Battle of the Bulge

The Battle of the Bulge was the German offensive of December 16, 1944, to mid-January 1945 in the Ardennes Forest of Belgium during World War II. On September 16, 1944, Adolf Hitler announced a counteroffensive in the Ardennes with the goal of capturing Antwerp. German Panzer units had been organizing in the areas near the Ardennes Forest in Belgium near the German border. Allied forces made successful landings in France in June (Operation Overlord) and the Netherlands (Operation Market Garden) and were making steady progress toward the border of Germany. Military planning for the offensive was delegated to General Alfred Jodl of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff on September 25.

Hitler chose the location of the Ardennes because it was the weakest part of the Allied line. He believed that an attack at this place would separate the British and the American forces and would hopefully lead to political problems between the Allies. The terrain was also ideal because it would require few German divisions to defend, and it was a heavily wooded area, thus providing secrecy from Allied air reconnaissance.

The final plan composed by Jodl was code-named Wacht am Rhein (Watch on the Rhine), involving the OB West commanded by Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt and Army Group B under Field Marshal Walter Model. Upon review of the plan, von Rundstedt and Model revised and returned it to Jodl for Hitler's approval. The proposed changes were not approved and ultimately Hitler's original plan was approved on December 9, 1944, because he could not be swayed otherwise. The deception of the plan's name, which alludes to a Rhine River attack [Page 66]against the Ardennes, combined with the small number of persons who knew of the plan and the true location of the attack, all helped continue the ruse. For additional security, a separate diary related to the counteroffensive was maintained by officers involved in the planning, rather than by a secretary. All persons involved in the planning knew that the penalty was death if they violated the secrecy of the plan.

Hitler's plans called for the buildup of troops in secret locations without notice by the Allies. German forces gathered east of Aachen, where the Allies would see the false preparations for the counteroffensive, while the real buildup took place near Eifel by the Seventh Army. Northwest of Cologne, military and civilian activity increased during daylight for the benefit of the observing Allied forces. Road improvements, truck and rail traffic, increased antiaircraft battalions, evacuated civilians, and a ghost army with real and false divisions all contributed to the charade. Meanwhile the real troop buildup continued in the Eifel. Troops hid in small villages; all movements of troops, supplies, and rails took place at night; and the area observed both a shooting and radio blackout. This plan was so well conceived that Allied intelligence failed to pick up on obvious indicators of a coming offensive.

Allied units in the area around Eifel did note changes in the weeks building up to the attack. Civilians reported a buildup of military vehicles, which was disregarded by commanders. Allied air reconnaissance noted train traffic with flat cars of Tiger tanks on the rail line between Düren and the Roer, but no one realized that a branch line went into Eifel. Other reports showed increased troop movements and traffic on the roads. A lack of coordination and communication between Allied air and ground units contributed to the success of the German counteroffensive. Even more unusual is the fact that the weather did not impede daily missions, and that the original attack date was moved from November 27 to December 16 because of problems getting more reinforcements and, more important, fuel to the area.

...