Peacekeeping

Theories of war try to explain why war occurs, given that it is often an inefficient way to resolve disputes. Scholars have proposed several explanations, among them the lack of information about relative capabilities or resolve and the inability of the parties to reach a credible commitment to end their dispute without resorting to violence. Some [Page 1841]argue that, once war occurs, the only way to end it and ensure that there is no recurrence of violence is to have a decisive victory of one side as most negotiated settlements generate credible commitment problems. This is an argument of particular relevance to civil (or intrastate) wars, which are today the most common form of large-scale armed conflict. One of the striking stylized facts emerging from the literature on civil wars is that these wars last a long time, and when they end, they frequently restart. These insights from rationalist theories of interstate and intrastate war point to an important role for third parties in mediating and resolving disputes. Third-party intervention can help defuse conflicts before they become violent by providing information or external-security guarantees. When wars do occur, security guarantees to help support a transition to peace often take the form of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping is how the international community, through its multilateral organizations, can reduce the risk that conflicts will escalate.

Today, peacekeeping is the multidimensional management of a complex peace operation, usually in a post–civil war context. Peacekeeping, authorized under Chapter VI of the United Nations (UN) Charter, is designed to provide interim security and assist parties to make those institutional, material, and ideational transformations that are essential to make a peace sustainable. It was not always this way. The record of UN peacekeeping begins during the Cold War with a limited activity, monitoring the performance of a truce by two hostile parties.

Contemporary peacekeeping doctrine is embodied in the Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (2000; also known as the Brahimi Report) and the Report of the Secretary-General on “No Exit Without Strategy: Security Council Decision-Making and the Closure or Transition of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations” (2001; also known as the “No Exit Without Strategy” Report), which expanded on Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 1992 report Agenda for Peace and its 1995 Supplement. The goal of peacekeeping today is to help parties achieve sustainable peace. This goal can be achieved by addressing the underlying root causes of hostility and by enhancing local capacities for institutional change and economic development. But peacekeeping requires the cooperation of the parties, which must realize that they cannot win a quick and decisive military victory. Once the parties have reached a settlement that defines the contours of a postwar political system, there is still danger that the implementation of the peace will fail. It is at that point that international capacities—a multidimensional peacekeeping force with a UN mandate and resources to help implement the settlement—can help allay the parties' concerns by providing transparency on the peace-building process and each other's observance of the terms of the settlement, by policing violations of the settlement by noncooperative parties or spoilers, and by helping jump-start the economy and offering technical expertise in the design of transformational postwar political institutions.

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