Simulation Theory

This entry introduces one of the alternative theories of mind, Simulation Theory; contrasts it with rival views; and presents recent developments in child psychology and neuroscience. The entry goes on to point out the resemblance of modern Simulation Theory to, and its difference from, earlier hermeneutic accounts of social sciences or classical theories of empathy.

Simulation Theory was originally developed as an alternative to a long-dominant view in philosophy of mind that our everyday understanding of human behavior is based on a tacit body of general knowledge, roughly comparable to a scientific theory, of the workings of the human mind. The alleged theory—often called folk psychology—posits unobservable mental states such as beliefs, desires, intentions, and feelings, linked to each other and to observable behaviors by lawlike principles. These principles, supposedly shared by people of all cultures and virtually all levels of intelligence, are applied to observable situations by way of logical inferences that generate predictions and explanations of behavior.

According to Simulation Theory, rather than having to inherit or acquire a body of general theoretical information about the mind (vide “Theory Theory”), human beings are able to use the resources of their own minds to simulate the mental states and processes of others by mental simulation—that is, to generate similar states and processes in themselves.

A typical method, though not the only one, would be role-taking, or “putting oneself in the other's place,” and making decisions within the context of such pretense. For example, one might anticipate the product of another's theoretical or practical inferences from given premises by making inferences from the same premises oneself; or knowing what the product is, one might retroduce the premises, perhaps by something resembling unconscious Bayesian inference. To reason from the same premises would typically require indexical adjustments, such as shifts in spatial, temporal, and personal “points of view,” to place oneself in the other's physical and epistemic situation insofar as it differs from one's own. One may also compensate for the other's reasoning capacity and level of expertise, if possible, or modify one's character and outlook as an actor might, to fit the other's background and behavioral history. Such adjustments, even when insufficient for making decisions in the role of the other, allow one to discriminate between action options likely to be attractive to the agent and those likely to be unattractive. Accordingly, one would be prepared for the former actions and surprised by the latter.

Simulation Theory and Theory Theory need not be formulated in ways that exclude one another. The resources underlying our everyday psychological understanding, or what psychologists (and others) call theory of mind (ToM), might incorporate both simulational and theoretical components. Indeed, a number of philosophers and psychologists have put forward hybrid accounts, usually with the suggestion that people rely on simulation in some contexts and theory in others.