Hume, David (1711–1776)

David Hume was Scottish. One of the great philosophers, Hume's wide-ranging thought incorporates a skeptical attack on the power of human reason along with an explanation of how the natural operations of mind and conduct generate beliefs and contribute to the formation of moral and political order. Hume suggests that we are guided less by abstract reason than by stable currents of passion, sentiment, and custom. A significant influence on his peers, including Adam Smith, and a popular figure in Enlightenment Scotland, Hume has also provided a powerful legacy to contemporary philosophers. Born in Edinburgh, he studied at the University of Edinburgh and later served as the Librarian to the Faculty of Advocates.

During his lifetime, Hume was most famous for his essays—some of which first appeared in 1741 (Essays, Moral and Political)—and for his six volume History of England. However, his major work is A Treatise of Human Nature. Disappointed with its reception, Hume revised the Treatise, publishing An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. Although differing in style from the Treatise, their [Page 1096]content is similar. Other major works include The Natural History of Religion, a naturalistic explanation of religious belief, and Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, published posthumously. In the Dialogues, Hume offers forceful criticisms of the Argument from Design, a powerful 18th-century argument for the existence of God.

Seeking a science of human nature, Hume devotes the first book of the Treatise to the understanding, the second to the passions, and the third to morals. The contents or perceptions of the mind are either ideas or impressions, but all ideas arise from impressions of sensation or internal impressions (passions or feelings). Reason is concerned with matters of fact or relations of ideas. Knowledge of matters of fact is founded on belief about cause and effect, but causal relations cannot be proved a priori; they can be gleaned only from the customary association of one thing with another. From the habitual experience of one object following another, we come to believe that these objects share a causal connection, even if there is no rational justification for assuming that future experiences of causation will be the same as in the past. Hume also contends that there is no justification for positing a self beyond particular impressions and ideas of the moment, nor is there reason for predicating a world that exists independent of us. Even without rational justification, we are, Hume explains, naturally constituted to believe in causality, a world external to ourselves, and a continuing self.

When he turns to consider the passions, Hume notes how, via a process of sympathy, we may come to share the passions and feelings of others. It is in fact the passions, and not reason, that motivate action, and because morality has a motivating force, morals must involve the passions. Moral judgments arise from the sentiment that occurs on considering, from a general rather than a partial point of view, the actions and qualities of other agents. The rules, or conventions, of justice—primarily rules of property—first emerge as a response to circumstances such as scarcity and limited benevolence. Rejecting any notion of a social contract, Hume argues that governments and laws find their justification in utility and that a cautious moderation is the appropriate attitude toward politics.

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