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Although the case is most frequently cited in relation to congressional powers relative to war, Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 1 (1 Cranch 1) (1801), like Little v. Barreme (1804), provides an early example of the U.S. Supreme Court's use of the concept of probable cause.

The facts involved a ship, Amelia, owned by a merchant of Hamburg (a neutral in the ongoing conflict between France and England) named Chapeau Rouge, who was represented in the proceedings by Hans Frederic Seeman. While sailing from Calcutta (then claimed by the British) to Bengal, the Amelia was captured by the French ship La Diligente. The ship was then recaptured by the USS Constitution, captained by Silas Talbot, and sent to New York, where Talbot claimed salvage rights for regaining the ship on Rouge's behalf. The district court had ruled that the ship should be returned to its owners with deductions for salvage, and the circuit court had ruled that no salvage costs should be paid.

Chief Justice John Marshall wrote the Court's unanimous decision. For Talbot to get a share of the goods, he needed to prove that the taking was lawful and that he had rendered a meritorious service to the recaptured ship. In looking at the first issue, Marshall examined a number of laws that Congress had adopted on the subject. He found that when Talbot captured the ship, he had “probable cause” to believe that the ship was a French ship subject under these laws to capture, and so he proceeded legally. As to whether he should receive a reward for his effort, this depended in part on whether Talbot had saved the ship from danger. Marshall found that French decrees of the day disregarded the rights of neutral parties, such as Rouge, in this case, and that had Talbot not rescued the ship, it would have been completely forfeited. He ruled that one-sixth the value of the cargo was a fair amount for such services.

JohnR.Vile

Further Reading

Sidak, J.Gregory. “The Quasi War Cases—and Their Relevance to Whether ‘Letters of Marque and Reprisal’ Constrain Presidential War Powers.” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy28 (2005): 465–498.
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