Plato

Unlike his teacher Socrates, who condemns all lying and deceiving (unless his use of irony is considered deceptive, a conclusion resisted by scholars), and his student Aristotle, who says that all lying is base and blameworthy (although falsely modest self-deprecating lies may be exempt), Plato (429–347 b.c.e.) explicitly endorses lying. In his major ethical and political work, The Republic (c. 388–375 b.c.e.), Plato provides an ethical justification for lying to [Page 769]others: it is justified when it benefits them and/or when it stops them from harming others. Thus Plato defends paternalistic lies and protective lies. Importantly, however, these lies are never lies about (true) reality. Lies about (true) reality can never be justified.

Plato makes a number of distinctions that are critical for an understanding of his position on lies and deception. First, Plato distinguishes between falsehood in the soul and falsehood in words.

A falsehood in the soul is a false belief about (true) reality, which includes ethical reality, held in that part of the soul that rules over the rest of the person, namely, his or her reason. Having a false belief about (true) reality is harmful to that person; hence falsehood in the soul is always “hated.” This is what Plato calls a “true falsehood.” There is never a justification for a true falsehood, not even a true falsehood told to one's enemies. The lies and deception that Plato endorses in The Republic are not true falsehoods.

A falsehood in words is merely a “copy” of a true falsehood. It is not a falsehood about (true) reality. It is possible for a falsehood in words to be “useful,” that is, beneficial, as opposed to harmful. When it is “useful” it is not “hated,” that is, it there is a justification for it. The lies that Plato defends in The Republic are falsehoods in words (only).