Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984

On October 12, 1984, President Reagan signed Public Law 98–473. Title II of the law was titled the Comprehensive Crime Control Act (CCCA) and changed federal provisions for law enforcement in fundamental ways. Many of these provisions amended the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (often referred to as the Controlled Substances Act) and attempted to assist law enforcement in weakening the illicit drug business and punishing drug offenders. The most important sections affecting drug policy are Chapters I, II, III, and V. Chapter I of the CCCA dispensed with pretrial bail if the court found probable cause to believe the defendant committed an offense of the Controlled Substances Act punishable by 10 years or more in prison, and allowed pretrial detention if the accused was considered dangerous to the community. The 1984 act also tightened restrictions on bail pending appeal.

Sentencing changed significantly under Chapter II of the CCCA. The Sentencing Reform Act, which had evolved over 10 years, created the U.S. Sentencing Commission, which set federal guidelines for sentencing. The Commission comprised seven members appointed by the president subject to approval by the Senate. The goal was to reduce disparity in sentencing, reform parole so that it would no longer substantially reduce the original sentence, and enforce tougher sentences. The commission guidelines limited parole by requiring offenders to serve 85 percent of their sentence and provided mandatory minimum and maximum prison terms for drug crimes. The CCCA also contained a provision that repeat convictions for drug and violent offenders would result in the maximum required sentence. These guidelines resulted in increased rates of incarceration for drug crimes, as well as longer time served in prison. The guidelines severely weakened the discretion of the sentencing judge. A concern that discretion would be shifted in favor of the prosecutor's decision to prosecute certain charges over others via plea bargaining was ameliorated by allowing judges to examine plea agreements. Either the defense or the federal government could appeal a court decision based on misapplication of the guidelines. A 2004 case in the Washington State Supreme Court (Blakely v. Washington) raised questions about the constitutionality of federal sentencing guidelines.

Chapter III revised the ability of law enforcement to forfeit property. The 1978 amendment to the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 allowed all tangible or intangible property traceable to a drug crime to be seized, including cars or other conveyances, real estate, securities, and valuables such as jewelry or money earned from drug crime, used, or intended to be used for a drug crime.

Chapter III further expanded forfeiture powers to include all property, assets, or substitute assets in the event thxat specific assets were beyond reach of law enforcement. Assets could now be forfeit on the basis of “probable cause” that they would be subject to forfeiture. Any location, such as a car, home, apartment, or office in which a drug crime had been planned or committed was subject to forfeiture. Under civil forfeiture rules, the property itself is deemed “guilty” if there is “probable cause” to believe it was used unlawfully, derived from unlawful sources, or is a public health hazard. Under civil forfeiture, the federal government can forfeit property or assets without a conviction, whereas criminal [Page 155]forfeiture requires prior conviction. The CCCA blurred the difference between civil and criminal forfeiture for drug-related crimes by allowing the standard of civil forfeiture to be used when “probable cause” existed to suspect a violation of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970.

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