Instrumental Value

Instrumental value refers to the value that something has in virtue of its being conducive to something else of value. As such, to value something instrumentally is to value it as a means to some other end. For instance, currency has merely an instrumental value to most persons, insofar as it enables them to procure other goods and services that they value. Instrumental value is contrasted with intrinsic value. To value something intrinsically is to value it in and of itself, for its own sake, and not as a means to anything else. Furthermore, something that is of instrumental value can come to lose that value: when it is no longer necessary to achieve the end in question, when something else is found that can be used to achieve that end equally well, or when the end in question is no longer desired. However, the intrinsic value of something cannot be replaced by something else or lost in a similar manner. Since people only value things instrumentally insofar as they are means to something else of value, many philosophers hold that people must value some things intrinsically; otherwise there could be no instrumental value. It is important to note that the categories of instrumental and intrinsic value are not necessarily mutually exclusive, as something might have both an instrumental and an intrinsic value for a person. For example, a person might value a piece of artwork intrinsically as an aesthetic object as well as instrumentally as an investment.

Although attributions of instrumental and intrinsic value are not necessarily mutually exclusive, a number of concerns in contemporary business ethics turn on the extent to which some business practices reduce certain values to the merely instrumental level. While there is much debate on what precisely can have intrinsic value, there is a large vein of philosophical ethics that maintains that persons have intrinsic value. Deontological theories, such as Kantian ethics, typically stress the intrinsic value of persons as ends in themselves. To recognize someone as having intrinsic value is to recognize his or her value independent of the projects or desires of others. Since persons, on such views, have an intrinsic value, it is morally wrong to treat them as mere means toward one's own ends. This entails, on most deontological accounts, a basic duty of respect for others and, often, acknowledging a corresponding set of human rights that ought to govern our interactions with others. Such views would rule out coercive or deceptive practices and prescribe behavior toward others that enhances their autonomy and respects their individual value.

In this vein, a number of business practices have been singled out as instances in which persons are treated as having merely instrumental value. For instance, deceptive advertising practices and predatory marketing to vulnerable groups have been seen as paradigmatic cases in which consumers are treated as mere instruments for the generation of revenue, at the cost of failing to respect their individual worth. Likewise, employers are accused of treating their employees as having a merely instrumental value when they subject them to working conditions that are inherently dangerous or degrading or that infringe on their basic human rights. Criticisms of the latter sort have been particularly prominent in regard to the use of sweatshop labor in undeveloped countries.

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