Convention Theory

French convention theory focuses on the quality characteristics of information and the need for common understandings and not just rules and norms as the basis of social action. It defends the plurality of publicly justifiable actions based on a limited number of coherent systems of values that are culturally specific.

French convention theory is both an economic and a sociological theory. In economics, it emerged in dialogue with the North American game theory approach to conventions (David K. Lewis: Convention: A Philosophical Study, 1969) and the “new microeconomic” theories of information, uncertainty and bounded rationality (George A. Akerlof: “The Market for Lemons,” 1970). In sociology, it marked a shift away from the classical concepts of social groups and classes and a turn to the way action is understood and justified in concrete situations, aligning itself with the pragmatist tradition. Differently from earlier French schools of thought associated with one particular leading figure, convention theory is itself plural with a collegiate of leading proponents—Luc Boltanski, Laurent Thévenot, André Orléan, Olivier Favereau, François Eymard-Duvernay, Robert Salais—each developing a specific approach to the way conventions are to be understood.