Scott v. Harris (2007)

In Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a police deputy did not violate the Fourth Amendment rights of a fleeing motorist when he, during an extended high-speed chase, rammed the car of the suspect causing severe injury to the suspect. Instead, the Court ruled that the deputy was entitled to qualified immunity.

In March 2001, a Georgia county deputy clocked Victor Harris's car traveling at 73 miles per hour in a 55-mile-per-hour speed zone. The deputy initiated chase, and other officers joined the pursuit. Harris refused to stop and instead sped up in an attempt to get away from the officers. The officers nearly had Harris cornered in a shopping mall parking lot, but Harris collided with deputy Timothy Scott's car and momentarily escaped.

After this incident, Scott took the lead in chasing Harris. Scott, in an attempt to end the pursuit, pushed his bumper into the rear of Harris's vehicle, causing Harris to spin out and wreck. The accident left Harris a quadriplegic. Harris then filed a section (§) 1983 lawsuit, alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Scott filed a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity.

A federal district court dismissed the motion, finding that a jury could reasonably believe that Scott's actions constituted a seizure that amounted to excessive force. A three-judge panel of the Eleventh U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

On further appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed by an 8–1 vote. Writing for the majority, Justice Antonin Scalia reasoned that Scott was entitled to qualified immunity because Scott did not violate Harris's constitutional rights. Instead, Scalia concluded: “A police officer's attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death.”

Harris had argued that Scott's actions were similar to the killing of the unarmed fleeing juvenile in Tennessee v. Garner (1985). Scalia disagreed, pointing out that the young boy in the Garner case posed no danger to others, while Harris's reckless actions threatened the lives of other motorists and potential pedestrians. Instead, Scalia said, the case should be evaluated under the objective reasonableness standard from Graham v. Connor (1989). Scalia determined that Scott's actions were an objectively reasonable way to end the threat to other motorists and pedestrians.

Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer each wrote concurring opinions. Ginsburg emphasized that such cases must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Breyer contended that the Court should overrule the qualified-immunity rule established in Saucier v. Katz (2001) that a court must determine first whether there has been a constitutional violation and then determine whether that right was clearly established. Breyer said this approach wasted judicial resources and [Page 559]forces courts “to embrace unnecessary constitutional questions” rather than avoid them. The Court later followed Breyer's advice in Pearson v. Callahan (2009).

Justice John Paul Stevens filed the lone dissent. “Whether a person's actions have risen to a level warranting deadly force is a question of fact best reserved for a jury,” he wrote.

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