United States v. Lopez

Facts of the Case

Alfonso Lopez Ir. was a 12th-grade student in the San Antonio, Texas, schools. When on March 10, 1992, Lopez was confronted by school officials based on an anonymous tip, he admitted that he was carrying an unloaded .38 caliber handgun. Lopez also had five bullets for the handgun. Lopez claimed that he brought the gun to school for delivery to a third party at the end of the school day in exchange for $40.

Lopez was charged with violating a Texas statute prohibiting the carrying of a firearm at school. The state charge was quickly dropped, and Lopez was charged with a violation of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. Lopez entered a plea of not guilty, and his attorneys moved to dismiss the charge on the grounds that Congress had exceeded its authority in adopting the Gun-Free School Zones Act.

A federal trial court in Texas denied the motion to dismiss on the basis that the act was a constitutional exercise of the well-defined power of Congress to regulate activities in and affecting commerce, finding that the business of elementary, middle, and high schools impacts on interstate commerce. Lopez waived his right to a jury trial. There was no material issue of fact, and Lopez was convicted on the basis of the undisputed evidence. He was sentenced to 6 months of imprisonment and 2 years of supervised release.

Lopez appealed his conviction to the Fifth Circuit, which reversed on the issue of congressional authority. The Fifth Circuit ruled that the law represented an impermissible extension of congressional power under the Commerce Clause.

The Court's Ruling

On further review, the Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez (1995) affirmed the order of the Fifth Circuit in a 5-to-4 judgment. Writing for the majority, Chief lustice Rehnquist held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act exceeded the congressional authority to regulate commerce among the several states. The chief justice spent a considerable time in his analysis discussing the development and meaning of the Commerce Clause. Rehnquist explained that the act was neither a regulation of the channels of interstate commerce nor an attempt to prohibit interstate transportation of a commodity through those channels.

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