Interpersonal Comparison of Utility

Utilitarianism posits that the ethical good is the greatest good for the greatest number. This moral principle implies simple aggregation of individual utilities without accounting for interpersonal comparisons. Needs and tastes may differ, however, and two problems appear paramount in determining what the greatest good actually is. The first problem is variety: How do we allow for the different needs of men and women, poor and wealthy, Christian and Taoist, and so forth? The second problem, given such variety, is interpersonal utility judgment: Who is in a position to make the comparisons necessary for maximizing the good?

Both problems received notice in classical utilitarianism. Jeremy Bentham maintained in The Rationale of Reward that utility is a simple calculus of personal pleasure and pain, so he resolved the problem of variety by stating that the game of pushpin had objectively equal value to poetry. John Stuart Mill, in Utilitarianism, replied by distinguishing between higher and lower pleasures (or pains) and suggesting that lovers of lower pleasures know only half the story. Mill had to address the problem of judgment, in consequence, so he distinguished sages, who can solve the problem, from fools, who cannot.

Mill's reference to those who “know” both sides of the comparison necessarily introduces the theory of knowledge into the problem of judgment. Marxist and feminist epistemologists, referred to as perspectivists and standpoint theorists respectively, have argued that those in disadvantaged social positions will gather superior knowledge of many social situations, for the simple reason that their survival demands it. If these theorists are right, then the disadvantaged might be the sages that Mill refers to, despite his apparent intention that the bourgeoisie would hold that position. Research cited by Martha Nussbaum suggests that perspectivism may be false, however, insofar as the truly downtrodden may set their sights so low that they will not voice very pressing needs, even when asked to do so. The problem of judgment may be intractable.

A proposed solution to the problem of variety is to substitute a theory of human flourishing for the utilitarian focus on pleasure (or pain). Both Amartya Sen and Nussbaum argue that a decent standard of living might be a revised goal that would require very different resources for different people. Interpersonal differences between elderly women and children with disabilities, then, would entail different specific demands for social resources that allow for individual capabilities for flourishing, though these distinct demands may be considered approximately as the same abstract right. This approach may lead back to the Marxist notion of somehow transferring resources to individuals with greater needs—on someone's judgment.