Ethics

In the context of this entry, ethics will be understood to refer primarily, though not exclusively, to military ethics. In the past, military ethics (when it was even considered at all as a distinct topic) was liable to be characterized ungenerously, as a kind of oxymoron—inasmuch as military force is often understood merely as indiscriminate and destructive violence ensuing when both the normal moral order and the rule of law have collapsed. Otherwise, military ethics would likely be described as a synonym for the “just war” theory, in turn misleadingly portrayed as a conversation of limited cultural and historical jurisdiction carried on among Christian theologians (primarily Roman Catholics of the medieval era in western Europe) concerning the permissibility of waging war in defense of the state.

Military ethics, however, is an enquiry distinct from that concerning the justification of war, which itself is not nearly as culturally or historically limited and formulaic as its practitioners and detractors alike quite often portray it. Broad, philosophical discussions concerning the morality of war, and its limited justification as a last resort for political conflict [Page 521]resolution, can be found in various forms in virtually any culture or historical epoch. Properly understood, just war reasoning is a form of “ideal speech” or public discourse, encountered in many cultures throughout history, concerning one of the gravest and most important moral decisions any society can make: deciding to commit its soldiers and citizens to the risks of harm in war.

Military ethics, somewhat in contrast, should be understood in a more restricted sense as a species of professional ethics, similar in kind to discussions among practitioners (e.g., physicians, clergy, journalists, or lawyers, as well as those who advise, consult with, or study them) regarding professional probity, rectitude, aspirations for best practice, and the boundaries of minimally acceptable practice within their distinct professional community. These confusions about definition and domain arise naturally in the ambiguity inherent in the nature of ethics itself.