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Groupthink

Irving Janis proposed that highly cohesive groups are likely to suffer from groupthink, a strong concurrence-seeking tendency that suppresses critical inquiry and results in faulty decision-making processes and flawed outcomes. He chose the term groupthink because of its frankly Orwellian connotation, similar to doublethink and crimethink. Janis discussed as examples of groupthink major historical fiascoes such as the lack of preparedness for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the escalation of war in Korea, the failed U.S.-sponsored landing of anti-Castro rebels in the Bay of Pigs, and escalation of U.S. involvement in the war in Vietnam. First presented in a 1971 issue of Psychology Today, this groupthink phenomenon quickly gained remarkably broad and firm acceptance, dominating the literature on group decision making for decades. Janis reasoned that dealing with vital, affect-laden issues results in “hot” cognitions, in contrast to the “cold” cognitions of routine problem solving. Such situations induce stress, resulting in defensive avoidance, characterized by lack of vigilant search, distortion of the meanings of warning messages, selective inattention and forgetting, and rationalizing. This entry describes the groupthink model and proposed remedies for groupthink. It then summarizes research evidence regarding groupthink, examines the bases for groupthink’s remarkable appeal and acceptance, and addresses groupthink’s usefulness for managers.

Fundamentals

The Groupthink Model

Janis presented three categories of antecedents to groupthink. First, moderate to high group cohesion is a necessary but not sufficient condition for group-think. Structural faults and a provocative situational context are secondary antecedents. The structural fault category includes insulation of the group, lack of impartial leadership, lack of norms requiring methodical procedures, and homogeneity of members’ social backgrounds and ideologies. The provocative situational context antecedents focus on the role of stress. These include external threats of losses combined with a low hope of finding a better solution than that of the leader and internal stress stemming from temporary low self-esteem attributable to members’ recent failures and perceptions that the task is too difficult to accomplish and there is no morally correct alternative.

Janis viewed the antecedents as leading to symptoms of groupthink, including an illusion of invulnerability, rationalization to discount warnings and other negative feedback, belief in the inherent morality of the group, stereotyped views of members of opposing groups, pressure on dissenters, self-censorship, illusion of unanimity, and self-appointed “mindguards” acting to shield the group from adverse information.

Janis saw groupthink as resulting in consequences that interfere with effective group decision making. For instance, the group limits its discussion to only a few alternatives. After a course of action is initially selected, members ignore new information concerning its risks and drawbacks. They also avoid information concerning the benefits of rejected alternatives. Members make little attempt to use experts. And because they are so confident that things will turn out well, they fail to consider what may go wrong and, as such, do not develop contingency plans. These “defects” are seen as leading to impaired performance and other undesirable outcomes.

Proposed Remedies for Groupthink

Janis suggested several methods to prevent or minimize the supposedly dysfunctional consequences of groupthink. These “remedies” include the following: The group leader should encourage all group members to air their doubts and objections; leaders should adopt an impartial stance rather than initially stating their preferences; members should be encouraged to discuss the group’s deliberations with trusted associates and report their reactions back to the group; outside experts should be invited to meetings and encouraged to challenge members’ views; when a competitor is involved, time should be devoted to assessment of warning signals from the competitor and of alternative scenarios of the competitor’s intentions; when considering alternatives, the group should split into subgroups to meet separately from time to time; the group should hold a “second-chance” meeting after a preliminary consensus is reached on a preferred alternative; and the group should consider using dissonance-inducing group processes.

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