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The Art of War is a Chinese treatise assembled two millennium ago addressing war strategy for battle and invasion. The work has generally been in its complete form since the Han dynasty (approximately 200 b.c.e.), and was probably written between 500 and 300 b.c.e. during the Warring States period of ancient China. It is attributed to Sun Tzu (Master Sun), a military official, and consists of 13 sections associated with war and battle. Along with Sun Tzu's statements on battle and strategy, 11 commentators provide additional information on the various topics covered. These individual commentaries were added to Sun Tzu's statements sometime between 155 and 1300 c.e.

Section 1, “Strategic Assessments,” contains strategies for deception. Though Sun Tzu made only three broad comments regarding deception, much of the strategies on deception in The Art of War come from the commentators addressing Sun Tzu's statements (this is also true across all the sections). Sun Tzu states that: “A military operation involves deception. Even though you are competent, appear to be incompetent. Though effective, appear to be ineffective.” Mei Yaochen, commenting on Sun Tzu's statement, observes, “Without deception you cannot carry out strategy, without strategy you cannot control the opponent.” Another commentator, Wang Xi, addresses Sun Tzu's statement by noting, “Deception is for the purpose of seeking victory over an enemy; to command a group requires truthfulness.”

The comments regarding deception in The Art of War maintain that deception is not only acceptable but also a required element of military strategy. In particular, an army should appear “opposite” of what it really is. If strong, it should appear weak; if orderly, it should appear disorderly. In essence, one's military goals should include altering the perception of one's enemies.

Other portions of the treatise also mention forms of deception and altering perceptions. Though these comments are not as well known, they do underscore the importance of creating misperceptions to the enemy and even to one's own troops. Section 5, “Force,” notes that unorthodox attacks are preferred and that, “victory is gained by surprise.” In Section 6, “Emptiness and Fullness,” Master Sun states, “Appear where they cannot go, head for where they least expect you.”

In Section 7, “Armed Struggle,” he states, “So a military force is established by deception, mobilized by gain, and adapted by division and combination.” A commentator, Du Mu, then adds, “A military force is established by deception in the sense that you deceive enemies so that they do not know your real condition, and then can establish supremacy.” Section 11, “Nine Grounds” focuses on leaders being deceptive to their troops, because revealed plans are often discussed, and troops will notice changes in a leaders' day-to-day routine and anticipate plans. Master Sun states, “The business of the general is quiet and secret, fair and orderly … he can keep the soldiers unaware, make them ignorant.”

In terms of knowing when one is being deceived, the last section of The Art of War addresses spies (Section 13, “The Use of Spies”). Spies act to provide correct information, therefore foiling deceptive practices by an enemy. Master Sun notes, “Foreknowledge cannot be gotten from ghosts and spirits, cannot be had by analogy, cannot be found out by calculation. It must be obtained from people, people who know the conditions of the enemy.” In other words, foreknowledge is obtained from spies. Because deception is part of warfare, developing ways to see through deception, such as the use of spies is paramount.

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