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Causal theories of memory aim to give a philosophical account of what it is to remember something. According to such theories, to remember something is to be in a mental state or undergo a mental episode that stands in an appropriate kind of causal connection to one or more of one's previous mental states or episodes. More specifically, causal theories of memory typically have it that the causal connection involves the persistence of a trace: The original experience of an event has left a trace on the subject, which is now operative in the subject's remembering the event. In psychology, the idea that remembering involves the activation of memory traces is typically taken as uncontroversial, the main focus of research being on what is known as the problem of localization—that is, of trying to identify brain structures that realize such traces. In fact, however, attempting to explain what it is to remember in terms of the idea of a memory trace turns out far from straightforward. This entry summarizes arguments for and against causal theories of memory and distinguishes two ways of understanding the appeal such theories make to the notion of a trace.

The Basic Intuition and the Problem of Deviant Causal Chains

Causal theories of memory typically take as their remit the concept of remembering quite generally, but most of the more detailed analyses focus on remembering particular, personally experienced events, or what psychologists call episodic memory. As applied to episodic memory, one basic intuition that informs causal theories of memory is that there can be cases in which a subject has in fact experienced a certain past event and can now represent it correctly, without it being true that she remembers the event. For instance, a subject might no longer remember her first kiss yet nevertheless represent it correctly because she is reading a diary she kept at the time. The reason why this does not constitute a case of remembering, according to the causal theorist's diagnosis, is that the subject's current ability to represent the event does not stand in the right sort of causal connection to her having experienced it.

Obviously, there remains a need for the causal theorist to elucidate what is meant by “the right sort of causal connection” in this context, and what, for instance, disqualifies the kind of causal connection that obtains in our example, where the diary forms the causal link between past and present. This is an instance of the problem of deviant causal chains, which also affects other causal theories in the philosophy of mind (e.g., of perception and action). We can distinguish between two ways of construing causal theories of memory in terms of the type of responses to this problem that they embody.

Memory Traces as Internal

One type of response to the problem of deviant causal chains, in the case of causal theories of memory, involves adding further constraints to the basic idea behind such theories. One such constraint might be that memory necessarily involves traces internal to the body of the subject, which would rule out the diary entry as a suitable trace.

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