Morals and Ethics

Nonconsequentialist View of Lying

Nonconsequentialist moral philosophers have argued that lying and deception are morally wrong, and not merely because of their bad consequences. Lying and deception have what Sissela Bok has called an “initial negative weight,” and are not morally neutral acts. According to these philosophers, lying and deceiving are morally wrong even if they have no bad consequences. Lying and deception are morally wrong even if they have good consequences.

The question is whether any of these philosophers can successfully defend the position that lying and deception are morally wrong without appealing to some form of harm to others, which is an appeal to bad consequences. Also, there remains the question of whether, if lies and deception are morally wrong for reasons other than their consequences, they are nevertheless sometimes morally permissible, or are always morally wrong. Finally, there remains the question of whether lying is always worse than deceiving without lying, or whether deceiving without lying can be just as morally wrong, or worse, than lying.

One argument for the moral wrongfulness of lying can be found in the work of W. D. Ross, Roderick M. Chisholm, and Thomas D. Feehan and Charles Fried. According to Ross, every time a person makes an assertion, she or he makes an implicit promise not to lie: “the implicit undertaking not to tell lies which seems to be implied in the act of entering into a conversation (at any rate by civilized men).” According to Chisholm and Feehan, in telling a lie, the liar “gives an indication that he is expressing his own opinion.” And he does this in a special way—by getting his victim to place his faith in him.” Fried also holds that “An assertion may be seen as a very general promise: it is a promise or assurance that the statement is true.” As a result, “Every lie is a broken promise, and the only reason this seems strained is that in lying the promise is made and broken at the same moment.” Every lie, therefore, is “a breach of trust,” and it is morally wrong for an individual to invite someone to trust them and to violate that trust.

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