Carter Doctrine

President Carter's foreign policy stance to protect U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf region. Formulated in 1980, the doctrine was a reaction to the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan and the rise to power of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran in 1979. Afghanistan was perceived to be a stepping stone to Soviet hegemony in the Gulf. The twin advantages of access to warm-water ports and control over a major portion of the world's oil supplies were seen as the historic aims of Soviet foreign policy, which the Soviets were determined to realize.

President Carter and Zbgniew Brzezinski, his national security adviser, believed that these two events were a serious threat to U.S. interests, mainly access to oil resources. In the words of Brzezinski, the doctrine was “to make it very clear that the Soviets should stay away from the Persian Gulf.” Within this doctrine, the use of military operations was considered to be a justifiable means to contain the Soviet and the Ayatollah's threat. As a result, the Carter administration expanded military aid to countries such as Israel and Egypt.

For many observers, the Carter Doctrine was a variant of President Truman's policy of containment in force during the early stages of the Cold War era. The doctrine contradicted President Carter's projection of his administration's determination to restore a moral dimension to U.S. foreign policy (especially concerning human rights) because it left the overarching foreign, geopolitical goals of the United States unchanged—the expansion of U.S. control over natural resources.

The major policy initiative generated by the doctrine was the creation of a Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force equipped for instant dispatch to the area in case of an attack. It also involved renewed U.S. efforts at securing bases that could be used for the deployment of military operations. Carter's implementation of his doctrine lacked force and was woefully inadequate; it had to wait for the “Reagan Corollary” to the doctrine for any meaningful military assurances of enforcement. For more information, see Evans and Newnham (1992) and Smith (1986).