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Deductive reasoning is the kind of reasoning in which, roughly, the truth of the input propositions (the premises) logically guarantees the truth of the output proposition (the conclusion), provided that no mistake has been made in the reasoning. The premises may be propositions that the reasoner believes or assumptions that the reasoner is exploring. Deductive reasoning contrasts with inductive reasoning, the kind of reasoning in which the truth of the premises need not guarantee the truth of the conclusion.

For example, a reasoner who infers from the beliefs

  • if the room is dark, then either the light switch is turned off or the bulb has burned out;
  • the room is dark;
  • the light switch is not turned off;

to the conclusion

  • the bulb has burned out

is reasoning deductively. If the three premises are true, the conclusion is guaranteed to be true. By contrast, a reasoner who infers from the belief

  • all swans that have been observed are white;

to the conclusion

  • all swans are white

is reasoning inductively. The premise provides evidential support for the conclusion but does not guarantee its truth. It is compatible with the premise that there is an unobserved black swan.

Deductive reasoning has been intensively studied in cognitive science, psychology, and philosophy. There are many important debates concerning the nature of deductive reasoning. This entry surveys three topics—the relationship between deductive reasoning and logic, the main psychological models of deductive reasoning, and the epistemology of deductive reasoning.

Deductive Reasoning and Logic

Deductive reasoning should be distinguished from logic. Deductive reasoning is a psychological process. In contrast, logic does not describe a psychological process. Logic is the abstract theory of the logical consequence relation, the relation that specifies what follows from what.

While logic does not provide a descriptive theory of reasoning, it is widely accepted that there is a normative connection between logic and reasoning. Yet it has proved difficult to precisely articulate this connection. On a simple proposal, reasoners ought to infer the logical consequences of their beliefs and ought not to hold logically inconsistent beliefs. However, Gilbert Harman and others have provided several arguments against this proposal. For example, in some cases, when reasoners recognize that an implausible claim follows from their beliefs, they should not believe the claim but instead give up one of their antecedent beliefs. Harman further claims that there is no distinctive tie between logic and reasoning. This claim, however, is not widely endorsed. Despite the difficulties of precisely articulating the connection between logic and reasoning, the idea that logic provides a normative standard for reasoning is widely accepted.

The Cognitive Psychology of Deductive Reasoning

Sources of Evidence

The psychological study of deductive reasoning has largely focused on investigating its algorithmic underpinnings. Experimental evidence has come from the performance of subjects, typically undergraduate students, on specific reasoning tasks. In one experimental paradigm, subjects are presented with premises and asked to indicate whether a proposed conclusion follows. In a related paradigm, subjects are presented with premises and asked to generate a conclusion that follows, if one exists.

A notable finding of this research is that subjects are highly prone to errors in evaluating the validity of arguments. For example, a meta-analysis carried out by Walter Schroyens, Walter Schaeken, and Géry D'Ydewalle of 65 studies on conditional reasoning found that while 97% of subjects correctly evaluated modus ponens inferences (if p, then q; p, therefore q) as valid, only 72% correctly evaluated modus tollens inferences (if p, then q; not-q, therefore not-p) as valid. Worse still, 63% incorrectly identified instances of the fallacy of affirming the consequent (if p, then q; q, therefore p) as valid and 55% incorrectly identified instances of the fallacy of denying the antecedent (if p, then q; not-p, therefore not-q) as valid. This research has also uncovered several content effects that influence subjects' responses. For example, subjects are more likely to mistakenly identify an invalid argument as valid if its conclusion is believable.

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