Nuclear Proliferation

Motivation and Characteristics

There are three main motivations behind nuclear proliferation. First, some nations might invest in the construction of nuclear weapons to improve national security; second, some nations might perceive nuclear weapons as political tools to win certain domestic benefits; and third, other nations might construe nuclear weapons as a critical normative symbol of a nation's position and identity in the global community. In general, there are mainly two types of nuclear proliferation: (1) governmental proliferation, which includes both vertical proliferation, referring to the advance of the number and power of nuclear weapons by nuclear weapon nations, and horizontal proliferation, referring to the possession of nuclear weapons by formerly nonnuclear weapon nations, and (2) nongovernment [Page 682]proliferation, which refers to the procurement of nuclear weapons by adversarial groups such as terrorists and criminals.

Nuclear Proliferation among Nations

Governmental nuclear proliferation frequently takes the form of arms races. If a nation possesses nuclear weapons, other nations within the region might feel insecure and rely on developing more nuclear weapons than their neighbors. Therefore, a vicious cycle could form and pose enormous threats to the whole world.

With realization of the potentially catastrophic effects of nuclear weapons, several treaties and agreements were made in the attempt to reduce the number of existing nuclear weapons while preventing new nuclear weapons from being built. However, credibility is an issue affecting their effectiveness. For instance, North Korea was secretly developing nuclear weapons although it had signed the nonproliferation treaty (NPT) in 1985. Its declaration of intention to withdraw from the NPT might result in unconstrained nuclear weapons production. Frequent nuclear inspections and accompanying diplomatic means are necessary to deter signatories from deviating.

Nongovernmental Organizations

The treaties and agreements probably will not have a constraining effect on terrorists’ acquisition of nuclear weapons. In 1998, Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden stated that the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) is a “religious duty” for Muslims. These types of declarations are indeed alarming. Some alternatives to fighting terrorists directly might play a larger role in risk mitigation of nuclear weapons. Given the close connections among different nations, some nations might rely on other nations for countering terrorism rather than fighting directly. For instance, subsidizing another government that can interfere with terrorist activities, including nuclear proliferation, has been explored by X. Shan and J. Zhuang as a feasible alternative to passively preparing for nuclear attacks. A similar concept of contract might be another feasible alternative to reduce terrorist incidents. One particular mitigation method is interdicting a nuclear weapon production project using diplomatic, economic, and military means.

The smuggling of nuclear weapons across borders facilitates the spread of nuclear materials, which could be prohibited by inspection and retaliation declaration. However, too much unnecessary inspection would affect normal trade between nations, and limited resources prohibit a thorough examination of every container. N. Haphuriwat et al. rigorously investigated the possibility of deterring the smuggling attempt by container shipments across borders. Later, Shan and Zhuang studied the scenario, where the retaliation threat might not be credible.

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