Deductive–Nomological Model of Explanation

Criticism

This model of explanation has, from early on, been subjected to serious criticisms by both philosophers of science and social scientists. According to physicist and philosopher of science Norman Campbell, the belief that it is the aim of science to bring all particular instances under one extremely general and universal law neglects the most important part of science and fails completely to understand its aims and development. Even if this were possible, Campbell notes, the resulting explanation would not be what science, developing the tendencies of common sense, demands. Sociologist Phillip Gorski observes that the model is inadequate considering that sociology has not as yet produced any such laws, and political scientist Samuel H. Beer asserts that the model has not led to success and that attempting to follow it would stand in the way of any social scientist who took it seriously.

Curious Status in the Social Sciences

The CLM enjoys a curious status in the social sciences. On the one hand, it is still widely believed to be a correct account of what a scientific explanation should be like. It continues to be widely presented as such in the social science methodology textbook literature. On the other hand, few if any explanations in the social sciences come close to fitting the model. This view of explanation would appear to be particularly distant from case study research, with its focus on complex situations. Even those social scientists who subscribe to the CLM usually admit that there are, as yet, no universal laws in the social sciences or that there are only a few that might arguably qualify as such. Duverger's Law and Michels's Iron Law of Oligarchy are among those that might be nominated. Yet even they are not universal laws in the sense of the CLM. Few would argue that the deductive-nomological model characterizes the explanations extant in the social sciences.

Some social scientists—for example, Robert Merton—argue that the absence of universal laws in the social sciences is due to the fact that they are not yet mature sciences. When they have reached maturity, so it is implied, their explanations will conform to the CLM. In the meantime, it is acceptable for social scientists to make use of what Merton calls “theories of the middle range.” Yet, as Gorski points out, such generalizations are not the universal laws presupposed under the CLM. In recent years, several writers have drawn attention to another problematic aspect of the deductive-nomological model, namely, that it mistakenly assumes covariance or regularity implies causality.

...