Normativity

Normativity is a property possessed by propositions. A proposition is normative just in case it is either an evaluative or a directive, or an appropriate function—such as negation, conjunction, or universal generalization—of evaluatives and directives. A proposition is an evaluative just in case a person who asserts it commends or “discommends” something; examples include the propositions that Alfred is a good person, that Barbara is a better parent than Carol, and that David is greedy. A proposition is a directive just in case a person who asserts it claims that someone or something is called on, or required, to behave in a certain way; examples include the propositions that Ellen should apologize to her brother, that Frank ought to help George, and that Harriet must stop hitting her sister.

1. It is intuitively very plausible that directives are in some way related to evaluatives. On many views, directives are analyzable into evaluatives. Objective consequentialists say that for it to be the case that Frank ought to help George is for it to be the case that the consequences of his doing so would be better than the consequences of his not doing so. Subjective consequentialists say that for it to be the case that Frank ought to help George is for it to be the case that Frank believes that the consequences [Page 687]of his doing so would be better than the consequences of his not doing so. According to a more complex analysis: for it to be the case that Frank ought to help George is for it to be the case that if Frank knew what would happen if he did, and what would happen if he didn't, then he would be in a measure defective if he didn't.

2. The examples so far mentioned are all moral propositions, that is, propositions such that to assert them is to make a moral judgment. All moral propositions are normative. All aesthetic propositions are also normative, for they too are either evaluatives or directives, or appropriate functions of evaluatives and directives. (On some views, there are no true aesthetic directives, and thus all true aesthetic propositions are evaluatives or appropriate functions of evaluatives.)

But are there any such propositions? In virtue of finding it unclear what could make a moral proposition true, some moral philosophers conclude that there are no moral propositions. Thinking it equally unclear what could make an aesthetic proposition true, and taking it for granted that the moral and the aesthetic exhaust the normative, they conclude that there are no normative propositions at all. On their view—currently called expressivism—to say the words “Alfred is a good person” is merely to display a favorable attitude toward Alfred qua human being; to say the words “That statue is beautiful” is merely to display a favorable attitude toward the appearance of the statue referred to by That statue; to say the words “Harriet must stop hitting her sister” is merely to display an unfavorable attitude toward Harriet's hitting her sister. A substantial literature has been devoted to efforts to refute or refine that view.

...