Criminal Insanity

History

The insanity defense has been recognized in English courts for over 700 years. During the reign of Edward III (1326–1377), complete madness was recognized as a defense to criminal charges. By 1581, it was well established that the lack of a guilty mind or felonious intent included the lack of criminal responsibility of a madman or lunatic. The “wild beast test” was introduced in the trial of Edward Arnold in 1723 and it, along with a determination of whether a defendant had the ability to distinguish good from evil, remained the standard for judging responsibility for three-quarters of a century. (This test set forth that to use the defense of insanity, a person must be totally deprived of understanding and memory so as not to know what he or she is doing—as if the person were a wild beast.) A landmark trial in 1800, involving an attempted assassination of a head of state, set a new standard. James Hadfield, a former soldier who believed himself the savior of mankind, attempted to assassinate the reigning English monarch, George III. Hadfield thought that to attain world recognition it was necessary that he sacrifice himself, as had Jesus Christ. Hatfield concluded that by assaulting the king, he would be executed and hailed as a martyr.

At trial the prosecution argued that the defendant's behavior (the purchase of a gun and ammunition, and the concealment of the pistol) indicated that he was neither an idiot nor a madman “afflicted by the absolute privation of reason” (Simon 1967: 18). In the defense's opening statement, Lord Erskine argued that the accused could know right from wrong, could understand the nature of the act he were about to commit, and could manifest a clear design, foresight, and cunning in its planning and execution, but if his mental condition either produced or caused the criminal act, he should not be held legally responsible. The chief justice, Lord Kenyon, recommended to the jury that Hadfield's trial be terminated. The jury accepted the court's suggestion and acquitted the defendant because “he was under the influence of insanity at the time the act was committed” (Simon 1967: 21). The decision was considered a landmark because it rejected two concepts previously accepted by the court: It denied that the defendant must be deprived of all mental faculties in order to be acquitted, and severed the tie between insanity and the ability to distinguish good from evil, or right from wrong.

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