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Martin Heidegger's notion of Dasein is the central organizing feature of his existential phenomenology as formulated in Being and Time. Heidegger employed the notion of Dasein to distinguish his conception from subjectivist individualism, which views the self as a pure “I” or pure consciousness independent of body and world, and an objectivism that views the world as inert matter to be mastered and controlled by subjects. Rejecting this subject/object model, Heidegger situated being human in a domain that is neither objective nor subjective but as a relation—a form of being in the world. Dasein is practically rather than theoretically oriented; it is not a substance or a thing, but practically situated and interested human activity. Understanding and knowing are elements of being in the world and not of disinterested subjectivity. Although Heidegger eschewed epistemology or method, his conception of Dasein has had a major impact on social science research and on the nature of qualitative research.

Conceptual Overview and Discussion

The basic feature of human being or Dasein is that it is self-interpreting. Dasein is the being that asks about its own being, which is what it is to be human. Dasein is the kind of being—the only kind of being—whose existence is a problem for itself. Dasein takes a stand on what is to be human. Human beings (Dasein) are unique because “their way of being embodies an understanding of what it is to be.” Dasein is activity. Being human means having to make sense of one's own existence to grasp one's own projects and prospects as one's own and to grasp them as part of one's own identity. This self-interpreting way of being is existence. Consciousness is not the condition of being but rather being is the condition of consciousness. Because our existential nature is the reason we can represent beings, consciousness presupposes existence.

For Heidegger's teacher Edmund Husserl, phenomenological philosophy began from the supposition of pure consciousness. Theory alone, not deficient ordinary understanding, made phenomena ultimately intelligible in their true nature. Husserl employed the modern ideal of knowledge free from presuppositions. By eliminating all our interests and involvements Husserl sought a pure intuition of things themselves. Heidegger rejected this approach. He held that we can only know the world because of our involvements. Knowledge requires presuppositions and contextbound understanding. Heidegger, in contrast, began with the idea that phenomenology was a clarification of fundamental understanding that was always already there. He suggested that humans do not originate meaning or the world as an individual ego or transcendental subject; these features precede us. The task of phenomenology, then, is not to provide a better understanding of theory but to bring to light what is already inherent in the lifeworld. Participants in the lifeworld already know the world through their own practical skill and mastery. They know the world because they inhabit it and because they live in the world with others. Knowledge is a practical achievement. Our practical knowledge, however, is largely implicit, a kind of global know-how that precedes our conscious elaboration.

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