Nature, Role of Human Mind in

Nature, at its microphysical level, constitutes the subject matter of quantum theory, also known as quantum mechanics. Never in the history of physics has there been a theory that has changed so drastically the shape of science as quantum mechanics; nor has there been a scientific theory that has had such a profound impact on human thinking. Since its inception in the early part of the 20th century, quantum mechanics has played, and still does play, a significant [Page 1703]role in philosophical thought both as a source of metaphysical ideas and as an important example of a scientific revolution. Thus, the advent of the quantum paradigm has gradually challenged the traditional philosophical substratum of science, the representational-visualizable description of micrō physical entities and phenomena, the commonly perceived part-whole relationship that is built into classical physics, the relationship of cause and effect, the unrestricted validity of deterministic laws, and even the nature of physical reality and its independence from the process of knowledge.

Quantum mechanics is a statistical theory of the microscopic structure of matter. Within the standard framework, the codification “statistical theory” should not be understood as referring to our incomplete knowledge of the real physical state of a system, or to our computational insufficiency arising because of the complexities of the microphysical situation. On the contrary, it should be considered as an aspect of the irreducibly probabilisticbehavior of matter at the microscopic level of description, as a genuine feature of reality that breaks with the apparent determinism of the classical Newtonian world. Quantum features such as noncommutativity, nonlocality, nonseparability, and the generalized phenomenon of quantum entanglement have been forcing us to revise radically the intuitive classical ideas about physical reality. According to our current understanding, for a consistent realist interpretation of quantum theory, the concept of realism must not be associated with ideas taken over from classical physics, such as atomism; localizability; separability; or similar philosophical presuppositions such as strict subject-object partition, mechanistic determinism, and ontological reductionism.