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Intentionality refers to the ability of mental states to be about, be directed at, or represent objects, properties, and states of affairs in the world. Just as it is disputed whether all mental states are intentional, so it is not settled whether all emotions have intentionality, but it is generally accepted that most emotions do and that this is one central way of distinguishing them from similar but non-intentional states such as moods. I am angry at someone, in love with my wife, afraid of the shark, worried by the shouting, happy about winning the lottery, surprised because of the kind act. Moods such as depression, in contrast, do not seem to be directed at anything at all, or at least at no particular or a less specific object. Providing an account of the intentionality of emotion is seen as one of the key elements in understanding the nature of emotion, and many of the differences between competing philosophical theories of emotion can thus be seen to hinge on different ways of explicating emotional intentionality.

The nature of intentionality is, however, complex, obscure, and subject to a great deal of philosophical debate, so it is unsurprising that, given the many and varied dimensions of emotional phenomena and the raging debates about defining emotion, the subject of the intentionality of emotion cannot avoid inheriting and multiplying this difficulty and complexity. As such, the reader should be aware that many of the issues discussed in this entry are hotly contested.

This entry is structured as follows: The first part provides an overview of some of the main issues concerning the intentionality of emotion, including the nature and range of the intentional objects of emotions. The second part examines the view of emotional intentionality inherent in cognitive and feeling theories of emotion and notes some of the problems facing such views. The third and final part examines some perceptual theories of emotion, the various views of intentionality arising from such theories, and some of the problems and challenges confronting these, such as explaining the role of the body and feelings in such intentionality.

Intentional Objects of Emotion

One central obstacle to capturing the intentionality of emotion in any unified way is that the intentional objects of emotions form an immense and varied range, including actions, events, values, states of affairs, particular objects, properties, propositions, and bodily states. If I am afraid of the lion, my fear is directed at a particular object, the lion, and perhaps also at the situation confronting me. We might also capture this by saying that I am afraid that the lion will eat me, thereby giving the emotion a propositional object (in italics). Whereas some emotions, such as anger, may be directed at either propositional objects or particulars, others, such as love, may require specific objects as their focus, and yet others, such as regret, may require propositional objects. Moreover, certain social emotions such as pride, jealousy, and shame, often involve a number of different intentional objects, partly in virtue of their self-reflexivity. If I am ashamed of performing a certain action, this may involve negatively evaluating both the action performed—for example, as shameful, or more specifically as morally or socially bad or unacceptable—as well as myself, as perhaps unworthy or in some respect dis-valuable.

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