Seventy-Two-Hour Program

THE SEVENTY-TWO-HOUR PROGRAM isthename for the Republican Party's plans for their get-out-the-vote drives (GOTV) that have been operational since the 2002 midterm elections. The purpose of these efforts has been to increase turnout among likely Republican voters. Karl Rove, the chief strategist for George W. Bush's 2000 presidential campaign, assembled a task force after that election to study how Democrats mobilized voters in the 72 hours prior to an election. The purpose of this study was to come up with a program where the Republicans could compete with the Democrats in mobilizing voters, an area where the Democrats, because of organized labor and party organizations in urban areas, had historically enjoyed an advantage. GOTV drives are critical in close contests, where effectively mobilizing voters can be the key to victory. GOTV drives typically include targeting likely voters, reminding targeted voters to vote, helping them get to the polls, and making them feel that they are performing an important civic duty.

Prior to the 2002 midterm elections, Rove implemented a program where the Republicans would counter organized labor and Democratic Party activists by building local organizations and targeting key Republican constituencies, notably voters in rural and exur-ban areas. It also included identifying voters who were, for example, opposed to abortion, gay marriage, and gun control; all issues where there are clear distinctions between Republican and Democratic identifiers. It also included an effort to mobilize voters who regularly attend religious services, as one of the components of the program was to gather membership directories from churches around the country. Their 2002 program also called for registering new voters in Republican constituencies, recruiting more than 2,000 GOTV coordinators, and more than 100,000 volunteers in key congressional races around the country. In undertaking these efforts, the Republicans were attempting to match the Democrats labor-based and party-activist centered field organization. A Volunteer Deployment Program, which sent Republican volunteers from Washington, D.C., into local areas to knock on doors, would supplement this grassroots organization and staff phone banks. The program also incorporates pro-Republican groups. Conservative Christian radio host lames C. Dobson's organization, Focus on the Family, mobilized Evangelical voters in battleground states.

In Missouri, Republican GOTV efforts, which included the state Republican Party paying individuals to help with the Election Day operation, was considered critical to former Congressman Tim Talent's victory over Senator lean Carnahan by 21,254 votes out of more than 1.8 million cast. By increasing turnout in Republican areas of the state, the GOTV effort provided Talent with the margin of victory. In 2004, the Republicans refined their targeting with polling, census, and commercial data to “micro-target” small groups of voters. By the end of the campaign, the Republicans had developed a 165 million-name database, known as Voter Vault. These tactics are credited for President Bush's victory, as well as the increase of four seats in the House of Representatives. In that election, although the Democrats surpassed all previous turnout records, the Republicans, through their efforts, turned out even more voters.

The Democrats, recognizing that the Republicans had gained an advantage in GOTV, commissioned their own study after the 2004 election to determine a new course of action. In response, the Democrats began to develop their own micro-targeting techniques for the 2006 midterm elections. The Democratic National Committee (DNC), as part of DNC Chairman Howard Dean's “50-state strategy,” hired organizers to work [Page 742]with the state parties to build GOTV efforts. This strategy caused some tension with the party's congressional campaign committees, which favored targeting the effort on key races. The Democrats took control of both Houses of Congress in 2006. Whether these victories can be attributed to their new GOTV efforts, or to President Bush's unpopularity, or to other factors, is unclear. In one study conducted after the election, Harvard political scientist Elaine Kamarck found that the Democratic vote increased by 4.7 percent nationally, but increased by 9.8 percent in the 35 districts where a DNC field worker was placed.

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