Stare Decisis

Stare decisis represents the principle of doctrinal precedent underpinning American common law. (The term stare decisis is Latin for “to stand by things decided.”) The doctrine of stare decisis encourages courts to resolve like cases alike, meaning that judges should follow earlier rulings when confronting issues that have been before them in prior litigation. Stare decisis is a basic principle of judicial interpretation of statutory law, common law, and constitutional law. Insofar as this doctrine is a fundamental aspect of judicial decision making, it strongly influences court actions in resolving any matters concerning education law or any other field of law.

In many instances, the U.S. Supreme Court has reviewed the multiple policy reasons for following stare decisis. The Court has repeatedly and consistently indicated that stare decisis is a fundamental aspect underlying the rule of law. This is because stare decisis, by placing the duty on the courts to follow prior precedent and decide like cases in a like manner, “promotes the evenhanded, predicable, and consistent development of legal principles,” and accordingly adherence to this principle by courts “fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process” (State Oil Co. v. Khan, 1997, p. 20).

Insofar as the policy in favor of such reasons is so strong, the Court has explained that adhering to precedent is usually a wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law “be settled” than that “it be settled right” (Agostini v. Felton, 1997, p. 235, citing Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 1932). Accordingly, the Court has maintained that it is willing to depart from stare decisis only where there is a compelling justification for doing so.

While stare decisis weighs heavy in judicial interpretation, it “is not an inexorable command because it ‘is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision’” (Payne v. Tennessee, 1991, p. 828, citing Helvering v. Hallock, 1940, p. 119). As such, where a prior decision has proven to be unworkable or badly reasoned, especially if it was reached by a narrow margin or with spirited dissent, the Supreme Court has not been constrained to uphold such judgments.

The Supreme Court has reasoned that the judicial interest in stare decisis is at its height in matters concerning property, contracts, and statutory interpretation. In the context of property and contracts, both of which [Page 783]can impact education law, the Court has determined that adherence to stare decisis is of heightened importance, because private reliance interests are highly involved in these areas. Stare decisis is significant in statutory interpretation for similar reasons. The legislature is thought to rely on consistent interpretation of the statutes it has enacted in taking, or refraining from taking, future action with respect to such statutes. For example, in Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railway Commission (1991), wherein Congress declined to alter a federal statute for three decades after the Court ruled on an interpretation of the law, the justices factored this implied reliance in its judgment not to tread on its previous interpretation.

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