Court Unification

Simplified Organizational Structure

Harry Lawson (1982) listed three forms of trial court consolidation: (1) all judges of the court at the same level, (2) one trial court, but different levels of judges (e.g., associate judges or magistrates), and (3) a state trial court that does not have jurisdiction over municipal matters. The primary benefits of trial court consolidation are flexibility in personnel assignments, flexibility in use of faculties, and the economic savings that result from these.

Section 1.11 of the ABA standards recommends that the jurisdiction of courts should be defined so that “all courts at each level in the system have identical jurisdiction.” Of course, a single-tiered trial court of general jurisdiction precludes overlapping jurisdictions because only one court exists, and cases cannot therefore be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Simplifying jurisdiction also removes the need for the trial de novo—a new trial of the entire case, conducted as if there had been no prior trial—and prevents appeals from going to trial courts rather than appellate courts. In states with separate courts of limited or special jurisdiction, for example, family courts, probate courts, or traffic courts, the jurisdiction of the general jurisdiction court is necessarily less extensive, most frequently not including traffic, driving while intoxicated, or juvenile cases.

Centralized Court Management

Three arguments are used to support centralized court management: efficiency, coordination, and consistency (Berkson and Carbon 1978). With centralized management, judges can be assigned where most needed to meet caseload demands. Standard record-keeping practices and forms used in any court within a state promote consistency. Arguments against centralized management are that local courts are too heterogeneous and too geographically dispersed to fit into one state administration system.

Centralized Rule Making

Pound (1940) believed that rule making should be vested in the state court of last resort. Since 1962, when the ABA recommended the same thing, most court reform organizations have agreed that courts of last resort should prescribe rules of practice and procedure (Winters 1962; Berkson and Carbon 1978). Judicial self-determination is the primary rationale for court control of rule making. Judge-made rules are more flexible than statutes and can be put into effect more efficiently. The arguments against vesting the court of last resort with rule making authority are that rule making is a legislative function and that many procedural issues may have substantiative consequences (Parness and Korbakes 1973).

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