Explanation of Action

Reasons

Explaining why any event occurred involves giving reasons that explain why the event happened. We can answer the question, “Why did the apple fall?” by giving a reason, as in “Because it was ripe.” That the apple is ripe is a reason that explains why it fell. A distinguishing feature of explanations characteristic of action is that they involve reasons that not only cause but may also rationalize the action.

Philosophers distinguish between two notions of reason for action, normative reasons, and operative reasons. To illustrate, consider the proposition that poking the chimpanzee may cause it to return Ayesha's glasses. Whether this is an operative reason depends on whether this proposition plays any role in explaining why Ayesha did in fact poke the chimpanzee. By contrast, whether it is a normative reason for Ayesha to poke the chimpanzee depends on whether this proposition has the potential to rationalize her action—that is, on whether the truth of this proposition would support the conclusion that it was rational for Ayesha to poke the chimpanzee given all the reasons she has for and against so acting. Normative reasons are not invariably operative reasons; sometimes propositions that would rationalize an action are not relevant to explaining why the agent acted, and conversely, operative reasons are sometimes not normative reasons.

That operative reasons are sometimes also normative reasons distinguishes explanations characteristic of action. Explanations of events other than actions involve reasons that are not even potentially normative reasons for those events (i.e., the ripeness of the apple is not even potentially a normative reason for its fall).

...