Abington School District v. Schempp (1963)

In Abington School District v. Schempp (1963), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that devotional bible reading and required prayer were unconstitutional because these practices violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The appellants, parents Edward and Sidney Schempp, challenged a Pennsylvania law requiring the daily reading without comment of 10 verses from the Bible followed by a recitation of the Lord's Prayer. Schempp was consolidated with a similar case on appeal, Murray v. Curlett, where parent Madalyn Murray sued to end a similar requirement for prayer and Bible reading in Maryland. If students are required to read the Bible in school and they are from a religious group that is not Christian, such as Islam, Hinduism, or Buddhism, they may feel that their religious freedom has been violated.

In an 8–1 decision, the Court determined that the state could not prescribe religious exercises as curricular activities for students who are required by law to attend school. Echoing the Establishment Clause adjudication principles espoused in earlier cases concerning religion and public education, most notably Engel v. Vitale, the Court maintained that states must remain neutral and unbiased in matters of religion “while protecting, all, prefer[ring] none, and disparage[ing] none” (374 U.S. 203, 215). The Court held that these practices constituted a clear infringement of the Establishment Clause because they demonstrated bias toward religion rather than neutrality. The Court granted certiorari in order to resolve earlier controversies over religion and public schools.

Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas Clark argued that the Establishment Clause “withdrew all legislative power respecting religious belief and the expression thereof” (374 U.S. 203, 223). Clark laid out the Court's first explicit test for Establishment Clause questions. To test whether a provision violates neutrality, thus threatening a fusion of governmental and religious functions, Clark wrote that it was essential to examine the purpose and primary effect of the enactment. To withstand “the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion” (374 U.S. 203, 222). The “purpose and primary effect” test eventually served as the basis for two of the three criteria of the Lemon test—established by the Court in 1971 in Lemon v. Kurtzman—that is still used in constitutional adjudication on most Establishment Clause cases.

The Court made it clear that they were not proscribing the avoidance of religion altogether in public schools. As Justice Arthur Goldberg noted in a concurring opinion, teaching about religion can be distinguished from the teaching of religion. In fact, Justice Clark wrote, “one's education is not complete without a study of comparative religion or the history of religion and its relationship to the advancement of civilization” (374 U.S. 203, 225). The Court also allowed for the study of the Bible in public schools as long as its focus was on the literary and historic qualities, as well as a general study of religions, when such study was presented as a part of a secular version of education. Though it is clear from these opinions that teaching about religion in public schools is acceptable, the Court left it open for public educators and policymakers to determine how to do so. Confusion about implementation and hesitancy concerning violation of legal restrictions [Page 4]has led many teachers and public officials to avoid religion in school curriculum.

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