Overton, Willis F., Philosophical Foundations of Developmental Science

Since the early 1970s, Willis F. Overton has written a series of essays (e.g., see Overton references, 1973–1998; Overton & Reese, 1973, 1981; Reese & Overton, 1970) that explain the ways in which developmental science theory and method are influenced by philosophical issues pertinent to the study of human development. More so than any other scholar in the past half century, Overton has been responsible for informing developmental scientists about the philosophical foundations of the theoretical, conceptual, methodological, and substantive facets of the field; explaining and critiquing the assets and limitations of diverse philosophical frameworks (models or metatheories of development); and championing the philosophical and conceptual advantages of an integrative, or relational, approach to developmental explanation and the application of developmental science for actions aimed at promoting positive development across the life span (Overton, 1998, 2003).

Beginning in 1970, Overton and his colleague Hayne W. Reese (e.g., Overton & Reese, 1973, 1981; Reese & Overton, 1970) brought to the attention of developmental science the import for theory and method in human development of two worldviews, the mechanistic and the organismic, which, historically, have been central in influencing theories of development. Overton and Reese significantly advanced the understanding of human development by describing the different “families” (related, or consonant, groups) of theories and methodological traditions associated with mechanistic- and organismic-related theories.

Moreover, Overton's work was seminal in promoting among other developmental scientists an interest in exploring the potential role of other worldviews or metatheories in shaping theories of development, influencing the selection and utilization of research methods, and providing a frame for research in and application of developmental science. For instance, Overton's contributions facilitated interest in Riegel's (e.g., 1975) discussion of the potential use of a “dialectical” model of development and Lerner's (e.g., Lerner & Kauffman, 1985) discussion of the ways in which a “contextual” world hypothesis (Pepper, 1942) could be used to devise a theory of development. In addition, his elaboration of a relational, integrative approach to developmental science shaped key arguments for the synthesis of basic and applied domains of scholarship that have served as an important foundation of the rationale for contemporary work in applied developmental science (Lerner, 2002; Overton, 1998, 2003).

Overton's (1984) work made clear that the dialectical and the contextual models did not readily provide [Page 772]a useful set of ideas for the derivation of scientifically adequate theories of development unless they were integrated into mechanistic or organismic conceptions. For instance, Overton (1984) argued that the dispersive nature of the contextual world hypothesis did not provide a useful frame for understanding the systematic, organized, and successive (or progressive) character of change, which is the defining feature of development (Lerner, 2002). Although Pepper (1942) claimed that it was not philosophically permissible to “mix metaphors” and combine mechanistic, organismic, and contextual worldviews, Overton's ideas suggest that one may do just this. Arguing on the basis of criteria of usefulness (e.g., in regard to developing statements that, in comparison with those of other positions, account for more variance in developmental data sets, lead to more novel discoveries, or integrate a broader range of phenomena pertinent to development), Overton (1984) advanced the notion of combining organicism and contextualism to frame a new, relational approach to developmental theory.

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