Linkletter v. Walker (1965)

Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), is a U.S. Supreme Court decision that upheld a ruling by the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals not to apply the exclusionary rule retrospectively to cases that had already been adjudicated prior to the Court's decision in Mapp v. Ohio (1961). Mapp had extended to the states the exclusionary rule, which excludes from trial evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In response to a habeas corpus petition, the Court thus refused to review Victor Linkletter's conviction on May 28, 1959, for simple burglary, despite the fact that his conviction had relied on evidence secured by a warrantless search of his house.

Justice Tom C. Clark wrote the Court's 7–2 decision examining the history of retroactive application of decisions. He observed that Sir William Blackstone had based his jurisprudence on the idea that judges “discover” the law whereas subsequent legal theorists like John Austin emphasize their role in making it. The United States had settled on a rule established in United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 103 (1801), that changes in law will be applied if a case “is on direct review” but that in other cases, the Court will consider a variety of factors including public policy concerns. The Constitution does not directly speak to the application of retroactivity in constitutional matters. Weeks v. United States (1914) had applied the exclusionary rule to the national government, but Wolf v. Colorado (1949) had refused to apply it to the states, and for a time, the Court had even approved the silver platter doctrine under which federal authorities could use evidence that states had illegally gathered. The Court in Mapp had revisited Wolf on the basis that states were increasingly adopting the rule, that only the rule seemed to be effective in deterring illegal searches and seizures, and that the rule was an essential part of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The impact of Wolf, however, could not be obliterated but must be examined in light of the purpose of Mapp, prior reliance on Wolf, and the effect of retroactive application of Mapp. As to Mapp's deterrent function, its retroactive application would do nothing to restore invasions of privacy. Both states and the accused relied on Wolf, with victims sometimes suing for invasions of privacy. Applying Mapp retroactively “would tax the administration of justice to the utmost.” Although the Court had applied rulings on coerced confessions retroactively, they had done so in part because such confessions were inherently untrustworthy and in part because they went “to the fairness of the trial,” in a way that exclusionary concerns did not. Clark further refused to accept the argument that Mapp should apply to the day of the seizure in Mapp rather than to its judgment in that case.

Justice Hugo L. Black authored a dissent that Justice William O. Douglas joined. Black observed that Linkletter would be entitled to application of the exclusionary rule if Mapp had been tried earlier or he had been tried later. He thought the majority decision took “a disparaging view of the Fourth Amendment.” He further charged that it is “the first instance on record where this Court, having jurisdiction, has ever refused to give a previously convicted defendant the benefit of a new and more expansive Bill of Rights interpretation.” He thought this was inconsistent with language in Mapp, as in Boyd v. United States (1886), putting Fourth Amendment rights on par with those of the Fifth Amendment. He further thought the Court's emphasis on the role of the exclusionary rule in punishing police officers ignored the rights of the accused. He observed that it offended

...