characterize morality as immune to luck. The claims that goodwill is independent of worldly contingencies, and that moral worth depends solely on the volition of an autonomous moral agent, have been attributed to Kant. The associated belief that moral value is wholly within our control, such that neither good fortune can augment it nor misfortune can take it away, is widely held among laypersons and moral theorists alike. Thus, when Bernard Williams coined the term moral luck, he expected it to be perceived as a contradiction in terms that threatened the modern conception of morality as a unique and supreme form of value. Aristotelian ethics, by comparison, has been characterized as more accommodating of the vulnerability of the good life to factors beyond our control, sensitive to the ways in which reversals of external fortune, and even internal human irrationality, may inhibit our ability to pursue the good life or to introduce conflicts of values that make a good choice impossible. Despite the perceived contrast between Kantian and Aristotelian ethics, it has been asserted that both theories recognize the problem of moral luck and the associated difficulty of reconciling attribution of moral responsibility with recognition of the influence of luck on human life.

Thomas Nagel distinguishes between four types of moral luck, none wholly within human control, which influence our own and others' judgments about persons' moral decisions and character. To illustrate them, consider the case of a pharmaceutical executive, deliberating whether and how to allocate resources to develop a potential cure for a disease whose victims may be unable to pay for it. Constitutive moral luck—who we are as a function of our natural makeup—arises in that the choice for this executive appears because it is in the natural makeup of a pharmaceutical company to have the capacity to produce treatments for disease. Circumstantial moral luck—the situations that chance introduces that bring about moral challenges—arises because the opportunity to develop a cure comes from the presence of the affliction and the chance that this company may have a research advantage on this type of disease. Causal moral luck—the antecedent circumstances that may determine who we are and the decisions we make—arises when an unexpected discovery in the research laboratory leads a research scientist to present the executive with the case for a possible cure. Finally, resultant moral luck—the consequences of our decisions and actions—will arise after a decision has been made about whether to go ahead with research and development. The outcomes subject the executive and the company to moral praise or blame, depending significantly on whether the drug is or might have been successful and accordingly how shareholders perceive the use of their capital.

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