Scientific Method

The expression “scientific method” is problematic for several reasons. First, it suggests that there is a single and uniform method employed in all scientific disciplines. However, even a cursory examination of various scientific fields reveals that this is not the case. Secondly, it ignores the historical fact that the general conception of science, including its purported methodology, has undergone changes since ancient times. Finally, it seems to encompass everything that is included in the cognitive processes of science, while in fact there are radical differences between two aspects of scientific cognition: the varied ways in which hypotheses are formed versus the more structured ways in which hypotheses are evaluated.

During the early modern stages of the scientific revolution, three major theories of scientific method were proposed: the first was the experimental approach advocated and practiced by Galileo and Toricelli, the second was a kind of empirical induction advocated by Francis Bacon, the third was the radical skepticism together with theological assumptions employed by the French mathematician and philosopher René Descartes. In the actual history of science, the evolution of the experimental trend proved fruitful, while the trends initiated by Bacon and Descartes turned out to be largely fruitless in modern science (even though they led to interesting developments in philosophy).

It is generally agreed that there is no recipe for scientific discovery, even though there is some agreement about the requirements for evaluating investigations and explanations. To understand what kinds of requirements are ideally regnant, it is useful to note the contexts in which scientific explanations occur.

To begin with, in any scientific inquiry there is the investigator, or much more commonly a team of investigators, conducting the research. Second, there are facts or problems, which the researcher(s) seek to discover, identify, explain, predict, or control. This factual component may be generated by the researchers, from other sources (such as others in the scientific community), or induced by phenomena occurring in the natural or human world. Third, there are the symbols used to represent the facts together with the symbols (which logicians call “syncategormatic terms”) used to organize and manipulate the factual concepts of interest. Fourth, at any given time there is a system of generally accepted, seemingly well-supported, conceptual schemes (theories, laws, concepts, etc.) that serves as a framework within which the results of the research are expected to fit. Fifth, there are varied sources of information, such as journal articles, conferences, and personal communications. Sixth, there are various rules and procedures, which ideally indicate the necessary logical requirements for making transitions from the factual component to the theoretical component. Following the proposal of F. S. C. Northrup inThe Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities,one may call these the epistemic correlations. Seventh, there are various evaluative criteria and related procedures that serve to distinguish between scientific and unscientific accounts, or to try to choose the best among competing scientific explanations. This component of the context of scientific investigations includes, but is not limited to, criteria intended to eliminate or minimize [Page 2066]bias. All these criteria may be referred to as the cognitive criteria. Eighth, there is the scientific community, composed primarily of investigators engaged in related fields of exploration. It is this community that should ultimately determine whether an individual scientist, or team of scientists, has obeyed the scientific and logical requirements that they all ideally accept. Of course, there are other things that initiate, guide, encourage, hinder, or prevent scientific exploration, such as funding and moral, social, political, and religious influences. These, however, are not integral components of science itself; they are external impositions. Whether such external impositions are needed, or desirable, is another matter.

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