Developmental Systems Theories

The Conceptual Orientation of Developmental Systems Theories

Prior to the emergence of developmental systems theories, prototypic concepts of development were predicated on Cartesian philosophical ideas about the character of reality that separated, or “split,” what was regarded as real from what was relegated to the “unreal” or epiphenomenal (Overton, 1998). Major instances of such splitting involved classic debates about nature versus nurture as “the” source of development, continuity versus [Page 354]discontinuity as an appropriate depiction of the character of the human developmental trajectory, and stability versus instability as an adequate means to describe developmental change.

Developmental systems theories eschew such splits, and depict the basic developmental process as involving relations—or “fusions” (Tobach & Greenberg, 1984)—among variables from the multiple levels of organization that comprise the ecology of human development (e.g., see Bronfenbrenner, in press). In developmental systems theories, the basic process of development involves mutually influential (that is, bidirectional) relations between levels of organization ranging from biology through individual and social functioning to societal, cultural, physical, ecological, and, ultimately, historical levels of organization (e.g., Ford & Lerner, 1992).

As a consequence, developmental systems theories transcend another split that has characterized the field of human developmental science, that is, a split between basic science and application (Fisher & Lerner, 1994; Lerner, 2002). The relational character of development means that some degree of change is always possible within the developmental system, as the temporality of history imbues each of the other levels of organization within the developmental system with the potential for change. Temporality means, then, that at least relative plasticity (the potential for systematic change) exists within the integrated (fused) developmental system, and that changes in the relations between individuals and their context (which may be represented as changes in individual ←→ context relations) may be instituted by entering the ecology of human development at any of its levels of organization.

Theoretically predicated attempts to change the course of development—of individual ←→ context relation—constitute both tests of the basic, relational process of human development and (given ethical mandates to act only to enhance human development) attempts to improve the course of life. Depending on the level of organization on which such interventions into the life course are aimed (e.g., individual, families, communities, or the institutions of society), we may term such actions either programs or policies (Lerner, 2002). Thus, from the viewpoint of the developmental systems theories that define the cutting edge of contemporary developmental science, there is no necessary distinction between research on the basic, relational process linking the individual to her complex, multi-tiered ecological system and applications aimed at promoting positive individual ←→ context relations.

There are numerous instances of developmental systems theories within contemporary developmental science (e.g., Baltes, Lindenberger, & Staudinger, 1998; Bronfenbrenner, in press; Elder, 1998; Ford & Lerner, 1992; Thelen & Smith, 1998; and see Lerner, 2002, for a review). However, all instances of this theoretical orientation possess four attributes that, together, mark the defining features of such models of human development.

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