Competitive Seats

A COMPETITIVE SEAT is defined as an election where the outcome is not pre-determined by party registration data or by other factors, such as the presence of a popular incumbent. Political scientists define a “competitive” outcome as one where the margin of victory is less than 10 percent. The number of competitive seats in Congress, state legislatures, and local legislative bodies has been declining in the United States. Beginning in the 1960s, political scientists observed that the average margin of victory for congressional incumbents was increasing and the number of competitive seats was declining. David Mayhew (1974) referred to this phenomenon as the “vanishing marginals.” In 2004, 22 of the 435 congressional elections were decided by fewer than 10 percent of voters. This is not limited to congressional seats, but also extends to presidential elections. In 1976, 20 states with 299 electoral votes were decided by five percentage points or less. In 2004, 10 states with 106 electoral votes were also decided by five percentage points or less.

The absence of competitive seats, it is suggested by advocates of reforms intended to produce more competitive elections, undermines democracy. It creates legislative bodies that are not accountable to or responsive to the will and interests of the voters. It also leads to an uneducated electorate and declining voter turnout. They also contend that the lack of competitive elections makes government more ideological and politically polarized, as challenges do not come from the opposing party, but from ideological extremists within their own party. Moderation and compromise, essential to the process of governing, is less likely to occur in polarized legislative bodies. Researchers find that politically competitive districts tend to produce more moderate representatives as they are cross-pressured by various constituencies.

Two major factors contribute to the decline in competitive seats. The first factor is the tremendous advantage that incumbent office holders enjoy over their challengers. The incumbency advantage increases the longer they serve in office. This edge is based on the opportunities to provide constituent service, name recognition, greater ability to raise money, use of the franking privilege and other government subsidized forms of communication that allow them to enhance their image with the voters, access to the media, and the ability to financially support their districts. Often, incumbent office-holders run unopposed or face token opposition.

A second factor has been the redistricting schemes that protect incumbent officeholders or create uncom-petitive districts that are politically homogeneous (gerrymandering). While gerrymandering is not new (the term dates back to the 1812 redistricting plan that the Jeffersonian Democrats pushed through the [Page 130]Massachusetts state legislature), the use of computers and detailed databases and legal and political consultants has made gerrymandering more scientific and, as a result, has produced fewer competitive districts. Further, whereas decennial redistricting was the norm, a switch in partisan control of a legislative body may lead to a new redistricting plan.

For example, in 2002, the Republicans took control of the state legislature in Texas. Once in control, they revised a court-approved redistricting plan for the sole purpose of increasing the number of Republicans in the state's congressional delegation. They succeeded. The 2002 midterm election produced an evenly-divided 32-member delegation, with three of the races being decided by fewer than 10 points. The delegation produced by the Republican-engineered plan consisted of 21 Republicans and 11 Democrats, with only one contest decided by fewer than 10 points. A similar situation developed in Colorado, where Republicans redrew district lines after taking control of the state legislature. However, the new Colorado districts were nullified as the state's supreme court held that they violated a state constitutional provision that specified that congressional districts could be redrawn only once every 10 years (there is not a similar provision in the Texas state constitution), and the court-imposed plan constituted that redistricting. The U.S. Supreme Court, which had upheld the revision of districts in Texas, upheld the Colorado ruling.

...