Summary
Contents
Congress and the Nation is the most authoritative reference on congressional trends, actions, and political and policy controversies. This award-winning series documents the most fiercely debated issues in recent American politics, providing a unique retrospective analysis of the policies the U.S. Congress. Organized by policy area, each chapter contains summaries of legislative activity, including bills passed, defeated, or postponed. No other authoritative source guides readers seamlessly through the policy output of the national legislature with the breadth, depth, and authority of Congress and the Nation.
Congress and the Nation is the most authoritative reference on congressional trends, actions, and political and policy controversies. This award-winning series documents the most fiercely debated issues in recent American politics, providing a unique retrospective analysis of the policies the U.S. Congress. Organized by policy area, each chapter contains summaries of legislative activity, including bills passed, defeated, or postponed. No other authoritative source guides readers seamlessly through the policy output of the national legislature with the breadth, depth, and authority of Congress and the Nation.
Chapter 15
Chapter 15
National Security Policy
Introduction
National security policy in the Johnson years was marked by an intense battle among Pentagon planners over the course of U.S. policy in the Vietnam war and the share of the nation's resources that should be made available for a new generation of costly and sophisticated weapon systems.
Central figures in this struggle were Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, backed by the powerful military and appropriations committees of Congress. McNamara sought to hold down military spending and limit the nation's objectives in Vietnam—courses that sparked bitter opposition from the Joint Chiefs and their Congressional allies.
By late 1967, it appeared that Pentagon “hawks” had won. Under instructions from the White House, McNamara announced plans for deployment of an antiballistic missile (ABM) system, a key program on the “wish lists” of the Joint Chiefs and one which McNamara had long opposed. Less than three months later, McNamara announced he would leave the Pentagon early in 1968 (after seven years in office) to assume the presidency of the World Bank. (See p. 863)
But by early 1969, a number of developments appeared to have diminished the military influence. To the surprise of many Washington observers, McNamara's successor, Clark M. Clifford, a prominent Washington attorney who had represented some of the nation's leading defense contractors, urged President Johnson to turn down the military's requests for escalation of the Vietnam war and to set his objectives on attaining a negotiated peace. After reported bitter in-fighting in the President's Cabinet, Clifford won the President's support for his position. By early 1969, increasing public distrust of the military's role in the war, concern over the nation's pressing domestic problems, dissatisfaction over the inflation and higher taxes wrought by increased defense spending, and doubts over the efficacy of the ABM and other weapon systems had resulted in greatly increased pressure on Congress for a larger amount of Congressional scrutiny over the military's purse-strings in the years ahead.
McNamara-Military Battles
Vietnam Strategy
McNamara's celebrated drive for Pentagon efficiency carried over to the air war against North Vietnam and made him a reluctant partner in Administration decisions to bomb North Vietnamese targets which he considered to be of questionable military significance. Unlike the military, McNamara saw little likelihood that the North Vietnamese could be bombed to the conference table.
McNamara's disagreements with the Joint Chiefs (JCS) over the bombing became so heated that they were twice aired in public. The first indication of the dispute came Jan. 23, 1967, in conflicting testimony from the Secretary and Army Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, JCS chairman, before the Senate Armed Services Committee. McNamara said the bombing had not reduced infiltration from North to South Vietnam. Wheeler said it had.
The second airing of differences came in a series of closed hearings that began on Aug. 9, 1967, before the Senate Armed Services Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee. In a report released Aug. 31, the panel said that it found “a sharp difference” between McNamara and the military witnesses on the use of air power against North Vietnam. Despite a Sept. 1 statement by President Johnson that “there is no deep division” of views, a number of North Vietnamese targets previously off limits to U.S. planes were brought under attack, raising speculation that the division did exist and that the President had overruled McNamara and had sided with the military experts.
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