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Rehnquist Court

The term Rehnquist Court refers to the period from October 1986 to June 2005, when William H. Rehnquist served as chief justice. During this period, the U.S. Supreme Court was sharply divided along liberal and conservative lines. Between October 1986 and October 1991, the Court arguably had a liberal majority. From October 1991 until June 2005, the Court arguably had a conservative majority. However, during both of these eras, there were numerous circumstances in which one or more justices switched sides and rendered liberal or conservative opinions. Insofar as the Court was sharply divided and some justices had a tendency to “swing,” it was difficult for the Court to reach clear and logical decisions. Thus, the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence, particularly during its last 5 years, could be characterized as embodying “split the difference” jurisprudence.

Legacy on Federalism

Despite the ambiguity of the Rehnquist Court's decisions, it did leave a significant legacy in one area, federalism. Prior to the Rehnquist Court, the principles of federalism, which is more appropriately called “dual sovereignty,” were largely useless as a limitation on the powers of the national government. Change began to emerge with Gregory v. Ashcroft (1991), wherein the Court held that the states could impose mandatory retirement on state judges. A year later, in New York v. United States (1992), the Court ruled that Congress could not compel the states to enact specific legislation. Similarly, in Printz v. United States (1997), the Court found that Congress could not compel state officials to enforce federal law.

Beginning with Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida (1996) and extending through a series of other cases, the Court limited the power of Congress to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity, a development that is particularly important to states' litigation strategies. However, the more significant federalism cases were those that limited the power of Congress over interstate commerce, United States v. Lopez (1995) and United States v. Morrison (2000), and those that limit the power of Congress to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, City of Boerne v. Flores (1997) and Morrison.

Legacy on Education

The Rehnquist Court's legacy for education law is also significant. As with its jurisprudence in other areas, the Supreme Court largely “split the difference” in cases involving education law.

On Race

First, the Court pursued a “split the difference” approach to race. Most obviously in the University of Michigan racial preference cases, Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) and Gratz v. Bollinger (2003), the Court, respectively, upheld the law school admissions system, which utilized race as one factor among many, but invalidated the undergraduate admissions system, which assigned a specific number of points based on race.

In doing so, the Court noted that the achievement of the educational benefits of a broadly defined diversity was a compelling governmental interest that might justify the use of race. At the same time, the Court emphasized that a system in which race was the determining factor was not narrowly tailored. The practical effect of these cases is that they have adopted the diversity rationale that Justice Powell presented in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978). Yet the cases also impose significant limitations on how institutions may use race.

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