Human Dignity

Human dignity is of central importance today, particularly in the fields of medical ethics and bioethics, as it represents a fundamental constituent of many contemporary constitutions, the most global being the Charter of the United Nations. It is, however, far from clear what the term human dignity means. The expression itself may be inappropriate, as it focuses solely on human beings. Perhaps we should use the dignity of human beingsinstead of human dignity, as the latter implies that human beings have dignity, whereas the dignity of human beings implies that dignity has a foundation and that it applies to human beings but can also apply to other creatures. The foundation of dignity, according to Kant, is the actual ability for autonomy. He stressed that human beings have that ability but that it is also possible for other creatures.

We distinguish between two types of dignity. One implies equality and one implies a certain hierarchy. The type of dignity relevant for our constitutions and ethical debates is that which implies equality among the bearers of that dignity. The first philosopher who [Page 1220]mentioned that type of dignity was Cicero in his De Officiis.

The other type of dignity, hierarchial, is older and is linked to abilities. If someone has X, then that person has dignity. The more X people have, the more dignity they have. X can be power, strength, beauty, reputation, or many other things.

Dignity that implies equality can have necessary or contingent foundations. If we decide that the basis of our governing constitution is dignity of this sort but we don't hold that this dignity is a natural constituent of human beings, then the dignity has a contingent foundation. If we hold dignity as being a natural constituent, then the dignity has a necessary foundation. The trouble with contingent foundations is that we cannot claim ethical superiority relative to other governments that do not place the dignity of human beings as the basis of their constitution, but hold, for example, the concept of human slavery as right and proper.

If we wish to claim ethical superiority, then we have to hold that dignity is a natural constituent of human beings or that it has a necessary foundation. The problem here is with the enormity of the claim that we have grasped the nature of human beings and that part of that nature is a dignity that all human beings share in the same manner. Most philosophers during the last century have abandoned making claims about the essence of the world.

What are the necessary foundations? In the history of ethics, the three most popular foundations are

• reason
• freedom
• likeness to God's image

We can find each of these in most foundations of dignity, although one aspect may be emphazised over the others.

If we believe that reason is the foundation, we must clarify what type of reason. Reason can be the means to live a good life (good for ourselves)or to live a moral life (impartially right). We can distinguish between the potential ability of reason, the actual ability of reason without necessarily acting on it, and actual ability of reason as the necessary basis of our actions. Kant suggested that the actual ability for autonomy is the foundation of human dignity, but he linked reason to each of the other foundations of dignity as well.

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