B. F. Goodrich

IN 1870, Dr. Benjamin Franklin Goodrich established the B. F. Goodrich Company. It was the first rubber company west of the Allegheny Mountains, and set up headquarters in Akron, Ohio. However, it was in the year of 1969 that B.F. Goodrich received national attention, not for its products and revolutionary inventions, but for a scandal.

On June 18, 1967, the B. F. Goodrich Wheel and Brake Plant in Troy, Ohio, received a contract to supply wheels and brakes for a new air force aircraft. Goodrich proposed a lighter-weight, fourrotor brake instead of the traditional five-disc brake. Before the air force could accept the brake, B. F. Goodrich had to present a report showing that the brake passed specified military qualifying tests. The last two weeks of June 1968 were set aside for testing the brake, giving Goodrich almost a full year for design and testing.

John Warren designed the brake, but Searle Lawson, a newcomer to B. F. Goodrich, was assigned responsibility for final production. Lawson began testing the brake using a prototype. In the first round of testing, the prototype reached 1,500 degrees. After a few tests, the linings of the brakes were almost totally disintegrated. Lawson tried new linings, thinking that was the problem, not the brake, but the same thing happened. He came to the conclusion that there was a design flaw, the four-disc brake was too small and a five-disc brake may be more effective. At this point, a redesign of the brake would mean delay and this meant that the brake would most likely not be ready for delivery on time. Goodrich had assured the air force that the fourdisc brake was possible and would be ready. Warren, the original designer, did not want to admit to any error or like the idea that a new employee, fresh out of college, had found the error. Warren believed it was the linings that were the issue, not the brake design. According to Warren, the four-disc brake was viable, and that was that.

The disagreement between Lawson and Warren meant that upper management needed to be consulted. Lawson approached the project manager, Robert Sink to explain the problem. Sink, knowing the politics of the company, was not willing to disagree with Warren. He believed that Warren would be able to fix, or at least minimize, the problem, since he had designed the brake. Sink advised Law-son to continue testing the linings using various other materials. A total of 12 tests were conducted, each resulting in failure. It was becoming evident that the brake was faulty not the linings. Test flights by the air force were now only 70 days away. Only a major redesign could fix the problem. Panic set in. During the testing phase by Lawson, Sink had been continually assuring the air force that the brake tests were going smoothly, which was a complete fabrication.

In April 1968, Kermit Vandivier became involved with the brake. He had discovered many discrepancies between the military specifications and the qualification tests carried out at Goodrich. It [Page 93]was Vandivier's job to write the appropriate documentation that would accompany the testing data in the qualification report. Given the discrepancies, Vandivier questioned whether he should write a report that was so out of line with the military specifications. Vandivier took his concerns to his immediate supervisor. He was assured that the testing laboratory would not issue a misrepresentation of the qualification tests. However, within a few days, a typewritten copy of the test logs was sent out. Virtually every entry in the test logs was significantly altered. On hearing of the interim report, Vandivier questioned Richard Gloor, test laboratory engineer, who told him that Lawson had directed the test lab to miscalibrate the instruments, at the order of one of Lawson's superiors. When Vandivier approached Lawson about the changed report, Lawson confirmed Gloor's account. Law-son told Vandivier that he had been told that no matter how the brake continued to test, Goodrich was going to qualify it.

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