Etel Solingen discusses Nuclear Proliferation

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    • 00:01

      [MUSIC PLAYING]

    • 00:17

      ETEL SOLINGEN: The study of nuclear proliferationencompasses three main areas.First and foremost is why some statesdecide to acquire nuclear weapons, whereas others do not.Think of it also in terms of diffusion.

    • 00:40

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: Have nuclear weapons proliferatedaround the world or not really?And I'll get into that in a second, the extent to whichthey have proliferated.But basically the question is, why do some states want nuclearweapons and others don't?That's number one.

    • 01:00

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: That's the demand side of nuclear weapons.The second aspect of it is, once states acquire nuclear weapons,what are the effects of that?For instance, do states that face eachother with nuclear weapons behave differentlyfrom states that don't acquire nuclear weapons?

    • 01:21

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: And the third aspect is, what is the roleof the international community?That's kind of the supply of inducements,positive inducements, negative inducements such as sanctionsand what effect they have in persuading states or dissuadingstates from acquiring nuclear weapons.

    • 01:48

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: First and foremost, there was some informationduring World War II that the Nazis were developing a programto acquire nuclear weapons, which of course, led to the USeffort to the Manhattan Project that eventually yieldedthe first nuclear weapon.

    • 02:09

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: In time, two nuclear weapons were used in Japanto dissuade Japan from pursuing the war in the Pacific.Those were the nuclear weapons droppedon Hiroshima and Nagasaki.And subsequently, a number of other states

    • 02:32

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: decided to acquire nuclear weapons as well, prominentlythe Soviet Union, but also the UK, France, China, and now wehave five.By the 1960s, there's some actionto constitute an international regime that

    • 02:55

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: eventually becomes known as the nonproliferation treaty.And the nonproliferation treaty recognizes two typesof states, the nuclear weapon states, the five that I justmentioned, and the non-nuclear weapon states, the rest of it.That's signed in 1968.

    • 03:16

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: It enters into force in 1970.However, additional states remain committedto acquiring nuclear weapons, and eventually, four moreare added to the tally.And that's North Korea, India and Pakistan and Israel.Although Israel never acknowledged

    • 03:37

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: acquisition of nuclear weapons.So now we have nine.In time, others, particularly in the 1990s,joined a nonproliferation treaty.A significant number of additional statesjoined in the 1990s.

    • 03:57

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: And at this point, you get the most highly subscribedinternational treaty in existence, 190 states,which is pretty remarkable.That does not, of course, mean that other states continuein their efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, includingstates that signed and ratified the nonproliferation treaty.

    • 04:20

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: And the usual suspects are North Korea,which of course was an NPT member when it actuallydeceived the International Atomic Energy Agency, but alsoIraq, Iran, Libya, and others.So NPT membership was obviously not a guarantee

    • 04:44

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: that states would completely abideby those international commitmentsnot to develop nuclear weapons.The reasons for why some states seek nuclear weaponsand others don't are many.

    • 05:07

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: And there are competing interpretations for why some doand others don't.In the early 1990s, I found a regularitythat links a country's political economy,or rather, a regime's political economy

    • 05:28

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: with its nuclear choices.And basically those regimes interested in growingtheir economies through integrationin the global economy were more prone to renouncenuclear weapons than regimes that by definition

    • 05:50

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: thrived on rejection of the global economy.If you consider the empirical record pertainingto which countries went for nuclear weapons,or at least for the development of nuclear weaponsand which were reluctant to do so,

    • 06:12

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: you will find that no country that renounced nuclear weaponsdid so under an inward-looking regime and that mostcountries that pursued nuclear weapons since 1970,

    • 06:33

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: since the conclusion of the NPT, wereled by inward-looking regimes from Peron to Nasser and SaddamHussein, the Kim family in North Korea, and several others.

    • 06:58

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: The main areas of contention reallyhave to do with the broader philosophical approachesto international relations theory.So, for instance, a leading theory goes by the nameof neorealism, pretty much monopolized thinking about whoacquires nuclear weapons and who doesn't.

    • 07:22

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: And he enjoyed that monopoly because itdealt with the heart of the securitydilemma, nuclear weapons.You get to the inner sanctum of a state's security.So it had an advantage in answering questionsof this sort.The problem is, over time you could

    • 07:45

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: find too many anomalies, empirical anomaliesthat this theory could not explain and also,too many conceptual shortcomings thatmade the theory, in some ways, almost tautological.

    • 08:05

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: It would take me a little bit to explain why,but for instance, if you adopted a neorealist viewpoint,you could say Japan circa 1970s, '80s should have acquirednuclear weapons, should have not acquired nuclear weapons,should have relied on the US alliance, et cetera, et cetera.

    • 08:30

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: All of those would have been consistentwith a neorealist view of things.So if that's the case, the theory suffers fromunder-determination and a number of other pitfalls in explainingwhy some do and others don't.There are also many empirical anomalies.

    • 08:52

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: For instance, you would think that countriesthat acquired nuclear weapons, by definition their neighborsmight follow suit.But that has not been the case for the most part,and so on and so forth.In the book, in Nuclear Logics, Iexplain the fallacies of neorealist thinking

    • 09:12

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: in explaining this question without really dismissingthe reality that security dilemmas arelegitimate subjects of study in international relations.And security dilemmas are not figmentsof the neorealist imagination.But we tend to overstate that lineof thinking when we try to explain why states acquire

    • 09:37

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: or don't acquire nuclear weapons.So that's one approach.A second leading approach in our fieldgoes by the name of neoliberal institutionalism.And all it means is that international institutions arecreated out there, like WTO or others or the NPT,

    • 09:59

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: to solve collective action problemsand that there are more efficient ways to coordinatecollaboration or cooperation.And indeed, the NPT, you can say,performed in many ways that function.The problem is, we don't have empirical validation for all

    • 10:24

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: of the 100-- let's say 180-some statesthat indeed, it was the NPT that led themto renounce nuclear weapons.It may well be.We just don't have that evidence.And so for instance, it could well

    • 10:45

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: be that other considerations led them to renouncenuclear weapons, not the NPT, and that thoseare other considerations led them also to sign on the NPTand ratify the NPT, but basically the causal workis done somewhere else, right?The prior decision to join the NPT is the real driver here.

    • 11:10

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: For instance, domestic considerationsof the kind that I explained earlier might have been--internationalizers might have beenmore prone to sign on to the NPT,and it's not really the NPT that did the work.There's a technical term for that fallacy of impudingcausal effects to the institution,

    • 11:33

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: and it's called selection effects.But leaving that aside, let's move to yet a third theory.A third theory duels on the nature of international norms,reigning international norms.So for instance, one might assume--we just had the anniversary of Hiroshima and Nagasaki--

    • 11:55

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: that those traumatic events in Japan really led to a revulsioninternationally from developing nuclear weaponsor at least using nuclear weapons.I think it's important to really differentiatenorms against using nuclear weapons

    • 12:17

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: and norms against acquisition.Because if we look at the post Hiroshima and Nagasaki period,we actually see more acquisition, notless acquisition.As I recounted in my answer to a previous question,we actually see some growth in the number of nuclear weaponstates and others that continue to pursue the acquisition

    • 12:40

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: of nuclear weapons.So that's a different question from nuclear use,particularly because some considerthe acquisition of nuclear weaponsto be a guarantee against use.It's a little tricky, but that's the way it works.Nuclear weapons presumably, for some people,are a guaranteed that they won't be

    • 13:02

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: used, particularly if it's in the contextof mutual deterrence.So the theory has certain anomalies because those normshave not become universal.I mean, for instance, the reactionto nuclear tests by India and Pakistan-- and by the way,India and Pakistan are not part of the nonproliferation treaty.

    • 13:25

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: Israel is also not part of the nonproliferation treaty.But the lack of effective responseto nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in the 1990s,for instance, shows you that, to some extent, the revulsion

    • 13:45

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: against acquisition, the testing is reallya threshold that countries cross whenthey acquire nuclear weapons.You can see that international norms are notas homogeneous against nuclear weapons as we might think.

    • 14:07

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: For one, countries have tested nuclear weapons not long ago.Other countries continue to pursue, not justNorth Korea and so on.And in particular, you see nuclear weapons being paraded.Just last week, or a few days ago, in the case of Chinabeing paraded.And even for countries that are not parading nuclear weapons,

    • 14:29

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: they seem to have widespread support, at least in someof the countries that are not the weaponstates within the NPT category.As I said, the NPT recognizes nuclear weapon states, onlythe five, and non-nuclear weapon states

    • 14:50

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: as the rest that are precluded from acquiring thembut in exchange for that get other benefitsin terms of nuclear technology.So the theory that norms drive some of thisis, again, not completely accurate.

    • 15:14

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: There are also counter-norms, countriesthat think that nuclear weapons are actually a positive thingto have.Then we have another potential explanation for why some doand why some don't.And many people derive this from a broader theoryof international relations that has to do with democracies

    • 15:37

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: and how they behave in the international realm.I looked into this question, and I found maybe a coupleof regularities having to do with the democracy-nondemocracykind of distinction.If you look at those two regions, East Asiaand the Middle East, which are the bulk

    • 15:59

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: of the problem of nonproliferation.You will not find in democracies thatare surrounded by other democraciesthe development of nuclear weapons.But you will find democracies thatare in a sea of authoritarianism thattend to do that-- India, for instance,

    • 16:19

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: yes, Pakistan is democratic sometimes, not others.Israel is, of course, in a contextof authoritarian states, and now, of course, Daesh,and Islamic state.So one regularity might be if it's true,if the democratic peace theory is true that democracies don't

    • 16:43

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: wage war against each other, maybethere is something there that democracies also might notdevelop nuclear weapons if they are surroundedby other democracies.It's just a hypothesis.Another regularity, though, countering the ideathat democracies are necessarily the main causal driverhere is the fact that the NPT was

    • 17:07

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: signed by a large number of nondemocracies as well,and many nondemocracies have actually abidedby their NPT commitments.Furthermore, some of the nuclear weaponsfree zones around the world actuallycame about in a context where both democraciesand nondemocracies reached an agreement

    • 17:29

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: to keep their regions free of nuclear weapons.So the very framework that I tried to describe initiallyabout internationalizing models versus inward-looking models,

    • 17:52

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: I think, is very well-positioned to explain why the MiddleEast has so many more cases of countriesthat pursue nuclear weapons than, let's say, East Asia.Because most of the Middle East from the 1950s onwards

    • 18:13

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: was dominated by inward-looking autocracies--inward-looking-- not just autocracies,inward-looking autocracies basically rejectingthe global economy for most of the last five or six decades.And sure enough, we see Iran, Iraq, Libya--

    • 18:37

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: Syria had a nuclear weapons program-- Egypt under Nasser--Nasser was one of the actually quintessential inward-lookingleaders, and perhaps Algeria and so on and so forth.So in terms of the political economy model,

    • 18:58

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: it applies very well to that part of the world.Actually, the idea that East Asiahas been inching towards proliferation is erroneous.

    • 19:21

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: Since 1964, the year that China exploded a nuclear deviceand joined the family of nuclear weapon states, the fifth oneto do so, since 1964 none of the other East Asian statesexcept for North Korea exploded a nuclear device

    • 19:43

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: or engaged in developing weapons.North Korea, of course, fits very muchthe pattern I spoke about-- inward-looking regimes benton rejection of the global economy and self-sufficiency.It goes by the name of "juche" in the North Korean context.

    • 20:04

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: But otherwise, the countries that you would have thoughtwould have been the perfect candidatesfor countering Chinese nuclear weapons would have been maybeTaiwan, maybe Japan, South Korea because of North Korea'sbehavior.Neorealist theory that I discussed

    • 20:26

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: a little earlier-- neorealist theory--would have actually told you thoseare the countries that would havebeen most likely to develop nuclear weaponsbecause their neighbors had done so.And yet that has not happened.Many predictions to that effect have been in placefor the last three decades, about Japan, about South Korea

    • 20:49

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: and so on.But that has not happened.And why?I believe that a major reason hasto do with the internationalizing agendas,internationalizing models that really drove Japan, SouthKorea, and Taiwan, the most likely candidates

    • 21:09

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: under other theories, to avoid nuclear weapons.One has to remember that Japan experienced the nuclearizationof not one, not two, not three, but the nuclearizationof basically Soviet Union first of all, China, and North Korea

    • 21:36

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: in its own region, and yet stayed with its decisionto avoid nuclearization.Now of course, Japan eventually enteredinto an agreement with the United Statesthat extended the US nuclear umbrella onto its territory,but that's a separate question.

    • 21:57

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: One important consideration to keep in mindin terms of your question about East Asiais that the center of gravity in East Asiais internationalizing.The overwhelming majority of states in East Asiahas this internationalizing platform of political survival.

    • 22:20

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: And that, of course, implies all the disincentivesthat I discussed earlier.Whereas the center of gravity in the Middle Eastis in the inward-looking direction.So the context, where that center of gravity is,matters for what states choose to do in their own context.

    • 22:46

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: Now, the role of alliances is, of course, an important one.But one needs to think that internationalizing modelsand alliances with the US were mutually reinforcing.If you did not have an internationalizing model,

    • 23:08

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: you might have not entered an alliance with the US.And why do I dwell on this?I dwell on this because alliances in and of themselvescannot explain why some countries do and others don't.Take North Korea as an example.North Korea had not one, but two very strong allianceswith the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union,

    • 23:32

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: and it still developed its own nuclear deterrent.But moving to Japan, a leading theorythat I mentioned earlier having to do with normssuggests that the experience of Hiroshima and Nagasaki

    • 23:54

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: left such an imprint on Japan that basically single-handedlyexplains why Japan has not acquired nuclear weapons.The theory sometimes goes by the name of nuclear allergy.When you look at the experience of Japanwith the nonproliferation treaty and so on,you come out with a different story.

    • 24:16

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: Number one, Japan took at least 18 monthsafter the ratification of the NPT,1970-- the NPT was signed in 1968,1970 it was ratified by the number of states that allowedit to enter into effect.

    • 24:37

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: And after that, Japan took 18 more months to sign it.But actually, it also took seven more years to ratify it.So it already shows some delay, some hesitation therethat you would have not expected if the nuclear allergy

    • 24:58

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: theory was as powerful as one could think.Once it's signed and ratified, it attached some sort of causethat pertained to its ability to withdraw from the treatyor make use of article 10 that allows states to withdraw

    • 25:22

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: from the nonproliferation treaty with three months advancenotice, which is interesting, let's say,for a country that has a nuclear allergy to do that.Moving on, you had government studies about the feasibility

    • 25:44

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: of nuclear weapons for Japan.They tended to be somewhat secret and so on.But the willingness to conduct a steadysuggest to you or maybe to others that therewasn't a genuine taboo here.Taboo is something that you don't even conceive of doing.

    • 26:06

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: But in this case, the willingnessto conduct studies, even if the studies basicallyrejected the idea of acquiring nuclear weapons,makes you think twice about the idea of a tabooagainst nuclear weapons.Another argument against that theoryis the fact that Japan essentially relied

    • 26:30

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: on a US nuclear umbrella.And by any other name, that might be conceivedas embedded nuclearization.It is relying on nuclear weapons,even if the nuclear weapons are owned by an ally in this case.But nonetheless, there is maybe one other point about this.

    • 26:54

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: Japan has something called three non-nuclear principlesthat were adopted under prime ministers Sato in the 1970s.But those principles never became law.Japan's constitution, which of course

    • 27:15

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: is strict in terms of Japan's ability to conduct war,is quite unclear in terms of its abilityto acquire nuclear weapons.Really, there's no genuine legal barrierin its constitution itself.And the non-nuclear principles, although in some mortal sense

    • 27:38

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: they're there, they never became law.Having said all that, Hiroshima and Nagasakileft an imprint on Japan, no doubt about it.But as you can tell, there are many caveats to the abilityto explain Japan's non-nuclear status simply in terms

    • 28:04

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.North Korea's nuclear ambitions cannot be severed from itsoverarching model of what they call "juche,"

    • 28:26

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: which means self-reliance, complete self-reliance,in the case of North Korea, pretty much autarchic survivalsevered from the global economy in a way that is not completelytrue for Iran, run for instance.But this is sort of a very extreme case.And nuclear weapons very much fit into that concept

    • 28:51

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: of complete self-sufficiency.In the case of Iran, the situationis a little bit more complex, because eventhough Iran's Islamic revolution in 1979equally abided by some concept of self-sufficiency--

    • 29:18

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: for instance, the idea was to rely less on oil exportsand so on and so forth, things that never actually cameabout-- Iran today is more dependent on oil exportsthen it was under the shah.But leaving that aside, the idea wasto sever itself more from dependence

    • 29:40

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: on the global economy and create this self-sufficiency.Iran might have been a new Turkeytoday, had it not 30 years ago detached itselffrom the global economy and pursued the kinds of policies

    • 29:60

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: that we're discussing right now, a nuclear weaponsprogram or at least a full nuclear fuel cycle program,which is the underlying foundation for nuclear weapons.The one difference between Iran and North Korea,among others, is that in Iran you

    • 30:22

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: can detect more of this factional political frameworkthat I discussed, where one faction has more affinitywith inward-looking objectives, similar to juche,

    • 30:46

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: but the other faction would like to pursue a moreinternationalizing agenda.You have more of that dynamic in Iranthan you have it in North Korea.Iran is a different political system, of course.And although for the last 30 years

    • 31:06

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: or so the inward-looking faction seems to have,for the most part prevailed, including by repressingthe results of the 2009 elections, it is possibleperhaps the election of President Rouhanisuggests that a more internationalizing fraction

    • 31:34

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: might be on the ascendance.We really don't know where this dynamic is leading.There's a lot of contention in the pressand so on about the future of Iran.But really, this is a political dynamic thatis extremely hard to predict.

    • 31:54

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: There were previous instances of effortsto internationalize Iran, for instance under PresidentKhatami that were only suppressed by the competingfaction, really precluding the kinds of changesthat might have taken place.

    • 32:14

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: So we're in a conjunture right nowthat seems to suggest that there is support significant supportfor an agenda of internationalizing Iran'seconomy, but we don't really know where

    • 32:36

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: this competition will lead.How important is theory?Crucially important.One of my mentors, Dina Zinnes-- she was presidentof the International Studies Association,

    • 32:58

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: and she's one of the leading figures in formal theoriesof international relations-- usedto warn us against the fallacy of fishing expeditions,basically engaging in research thatdoesn't have purely formulated theoretical foundations.

    • 33:20

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: So theory is extremely important.Neorealism variables, security dilemma,deterrence theory and so on were the center of attention

    • 33:42

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: for explaining questions of who goes nuclear and who doesn't.I think the field has changed to a large extent.And you may see now even in the media much stronger connections

    • 34:04

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: between the political economy of the regime--is Rouhani really genuinely trying to internationalizethe economy?-- and the consequences for nuclearweapons development.Those two were not as tightly connected 20 years agoas they are now.And I think that really puts this argument much more

    • 34:31

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: centrally than it was two decades ago.I think that we've all come to the realizationthat there is no theoretical silver bullet that explainseverything about why countries eitherdecide to go nuclear or decide not toand that there's a lot of complexity.

    • 34:53

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: But at the same time, the inabilityof the leading theory at the timeto answer so many questions regarding this issuehas made room for other theories to provide more compelling

    • 35:18

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: answers to this question.It is not the case that security dilemmas are not realitiesof international life.But the ability to filter those security dilemmasthrough different domestic political economies

    • 35:39

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: gives you a proper sense of the weight of those securitydilemmas.So for instance, internationalizing regimesmay be able to filter those securitydilemmas through different lensesthan inward-looking regimes.The inclusion of this framework improves our understanding

    • 36:02

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: of the weight of security dilemmas, norms, democracy,and other theoretical inputs into the question.It's important to realize that no theory can establish

    • 36:27

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: conditions of sufficiency and necessity,in the social sciences in particularand that the ability to connect political economymodels with nuclear choices is bounded.

    • 36:48

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: And it's bounded by, first of all,the nature of the regional order.Is the center of gravity more internationalizingor more inward-looking?It's also bounded by the temporal sequence of decisions.

    • 37:13

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: For instance, nuclear weapons might be easier to be abandonedor nuclear weapons programs mightbe easier to be abandoned in earlier stagesthan in later stages when countriesget very close to the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

    • 37:36

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: This is not a deterministic statement.We don't have deterministic statementsin the social sciences for the most part, but proclivities.The incentives not to develop nuclear weapons thatstem from integration into the global economy

    • 37:57

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: may be more powerful in earlier stages of internationalizationthan in later stages of internationalization.That's one form in which temporality matters.Another aspect of temporality is whether nuclear weapons

    • 38:20

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: are acquired before internationalizationor after internationalization.So for instance, China acquired nuclear weapons in 1964under Mao.This was a quintessential inward-looking regime.And by that time China internationalized,the temporality was such that it already was a nuclear weapon

    • 38:42

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: state and it became internationalized afterwards.Now, there's a theory by the name of prospect theorythat says that once you have whatis called some sort of endowment-- in this casethe endowment is nuclear weapons--it is much harder to abandon what you already have than what

    • 39:06

      ETEL SOLINGEN [continued]: you might have in the future.[MUSIC PLAYING]

Etel Solingen discusses Nuclear Proliferation

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Abstract

Professor Etel Solingen discusses the study of nuclear proliferation, including past and current understandings of why certain countries seek nuclear weapons while others do not. She contrasts the actions of inward-looking autocracies with internationalized countries. She also pays particular attention to the effects a country's neighbors have on its nuclear choices.

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Etel Solingen discusses Nuclear Proliferation

Professor Etel Solingen discusses the study of nuclear proliferation, including past and current understandings of why certain countries seek nuclear weapons while others do not. She contrasts the actions of inward-looking autocracies with internationalized countries. She also pays particular attention to the effects a country's neighbors have on its nuclear choices.

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