Politics in Germany


M. Donald Hancock & Henry Krisch

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    For Kendra and Erik, my daughter and son, in gratitude for what they have taught me about life and love.

    M. Donald Hancock

    For my daughter Jennifer and my son Daniel, for all they have meant to me.

    Henry Krisch

    Boxes, Maps, Figures, and Tables

    • 7.1 German Parties and Their Political Colors 132
    • 8.1 Prominent Women in Modern German Politics 155
    • 1.1 Length of Railway Line, 1840–1920 13
    • 4.1 Question asked: “Has the Basic Law proven itself?” 64
    • 6.1 Per Capita Income, 2004 105
    • 7.1 National Elections in West Germany, 1983 and 1987 122
    • 7.2 Question asked: “Is it time for other parties to be in charge of the government?” 128
    • 8.1 Number of Registered Lobbyists, 1972–2007 138
    • 8.2 Days Lost through Strikes and Lockouts per 1,000 Employees, 1995–2001 140
    • 8.3 DGB Trade Union Membership, 1950–2006 141
    • 8.4 Comparative Trade Union Density 143
    • 8.5 Membership in the BDA 145
    • 1.1 Indexes of Industrial Production, 1850–1913 13
    • 1.2 Population of Major German Cities, 1850–1931 15
    • 1.3 Percentage of Workers by Economic Sector, 1882–1925 15
    • 1.4 German States by Population and Area, 2005 17
    • 1.5 Economically Active Population by Occupational Groups and State, 2005 18
    • 1.6 Per Capita Income, 2005 19
    • 4.1 Question asked: “Of which achievement of our country are you as a German especially proud?” 63
    • 4.2 Question asked: “Do you feel yourself to be a German or a West or East German?” 65
    • 4.3 Question asked: “Do you feel affiliated to …” 65
    • 5.1 Number of State Seats in the Bundesrat89
    • 5.2 Legislative Activity, 1990–2006 92
    • 5.3 Types and Number of Local and State Courts by State, 2006 94
    • 6.1 Religious Adherents in Germany, 1900, 2000, 2025 106
    • 6.2 Political Parties in the Imperial and Weimar Eras 108
    • 6.3 Party Membership Totals, 1990–2008 113
    • 6.4 Sources of Party Finances, 2004 115
    • 6.5 Major Contributions by Party, 2004 116
    • 7.1 National Elections in West Germany, 1949–1980 121
    • 7.2 East German Election Results, March 1990 123
    • 7.3 National Election Results, 1990–2005 124
    • 7.4 Polling Predictions and Electoral Results 130
    • 7.5 Voter Migration, 2002–2005 Elections 131
    • 8.1 DGB Union Membership, 2005 142
    • 8.2 Circulation of Major German Daily Newspapers, 2004 148
    • 8.3 States and Their Broadcasting Networks 149
    • 8.4 Votes for the NPD in the 2005 National Election 153
    • 8.5 Women as a Percentage of Bundestag Members, 1998–2005 155
    • 9.1 Government Social Welfare Expenditures, 1995–2005 161
    • 9.2 Comparative Health Care Expenditures and Service, 1990–2004 162
    • 9.3 Average Annual Economic Growth Rate in Germany and Other Leading OECD Countries, 1950–1984 164
    • 9.4 Indicators of Economic Performance in Germany and Other Leading OECD Countries, 1982–2005 167
    • 9.5 Shares in World Trade by Leading OECD Countries, 1992–2007 169
    • 9.6 German Trade, 2003–2006 170
    • 10.1 German Military Deployments Abroad 176
    • 10.2 Support for German Military Peacekeeping, 2006 180
    • 10.3 German Attitudes toward the EU, 2007 186
    • 10.4 German Attitudes in EU Context 186
    • 11.1 Percentage of Germans Who Believe that Conflicts between Social Groups Are Strong/Very Strong 190
    • 11.2 Question asked: “Is [named country] a Trustworthy Partner for Germany?” 199


    In these early years of the twenty-first century, with internal and external armed conflicts raging throughout the “global south” and the rise of new world powers such as China and India demanding increased attention, one may well ask: Why a book on German politics? Is this not just an example of the traditional American academic focus on European states?

    We believe there are two compelling answers to this question, one practical, the other philosophical. The practical answer is that Germany is the strongest economic power and most populous nation in the European Union (EU), which itself is a major force in world affairs. It is thus important to know not only how Germany's politics, economic policies, and foreign policy affect the rest of the EU (and Europe in general), but also how Germany compares on each of these dimensions with its neighbors. Moreover, given Germany's current strength and history, it is natural to ask how democratic at home and peaceful abroad today's Germany has become and is likely to remain. This combination of analytical description and comparison is a major feature of our book and the first reason for writing it.

    The second reason, the philosophical one that is almost unavoidable for any scholar dealing with modern Germany, is to link present-day Germany—united, peaceful, democratic, and prosperous—with the Germany that preceded 1990. During this period Germans achieved great successes in the sciences and arts, as well as innovative social policy and efficient administration, but they also supported authoritarian rulers and tyrannical dictatorships when their efforts at revolutionary transformation and democratic government fell short. Finally, in their name and with the collaboration of a majority, the crimes of World War II and the Holocaust were perpetrated.

    We do not pretend to have an answer to the historical riddle of how Germans could rise to such heights and also sink to such depths; in any case, this is a book on contemporary politics, not one of history. Nevertheless, we could not analyze and describe the Germany of the twenty-first century without being aware of its historical background. Thus an underlying theme of our book becomes: Is Germany today a modern democratic European state like its EU partners, or is it an exceptional case?

    In undertaking this assessment, we bring together complementary intellectual experience and perspectives. One of us (Hancock) has written extensively on western Germany, Scandinavia, and the EU; the other (Krisch) on the former Soviet-bloc German Democratic Republic (GDR). Both of us have studied and taught postwar German politics in explicit comparative contexts (West European and the Soviet bloc, respectively). We therefore view modern Germany from the dual perspectives of the former Federal Republic in western Germany and the one-time GDR in the east. We ask, at relevant points, what the legacy of this almost half century of partition and two-state competition has been for Germany today.


    I (Henry Krisch) thank the staff of the Homer Babbidge Library at the University of Connecticut, particularly Steven Batt, as well as several colleagues in all parts of Germany, for help with sources. For earlier research in Germany, some of which I have used in this book, I thank the staff at the Humboldt University Library in Berlin and the staff at the SAPMO, the Berlin section of the German Federal Archives devoted to the parties and mass organizations of the GDR. I owe a debt to colleagues both here and in Germany for many years of intellectual stimulation and frequent reality checks about the nuances of German politics. I especially owe my collaborator, Don Hancock, for exemplary scholarly collaboration. He made coauthorship—a new form for me—an experience full of plusses and no minuses. I certainly appreciated his grasp of the modernization processes and the political economy of Germany. He would probably agree that his strengths in German affairs and mine dovetailed nicely, a judgment with which we hope our readers will agree. Finally, none of these good things would have happened but for the patient and, where necessary, critical support of my wife, June.

    For my part (Donald Hancock), I am deeply indebted in turn to the knowledge and acumen of Henry Krisch. We first met during graduate studies and our initial teaching experiences at Columbia University, and we have maintained a close personal and professional friendship through the years. While our immersion in German and comparative politics diverged for much of that time along the lines of Europe's Cold War division, Germany's reunification and the eastward extension of the EU have brought a convergence of our research interests and deepened our understanding of German politics in its multiple dimensions.

    On behalf of both of us I would like to thank Brian Boling, Larry Romans, and Amy Stewart-Mailhoit in the documents section at Vanderbilt University's Jean and Alexander Heard Library for their indefatigable help in tracking down countless sources and references. Students, as always, proved a powerful intellectual stimulus in the course of our research and writing—among them, Boyce Adams, Irek Kusmierczyk, Rodelio Manacsa, and Matthew McGrath. I also wish to acknowledge the assistance and encouragement of a number of Vanderbilt stalwarts: Anja Beck, a visiting scholar from Leipzig at the Center for the Americas; John McCarthy, director of the Max Kade Center for European and German Studies; and fellow political scientists James Booth, Tim Boyd, Florence Faucher-King, Marc Hetherington, Michaela Mattes, and Neal Tate. Friends on both sides of the Atlantic provided us with indispensable insights and understanding of Germany on a personal level of society and politics.

    We also wish to thank Elise Frasier and Charisse Kiino, our development and acquisitions editors, respectively, at CQ Press, and Lorna Notsch, our project editor, for their patient understanding of authors' travails and their expert handling of our manuscript. Finally, both of us are grateful for the careful reading of draft chapters by several outside reviewers, including Patrick Altdorfer, University of Pittsburgh; Mary Hampton, Air Command and Staff College; James McAdams, University of Notre Dame; David Patton, Connecticut College; Lori Poloni-Staudinger, Northern Arizona University; Susan Scarrow, University of Houston; Robin E. Taylor; and Helga Welsh, Wake Forest University. They inspired us through their suggestions and constructive criticism.

  • Notes

    Introduction Notes

    1. See, for example, George Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1964).

    2. Mary Hampton, “The Past, Present, and the Perhaps: Is Germany a ‘Normal’ Power?” Review essay published in Security Studies online publication, 01 (December 2000).

    3. The authors are sympathetic to the view of such scholars as Mary Fulbrook, who rightly asks what the essential hallmarks of a “normal” European development are. See Mary Fulbrook, The Divided Nation: A History of Germany 1918–1990 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 4–6.

    4. Alan Watson, The Germans: Who Are They Now? (Chicago: Edition Q, 1992), 13.

    5. In chapters 2 and 5 Hancock incorporates updated and expanded portions of his earlier assessment of German political development and federalism originally published in West Germany: The Politics of Democratic Corporatism (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House Publishers, 1989).

    Chapter 1 Notes

    1. This definition of modernization is derived from Dankwart A. Rustow, A World of Nations (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1967), 35; and C.E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), 7.

    2. Inglehart first advanced this argument in “The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies,” American Political Science Review 65 (1971): 991–1017 and The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977). He has elaborated his analysis of postmaterialist values on the basis of extensive survey research in Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990) and Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997).

    3. Inglehart, Culture Shift, 5.

    4. Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1962).

    5. Thalidomide was developed by a German pharmaceutical company and sold in a number of countries to alleviate symptoms of insomnia and morning sickness among pregnant women. Only about half of the infants afflicted with birth defects associated with the drug survived childhood. Thalidomide was subsequently banned for use during pregnancy. The Chernobyl disaster involved the release of fission material and radiation fuel into the atmosphere, affecting not only workers at the poorly designed nuclear plant but also residents throughout much of the Ukraine and the rest of Europe. The high rate of nuclear fallout resulted in an increase in the number of thyroid cancers among those most directly affected.

    6. Italy is 116,333 square miles (301,302 square kilometers), England is 50,363 square miles (130,439 square kilometers), and France is 210,026 square miles (543,965 square kilometers).

    7. The Nibelungenlied—which consists of a mixture of early Germanic and Nordic mythology—inspired Richard Wagner's soaring operatic opus, Der Ring des Nibelungen (The Ring of the Nibelungen).

    8. A classical presentation of the forest's role in German aesthetic and political imagination may be found in Simon Schama's work, Landscape and Memory (New York: Knopf, 1995).

    9. Economic “take off,” defined as the onset of sustained growth, is associated with W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, 3rd ed. (Cambridge, England, and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

    10. B. R. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: Europe 1750–2000, 5th ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 430–431, 454.

    11. A classical assessment of the role of the Prussian and Imperial states in promoting rapid industrialization, in part for military purposes, is Thorsten Veblen, Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1966). Veblen's book was first published in 1915.

    12. There remains to this day a Slavic ethnic minority people, known as the Sorbs (Sorben in German), who live in the forested area south east of Berlin. They have (and had in the GDR) limited social and linguistic rights. See Peter Barker, The Sorbian Minority and the German State since 1945 (Lewiston N.Y.: E. Mellen Press, 2000).

    13. During the Protestant Reformation in the sixteenth century, Martin Luther helped establish the basis for a common Germanic language (“high German” or Hochdeutsch) through his translation of the Bible from Latin into German. Hochdeutsch became the preferred language of educated Germans and eventually the linguistic norm of the nation as a whole, although it has never fully supplanted local and regional dialects.

    14. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics, 80–82.

    15. Ibid, 150.

    16. A catalytic event was Martin Luther's defiant proclamation in 1517 of ninety-five theses against alleged church abuses, which helped spark the Protestant Reformation in Germany and elsewhere in Central and Northern Europe.

    17. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics, 82.

    18. Ibid.

    19. Within Western and Central Europe, France is second with a population of approximately 64 million, followed by the United Kingdom (approximately 60 million), Italy (57.2 million), and Poland (38.7 million). Population data in this section are taken from the reports of the Federal Office for Statistics (Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland) at http://www.destatis.de. See also Bundesinstitut für Bevölkerungsforschung, at http://www.bib-demographie.de.

    20. A three-month survey, conducted in January-March 2004, found that 84 percent of eastern Germans saw this out-migration as a threat to the future of their part of the country. The readiness to seek jobs in western parts of Germany was greatest in those areas closest to the old East-West border. The numbers obscure the growing trend of eastern commuters to western jobs. See “Abwanderung gefährdet Ostdeutschland,” ZDF online, March 26, 2004.

    21. “Der Migrationsbericht 1999,” Der Tagesspiegel, December 18, 1999; Die Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen, Migrationsbericht 1999, Berlin, 1999; Phillip L. Martin, “Germany: Migration Policies for the 21st Century,” Policy Paper #50 (Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California at Irvine, April 1999). See also the interview with Walter Link, who chaired the Bundestag's “Enquete-Kommission ‘Dempographischer Wandel’,” in “Trotz der Brisanz herrschte weitgehend Übereinstimmung” (Beilage zur Wochenzietung Das Parliament) 48, nos. 43–44 (October 16–23, 1998): 2.

    22. “Deutschland braucht mehr Zuwanderer,” Der Tagesspiegel, January 6, 2000; Klaus J. Bade, “Verordnete Einwanderung ist kein Allheilmittel,” Frankfurter Rundschau, January 12, 2000; “Migrationsbericht 1999”: 45–47.

    23. Ironically, the 1913 law did not define German nationality as such (until the Nazi era, each German state granted citizenship separately) and did not ban dual citizenship—a central issue in contemporary debates. See Erich Roper, “Die doppelte Staatsangehörigkeit als traditionelles Rechtsinstitut” (Beilage zur Wochenzietung Das Parliament) 50, no. 6 (February 1999): 16.

    24. Beate Winkler, “Den Deutschen darf nichts ‘fremd’ sein,” Die Zeit, August 23, 1996. See also Robert Leicht, “Aus Knechten Bürger machen,” Die Zeit, July 5, 1996. “Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne,” Der Spiegel, 48, 1998 (title story).

    25. Ralf E. Ulrich, “The Reform of German Immigration Law,” (Occasional Paper, 1990) American Institute for Contemporary German Studies.

    26. See Statistisches Bundesamt, Statistisches Jahrbuch 2007, http://www.destatis.de.

    27. A recent analysis of the unintended process by which guest workers became immigrants and residents is Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos and Karen Schönwälder, “How the Federal Republic Became an Immigration Country,” German Politics & Society 24, no. 3 (Autumn 2006): 1–19.

    28. Convenient summaries of the legal provisons are in “Nationality Law,” Bonn: Inter-Nationes Legal Texts, October 1999. For an exposition and defense of the law by the sponsoring cabinet member, Interior Minister Otto Schilly (SPD), see his statements, “Was heisst eigentlich ‘Nation’?” (Beilage zur Wochenzietung Das Parliament) 50, nos. 21–22 (May 1999): 16, and “Wir bilden ein ‘Bündnis der Vernunft”’ (Beilage zur Wochenzietung Das Parliament) 50, no. 13 (March 1999): 14.

    29. The text and additional information about the law are available at http://www.bundesregierung.de/Webs/Breg/DE/Bundesregierung/Beauf-tragtefuerIntegration/Zuwanderungsrecht/zuwanderungsrecht.html; Thomas Kröter, “Zuwanderungsreform als ‘historisch’ gelobt,” Frankfurter Rundschau online, June 18, 2004.

    30. This is the federal office for migration, integration and refugees, headed by a state secretary, the Beauftragte für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration. Merkel upgraded this office in 2005 by placing it in the Federal Chancellery.

    31. The new language requirements now apply also to so-called Spötaussiedler, ethnic Germans from Russia and Eastern Europe. Persons of German descent, living abroad, have automatic claim to citizenship. The Kohl government had already taken steps to limit this immigration, both by economic aid to “German” communities abroad and by limiting automatic repatriation to those who had suffered due to their German nationality, resulting in a decline in new arrivals.

    32. Alan Cowell, “German Court Upholds Law to Limit Refugees,” New York Times, May 18, 1996.

    33. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland/Stand: November 1994 (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 1994), 87–88. The Basic Law is now also available online at http://www.bpb.de.

    34. Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland, “Bevölkerung,” 1998, http://www.destatis.de; Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland (“Protestant Church in Germany”); “Christenturn und politische Kultur”; “Kirchensteuer 1998.” The Web site for the Evangelkical Church is http://www.ekd.de; the Catholic Bishops Conference is at http://www.dbk.de.

    35. See “Jüdische Zuwanderer aus der ehemaligen Sowjetunion,” Migrationsbericht des Bundesamtes für Migration und Flüchtlinge im Auftrag der Bundesregierung (Migrationsbericht 2005), Section 2.4, 49–52. The relevant section is paragraph 23. Source online at BMI: Zuwanderungsrecht in Deutschland, http://www.zuwanderung.de.

    36. These rules no longer apply to Jewish persons from the Baltic states, now that those states are EU members; the rules on language and economic status do not apply to those certified to be victims of Nazi persecution.

    37. For this agreement, see “Schröder und Spiegel zeichnen Staatsvertrag,” Frankfurter Rundschau online, January 28, 2003. Data on numbers of Jews from the Web site of the Central Council, http://www.zentralratdjuden.de/en. In 2006, the first rabbis to graduate from a seminary in Germany since 1942 were ordained. “Erste jüdische Geistliche seit 1942 in Deutschland ausgebildet,” Frankfurter Rundschau online, September 15, 2006. There are about 50,000 reform Jews and an undetermined number of nonobservant Jews.

    38. Die Bundesbeauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen, “Islamunterricht ist Beitrag zur Integration,” press release, Berlin, November 17, 1999. See also Roger Cohen, “Long Dispute Ends as Berlin Court Backs Islamic School Lessons,” New York Times, November 6, 1998; “Islamische Föderation will Religionsunterricht erteilen,” Der Tagesspiegel, May 6, 1997; “Allahs Einzug ins Klassenzimmer,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, November 6, 1998. A more recent study is Bassam Tibi, “Europeanizing Islam or the Islamization of Europe: Political Democracy vs. Cultural Differences,” in Timothy A. Byrnes and Peter J. Katzenstein, eds., Religion in an Expanding Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 204–224. Tibi notes (ibid, 215–216) that different German Muslim interest groups have ties to different foreign governments, particularly to Turkey and Saudi Arabia. See also Jytte Klausen, The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

    Chapter 2 Notes

    1. In the face of a deteriorating military situation on the western front and revolutionary upheavals throughout Germany, members of the military High Command and the last Imperial chancellor, Prince Max von Baden, urged the kaiser to abdicate. He did so on November 9 and promptly left for lifetime exile in the Netherlands, where he died in 1940.

    2. Radical right-wingers included roving bands of disgruntled wartime veterans and racist-nationalist political movements. One of the latter was the German Workers Party, founded in Munich in 1918. Adolf Hitler became its leader and transformed it into the National Socialist German Workers Party, or NSDAP, that is, the Nazi party.

    3. Useful historical accounts of the Weimar Republic include Richard J. Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich (New York: Penguin, 2004); Heinrich August Winkler, Germany: The Long Road West (translated by Alexander J. Sager) (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Erich Eycke, A History of the Weimar Republic (translated by Harlan P. Hanson and Robert G.L. Waite) (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962–1963); John R.P. McKenzie, Weimar Germany, 1918–1933 (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1971).

    4. Together, the three democratic parties won a resounding majority of 83.7 percent in elections to a constituent assembly held in January 1919 to draw up a new constitution. Because of street violence and the threat of revolution in Berlin, the delegates met in the more tranquil provincial city of Weimar that was renowned for its literary and humanistic traditions. Both the constituent assembly and Germany's first democratic republic assumed the name Weimar.

    5. Under the Versailles Treaty Germany was forced to cede all of its overseas colonies and portions of its own territory to the newly reconstituted state of Poland in the east and the provinces of Alsace-Lorraine to France in the west; accept responsibility for causing World War I; pay long-term monetary reparations to the Western allies to cover the direct and indirect costs of the war; and limit its military to 100,000 men. The United States Senate refused to ratify the treaty.

    6. For the Stern quote, see his speech at the Leo Beck Institute in New York on November 14, 2004, at http://www.lbi.org/fritzstern.html. The literature on Hitler and the National Socialist movement is voluminous. Standard references include Ian Kershaw's masterful Hitler, 2nd ed. (Harlow, England, and New York: Longman, 2001) (along with numerous other studies by Kershaw); Karl Dietrich Bracher, The German Dictatorship (London: Penguin Books, 1973); Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (New York: Harper and Row, 1964); Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, 2d ed. rev. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965); Hitler's own Mein Kampf (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1943); Franz Neumann, Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism (New York: Free Press, 1942. Unfortunately available only in German is an excellent study by Karl Bracher, Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik: Eine Studie zum Problem des Machtverfalls in der Demokratie (Stuttgart: Ring Verlag, 1957).

    7. These demands were codified in a twenty-five-point NSADAP party program drawn up by Hitler and published in February 1920. For a summary, see http://www.hitler.org/writings/programme/

    8. A particularly compelling account of Hitler's hypnotic effect on others can be found in Albert Speer's memoirs, Inside the Third Reich (New York: Macmillan, 1970), 15–16.

    9. Cornelia Essner, Die Nürnberger Gesetze oder die Verwaltung des Rassenwahns, 1933–1945 (Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 2002).

    10. See Ralf Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany (translation of Gesellschaft und Demokratie in Deutschland), 1st U.S. ed. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967).

    11. For details see Anthony Read and David Fisher, The Deadly Embrace: Hitler, Stalin, and the Nazi-Soviet Pact, 1939–1949 (New York: Norton, 1988) and John Kolasky, Partners in Tyranny: The Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact, August 23, 1939 (Toronto: Mackenzie Institute, 1990).

    12. Standard histories of World War II include Winston Churchill's multivolume The Second World War (New York: Time, Inc., 1959), and Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War (New York: Da Capo Press, 1999). Other noteworthy sources are Dwight D. Eisenhower's wartime memoirs, Crusade in Europe (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1948) and A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (New York: Fawcett, 1961, 1968). Taylor's account has generated considerable controversy because of his argument that the responsibility for the outbreak of World War II can be attributed to all of the super powers rather than Nazi Germany alone.

    13. A diplomatic history of prewar and wartime big power summits is Lloyd Gardner, Spheres of Influence: The Great Powers Partition Europe, from Munich to Yalta (Chicago: I.R. Dee, 1993).

    14. The so-called two + four settlement (formally, the Treaty of 12 September 1990 on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany) provided in Article 1 that the “united Germany shall comprise the territories of the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic and the whole of Berlin.” See The Unification of Germany in 1990: A Documentation (Bonn: Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, 1991), 99.

    15. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1960).

    16. Ibid.

    17. F. Roy Willis, The French in Germany 1945–1949 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), 51.

    18. The French subsequently agreed to the unification of the Saarland and West Germany in the context of European economic integration from the early 1950s onward.

    Chapter 3 Notes

    1. Henry Krisch, “The Changing Politics of German National Identity,” in Peter H. Merkl, ed., The Federal Republic of Germany at Fifty (London: Macmillan, 1999), 33–42. The GDR's economic disadvantage relative to West Germany was due to policy choices after 1947 and not primarily to the relative economic endowment of the two states. For a recent treatment, see Christoph Buchheim, “Kriegsfolgen und Wirtschaftswachstum in der SBZ/DDR,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 25, no. 4 (1999): 55–80.

    2. Norman M. Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945–1949 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995).

    3. F. Roy Willis, The French in Germany 1945–1949 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), 51.

    4. A majority of the members of the Bavarian state parliament voted against the Basic Law because it provided for a more centralized form of government than they would have wished. Nonetheless, the Bavarian Landtag endorsed the Basic Law as binding on the state. An excellent account of the Bavarian debate can be found in Peter H. Merkl, The Origin of the West German Republic (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 148–161.

    5. Henry Krisch, German Politics under Soviet Occupation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974). Krisch reviewed differing interpretations of this event in “Original Sin or Working Class Unity? Conflicting Interpretations of the Formation of the SED,” in Peter Barker, ed., The GDR and Its History: Rückblick und Revision (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 2000), 145–157.

    6. A good account is David F. Patton, Cold War Politics in Postwar Germany (New York: St. Martin's, 1999).

    7. Peter Glotz, “German Democracy at Fifty: Historical Retrospective and Political Outlook,” Research paper, Center for the Study of Democracy, University of California at Irvine. The Bonn Republic, writes Glotz, was a success marked by constructive international integration, a social market economy, and a commitment by all political forces to a limited state with the rule of law.

    8. See Gert–Joachim Glaessner, Demokratie und Politik in Deutschland (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 1999).

    9. Glaessner op cit., ch. 2; Mary Fulbrook, Anatomy of a Dictatorship. Inside the GDR 1949–1989 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Henry Krisch, The German Democratic Republic: The Search for Identity (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985). Fulbrook has recently told this story from a societal perspective in Mary Fulbrook, The People's State: East German Society from Hitler to Honecker (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005).

    10. By 1988, the authorities allowed Volker Braun's “Die Preussen kommen!” [The Prussians Are Coming] to be produced—a decade after it was written.

    11. A thorough work is Manfred Hagen, DDR—Juni '53 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1992). A recent German retrospective is Rolf Hochhuth, “Der ehrensvollste Tag unserer Geschichte” (Beilage zur Wochenzietung Das Parliament) 47, no. 28 (July 4, 1997): 17.

    12. Frederick Taylor, The Berlin Wall: A World Divided, 1961–1989 (New York: Harper Collins, 2006).

    13. Rainer Münz and Ralf Ulrich, “Too Many foreigners? Demographic Developments, Changing patterns of Migration and the Absorption of Immigrants: The Case of Germany, 1945–1994.” Working Paper 11, Center for German and European Studies, Georgetown University, March 1995.

    14. A. James McAdams, Germany Divided. From the Wall to Unification (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). See also his earlier East Germany and Détente (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

    15. Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997 [1995]).

    16. A detailed analytical study is Hannes Adomeit, Imperial Overstretch: Germany in Soviet Policy from Stalin to Gorbachev (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1998).

    17. Robert F. Goeckel, The Lutheran Church and the East German State (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); Jeffrey Koppstein, The Politics of Economic Decline in East Germany, 1945–1989 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997).

    18. McAdams (Germany Divided, 167) gives these suggestive figures: in 1986, the regime allowed over a half million East Germans under retirement age to visit the West, under a relaxed interpretation of “pressing family matters.” In 1987, this figure rose to 1.2 million! If one adds in retirees, McAdams suggests, one may have had between a fifth and a quarter of the East German population in the West in 1987 alone.

    19. Charles S. Maier, Dissolution. The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997) is the best account in English. For two vivid, if differing, eye witness accounts, see Robert Darnton, Berlin Journal, 1989–1990 (New York: Norton, 1991), and Peter Marcuse, Missing Marx. A Personal and Political Journal of a Year in East Germany, 1989–1990 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1991). See also Laurence H. McFalls, Communism's Collapse, Democacy's Demise? (New York: New York University Press, 1995) and M. Donald Hancock and Helga A. Welsh, eds., German Unification: Process and Outcomes (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994). For a cultural analysis of many works in German, a good introduction is Gert-Joachim Glaessner, Der schwierige Weg zur Demokratie: Vom Ende der DDR zur deutschen Einheit (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1991).

    20. There is an enormous literature in German on this and related topics. In English, see John Torpey, Intellectuals, Socialism and Dissent (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), and Christian Joppke, East German Dissidents and the Revolution of 1989 (New York: New York University Press, 1995).

    21. An account is Konrad H. Jarousch, The Rush to German Unity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

    22. For the role of Neues Forum, especially in the crucial events in Leipzig 1989, see Neues Forum Leipzig, Jetzt oder nie—Demokratie, Leipziger Herbst 1989 (Munich: C. Bertelsmann Verlag, 1991).

    23. Zelikow and Rice, op cit. A German government insider's account is Horst Teltschick, 329 Tage: Innenansichten der Einigung (Berlin: Siedler Verlag bei Goldmann, 1991).

    24. Thomas A. Baylis, “Leadership Change in Eastern Germany: From Colonization to Integration?” in Peter H. Merkl, ed., The Federal Republic of Germany at Forty-Five (New York: New York University Press, 1995), 243–64; see also a later perspective in ibid, “East German Leadership after Unification: The Search for Voice,” in Peter H. Merkl, ed., The Federal Republic of Germany at Fifty (London: Macmillan, 1999), 135–146.

    Chapter 4 Notes

    1. These include Imperial Germany, the Weimar Republic, Nazi Germany, the occupation regime, the Federal Republic in the West, the German Democratic Republic in the East, and unified Germany.

    2. The literature on political culture is enormous. Basic texts include Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney P. Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963) and ibid, eds., The Civic Culture Revisited (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980), including and especially David Conradt, “Changing German Political Culture,” 212–272. Gabriel Almond offered an insightful retrospective in his 1995 lecture in the Research Colloquia series at the University of California, Irvine, “The Civic Culture: Prehistory, Retrospect and Prospect,” which is available at the Center for the Study of Democracy homepage. See also David Laitin, “The Civic Culture at 30,” American Political Science Review 89, no. 1 (1995): 168–174. Among the many important more recent writings on this subject, noteworthy contributions include Harry Eckstein, “A Culturalist Theory of Political Change,” American Political Science Review 82, no. 3 (1988): 789–804; and Ronald Inglehart, “The Renaissance of Political Culture,” ibid, 82, no. 1 (1988): 203–230. A recent example is Russell J. Dalton, “Citizen Attitudes and Political Behavior,” Comparative Political Studies 33, no. 67 (2000): 912–940.

    3. A landmark application of the political culture concept to politics in the Federal Republic was Kendall L. Baker, Russell J. Dalton, and Kai Hildebrandt, Germany Transformed: Political Culture and the New Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981). Over the years, the political culture approach was assimilated to German political science; see, for example, Bettina Westle, Kollektive Identität im vereinten Deutschland (Opladen: Lesk + Budrich, 1999), and ibid, “Demokratie und Sozialismus: Politische Ordnungsvorstellungen im vereinten Deutschland zwischen Ideologie, Protest und Nostalgie,” KZfSS, [Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychohgie] 4 (1994): 571–596. See also Robert Rohrschneider, Learning Democracy. Democratic and Economic Values in Unified Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), ch. 2.

    4. A classic study is that of Peter Gay, Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider (New York: Harper and Row, 1968).

    5. See, for example, Ian Kershaw, Hitler 1936–1945: Nemesis (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000), 746.

    6. A readily available source for these data is the summary (with data) published in two volumes by Richard and Anna Merritt. See Anna J. Merritt and Richard L. Merritt, eds., Public Opinion in Occupied Germany: The OMGUS Surveys, 1945–1949 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970), and ibid, Public Opinion in Semisovereign Germany: The HICOG Surveys, 1949–1955 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1980).

    7. Merritt and Merritt op cit., [OMGUS surveys], 31–33.

    8. A useful summary is Kendall L. Baker, Russell J. Dalton and Kai Hildebrandt, Germany Transformed: Political Culture and the NewPolitics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981). See especially chap. 1, “The Changing Political Culture.”

    9. In the monthly Politbarometer surveys of the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen for 2005—a year with higher than usual levels of concern—the percentage of respondents who, when asked to name the two most pressing issues of the day, named “Politikverdruss/Affären” hovered near 10 percent. For a German analysis, see Martin und Sylvia Greiffenhagen, Ein schwieriges Vaterland: Zur politischen Kultur im vereinigten Deutschland (Munich: Paul List Verlag, 1993), especially 174–188 “Politikverdrossenheit: Parteien unter Druck.”

    10. Richard J. Evans, “Zwei deutsche Diktaturen im 20. Jahrhundert?” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament) nos. 1–2 (January 3, 2005): 3–9.

    11. These issues are examined in Henry Krisch, “Changing Political Culture and Political Stability in the German Democratic Republic,” Studies in Comparative Communism 14, no. 1 (1986): 41–53.

    12. Catherine Epstein, The Last Revolutionaries: German Communists and Their Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003) especially ch. 8.

    13. This work was done at the Institute for Youth Research in Leipzig under its long-time director, Walter Friedrich. The institute avoided the general crackdown on survey work because of its director's personal ties to the head of the official youth organization (FDJ), Egon Krenz, who later became a powerful leader of the ruling party.

    14. Almost none of this work could be published before 1989. Fortunately, the institute specialized in longitudinal studies, which were continued after 1989, thus giving us an insight into change from pre-1989 opinions. See, for example, Walter Friedrich/Peter Förster/Harry Müller, “Ostdeutsche Jugend 1992,” Utopie kreativ 21/22 (1992): 114–125, and Peter Förster and Walter Friedrich, “Jugendliche in den neuen Bundesländern,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament) B19 (1996): 18–29. They write that a change in values and attitudes among youth could be observed already in GDR times (ibid, 20).

    15. Ibid, 27

    16. The quote is “what belongs together now grows together” [“jetzt wächst zusammen, was zusammen gehört]. He is supposed to have said this—and many people swear they heard it—at a rally on November 10, 1989, in front of the Schöneberger Rathaus (then West Berlin's city hall.) But did he say it? Although many media and some scholarly sources say that he did, we have found different versions of his actual speech. In the version from the SPD files in the German Historical Museum (DHM) in Berlin, these words are missing; see Ansprache des SPD-Ehrenvorsitzenden Willy Brandt vor demSchöneberger Rathaus in Berlin am 10 November 1989, http://www.dhm.de/lemo/html/dokumente/DieDeutscheEinheit_rede-Brandt1989/index.html. However, in a chronology (2+4 Chronik), published by Weidenfeld, (http://www.2plus4.de) the words do appear.

    17. A useful discussion is Mary Fulbrook, Interpretations of the Two Germanies, 2nd ed. (New York: St Martin's Press, 2000), 74.

    18. Samples of important recent work include a special issue of the journal Berliner Debatte Initial 11, no. 5/6 (2000), “Demokratie in Gefahr? Politische Kultur in Osteuropa,” with contributions especially by Robert Rohrschneider and Detlef Pollack/Jan Wielgohs; David P. Conradt, “Political Culture in Unified Germany: Will the Bonn Republic Survive and Thrive in Berlin? German Studies Review 21, no. 1 (1998): 83–104; Ursula Hoffman-Lange, “Politische Grundorientierungen,” in Ursula Hoffman-Lange, ed., Jugend und Demokratie in Deutschland (Opladen: Lesk + Budrich, 1995), 159–194; Detlef Pollack, “Wirtschaftlicher, sozialer und mentaler Wandel in Ostdeutschland: Eine Bilanz nach zehn Jahren,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament) B40/2000 (2000): 13–21; and Thomas Gensicke, “Auf dem Weg der Integration: Die neuen Bundesbürger nach der Einheit,” Deutschland Archiv 34, no. 3 (2001): 398–410.

    19. “Deutsche Einheit,” a special poll in the Politbarometer series conducted by Forschungsgruppe Wahlen (September 2004), 1–4.

    20. Gensicke, op cit. 400.

    21. Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, op cit., September 2007.

    22. Pollack, op cit., 17–18.

    23. Hoffman-Lange, op cit., Table 5.4 on 174.

    24. Peter Förster, “Die 30-Jährigen in den neuen Bundesländern: Keine Zukunft im Osten!” Deutschland Archiv 34 no. 1 (2004): 23–32.

    25. This seems to have remained constant from the first surveys soon after unification until today. See Westle, Kollektive Identität, 196–197.

    26. Rohrschneider, op cit. 62.

    27. Detlef Pollack/Jan Wielgohs, “Politische Kultur und demokratische Konsolidierung. Kritische Anfragen an das Konzept der politischen Kulturforschung zu postsozialistischen Gesellschaften,” Berliner Debatte Initial 11, no. 5/6 (2000): 65–75.

    28. The broader organizational setting for these changing political ideas is discussed further in Chapter 8. The role of radical ideas is analyzed in Paul Hockenos, Joschka Fischer and the Making of the Berlin Republic: An Alternative History of Postwar Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), especially Part II, “The Red Decade,” 53–128. See also Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), 390–452.

    29. For the argument that it was this notion of a social economy and state that underlay the democratic stability of the Federal Republic, see Klaus Hartung, “Der neue deutsche Weg,” Die Zeit online, October 9, 2003, no. 42. Hartung writes, “The social state (Sozialstaat) not only represents a founding myth of the Federal Republic: it was its core.” He points to seminal legislation of the Adenauer years that provided, among other benefits, help for refugees, equalization of social obligations, ands similar measures to heal the social wounds left by the war. The task ahead, as he sees it, is to move from a “social nation” to a more individualistic “citizen nation.”

    30. Rolf Becker, “Political Efficacy and Voter Turnout in East and West Germany,” German Politics 13, no. 2 (2004): 317–340.

    31. Almond and Verba, op cit.

    32. Bundesverband deutscher Banken, “Bilanz für die Zukunft: 50 Jahre Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” Demo/Skopie no. 5 (1999): 15.

    33. Westle, Kollektive Identität, 195.

    34. Ibid, 4–5.

    35. Bundesverband deutscher Banken, inter/esse 11 (2002), cited in http://www.bankenverband.de.

    36. Ayhan Kaya, “German-Turkish Transnational Space: A Separate Space of Their Own,” German Studies Review 30, no. 3 (October 2007): 483–502.

    37. Americans may be reminded of debates over “Confederate identity.” The literature on German wrestling with the past is enormous. Scholarly treatments in the broader East European context include Helga A. Welsh, “Dealing with the Communist Past: Central and East European Experiences after 1990,” Europe–Asia Studies 48, no. 3 (1996): 413–428, and Dieter Segert, “The State, the Stasi and the People,” Journal of Communist Studies 9, no. 3 (September 1993): 202–215. Several aspects of this complex set of issues are thoughtfully discussed by Mary Fulbrook in German National Identity after the Holocaust (Maiden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1999). German writings on the subject include Christoph Klessmann, “Das Problem der doppelten ‘Vergangenheitsbewältigung’,” Neue Gesellschaft/Frankfurter Hefte 39, no. 12 (December 1991): 1099–1105; Klaus Sühl, ed., Vergangenheitsbewältigung 1945–1989. Ein unmöglicher Versuch? (Berlin: Verlag Volk und Welt, 1994); Christoph Kleßmann, Hans Misselwitz, and Günter Wichert, eds., Deutsche Vergangenheiten—eine gemeinsame Herausforderung (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 1999).

    38. These and other similar quotations are taken from an essay by James J. Sheehan, which has lost none of its analytical power for having been published almost a decade before German unification. See James J. Sheehan, “What is German History? Reflections on the Role of the Nation in German History and Historiography,” Journal of Modern History 53 (March 1981): 1–23.

    39. Martin Walser's speech objecting to what he saw as an instrumentalization of the Holocaust for current political ends produced a voluminous polemical exchange in the media.

    40. Examples are the slow and difficult negotiations over payments for Nazi-era slave laborers, and the decade-long struggle over a Holocaust memorial in the center of Berlin.

    41. Official policy here reflected popular attitudes. The percentage of Germans who chose the “peacetime” Third Reich (1933–1939) as the “best period in German history” was still as high as 42 percent in 1951; by 1970 it had declined to only 5 percent. From surveys cited in Baker, Dalton, and Hildebrandt, Germany Transformed, 92.

    42. Christa Wolf, Kindheitsmuster (Berlin and Weimar: Aufbau Verlag, 1976), published in English as A Model Childhood (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1980.) First-person accounts of former Nazis who lived in the GDR may be found in Lutz Niethammer, Die volkseigene Erfahrung (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1991). The retrospective view of an East German dissident is Konrad Weiss, “Gebrochener, nicht ‘verordneter’ Antifaschismus” (Beilage zur Wochenzietung Das Parliament) 46, no. 20 (May 10, 1996): 15.

    43. Hence the choice as “non-word of the year” some time after unification: Besserwessi; a pun on the words for Westerner and Know-It-All.

    44. Alan Cowell, “Former East Germans Confront Lurid Steroids Legacy,” New York Times, April 5, 1998; and Alan Maimon, “One Tale of Doping and Birth Defects,” New York Times, February 6, 2000.

    45. Literally, the “history and consequences of the SED dictatorship in Germany,” a somewhat question-begging and politicized title; Deutscher Bundestag, 12. Wahlperiode, Enquete-Kommission, Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen der SED-Diktatur in Deutschland, 18 vols. (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1995). See Jennifer A. Yoder, “Truth without Reconciliation: An Appraisal of the Enquete Commission on the SED Dictatorship in Germany,” German Politics 8, no. 3 (December 1999): 59–80.

    46. For a thoughtful analysis of this process, see Peter E. Quint, “Judging the Past: The Prosecution of East German Border Guards and the GDR Chain of Command,” Review of Politics 6, no. 2 (Spring 1999): 303–329. See also Anne Sa'adeh, Germany's Second Chance. Truth, Justice, Democratization (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), especially chs. 3 and 4. Sa'adeh places the post-1989 developments both in a comparative and in German post-1945 per spective. The highest ranking GDR figure to be jailed is Egon Krenz, who briefly succeeded Honecker as SED chief (October–December 1999). Roger Cohen, “Verdict in Berlin Wall Deaths Is Upheld,” New York Times, November 9, 1999, and Karl-Heinz Baum, “Der letzte SED-Chef muss in Haft,” Frankfurter Rundschau, November 9, 1999). Border guards at lower levels had previously been convicted; among others tried were, prominently, judges and lawyers convicted of bending GDR law for political purposes. A recent example is “Ehemalige Staatsanwältin der DDR verurteilt,” Frankfurter Rundschau, February 3, 2000.

    47. Matthias Arning, “Von Dohnanyi mag einfach nicht mehr ständig über Auschwitz reden,” Frankfurter Rundschau, May 27, 2000.

    48. A recent scholarly survey of this question is Helmut Schmidt, ed., A Nation of Victims? Representations of German Wartime Suffering from 1945 to the Present (Amsterdam: Rodolpi, 2007). As the various contributors to this work make clear, the issue of German suffering in the Nazi era has been a problematical and politically charged one since the 1950s.

    49. This speech is accessible as an appendix to von Weizsäcker's memoirs [Richard von Weizsäcker, From Weimar to the Wall: My Life in German Politics (New York: Broadway Books, 1999); the quote is on page 381.] The German original may be found, inter alia, in ibid, Von Deutschland aus (München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1987), 9–36.

    50. For the text of a declaration published by a group of conservative publicists and politicians, see Reuter Textline/Reuter German News Service, “Neuer Streit Um Gedenken Nach Aufruf Konservativer,” April 7, 1995; Norbert Seitz, “Bemuehter Umgang. 50 Jahre 8. Mai - eine deutsche Pathologic” Süddeutsche Zeitung, April 15, 1995; a review of the literature is in Enrico Syring, “Der immer noch umstrittene Jahrestag [der 8. Mai 1945 in Forschung und Literatur]” (Beilage zur Wochenzietung Das Parliament) 45, no. 35 (August 25, 1995): 13–15.

    51. Richard Bernstein, “German War Commemoration Ceremonies Stress Responsibility for Europe's ‘Mass Graveyard’,” New York Times, May 9, 2005.

    52. For a thorough scholarly analysis, see Philipp Ther and Ana Siljak, Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944–1948 (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001).

    53. W.G. Sebald, On the Natural History of Destruction (New York: Random House, 2003); Jorg Friedrich, Der Brand (Munich: Propyläen Verlag, 2002) Hans Erich Nossack, The End: Hamburg 1943 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). The Internet discussion list H-German has archived a wide-ranging discussion of these and other works on the subject. See especially the contribution of Charles Maier, H-Net: Humanities and Social Sciences Online [H-German Forum], posting of November 12, 2003.

    54. Sebald, op cit., 104.

    55. Peter Schneider, “The Germans are Breaking an Old Taboo,” New York Times, January 18, 2003.

    56. On this latter subject, the best account is in Norman Naimark, The Russians in Germany (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), ch. 2: “Soviet soldiers, German Women, and the Problem of Rape.”

    57. Günter Grass, Im Krebsgang (Göttingen: Steidel Verlag 2002); in English: Günter Grass, Crabwalk, translated from the German by Krishna Winston (Orlando, Fla.: Harcourt, 2002).

    58. For an interesting critique that places the Grass novel and discussion of it in a larger context, see Robert G. Moeller, “Sinking Ships, the Lost Heimat, and Broken Taboos: Günter Grass and the Politics of Memory in Contemporary Germany,” Contemporary European History 12, no. 2 (2003): 147–181.

    59. Grass's admission, in his memoirs Peeling the Onion, that he had served in a Waffen–SS unit in the closing weeks of world War II—a fact hitherto unrevealed—produced a storm of controversy and commentary in Germany as well as other countries, including Poland. For an introduction to the issues in English, see Alan Riding, “Günter Grass under Siege after Revealing SS Past,” New York Times, August 18, 2006.

    60. In part this is a generational difference. Gerhard Schröder, for example, was less than a year old when the war ended. For him, as for many of his age cohorts around the world (think of Madeline Albright!), details about his family's past reached him many years later. See Roger Cohen, “Schröder, Like Germany, Is Looking Harder at the Past,” New York Times, July 2, 2001.

    61. “Ich liebe Menschen! Bundespräsident Johannes Rau über richtigen und falschen Nationalstolz,” [interview] in Der Spiegel, no. 13 (2001), http://www/spiegel.de/spiegel/O.15128.124580.00.html.

    62. Roger Cohen, “Schröder Joins Debate, Taking Side of Pride in Germany,” New York Times, March 20, 2001. Cohen remarks that “… Germans are tired of seeing their history reduced to the 12 Nazi years.”

    63. Werner Reutter, “Germany on the Road to ‘Normalcy’: Policies and Politics of the Red-Green Federal Government, 1998–2002,” in Werner Reutter, Germany on the Road to ‘Normalcy’: Policies and Politics of the Red-Green Federal Government, 1998–2002 (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), For Schröder's speech at an election rally in Hanover on August 5, 2002, see http://berlin.spd.de/servlet/PB/show/1017816/btw2002_0805schroeder_rede.pdf. On this occasion he said, “It is true that we have set forth on our way, our German way (unseren deutschen Weg)…” and later, discussing the danger of an Iraq war, he declared that light-hearted war plans [Spielerei mit Krieg] would receive no support from his government. He charged that Kohl had evaded these difficult choices by refraining from military action but helping to finance them. But now, he continued, “this Germany, our Germany is a self confident [selbstbewusstes] country….”

    64. Interview with Die Welt, December 4, 2004, cited in Deutschland Nachrichten (German Information Center Web site), December 13, 2004.

    65. Interview with Die Zeit, November 28, 2002, cited in Deutschland Nachrichten (German Information Center Web site), December 4, 2002.

    66. “Das ich Frau bin, spielt keine Rolle,” [interview with Angela Merkel] Cicero (October 2005), http://www.cicero.de/839.php/ausgabe=10/2005.

    67. James E. Young, “Berlin's Holocaust Memorial,” German Politics & Society 17, no. 3 (Fall 1999): 56.

    68. Brian Ladd, The Ghosts of Berlin: Confronting German History in an Urban Landscape (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 233.

    69. Grass often presented himself as the political “conscience” of postwar Germany through his sharp criticism of prominent officials and government policies. Grass is a prolific writer and winner of the Nobel Prize for literature in 1999. For many German and foreign commentators, his reputation suddenly became tarnished in the fall of 2006 when he publicly admitted with the publication of his autobiography, Häuten der Zwiebel (Peeling the Onion) that he had served in the infamous Waffen SS as a teenager during the last stages of World War II. When asked by a German journalist why he had not revealed this episode earlier, Grass replied: “My silence during all the years is one of the reasons I've written this book. It finally had to come out.” “Warum ich nach sechzig Jahren mein Schweigen breche,” interview published in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, August 12, 2006.

    70. Günter Grass, The Tin Drum, trans. Ralph Manheim (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), 31.

    71. http://www.ucalgary.ca/appliedhistory/tutor/popculture. Accessed May 20, 2007.

    72. Ibid.

    73. A young Peter Lorre starred in Murderers Among Us, which is the story of a child murderer and his pursuers.

    74. Among them were Lorre and Dietrich, both of whom sought political refuge in the United States and went on to achieve international stardom in English-language cinema.

    75. For an introduction to and survey of East German cinema, see Sean Allan and John Sandford, DEFA-East German Cinema 1946–1992 (New York: Berghahn Books, 1999), and Daniela Berghahn, Hollywood behind the Wall: The Cinema of East Germany (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005).

    76. Barbara Kosta, “Tom Tykwer's Run Lola Run and the Usual Suspects: The Avant-Garde, Popular Culture, and History,” in Agnes C. Mueller, ed., German Pop Culture (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004), 166–167.

    77. Thomas Brussig, Am kürzeren Ende der Sonnenallee (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2005).

    78. Sabrina Petra Ramet, ed., Rocking the State: Rock Music and Politics in Eastern Europe and Russia (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994).

    79. Ibid, 2.

    80. Among them is Silly, a rock band established in 1978.

    81. New York Times, February 27, 2008. The Times article observes: “Among other things, the book shows how far comics have come as a cultural medium taken seriously [in Germany], but also that the Holocaust has come a long way too, as a topic to be freshly considered by a new generation of German teenagers.”

    82. Art Spiegelman, Maus: A Survivor's Tale (New York: Random House, 1986).

    Chapter 5 Notes

    1. Article 23 (the text of which has subsequently been deleted from the constitution) proclaimed that “This Basic Law is currently valid in the territory of the states of Baden, Bavaria, Bremen, greater Berlin, Hamburg, Hesse, Lower Saxony, North Rhine–Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Schleswig-Holstein, Württemberg-Baden, and Württemberg-Hohenzollern. It will be enacted in other parts of Germany upon their admission to the Federal Republic.”

    2. See Peter H. Merkl, German Unification in the European Context (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), especially 226–230.

    3. The terms “Basic Law” and constitution are used interchangeably in this book. Delegates to the Parliamentary Council chose the former terminology to underscore the transitional nature of their efforts pending German unification and the adoption of an all-German constitution. In practice, the Basic Law (as amended) has become the all-German constitution.

    4. Article 31 asserts categorically: “Federal law shall override Land law….”

    5. Article 91a.

    6. Article 91b.

    7. Article 28.

    8. Arthur B. Gunlicks, “Fifty Years of German Federalism: An Overview and Some Current Developments,” in Peter H. Merkl, ed., The Federal Republic of Germany at Fifty: The End of a Century of Turmoil (London: Macmillan Press, 1999), 200.

    9. The enumeration of these individual rights is contained in Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 10, and 13, respectively.

    10. Article 1 of the Basic Law.

    11. Article 6.

    12. Article 9.

    13. Article 12.

    14. Article 14.

    15. Article 15.

    16. See chapter 7.

    17. Article 61.

    18. Article 68.

    19. Article 59.

    20. The fourth paragraph of Article 63 anticipates further contingencies for the election of a federal chancellor, which thus far have not occurred: “If no candidate has been elected (within 14 days), a new ballot shall take place without delay, in which the person obtaining the largest number of votes shall be elected. If the person elected has obtained the votes of the majority of the members of the Bundestag, the federal president must appoint him within 7 days of the election. If the person elected did not obtain such a majority, the federal president must within 7 days either appoint him or dissolve parliament.”

    21. See chapter 7.

    22. Article 65.

    23. This has occurred once, when Ludwig Erhard stepped down in 1966 after he lost support within his own Christian Democratic faction. The Bundestag elected Kurt Georg Kiesinger as his successor as part of the formation of the first Grand Coaliton cabinet.

    24. Article 51.

    25. Article 50.

    26. For the continuing evolution of German federalism, see Arthur B. Gunlicks, The Länder and German Federalism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), 203, and Gunlick, “German Federalism and Recent Reform Efforts,” German Law Journal 6 (2005): 1283, at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol06No10/PDF_Vol_06_No_10_12831296_SI_Articles_Gunlicks.pdf. See also Stephen J. Silvia, “The Bundesrat, Interest Groups, and Gridlock: German Federalism at the End of the Twentieth Century,” in Carl Lankowski, ed., Breakdown, Breakup, Breakthrough: Germany's Difficult Passage to Modernity (New York: Berghahn Books, 1999), 121–136.

    27. Statistisches Jahrbuch 2007 für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt, 2007), 106.

    28. B. Guy Peters, The Politics of Bureaucracy (New York: Longman 1978), 111.

    29. Percentages calculated from Statistisches Jahrbuch 1998 für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 516.

    30. Peters, Politics of Bureaucracy, 111–112.

    31. For a discussion of the tendency to settle issues of social integration through litigation, see Michael Naumann, “Das Kreuz mit dem Tuch,” Die Zeit 57, no. 20 (July 11, 2002): 1.

    32. Statistisches Jahrbuch 2007 für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 263–264.

    33. Georg Vanberg, The Politics of Constitutional Review in Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1–3. Vanberg has called the Court “the most notable and powerful such court in the world. Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, it need not wait for a court case to reach it before making constitutional judgments; both individuals and other parts of the federal government may bring such cases directly to the court.

    34. Lüth case of January 15, 1958.

    35. Classroom Crucifix Case of May 16, 1995. A useful compilation of Federal Constitutional Court case law in English translation is Bundesverfassungsgericht, Decisions of the BundesverfassungsgerichtFederal Constitutional CourtFederal Republic of Germany (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1998).

    36. “Immer mehr Bürger beschweren sich in Karlsruhe,” Frankfurter Rundschau online, March 3, 2007. An analysis of recent developments is Ludger Helms, “The Federal Constitutional Court: Institutionalizing Judicial Review in a Semisovereign Democracy,” in Ludger Helms, ed., Institutions and Institutional Change in the Federal Republic of Germany (New York: St Martin's Press, 2000), 84–104. See also Rupert Scholz, “Fünfzig Jahre Bundesverfassungsgericht,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament) B 37/38 (September 7, 2001): 6–15.

    37. Koppel S. Pinson, Modern Germany: Its History and Civilization (New York: Macmillan, 1954), 162. The most authoritative source on the history of the Germany military prior to 1945 remains Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640–1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967).

    38. Pinson, Modern Germany, 435–436.

    39. See Michael C. Thomsett, The German Opposition to Hitler: The Resistance, the Underground, and Assassination Plots, 1938–1945(Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland and Company, 1997); Jürgen Schmädeke and Peter Steinbach, eds., Der Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus: Die deutsche Gesellschaft und der Widerstand gegen Hitler (Munich: Piper, 1985); and Klemens von Klemperer, German Resistance against Hitler: The Search for Allies Abroad (Oxford: Oxford University Press/Clarendon Press, 1984).

    40. This move was accompanied by an amendment to Article 73 of the Basic Law, which extended the federal government's exclusive jurisdiction to include “the defense as well as the protection of the civilian population.”

    41. Article 65a, adopted in March 1956. In the event of war, the federal chancellor would assume command.

    42. Thomas M. Foster, NVA: Die Armee der Sowjetzone, 3rd ed. (Cologne: Markus-Verlag, 1967).

    43. Cited in Jörg Schönbohm, Two Armies and One Fatherland, translated from the German by Peter and Elfi Johnson (Providence, R.I.: Berghahn Books, 1996), 32.

    44. An informative assessment of the NVA's efforts at transformation followed by pending collapse is Dale R. Herspring, Requiem for an Army: The Demise of the East German Military (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998).

    45. Chapter 1, Article 4, paragraph 3 states: “No one shall be forced against his [or now also her] conscience to perform armed military service.” The law regulating civilian service came into force after the introduction of conscription in 1956.

    46. Data for this section drawn from the Web site of the Federal Office for Civilian Service (Bundesamt für Zivildienst), at http://www.zivildienst.de.

    47. Prior to unification the Bundeswehr had numbered 500,000 and the NVA 175,000.

    48. Herspring, 149.

    49. Herspring, 155–158. Herspring reports that most NVA equipment was destroyed but some was sold or given away abroad. The Bundeswehr retained only some of it for itself, notably a fleet of MiG–29s.

    50. Schönbohm, 51.

    51. Schönbohm, 206.

    52. See data at http://www.bundeswehr.de; Stephen Szabo, “The German Defense White Paper,” AICGS Advisor, December 7, 2006.

    53. The latter option is available to conscientious objectors under Article 4 of the Basic Law (freedom of religion).

    54. For this section generally, see the Web sites of the various security agencies and also Alexander Weinlein, “Gebraucht wird der lange Atem” (Beilage zur Wochenzietung Das Parliament) 52, nos. 15–16 (April 12–19, 2002): 6, and Eckart Wertebach, “Deutsche Sicherheitsstrukturen im 21. Jahrhundert,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament) B 44 (October 25, 2004): 5–13.

    55. As in Chapter 1, we attribute the concept of “take-off” to W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, op cit.

    56. Post-Communist members include Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, and the three Baltic republics (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). The Mediterranean island countries of Malta and (Greek) Cyprus also joined in 2004.

    57. They include Croatia and possibly Turkey.

    58. The United Kingdom and Denmark negotiated the treaty right to opt out of EMU, whereas Sweden chose for domestic political reasons not to join. Greece did not initially meet the requisite economic criteria for EMU membership but later qualified. As of 2008, the newest members of the eurozone include Slovenia, Malta, and Cyprus.

    Chapter 6 Notes

    1. Excellent introductions to this topic include Gerald Braunthal, Parties and Politics in Modern Germany (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996); Thomas Saalfeld, “The German Party System: Continuity and Change,” German Politics 7, no. 3 (2002): 99–130; and Bernhard Wessels, “The German Party System: Developments after Unification,” in Werner Reutter, ed., Germany on the Road to “Normalcy”: Policies and Politics of the Red-Green National Government, 1988–2002 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 47–65. A highly informative comparison of linkages between citizens and political parties is Russell J. Dalton, Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 4th ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2006).

    2. It is notable that the upsurge of dissatisfaction in the 1990s with both parties and politics generally—linked to the catch words Politikverdrossenheit and Parteienverdrossenheit (roughly, the state of being fed up with politics and parties), which received wide publicity through their use by the then federal president Richard von Weizsäcker—seemed to ebb as quickly as it had flooded. This is not to say that there are no long-range problems regarding party effectiveness and electoral turnout. See Stefan Immerfall, “Strukturwandel und Strukturschwächen der deutschen Mitgliederparteien,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (Beilage zur Wochenzietung Das Parliament) 1–2 (January 2, 1998): 3–4.

    3. For an early and still highly informative assessment of the emergence of grassroots movements in Germany, see Jutta Helm, “Citizen Lobbies in West Germany,” in Peter H. Merkl, ed., Western EuropeanParty Systems (New York and London: Free Press, Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1980), 576–596.

    4. Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2007 (Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt, 2007), 72.

    5. See the map in Jörg Schindler, “Die rote Truppe ist bunt,” Frankfurter Rundschau online, February 28, 2008.

    6. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds., Party Systems and Voter Alignments (New York: Free Press, 1967).

    7. Dalton, op cit.

    8. One study of the SPD from its origins to the end of the Schröder government in 2005 is Heinrich Potthoff and Susanne Miller, The Social Democratic Party of Germany 1848–2005 (Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz Nachf, 2006). The modern CDU under Kohl's leadership as party chair and chancellor for more than thirty years is covered in Clay Clemens and William E. Patterson, ed., The Kohl Chancellorship (London: Frank Cass, 1998).

    9. An account of the largely forced SPD-KPD unification in the Soviet zone in April 1946, based on interviews and archival materials, is Henry Krisch, German Politics under Soviet Occupation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).

    10. The program was named after the city on the Rhine south of Bonn where the party congress met.

    11. Vorstand der SPD, Grundsatzprogramm der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands, adopted at a party congress in Berlin on December 20, 1989, and revised at a party congress in Leipzig on April 17, 1998 (Braunschweig: Braunschweig Druck GmbH, 1999).

    12. For two early but still valuable studies of the Greens in particular, and the larger radical setting in which the party arose, see E. Gene Frankland and Donald Schoonmaker, Between Protest and Power: The Green Party in Germany (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992) and Andrei S. Markovits and Philip S. Gorski, The German Left: Red, Green and Beyond (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

    13. An informative biography of Fischer's political evolution from an antisystem protester in his youth to national statesman is Paul Berman, Power and the Idealists: Or the Passion of Joschka Fischer and Its Aftermath (Brooklyn, N.Y.: Soft Skull Press, 2005). Fischer's political career is placed in a larger movement context in Hockenos, op cit., 158–185, 199–216.

    14. There is an extraordinarily voluminous literature on the PDS, produced in several languages both by scholars and such party leaders as Gregor Gysi and Lothar Bisky. Some useful titles include Dan Hough, The Fall and Rise of the PDS in Eastern Germany (Birmingham, UK: Birmingham University Press, 2001); Heinrich Bortfeldt, Von der SED zur PDS: Wandlung zur Demokratie? (Bonn: Bouvier, 1992), which is a semi-insider's account of the PDS's transition from being the ruling party in the former GDR to a struggling postcommunist party in unified Germany; Henry Krisch, “The Party of Democratic Socialism: Left and East,” in Russell J. Dalton, ed., Germans Divided: The 1994 Bundestag Election and the Evolution of the German Party System (Oxford: Berg, 1996), 109–132, which is an analysis of the PDS's early straddle between its eastern German base and becoming a nationwide left wing force.

    15. WASG was a loose collection of (mostly western German) left-wing opponents of Schröder's economic and social policies, including some defectors from the SPD.

    16. Basic documents from the unity party congress, including speeches by Lafontaine, Gysi, and Bisky, can be found at: http://dielinke.de/partei/organe/parteitage/gruendungspartteig.

    17. Lafontaine had, after all, been the SPD's chancellorship candidate in 1990, SPD chair (1995–1999), and for a time (1988–1989) finance minister in the first Schröder cabinet. His commitment to left-wing politics is exemplified by his slogan in his June 2007 congress speech: “Freedom through socialism.”

    18. Hubert Kleinert, “Warum Deutschland umdenken muss,” Der Spiegel, February 25, 2008, at http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0.1518.537472.00.html.

    19. A number of smaller Protestant parties existed as well.

    20. http://www.germanculture.com.ua/library/facts/bl_fdp.htm.

    21. The NPD's total of 4.9 percent in 1969 came the closest.

    22. For a perceptive assessment of the German case with other countries, see Peter H. Merkl and Leonard Weinberg, eds., Right-Wing Extremism in the Twenty-First Century (Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003).

    23. Peter Mair and Ingrid van Biezen, “Party Membership in Twenty European Democracies, 1980–2000,” Party Politics 7, no. 1 (2001): 5–21. Austria ranked first with 17.66 percent. The mean for the twenty countries was 4.99.

    24. This may have been due in part to the Greens' merger with the eastern German Bündnis '90.

    25. Oskar Niedermayer “Parteimitgliedschaften im Jahre 2003,” Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, no. 2 (2004): 320; data from respective party Web sites.

    26. Franz Walter, “Bürgertum koppelt sich von Union ab,” Der Spiegel online, July 9, 2006. For the SPD see Thomas Koch and Wolfgang Schröder, “Auf dem Kurs zu einer Nichtarbeitnehmer-Partei?” Frankfurter Rundschau online, January 10, 2002.

    27. Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2001), 22.

    28. Parties are further and narrowly defined in the national law on parties as “unions of citizens who seek to influence the formation of political attitudes (politische Willensbildung) on a national or state level and who seek to participate in popular representation in the Bundestag or in a Landtag, and who do so continuously or for a longer time.” Moreover, such groups must satisfy detailed criteria set out in the law. The would-be party's seriousness (Ernsthaftigkeit) in seeking to reach these goals are judged by the scope and stability (Umfang und Festigkeit) of a party's organization, the size of the membership, and its public presence. See the Web site of the federal election commissioner: http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de.

    29. Braunthal, op cit, 102–104.

    30. Six of the sitting judges would have had to favor continuing the case, but three of the seven judges voted to dismiss. For a discussion of this case against the background of the NPD's history, see Eckhard Jesse, “Das Auf und Ab der NPD,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament) no. 42 (October 17, 2005): 31–38, and Lars Flemming, “Das Scheitern der Antständigen” (Beilage zur Wochenzietung Das Parliament) 55, no. 45 (November 7, 2005): 7.

    31. For details of the current system, which has been in effect since a 1994 ruling of the Constitutional Court, see a summary of the system (in English) at http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/datab/finance/finance_l.html. See also the federal election commissioner: (Bundeswahlleiter) at http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/wahlen/abc/d/ts2.htm#Staatliche.

    32. To qualify to receive such funding, parties must file annual financial statements of income and expenditure with the Bundestag.

    33. Saalfeld, op cit., 122–123, especially Table 7, 123.

    34. Clay Clemens, “A Few Bad Apples or a Spoiled Barrel? The CDU Party Finances Scandal Five Years Later,” German Politics and Society 23, no. 2 (2005): 72–87, and Clay Clemens, “A Legacy Reassessed: Helmut Kohl and the German Party Finance Affair,” German Politics 9, no. 2 (August 2000): 25–50. An early but useful chronology of the scandal's unraveling is “Der Fall Kiep und die CDU—eine Chronologie,” Der Spiegel 49 (November 29, 1999).

    35. Clemens, “A Few Bad Apples …,” 78–79.

    36. Ibid, “Kohl and the Fall from Grace,” http://www.aicgs.org/topics/Germany2000/clemens.shtml; Roger Cohen, “Kohl, a Stubborn Statesman, May Be Wrecking His Party,” New York Times, January 12, 2000.

    37. http://www.germanculture.com.ua/library/facts/bl_electoralsystem.htm, “Electoral System of Germany.”

    38. Ludger Helms, “The German Federal Election, September 2005,” Electoral Studies 26 (2007): 225.

    Chapter 7 Notes

    1. The Refugee Party, officially known as the Association of Refugees and Dispossessed (BHE), was founded in January 1950 to represent the economic and social needs of the nine to eleven million ethnic Germans who had resettled in West Germany from East Prussia and Poland, the Sudentenland in Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet zone/GDR. The party scored initial successes in state elections in Schleswig-Holstein, Hesse, Lower Saxony, and Bavaria. Twenty-seven deputies were elected to the Bundestag in the 1953 national election, and the party joined the government as a junior coalition partner in the second Adenauer cabinet (1953–1957). As expellees and refugees became increasingly integrated in West German society, the party's electoral fortunes began to wane and it failed to surmount the 5 percent threshold for Bundestag representation in the 1957 election. The BHE was subsequently dissolved and most of its former supporters migrated to the CDU/CSU. For a discussion of the party's ideological appeal and heterogeneous clientele, see Richard Hiscocks, Democracy in Western Germany (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957).

    2. Although the Bündnis 90 did include an environmental group, their chief link with the Greens was the reluctance of both groups to rush into reunification. Indeed, the Greens, unlike all the other West German parties, did not establish an “eastern branch” for the 1990 GDR elections and extended their party to the East only after reunification had taken place.

    3. Because the Greens had not formed an all-German party before the elections, they were nearly shut out of the Bundestag: the only-West German Greens failed to clear the 5 percent hurdle, but their East German allies, the Bündnis 90 did.

    4. We do not yet have a detailed insider account of the decision making process involved here, unlike the 1982 change documented in Klaus Böiling, Die letzten 30 Tage des Kanzlers Helmut Schmidt: Ein Tagebuch (Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 1982). For 2005, see “Bundestag wird im Herbst neu gewählt,” Frankfurter Rundschau, online, May 23, 2005; Claus Christian Mahlzahn, “Selbstmord aus Angst vor dem Tod,” Der Spiegel online, May 23, 2005. The decision to seek early elections seems to have been taken without serious consultation with Deputy Chancellor and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, the leader of the Greens party coalition partner.

    5. Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Politbarometer KW 27 (July 1, 2005) and KW 29 (July 11, 2005).

    6. Thomas Kröter, “Bundestag stimmt für Neuwahl,” Frankurter Rundschau online, July 2, 2005. The vote was 151 yes, 296 no, 148 abstentions. While 105 SPD deputies voted for Schröder, enough (140) abstained for him to lose. It was perhaps a sign of how little the Greens had been consulted that only eight of their number (including Fischer) abstained as planned, while 46 defiantly voted yes.

    7. See his formal statement, under the heading “Jetzt haben Sie es in der Hand” (Beilage zur Wochenzietung Das Parliament) 55, nos. 30–31 (July 25/August 1, 2005): 17, and “Die Fernsehansprache des Bundespräsidenten—Die Erklärung des Budeskanzlers,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, July 23, 2005, 2. Köhler explained his view of this process in an interview, “Und dann entscheide Ich,” Die Zeit, 23 (2005).

    8. Ibid. See also Richard Bernstein, “German President Dissolves Parliament and Calls Early Elections,” New York Times, July 22, 2005.

    9. “Klagen abgewiesen,” Frankfurter Rundschau online, August 25, 2005; “Beurteilungsspielraum des Bundeskanzlers bestätigt,” and “Sieg für den ‘Deutschlandachter’,” both in (Beilage zur Wochenzietung Das Parliament) 55, nos. 34–35 (August 22/29, 2005): 17.

    10. The text is available in German at the court's Web site: http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entsdcheidungen/es20050825_2bve000405.html, which includes the dissenting opinion of Judge Hans-Joachim Jentsch. In his dissent, Jentsch pointed out that neither Schröder nor Köhler had pointed to specific legislation that had been blocked.

    11. The presiding judge of the court, Hans-Jürgen Papier, who had voted with the majority, called for allowing the Bundestag to dissolve itself by a super-majority vote.

    12. Article 68 provides that, should a chancellor not receive a requested vote of confidence of a majority of Bundestag members (the so-called Chancellor majority), he may ask the president to dissolve the Bundestag; the president then has twenty-one days to comply. If during that period the Bundestag elects another of its members as chancellor, the proposed dissolution lapses. See Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Bonn: Bundeszentrale fuUr politische Bildung, 2001), 41.

    13. The political and constitutional background of this issue, as displayed in both the Brandt and Kohl episodes, is explored in Jörg Kürschner, “Neuwahlen nur nach Vertrauensfrage” (Beilage zur Wochenzietung Das Parliament) 55, no. 22 (May 30, 2005): 19.

    14. For an overview of the campaign and its outcome see Erich Langenbacher, ed., Launching the Grand Coalition: The 2005 Bundestag Elections and the Future of German Politics (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006). See also Hans Rattinger and Marie Juhasz, Die Bundestagswahl 2005. Neue Machtkonstellation trotz Stabilität der politischen Lage (Munich: Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung and Akademie für Politik und Zeitgeschehen, 2006).

    15. Richard Meng, “Mit der Sensation rückt Müntefering zuletzt heraus: Neuwahl,” Frankurter Rundschau online, December 28, 2005.

    16. Mathias Jung, Andrea Wolf, op cit.: 6.

    17. Ibid, 5.

    18. TV news regarding Kirchhof showed two tendencies as the summer wore on: one, that it was more often mentioned, and that the mentions were increasingly negative. See Frank Brettschneider, “Bundestags Wahlkampf und Medienberichterstattung,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament) B51–52 (December 19, 2005): 19–26, especially Table 5, 25.

    19. Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Politbarometer, “Umfrage zum TV-duell vom 04.09.2005,” 2; Richard Meng, “Wahklkampf kommt nach Duell in Fahrt,” Frankfurter Rundschau online, September 6, 2005.

    20. Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Politbarometer, September 1, 2005, KW 5.

    21. Schröder described the Left Party as having a “rage to regulate” and relying on wishful thinking. Along with Müntefering, he accused Lafontaine and Gysi (although not by name) of having irresponsibly resigned from important positions. “Schröder und die Left Party,” Süddeutsche Zeitung online, July 5, 2005.

    22. A complete list of candidates for both the Länder and the electoral districts may be found in Das Parlament 55, no. 36 (September 5, 2005): 13–25.

    23. For the often tortuous negotiations to form a joint electoral ticket see, among numerous accounts, “Der PDS-Bundesvorsitzende sieht eine historische Chance,” (interview by Robert Roßmann), Süddeutsche Zeitung online, June 1, 2005, at http://sozialisten.de/sozialisten/pressespiegel/view_html?zid=275728cbs=l&;n=0; “Left Party—aber nur mit PDS,” Neues Deutschland online, June 24, 2005; “Die Left Party—Aufbruch für eine Politik für soziale Gerechtigkeit, Frieden und Demokratie in Deutschland,” online at http://sozialisten.de/sozialisten/nachrichten/view_html?zid=27997&bs=1&n=0.

    24. Mathias Jung and Andrea Wolf, “Der Wählerwille erzwingt die große Koalition,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament) B51–52 (December 19, 2005): 3–12. One apparent effect of Merkel's candidacy was to even out the gender-specific attraction of the SPD and CDU/CSU. Female voters moved to the latter, while males moved to the former. See data in http://www.destatis.de/presse/deutsch/pk/2006/wahlstat_2005b.htm; link to Wahlbeteiligung nach Geschlecht und Altersgruppen seit 1983. Karl-Rudolf Korte makes the interesting point that, as a result of this trend, the grand coalition of 1966 was based on 86.9 percent of the two-party vote, whereas the coalition of 2005 only represents 69.4 percent. Karl-Rudolf Korte, “Was entschied die Bundestagswahl 2005?” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament) B51–52 (December 19, 2005): 12–18.

    25. Ludger Helms, “The German Federal Election, September 2005,” Electoral Studies 26 (2007): 226, citing data published by the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen.

    26. Mary Hampton, “Obstacles and Opportunities: The Changing Role of German Women in National Elections (Or Kinder, Kueche, Kirchen … und Kanzleramt).” Unpublished manuscript on the 2005 election.

    27. Matthias Dobrinski, “Die zittrige Hand des Wählers,” Süddeutsche Zeitung online, September 19, 2005.

    28. Ibid; Jeannette Godar, “Das Wahlvolk wird immer wankelmütiger” (Beilage zur Wochenzietung Das Parliament) 55, nos. 28–29 (November 11, 2005): 11.

    29. Harald Schoen/Jürgen W. Falter, “Die Linkspartei und ihre Wähler,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (Beilage zur Wochenzietung Das Parliament) B51–52 (December 19, 2005): 33–40. Thanks to Lafontaine's prominence, the Left Party received an astounding 18.5 percent of the vote in the Saarland, an increase of 17.1 percent over 2002.

    30. FGW, Politbarometer September 3, 2005, KW 38.

    31. “Rot-Schwarz, Schwarz-Rot, Jamaika oder Ampel,” Süddeutsche Zeitung online, September 19, 2005.

    32. “Kanzlerstreit soll am Sonntag enden,” Frankfurter Rundschau online, October 6, 2005, citing recent polls.

    33. Dürr (ibid., 34–38) refers to two political camps of “inertia and movement” (Beharrung und Bewegung), and Charles Maier speaks of “territorialists and globalists” (Charles S. Maier, “Territorialisten und Globalisten. Die beiden neuen ‘Parteien’ in den heutigen Demokratien,” Transit—Europäische Revue 14 (1997). Salved points to the ability of parties to shape their systemic environment to aid their survival in the wake of unification, but leaves open the question of their response to newer challenges. See also Bernhard Wessels, “The German Party System: Developments after Unification,” in Werner Reutter, ed., Germany on the Road to “Normalcy”: Policies and Politics of the Red-Green Federal Government, 1988–2002 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 7.

    34. The equivalent Swedish party calls itself Vänstern (the Left). Like the German Left Party, the Swedish Left is a democratic party that evolved out of an earlier communist party (albeit several decades sooner than its German equivalent). The Swedish Left has never joined a formal coalition with the far larger Social Democratic Party but has generally supported its policies in parliament and government. See M. Donald Hancock, “Sweden,” in Hancock et al., Politics in Europe, 4th ed. (Washington D.C., CQ Press, 2007), 393—449. Also see Eric S. Einhorn and John Logue, Modern Welfare States: Scandinavian Politics and Policy in the Global Age, 2nd ed. (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003).

    35. Moreover, fringe parties have had surprising, albeit often transitory, successes at the state level, as in Hamburg, Brandenburg, Saxony-Anhalt, and Saxony.

    36. See the analyses of Franz Walter, “Die neue alte Linke,” Der Spiegel online, May 14, 2007, at http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,482717.00.html, and “Die Schwache der Großen,” Frankfurter Rundschau online, May 14, 2007.

    37. Prominent among them is Klaus Wowereit, the lord mayor of Berlin and since 2001 the head of an SPD-PDS coalition government.

    38. Tobias Dürr, “Bewegung und Beharrung: Deutschlands künftiges Parteiensystem,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament) 32–33 (August 8, 2005): 31–38.

    Chapter 8 Notes

    1. By emphasizing organized groups, we avoid the vagueness that plagued earlier generations of group theorists who mused about the existence of “potential” or “latent” interest groups. See, for example, David Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962). Also see Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965). More recent studies of interest groups include G. David Garson, Group Theories of Politics 61, Sage Library of Social Research (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1978); Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, Special Interest Politics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001); and Amy Gutmann, Identity in Democracy, especially ch. 2, “The Value of Voluntary Groups” (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2003).

    2. If an interest group does seek public office, it in effect becomes a political party. An example is the short-lived Refugee Party in western Germany noted in the preceding chapter.

    3. For a contemporary assessment of British interest groups, see Bruce F. Norton, “Pressure Groups,” ch. 6 in Politics in Britain (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2007). Noteworthy studies of interest groups in U.S. politics include E. E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy (Fort Worth, Texas: Harcourt Brace Jovanoich College Publishers, 1960, 1975) and Kevin M. Esterling, The Political Economy of Expertise: Information and Efficiency in American National Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004).

    4. Stein Rokkan, “Norway: Numerical Democracy and Corporate Pluralism,” in Robert A. Dahl, ed., Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966), 107.

    5. Philippe Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbruch, eds., Trends toward Corporatist Intermediation (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1979) and Gerhard Lehmbruch and Philippe Schmitter, eds., Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1982).

    6. M. Donald Hancock, West Germany: The Politics of Democratic Corporatism (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1989). In a later study, Hancock and his collaborators contrasted democratic corporatism with pluralism and étatism as alternative forms of government-group interactions in Hancock, John Logue, and Bernd Schiller, eds., Managing Modern Capitalism: Industrial Renewal and Workplace Democracy in the United States and Western Europe (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood-Praeger, 1992).

    7. By “descriptive census,” Almond meant an inventory of interest groups, their membership, resources, and activities. See Gabriel Almond, “A Comparative Study of Interest Groups and the Political Process,” American Political Science Review 52 (March 1958): 270–282. Reprinted in Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter, eds., Comparative Politics: A Reader (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), 397—408.

    8. Martin Sebaldt, “Interest Groups: Continuity and Change of German Lobbyism since 1974,” in Ludger Helms, ed., Institutions and Institutional Change in the Federal Republic of Germany (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 188–204. Article 9, section 1, of the Basic Law guarantees “all Germans” the right to form societies and organizations (Vereine und Gesellschaften) and Article 9, section 3, explicitly exempts labor struggles from the purview of emergency legislation.

    9. Sebaldt, op cit., 195–196. Sebaldt shows that the major activity of these lobbyists is to work with government ministries on the details of regulations designed to flesh out the general clauses in legislation. In 2007, thirteen of some 1,900 lobbyists represent human rights causes.

    10. In March 1920 the unions staged a general strike that defeated an attempted right-wing coup (the Kapp Putsch). During the Weimar era the unions were active participants in the creation and administration of elective “works councils” established on the enterprise level.

    11. They are the German Union of Salaried Employees (Deutsche Angestelltengewerkschaft) and the Federal Association of Free Professions (Bundesverband der freien Berufe), respectively.

    12. Chronik-Gollsar, “Freier Deutscher Gewerkscaftsbund (FDGB),” http://www.chronikderwende.de.

    13. For a broader view of the dynamics of worker-leadership relations in the GDR see Jeffrey Kopstein, The Politics of Economic Decline inEast Germany: 1945–1989 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), especially ch. 6.

    14. DGB, “Die Aufgaben von DGB und Gewerkschaften,” http://www.dgb.de/dgb/aufgaben/aufgaben.htm.

    15. DGB, “Grundsatzprogramm,” http://www.dgb.de/dbg/grundsatzprog/anforderungen.

    16. The 1976 bill achieved “near” rather than complete parity codetermination because board chairs (whose appointment must be approved by shareholders) are allowed a double vote in the event of a tie between worker and shareholder representatives on the board.

    17. The DGB reported that in 2007 such agreements were in force in 250 branches of industry. DGB, “So funktioniert das Tarifsystem,” http://www.dgb.de/dgb/Tarifsystem.html.

    18. The earlier British measure was initiated by a Conservative government in an effort to deal with a persisting “English sickness” characterized by sluggish economic growth and labor unrest. The bill established a National Economic and Development Council comprised of representatives of the government, employer associations, and trade unions.

    19. The classic depiction of how industry and labor jointly came to dominate industrial policy is in Peter J. Katzenstein, Policy and Politics in West Germany: The Growth of a Semi-Sovereign State (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987). This perspective was applied by M. Donald Hancock in West Germany: The Politics of Democratic Corporatism (Chatham N.J.: Chatham House, 1989).

    20. Wolfgang Streeck, “Die Gewerkschaften im Bündnis für Arbeit,” in Jörg and Hans-Joachim Sperling, eds., Umbrüche und Kontinuitäten: Perspektiven nationaler und internationaler Arbeitsbeziehungen (Munich: Rainer Hampp Verlag, 2001), 271.

    21. Klaudia Prevezanos, “Stepping Forward: German Trade Unions Prepare for the Future,” AICGS Issues Report (2001). According to Prevezanos, only eight of fifty companies listed by the German equivalent of NASDQ had such committees. See also Lothar Funk, “Der neue Strukturwandel: Herausforderung und Chance für die Gewerkschaften,” op cit. (note 3), 14–22.

    22. By 2007 Ver.di, with nearly three million members, claimed to be the largest union in the world.

    23. Wolfgang Schroeder, “Der neue Arbeitsmarkt und der Wandel der Gewerkschaften,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament) B47–48 (November 17, 2003): 6–13.

    24. Wolfgang Streeck, “Industrial Relations: From State Weakness as Strength to State Weakness as Weakness. Welfare Corporatism and the Private Use of Public Interest,” in Simon Green and William E. Patterson, ed., Governance in Contemporary Germany: The Semi-Sovereign State Revisited (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 138–164. Streeck (158–162) makes clear the interplay between political and economic events and the political weakening of the trade unions.

    25. Compare the hostile reaction accorded both Chancellor Merkel (CDU) and then Vice Chancellor Franz Müntefering (SPD) with the applause for Left Party cochair Oskar Lafontaine at the DGB's 2006 National Congress. “DGB geht auf Konfrontationskurs zur großen Koalition,” Frankfurter Rundschau online, May 26, 2006.

    26. Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände, “Name, Sitz, Geschäftsjahr und Zweck,” http://www.bda-online.de/www/bdaoline.nsf/id.

    27. Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände, “Arbeitsmarkt,” ibid.

    28. BDI, “Unser Mandat,” http://www.bdi-online.de/de/bdi/72.htm.

    29. http://www.bauernverband.de/index.php?redid=152876.

    30. An additional twenty-eight partner organizations from nonmember states, including Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey, also belong to COPA.

    31. See “Scientology wird bundesweit observiert,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, June 7, 1997; “Germany to Put Scientology under Surveillance,” New York Times, June 7, 1997. The recent efforts of Scientology member Tom Cruise to film in Berlin about the 20th of July plot against Hitler, with Cruise himself playing the role of Stauffenberg, has reignited hard feelings. See “Plot Thickens in a Tom Cruise Film, Long before the Cameras Begin to Roll,” New York Times online, June 30, 2007.

    32. For the founding in 2007 of the Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany (KRM), see the interview with its German-born (and Muslim convert) chair, Ayyub Axel Köhler, “Wir vertreten einen Mainstream-Islam,” Die Zeit online, no. 17 (April 19, 2007). Köhler is also a prominent leader of the older Islamic Council of Germany. For an example of official German pressure to have an Islamic negotiating partner, see the urging of the interior minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, “Wer spricht für die Muslime?” Frankfurter Rundschau online, May 2, 2007.

    33. For listings of the wide variety of Turkish organizations, both Muslim and secular, with some tied to authorities in Turkey and others not, see Frank Jessen, “Türkische religiöse und politische Organisationen in Deutschland III,” Zukunftsforum Politik Broschürenreihe, no. 72, Sankt Augustin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. March 2006, and Canan Atilgan, “Türkische politische Organisationen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” Sankt Augustin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V., n.d. [Materialien für die Arbeit vor Ort Nr. 9].

    34. “Freedom of the press … shall be guaranteed. There shall be no censorship.” For this text, see the Basic Law online at http://www.bpb.de.

    35. Although the decision was reached on a very narrow legal basis, it was justified in part by the need to safeguard the public broadcasters' freedom. See “21 Cent zu wenig,” Frankfurter Rundschau online, September 24, 2007.

    36. Germans can also read a number of important monthly and weekly journals, including the weekly Die Zeit, founded under British license in 1946; the lively new monthly Cicero; and other “serious” journals. Additionally, there are two major newsweeklies, Der Spiegel (also an early British-zone licensee) and Focus. The courts' rebuff of the 1962 attempt, under Adenauer and his then defense minister, Franz-Josef Strauss, to pressure the Spiegel away from covering a scandal within the government led to a landmark case and a decision that firmly underlined the importance and special status of press freedom.

    37. Achim Baum, “Pressefreiheit durch Selbstkontrolle,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament) no. 38 (September 18, 2006): 6–10.

    38. Johanna Metz, “Journalisten im Visier des Staates” (Beilage zur Wochenzietung Das Parliament) 56, no. 4 (January 23, 2006): 3, and “Ein offensichtlicher Versuch der Einschüchterung,” ibid (interview with Michael Konken, head of the Union of German Journalists).

    39. ZDF, based in Mainz, has a governing board that includes some Bundestag members; three representatives of the government; and various business, religious, cultural and other organizations, in addition to representatives of the states.

    40. Barbara Sichtermann, “Television in Germany,” Goethe-Institute, USA-Knowledge-The Press/Radio/TV, at http://www.goethe.de/ins/us/lp/wis/pre/en14668.htm.

    41. Ralf Hohlfeld, “Bundestagswahlkampf 2005 in den Nachrichtensendungen,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament) no. 38 (September 18, 2006): 11–17.

    42. Kai Hafez/Carola Richter, “Das Islambild von ARD und ZDF,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament) nos. 26–27 (June 25, 2007): 40–46. Details on the research underlying this article can be found at http://www.kommunikationswissenschaft-erfurt.de; a press summary is at “ARD- und ZDF- Programm ‘stärkt Islam-Angst’,” Frankfurter Rundschau online, February 3, 2007.

    43. Of the leaders and participants in the student and youth revolts of the decade roughly from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, one, Rudi Dutschke, who was shot by a neo-Nazi in 1968 (he remained politically active after a partial recovery and died in 1979), has had a street named after him in Berlin; one of those he influenced to join Green politics, Joschka Fischer, became German foreign minister from 1998 to 2005. For an account of these “alternative” aspects of postwar German politics, focusing on the career of Joschka Fischer, see Paul Hockenos, Joschka Fischer and the Making of the Berlin Republic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

    44. For an excellent account that places these movements and events in both historical and comparative perspective, see Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), op cit., ch. 12 “The Spectre of Revolution.”

    45. The voluminous writings on GDR dissent and its social manifestation include John C. Torpey, Intellectuals, Socialism and Dissent: The East German Opposition and Its Legacy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995); Christiane Olivo, Creating a Democratic Civil Society in Eastern Germany (New York: Palgrave, 2001); Mary Fulbrook, Anatomy of a Dictatorship: Inside the GDR 1949–1989 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); and Henry Krisch, The German Democratic Republic: The Search for Identity (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985).

    46. Even the happy experience of hosting the 2006 World Cup soccer championships was marred by a warning issued by Schröder's former press spokesperson that advised foreign guests to avoid certain small towns in Brandenburg. (Indeed, an Afro-German group issued a list of “no-go” areas.) See “Lebensgefahr für Schwarze WM-Gaste in Brandenburg?” Frankfurter Rundschau online, May 17, 2006.

    47. “Wie Neonazis den Sport unterwandern,” Frankfurter Rundschau online, February 12, 2008, and “öfters Pöbeleien beim Fußball,” ibid, October 13, 2006. For a detailed analysis of the travails of one eastern German soccer club, see “Kehrseite des Sommermärchens” (Beilage zur Wochenzietung Das Parliament) 53, no. 13 (March 26, 2007): 3. As part of its anti-American, anti-globalization rhetoric, the NPD organized a rally to greet the Iranian team at the World Cup.

    48. For a chronicle of violence against foreigners in eastern Germany between June 2000 and August 2007, see “Ausländerfeindliche Gewalt in Ostdeutschland,” Süddeutsche Zeitung online, August 21, 2007. Some trials do end in severe sentences, including the maximum penalty of life in prison, for violent acts. See Roger Cohen, “Neo-Nazi Youths Sentenced in Beating of Immigrant,” New York Times online, August 31, 2000. A telling sign of the constant, if low grade, virulence of these phenomena is the recurrent alarm in journals and newspapers. Two examples of the range in time and detail of these are Markus Wehner, “Der Jugendklub als ‘national befreite Zone,”’ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, September 26, 1998, 9; and Achim Zons, “Angekommen am Anfang,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, August 23, 2007, 2.

    49. Klaus Hartung, “Der neue Deutsche Weg,” Die Zeit, no. 42 (October 9, 2003).

    50. Some examples are Alan Cowell, “Neo-Nazis Carving Out Fiefs in Eastern Germany,” New York Times online, February 8, 1998; “Far-Right Surge Alarms Mainstream Germany,” ibid, September 19, 2004, and Richard Bernstein, “Germany's Far Right Tries to Put on a Normal Face,” ibid, March 14, 2006.

    51. A striking example of this is the semi-official political weekly Das Parlament and its scholarly essay insert Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte. Entire issues of the former were devoted to the subject of right-wing extremism in September 2000 and again in November 2005; the latter had theme issues on this topic in September 2000, October 2000, November 2001, and September 2007. In reviewing these materials, it is to be noted that neither the diagnoses nor the prescriptions change much from issue to issue or from year to year.

    52. One of us (Krisch) observed a post-performance theater discussion in East Berlin in 1988 during which audience members declared that of course there were skinheads in the GDR, and not just silly imitators of Western trends. Secret studies of these trends, including opinion surveys among youth, subsequently were commissioned by high party leaders.

    53. For a survey of this subject, see the special issue of Das Parlament 55, no. 45 (November 7, 2005) on right-wing extremism in Europe. For Eastern Europe, see Michael Minkernberg, “Nationalistische Rhetorik ist kein Randphänomen,” ibid, 8; and Dieter Segert, “Die Gefahr des Allparteienpopulismus,” ibid. An earlier study was Hans-George Betz, “The New Politics of Resentment: Radical Right Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe,” Comparative Politics 25, no. 4 (1993): 413–427.

    54. Walter Friedrich, “Ist der Rechtsextremismus im Ostern ein Produkt der autoritären DDR?” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament) B46 (November 9, 2001): 16–23. Official figures for 2006 showed that the four states with the highest number of violent crimes with a right extreme background were eastern states (counting Berlin).

    55. Bernhard Honigfort, “Frau=schlau=weg,” Frankfurter Rundschau online, May 31, 2007.

    56. This is not to say that other European countries have not also had right-wing violence. EU statistics show that Germany trails six EU countries in percentage increase in right-wing violence between 2000 and 2006. During this period, the number of racist attacks in Germany increased 5.3 percent compared to increases of 70.9 percent in Denmark, 45.1 percent in Slovakia, 27.3 percent in Scotland, 27.1 percent in France, 21.2 percent in Ireland, and 8.4 percent in Finland. Smaller percentage increases were reported in England and Wales (4.2 percent) and Poland (2.3 percent), while the number of racist attacks declined by 4.4 percent in the Czech Republic, 2.3 percent in Sweden, and .2 percent in Austria. Statistics from “Assessing Trends in Officially Recorded Racist Violence and Crime, 2007,” in European Union: Racist Violence: Essential Information,” published by EUMC (European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia) and available online at http://www.fra.europa.eu/factsheets.

    57. NPD data and other details of the party from http://www.bmi.bund.de/verfassungsbericht/2005_en.pdf.

    58. In Saxony and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, the NPD obtained 14.4 and 16.3 percent, respectively. Felix Lee, “Bis zu 16 Prozent in den Hochburgen im Osten” (Beilage zur Wochenzietung Das Parliament) 55, no. 45 (November 7, 2005): 6.

    59. There is a coordinating body of women's organizations that does lobbying and educational work. The very breadth of its membership, however, precludes focused campaigns; on the other hand, it does encompass, for example, both Christian and Muslim women's organizations. For the Council of German Women (Deutscher Frauenrat), see its Web site at http://www.frauenrat.de.

    60. The iconic postwar woman—analogous in some ways to America's “Rosie the Riveter”—was the “rubble woman” (Trümmerfrau) whose heavy labor cleared the streets of bombed German cities.

    61. Birgit Meyer, “Much Ado about Nothing? Political Representation Policies and the Influence of Women Parliamentarians in Germany,” Review of Policy Research 20, no. 3 (2003): 401–422.

    62. We will not consider the situation of women in the GDR here. For a combination of necessity (for labor) and ideology, East German women were a major portion of the labor force. Their political representation, however, was extremely limited; for example, there were never any women who were full members of the SED Politburo. One notable exception was Margot Honecker, wife of former head of state Erich Honecker, who served as the GDR's education minister from 1963 until 1989. An unrepentant Communist, Margot chose political exile in Chile in 1992 rather than face German charges of crimes against humanity. In economic administrations as well, women were usually found in lower levels of management and in “feminine” lines of work such as the textile industry. For a comparison of the East and West situations, as well as a pre-and postunification perspective, see Eva Kolinsky, “Women and Politics in Western Germany,” in Marilyn Rueschemeyer, ed., Women in the Politics of Postcommunist Eastern Europe (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), 63–86; and Marilyn Rueschemeyer, “Women in the Politics of Eastern Germany,” ibid, 87–116.

    63. “Eile bei Gleichstellungsgesetz,” Frankfurter Rundschau online, May 11, 2006; “Ende einer ‘heilen Männerwelt’,” ibid, January 3, 2001.

    64. “Frauen verdienen ein Viertel weniger,” ibid, March 8, 2007. On the question of how effective women have been in the legislatures, see Birgit Meyer, op cit., 410–417.

    65. A comparative study of the effects of electoral systems on gender representation is Richard Vengroff, Lucy Creevey, and Henry Krisch, “Electoral System Effects on Gender Representation: The Case of Mixed Systems,” Japanese Journal of Political Science 1, no. 2 (2000): 197–227, especially regarding Germany at 209–210, 214–215.

    66. Joanna McKay, “Woman MPs and the Socio-Environmental Preconditions for Political Participation in the Federal Republic,” German Politics 16, no. 3 (September 2007): 379–390, and more informally, Tissy Bruns, “Ende der Schattenspiele” (Beilage zur Wochenzietung Das Parliament) 57, no. 7 (February 12, 2007): 4.

    67. Rokkan, “Norway: Numerical Democracy and Corporate Pluralism,” op cit.

    Chapter 9 Notes

    1. European Trade Union Confederation, “What is the ‘European Social Model’ or ‘Social Europe’?” http://www.etuc.org/a/111. The ETUC critically contrasts this concept with the American model, “where small numbers of individuals have benefited at the expense of the majority.” Ibid.

    2. Leading examples of an institutionalized European Social Market include Germany, Scandinavia, and Slovenia, with the latter exemplifying a well-developed system of decentralized worker ownership of firms.

    3. Business Europe, “About Us: Mission and Priorities,” http://www.businesseurope.eu/(November2007).

    4. Ibid.

    5. M. Donald Hancock, West Germany: The Politics of Democratic Corporatism (New York: Chatham House, 1989). See also Peter J. Katzenstein, Policy and Politics in West Germany: The Growth of a Semisovereign State (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987); and Katzenstein, ed., Industry and Politics in West Germany: Toward the Third Republic (New York: Cornell University Press, 1989).

    6. See Andrew Schonfeld, Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Capital (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), and M. Donald Hancock, John Logue, and Bernt Schiller, eds., Managing Modern Capitalism: Industrial Renewal and Workplace Democracy in the United States and Western Europe (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991).

    7. Peter Wahl, “The End of ‘Rhineland Capitalism’: Germany at the Crossroads,” Red Pepper Magazine, http://www.redpepper.org.uk.

    8. See the discussion of codetermination in Chapter 8.

    9. Michel Albert, Capitalisme contre capitalisme (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1991). Published in English as Capitalism vs. Capitalism: How America's Obsession with Individual Achievement and Short-Term Profit Has Led It to the Brink of Collapse (New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 1993). Cited in Chris Caldwell, “Europe's ‘Social Market’: Two, three, many capitalisms,” Hoover Policy Review (October and November 2001).

    10. Robert Cooper develops the concept of a “post-modern world,” which he contrasts with “pre-modern” and “modern” states in The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century (London: Atlantic Books, 2003). We return to Germany's place in a postmodern system of European nations in Chapter 11.

    11. Peter Flora and Arnold J. Heidenheimer, eds., The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America (New Brunswick, N.J: Transaction Books, 1981), 18.

    12. W.M. Mommsen, ed., The Emergence of the Welfare State in Britain and Germany 1850–1950 (London: Croom Helm on behalf of the German Historical Institute, 1981), 71.

    13. Timothy A. Tilton, “Perspectives on the Welfare State,” in Norman Furniss, ed., Futures for the Welfare State (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 14. In an earlier coauthored study, Furniss and Tilton provided a useful typology of the “British social security state,” the Swedish “social welfare state,” and the American “positive state.” Regrettably, they did not include Germany in their analysis. See Norman Furniss and Timothy Tilton, The Case for the Welfare State: From Social Security to Social Equality (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977).

    14. Tilton, op cit., 15.

    15. A. Briggs, “The Welfare State in Historical Perspective,” European Journal of Sociology 2 (1961): 221–258. Quoted in Mel Cousins, European Welfare States: Comparative Perspectives (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 2005), 6.

    16. See “Modernization, Democratization, and the Development of Welfare States in Western Europe,” in Flora and Heidenheimer, op cit.

    17. Current Affairs, “German Welfare State at a Turning Point,” Deutsche Welle, August 15, 2004, http://www.de-world.de/English/0,3367,1430_A,00.html.

    18. See Eva Kolinsky, Women in Contemporary Germany: Life, Work, and Politics, 2nd revised ed. (Providence, R.I.: Berg, 1993). Kolinsky notes that a larger percentage of East German women than men became unemployed following reunification, and retired women experienced greater poverty (280–285). She concludes: “[S]ociety after unification has brought more problems than opportunities: material hardship and social uncertainties in place of the system of state provisions and life-style allocations in the past.” Such hardships may be generation-specific, however. Kolinsky observes further that “Younger women seem poised to play a full part in rebuilding the working environment, gaining new skills and receiving fairer rewards than the GDR was willing to extend” (286).

    19. David Conradt, “How Is Power Used?” in his section on “Germany” in M. Donald Hancock et al., Politics in Europe, 4th ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2007), 253. Conradt cites Peter J. Katzenstein, Policy and Politics in West Germany (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987).

    20. Patricia Dismore, “Country Case Studies and Links. Germany,” http://www.pitt.edu/~heinisch/ca_germ.html.

    21. See, for example, Gerhard Backer, Walter Hanesch, and Peter Krause, eds., Combating Poverty in Europe and Germany (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2003).

    22. Paul Spicker, The Welfare State: A General Theory (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 2000), 145.

    23. Cathy Schoen et al., Web Exclusive, “Toward Higher-Performance Health Systems: Adults' Health Care Experiences in Seven Countries, 2007,” Health Affairs 26, no. 6 (2007): w717–w734. “2007 by Project HOPE,” http://content.healthaffairs.org/Most_Read_1.php.

    24. According to Ministry of Family statistics, 30 percent of working women are childless. Germany's average birth rate of 1.37 children per woman compares with 1.9 percent in France, 1.81 in Norway, and 1.75 in Sweden. This decline has prompted efforts by the federal government to encourage women to have more children through a variety of financial and workplace incentives.

    25. Current Affairs, “German Welfare State at a Turning Point,” op cit.

    26. Rüstow returned to Germany in 1949 and was named a professor of economic and social science at the University of Heidelberg. He later served as the first chair of the German Association of Political Science.

    27. Michael Rösch, “The German Social Market Economy and its Transformations.” Rösch notes: “Another aim of the Social Market Economy was to create and develop an economic order which could be accepted by any ideology so that all forces in society could be focused on the common task of assuring the basic living condition and then the rebuilding of the economy,” http://tiss.zdv.uni-tuebingen.de/webroot/sp/spsba01_W98_1/germany1b.htm.

    28. Concerted action was modeled on a National Economic Development Council (NEDC) introduced by the Conservative government in Britain in 1962. Made up of representatives of the government, private business, and trade unions, NEDC was designed to coordinate measures to combat Britain's then-prevailing “economic disease.” See Bruce F. Norton, Politics in Britain (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2007), 133–134.

    29. Hancock provides a detailed account of “The Rise and Fall of Concerted Action” in his West Germany: The Politics of Democratic Corporatism (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House Publishers, 1989), 135–138.

    30. Statistiches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik 2007 (Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt, 2007), 523.

    31. The freeze on pension benefits was coupled with a requirement for retired persons to pay for their own nursing insurance. The legislation was bitterly denounced by trade unions and left-wing Social Democrats and opposed by the Christian Democratic faction in parliament, at the time still in opposition, on the grounds that it “was not the right solution.” Current Affairs, “German Parliament Freezes Pensions,” Deutsche Welle, November 6, 2003, http://www.de/de/article/0,2144,1023585,00.html. The 2003 legislation was preceded by cost-cutting reforms enacted in 2001. See Winfried Schmähl, “Paradigm Shift in German Pension Policy: Measures Aiming at a New Public-Private Mix and Their Effects,” in Martin Rein and Winfried Schmähl, eds., Rethinking the Welfare State: The Political Economy of Pension Reform (Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar, 2003).

    32. OECD, Economic Outlook 81 (June 2006), 256.

    33. Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2005 (Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt, 2005), 48.

    34. “Germany recognizes its face is changing,” International Herald Tribune, May 6, 2006.

    35. As of January 1, 2008, fifteen members of the EU had joined EMU and adopted the euro. They include Germany; France; the three Benelux countries of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg; Austria; Italy; Spain; Portugal; Greece; Finland; Ireland; Slovenia; Malta; and southern Cyprus.

    36. A blatant exception to the competitive regional market for goods and services (including investments) is the EU's Common Agricultural Policy, which relies heavily on subsidies to farmers.

    37. A comprehensive summary and preliminary evaluation of the Lisbon Strategy can be found in Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Spring European Council: Implementing the Renewed Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, December 2006).

    38. Events often belie generalizations. An example is a spate of strikes instigated by the railroad union in late 2007 to press for higher wages.

    39. See Denis Bouget, “Convergence in the Social Welfare Systems in Europe: From Goal to Reality,” in Peter Tayor-Goodby, ed., Making a European Welfare State? Convergences and Conflicts over European Social Policy (Maiden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishing, 2004).

    1. General overviews include Helga Haftendorn, Coming of Age: German Foreign Policy since 1945 (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006); Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (New York: Random House, 1993); Thomas Banchoff, The German Problem Transformed: Institutions, Politics and Foreign Policy, 1945–1995 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999); David F. Patton, Cold War Politics in Postwar Germany (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999).

    2. Politbarometer reports issues by the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen.

    3. Gunther Heilmann, “Agenda 2020: Krise und Perspektive deutscher Außenpolitik,” Internationale Politik, no. 9 (2003): 39–50. Germany currently spends 1.4 percent of GDP on defense, less than either Great Britain or France and below the NATO's target of two percent. Stephen Szabo, “The German Defense White Paper,” AICGS Advisor, December 7, 2006. Germans continued to oppose greater defense spending, even when they approved of a more active German role in world affairs. See the compendium of survey data in Gunther Heilmann und Sebastian Enskat, “Umfragedaten zu deutscher Aussenpolitik und Deutschlands Rolle in der Welt seit 1990,” Eine Dokumentation Stand, January 25, 2004, in 2004_Umfragen.pdf at http://www.das-parlament.de/2004/11/Beilage/oo5.html.

    4. http://www.cia.go/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2034.html.

    5. Haftendorn, op cit., 1–2.

    6. Inasmuch as contemporary German foreign policy continues that of the (West) German Federal Republic, we will not consider GDR foreign policy in any detail here. As indicated in Chapter 3, the two Germanys had similar goals regarding national unification until at least 1961, if not 1970. Thereafter, the GDR leadership stressed the existence of two German states and generally spoke of national unity as a distant goal. Especially in the 1980s, the GDR tied itself closely to many aspects of the German national heritage. At no time did the GDR achieve as much autonomy from Soviet leadership as West German leaders had attained quite early on. A good point of comparison here is the freedom of the Brandt government to pursue Ostpolitik, with visits to Moscow, Warsaw, and Erfurt in the GDR, while as late as 1984, the Soviet leaders blocked Honecker from visiting West Germany. Useful works on GDR foreign policy include A. James McAdams, Germany Divided: From the Wall to Reunification (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), Patton op cit., note 1, and Eberhard Schulz et al., GDR Foreign Policy (White Plains, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1982). An insightful view of the Soviet-GDR dynamic at a time of particular crisis is Hope M. Harrison, Driving the Soviets Up the Wall: Soviet-East German Relations, 1953–1961 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003).

    7. A thorough account, both an insider's tale and historical analysis, is Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1997). For an account in German by Kohl's chief adviser, see Horst Teltschik, 329 Tage: Innenansichten der Einigung (Berlin: Siedler, 1991).

    8. For a recent historical overview of these developments, focused on Germany but including a broader European framework, see James Sheehan, Where Have All the Soldiers Gone? The Transformation of Modern Europe (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2008), especially ch. 8, “The Rise of the Civilian State.”

    9. As James Sperling (among others) has pointed out, “Germany's ‘European’ and ‘democratic’ commitments were both a normative stance as well as a tactical advantage in Germany's effort to rejoin the world order as a ‘normal’ state.” James Sperling, “The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic: The Very Model of a Post-Modern Major Power? A Review Essay,” German Politics 12, no. 3 (December 2003): 1–34.

    10. An observer of Schröder-Fischer foreign policy has noted that to secure SPD and Green approval for important qualitative changes in German policy toward military action, such steps had to be sold as a humanitarian rather than as a Realpolitik measure; Fischer defended intervention in Kosovo in 1999 by declaring that “never again Auschwitz” nowadays must mean “beware of the origins” (of crimes against humanity). Gregor Schöllgen, “Deutsche Außenpolitik in der Ära Schröder,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament) 20, nos. 32–33 (August 8, 2005): 3.

    11. August Pradetto has pointed out that foreign policy was not a central issue for the Schröder government when it came into office in 1998. However, circumstances forced it to modify its expectations. This applies especially to the commitment of German forces in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and particularly after 9/11, in war on terrorism areas. See August Pradetto, “From ‘Tamed’ to ‘Normal’ Power: A New Paradigm in German Foreign and Security Policy?” in Werner Reutter, ed., Germany on the Road to “Normalcy”: Policies and Politics of the Red-Green Federal Government 1988–2002 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 209–234. Pradetto notes that while Germany remained committed to multilateralism and a strongly institutional orientation (UN, NATO, OSCE, EU, etc), it was able to work through these institutions for new national goals.

    12. See, for example, Schröder's op-ed piece in fall 2003 (Gerhard Schröder, “Germany Will Share the Burden in Iraq,” New York Times, September 19, 2003) and most commentaries on Merkel's policies, as for example, Richard Bernstein, “New German Leader, Same Ties to U.S.,” New York Times, October 14, 2005.

    13. The strategic rationale for this policy was clearly enunciated in the government's White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr; an English-language version can be found at http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg. See also Stephen Szabo, “The German Defense White Paper,” AICGS Advisor, December 7, 2006. Especially relevant for the deployment of German forces abroad is the White Paper's redefinition of German security objectives away from a territorial defense to “international conflict prevention and crisis management, to include the fight against international terrorism.” (White Paper 2006, op cit., 9.) The headline writers' shorthand for this is “Germany's defense line begins at the Hindu Kush.”

    14. Mary Elise Sarotte, German Military Reform and European Security (London: Oxford University Press, 2001), 9–11 [Adelphi Paper 340]. Data was also drawn from German government sources; see http://www.einsatz.bundeswehr.de, and author's tabulations. In 2000, German forces accounted for the second largest NATO contingent in Kosovo, and a German general commanded KFOR.

    15. In the 2001 debate over the Afghan deployment, Schröder explicitly linked such actions to “a united and sovereign Germany accepting its greater responsibility in the world.” See his speech in the Bundestag as reported in Das Parlament 50, nos. 48–49 (November 23/30, 2001): 11.

    16. Kerry Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force: The Evolution of German Security Policy, 1990–2003 (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2004), 56–57.

    17. Longhurst (ibid, 63–64) is especially good on the political party wrangling on these issues.

    18. Longhurst (ibid, 64) is surely correct in her assessment: “In mapping the trajectory of change in Germany's post–Cold War security policy, the Constitutional Court's decision of 12 July 1994 is of central significance.” See also Focus on Germany (New York: German Information Center, 1994).

    19. Longhurst, ibid, 84–88. See Schröder's speech (note 15).

    20. That is, in addition to the positions espoused by political parties.

    21. Herfried Münkler, “Militärinterventionen in aller Welt,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, October 9, 2006, 8. In Münkler's pungent phrasing, “Der Imperativ, etwas tun müssen, Überlagert die überlegung, was man tun kann.” (“The imperative to do something obscures the issue of what one can do.”)

    22. As Matthias Geis has put it, Germany, having gained full sovereignty at unification, finds that as an “internationally embedded middle power,” it has difficulty refusing appeals for German military contributions, whether these come “from the USA, the UN or even just from CNN.” See Matthias Geis, “Die Armee, die nicht verweigern darf,” Die Zeit online, no. 31 (July 27, 2006).

    23. Alexander Weinlein, “Marsch in die historische Mission” (Beilage zur Wochenzietung Das Parliament) 56, no. 3 (September 25, 2006): 1. Geis (op cit.) sees this mission as breaking the “last geo-historical taboo” for German military action.

    24. The Week in Germany, July 6, 2007. The court's decision is summarized at http://www.bundesregierung.de/nn_774/Content/DE/Artikel/2007/07/2007-07-03-urteil-bverfg-tornado-einsatz.html.

    25. Thom Shanker, “Gates Says Anger Over Iraq Hurts Afghan Effort,” New York Times online, February 9, 2008; “Bundesregierung wider-spricht U.S.-Forderung,” Frankfurter Rundschau online, February 1, 2008; Thorsten Knuf, “Eiszeit unter Freunden,” ibid, February 1, 2008.

    26. Stefan Hebestreit, “Afghanistan quält die SPD,” Frankfurter Rundschau online, June 28, 2007; “Zweifel an Afghanistan-Einsatz wachsen,” ibid, May 21, 2007.

    27. A poll taken at about the same time for the television network ARD on September 16, 2006, showed that if further peace-keeping missions required more expenditures for the Bundeswehr, 63 percent would rather desist from further actions; 32 percent would pay more. Similarly, the decision to send 780 soldiers for a four-month EU mission to oversee elections in the Congo was regarded as “sensible” (sinnvoll) by only 37 percent, and “not sensible” by 59 percent of those polled. (Infrastest Dimap polling reported in “Kongo-Einsatz gebilligt,” Frankfurter Rundschau online, June 2, 2006.)

    28. These findings are part of a Projekt Links survey on a variety of political issues; see Die Zeit online, August 9, 2007.

    29. See, for example, Geis (op cit.), and Münkler (op cit.).

    30. For a cogent analysis of the operational and political difficulties, see Markus Kaim, “ISAF ausbauen—OEF beenden,” SWP-Aktuell 43, Stiftung Wissenschaftund Politik online, July 2007; for the political difficulties as of summer 2007, see Judy Dempsey, “Keeping the Peace Abroad a Tough Sell in Germany,” International Herald Tribune, August 9, 2007.

    31. For some of the milder comments, as reported in the press, see Richard Bernstein, “The German Question,” New York Times Magazine, May 2, 2004, 52–57, and Steven Erlanger, “U.S. Quietly Chides German for His Dissension on Iraq,” New York Times online, August 17, 2002. A more balanced commentary by a U.S. diplomat with a long record of service in Germany is J.D. Bindnagel, “The Transatlantic Relationship in the Era of American Primacy,” American Institute for Contemporary German Studies online, September 26, 2003. Ivo Daalder points out that Schröder's frank disagreements with the United States mirror what Colin Powell said earlier in 2002 about George W. Bush's style: that he states his views frankly and then goes ahead, hoping but not waiting for allied support. Ivo Daalder, “U.S.-German Relations after the Elections,” American Institute for Contemporary German Studies online, October 25, 2002.

    32. Jackson Janes, “The Change in Government and Transatlantic Relations,” German Politics and Society 24, no. 1, issue 78 (Spring 2006): 121–124.

    33. A sampling would include: on climate change, Helene Cooper and Andrew C. Revkin, “U.S. Rebuffs Germany on Greenhouse Gas Cuts,” New York Times online, May 26, 2007; regarding multiparty support for Merkel's demand that the United States close the detention center at Guantanamo Bay, “Viel Beifall für Merkels Kritik,” Frankfurter Rundschau online, January 9, 2006; and criticism from the CDU and SPD regarding Iran and Iraq and arms sales to Saudi Arabia: “Unverständnis in Berlin,” Frankfurter Rundschau online, July 31, 2007, “Bushes Irakpolitik entsetzt Berlin,” ibid, January 11, 2007, and “USA sollten Iranpolitik verändern,” ibid, March 17, 2006.

    34. For a discussion of German and French opposition to the Iraqi invasion, see M. Donald Hancock and Brandon Valeriano, “West European Responses to the Bush Doctrine,” in Mary Buckley and Robert Singh, eds., The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism: Global Responses and Global Consequences (London: Routledge, 2006).

    35. The Rumsfeld-Fischer exchange at the February 2002 Munich strategy conference indicated the extent of the gulf between German and U.S. views. Speaking directly to Rumsfeld and breaking into English, Fischer declared, “Sorry, I am not convinced. You have to make your case. Sorry, you haven't convinced me.” Paul Hockenos, Joschka Fischer and the Making of the Berlin Republic: An Alternative History of Postwar Germany (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 4–5.

    36. At an election rally in Hannover on August 5, 2002, Schröder said, “It is true that we have set forth on our way, our German way [unseren deutschen Weg]” and later, discussing the danger of an Iraq War, he declared further that light-hearted war plans (Spielerei mit Krieg) would receive no support from his government. He charged that Kohl had evaded these difficult choices by refraining from military action but helping to finance them. But now, he continued, “this Germany, our Germany is a self-confident [selbstbewusstes] country.” See http://berlin.spd.de/servlet/PB/show/1017816/btw2002_0805schroeder_rede.pdf.

    37. For example, see “Wir sind alle gegen diesen Krieg,” [interview with Wolfgang Schäuble], Die Zeit online, no. 14 (2003); in 2005, Schäuble became interior minister in Merkel's government. Note that before the war began, Bush was able to disarm German suspicions, which may have fueled later disappointment; see his speech to the Bundestag and consultations with heads of party fractions in May 2002. See Bush's speech, “Wir verteidigen das gleiche Haus der Freiheit” (Beilage zur Wochenzietung Das Parliament) 52, nos. 22–23 (May 31–June 7, 2002): 17–18; Markus Feldenkirchen, “Freimütig und direct,” Der Tagesspiegel online, May 24, 2002; and Steven Erlanger and Terence Neilan, “Bush Warns Germans on Terror: Has No Iraq ‘War Plans on Desk’,” New York Times online, May 23, 2002.

    38. Statistisches Jahrbuch der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2006, 470—473; “Rangfolge der Handelspartner im Außenhandel der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” Statistisches Bundesamt, 2007; Mark Landler, “Germany's Export-Led Economy Finds Global Niche,” New York Times online, April 13, 2007.

    39. More recently, Joschka Fischer has pointed out that while a post-Bush United States might be seen in a more favorable light in Germany, the strain between the United States on the one hand and the EU (and Germany in particular) on the other will remain, thanks to the disparity of power between them. Fischer therefore prescribes a range of close cooperative ventures to restore a harmonious Atlantic alliance. Joschka Fischer, “Wird alles wieder gut?” Die Zeit online, January 14, 2008.

    40. Karen Donfried, “Germany on the Global Stage: The U.S.-German Relationship after Unification,” in Carl Lankowski, ed, Breakdown, Breakup, Breakthrough: Germany's Difficult Passage to Modernity (New York: Berghahn Books, 1999), 51–76.

    41. Robert G. Livingston, in “The Likable Germans,” Atlantic Times, May 2007, 42. Livingston points to German embassy polling on Americans' attitudes toward Germany. The normal state is that Germany is considered an important international partner, mostly for trade reasons. The “normal” level of favorable (“high” or “good”) about Germany is at a level of more than 40 percent; it rose very high (65 percent) after 9/11, dropped to 17 percent at the start of the Iraq War, and stands at 39 percent in the most recent survey.

    42. These figures and related data in the following paragraph are taken from “Global Unease with Major World Powers,” a forty-seven-nation survey presented June 27, 2007, “America's Image in the World: Findings from the Pew Global Attitudes Projects,” [Congressional testimony by Andrew Kohut, President, Pew Research Center, March 14, 2007]. Both sources are at http://www.pewglobal.org.

    43. “Botschafter wider Willen,” Der Spiegel online, July 23, 2007, 30–31.

    44. Paul Nolte, “Die unamerikanische Nation,” Die Zeit online, no. 22 (May 28, 2002). A parallel analysis, but one critical of German attitudes, is Peter Schneider, “Zeit der Rechthaber,” Der Spiegel online, no. 26 (June 23, 2003).

    45. V.R. Berghahn, “German Americanism and Anti-Americanism in Historical Perspective,” American Institute for Contemporary German Studies (online), December 20, 2002. Berghahn points out that European and German cultural suspicion of the United States, which dates back to the turn of the last century, was much stronger politically just after 1945 than at any time since. Survey data substantiates the view that any sharp rise in such views tends to be policy-related. For early postwar anti-Americanism in Western Europe, including West Germany, see Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 (London: Penguin Books, 2005), 220–225.

    46. For the background of current German-Russian relations see Angela E. Stent, Russia and Germany Reborn: Unification, the Soviet Collapse, and the New Europe (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999). See especially 1–15 for a historical overview.

    47. For some typical examples of Russian-German official goodwill, under both Schröder and Merkel, see Roger Cohen, “Putin Discovers a New Rapport with Germany,” New York Times, June 13, 2000, 1; “Merkel will Beziehung zu Russland intensivieren,” Der Spiegel online, January 16, 2006.

    48. Roland Götz, “Deutschland und Russland—‘strategische Partner’?” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament) B11 (March 13, 2006): 14–23.

    49. Ibid, 14–15, and Tables 1 and 2.

    50. Vladimir Milov, “Energy Relations of Europe, Germany and Russia in the Transatlantic Context,” 17–26 of the AICGS Working Paper The U.S.-German-Russian Triangle: German-Russian Relations and the Impact on the Transatlantic Agenda (2007), at http://www.aicgs.org/analyses/publications. Milov assets further that while Germany is the largest consumer of Russian natural gas in Europe in absolute terms, this natural gas makes up less than 10 percent of Germany's total energy consumption. The main German incentive in using Russian natural gas is to offset declining production in the North Sea fields.

    51. Upon leaving office, Schröder became a co-chair of the company that will operate this system, a move that aroused controversy within Germany. This also aroused intense Polish hostility. For some criticism, see “Schröder verrubelt seinen Ruf,” Der Spiegel online, December 12, 2005; for Schröder's defense, see “Schröder wehrt sich gegen Vorwürfe,” ibid, December 12, 2005, as well as in his interview a year later, “Fur mich gibt es keine Rückkehr,” ibid, October 23, 2006.

    52. Angela Stent, “Berlin's Russia Challenge,” The National Interest online, March 3, 2007. Stent places this issue in a broader EU-Russia framework.

    53. See Strategische Partnerschaft mit Russland, April 26, 2006, at http://www.auswärtiges-amt.de.

    54. Mark Landler, “Putin Prompts Split in German Coalition,” New York Times, May 22, 2007. Merkel's aide for Russian affairs, Andreas Schockenhoff, has stressed that unlike Schröder, Merkel sees relations with Russia as having more than a trade dimension. However, he stressed that Germany is concerned not to single out Russia for political defects—he mentioned Guantanamo—and suggested Russian NGO presence at meetings to reflect Russian societal breadth. “Russland braucht keine verordneten Vereine,” Der Spiegel online, July 10,2006.

    55. The subsequent “cyber attack” on Estonian computer networks during a dispute over a Word War II memorial, as well as the British controversy over the Litvinenko murder, have provided those suspicious of Moscow with added ammunition.

    56. See the analysis by Angela Stent, Russia and Germany Reborn, 233–245, and Stent (note 46).

    57. “Global Unease …,” 73–74 [Pew poll, cited in note 42].

    58. Florian Hassel, “Viele Russen halten Demokratie für schädlich,” Frankfurter Rundschau online, March 13, 2007.

    59. There is a voluminous literature on Germany' relationship to the ever-enlarging European community. For immediate background, see Banchoff, op cit., ch. 2; August Pradetto, “The Policy of German Foreign Policy: Changes since Unification,” in Hans W. Maull, Germany's Uncertain Power: Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 17–18.

    60. “French Leader, in Berlin, Urges a Fast Track to Unity in Europe,” New York Times, June 28, 2000. Chirac's Berlin speech reinvigorated close German-French EU cooperation. Nicolas Sarkozy's election as French president in May 2007, however, marked the onset of a new phase of “difficulty” in the Franco-German partnership. Sarkozy and Chancellor Merkel differ markedly in their leadership styles and personalities, and Sarkozy has sought to launch several EU ventures without prior consultation with the German government. A case in point was his 2008 initiative to create a Mediterranean Union consisting of European and North African nations, which riled Merkel because in her view it threatened to divide the EU. The two leaders subsequently patched up their differences. See “The Awkward Partners: The Franco-German Relationship,” The Economist, March 15–21, 2008, 61.

    61. Hans Stark, “The Franco-German Relationship, 1998–2005,” in Maull, op cit., 109–121. The mutual importance of Germany and the larger European community for each other is a recurrent theme in Tony Judt's (op. cit., 153–160) history of postwar Europe.

    62. For details on the growth and elaboration of the EU structures and practices, see Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration, 3rd ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, Publishers, 2005); Roy H. Ginsburg, Demystifying the European Union: The Enduring Logic of Regional Integration (New York and London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007); and Simon Hix, The Political System of the European Union, 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). One of the authors of this volume provides an overview of the EU's development, institutions, and policies in M. Donald Hancock and Guy Peters, “The European Union,” in Hancock, et al., Politics in Europe, 4th ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2007).

    63. European Commission, Eurobarometer 67 (Spring 2007) [German and English language versions], National Report: Germany. Issues Germans would like to see decided at the national level included: jobs, taxes, education, pensions, and health and social concerns.

    64. As the data in Table 10.4 suggest, eastern Germans are less supportive of EU projects, perhaps reflecting their lower levels of trust in political institutions. See on this point Oscar W. Gabriel, Sonja Zmerlki, “Politisches Vertrauen: Deutschland in Europa?” AusPolitik und Zeitgeschichte (Beilage zur Wochenzietung Das Parliament) nos. 30–31 (July 24, 2006): 8–15. It is noteworthy that the PDS (and now the Left Party) has always supported a European engagement, albeit with sharp policy differences from the major parties.

    65. EU budget assessments are figured as a percentage of gross domestic product. However, a country such as Germany, although itself a major contributor, may receive structural aid funds for a part of its territory. Thus, in 2000–2006, Germany received almost ¢30 million for infrastructure and growth, furthering measures in the former East Germany. See http://www.bundesregierung.de/Europa/lexicon.

    66. Alister Miskimmon and William E. Patterson, “Adapting to Europe? German Foreign Policy, Domestic Constraints, and the Limitations of Europeanization since Unification,” in Maull, op cit., 29–46.

    67. Sebastian Harnisch and Siegfried Schieder, “Germany's New European Policy: Weaker, Leaner, Meaner,” ibid, 95–108.

    68. The official title of the office is “High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy.”

    69. For some of the expansive press analysis, see Stephen Castle and Dan Bilefsky, “Leaders in Deal on Europe's Charter,” New York Times online, June 23, 2007; former foreign minister Joschka Fischer, “Knapp am Totalschaden vorbei,” Sueddeutsche Zeitung online, June 25, 2007; and “Merkel warnt vor Scheitern des EU-Verfassungsvertrags,” Frankfurter Rundschau online, June 14, 2007.

    1. According to a recent poll by Harris Interactive for the International Herald Tribune and France24 television, 68 percent of French respondents considered Angela Merkel the leader of Europe, followed by 57 percent of Germans and Spaniards. Italians and the British divided their votes between Merkel and Gordon Brown, the British prime minister. Reflecting traditional attitudes about the “special relationship” between the United States and Britain, a majority of Americans viewed Brown as Europe's leader. “The leader of Europe? Answers an ocean apart,” International Herald Tribune, April 4, 2008.

    2. Laggard modernization characterizes a number of peripheral regions in Europe and elsewhere. Southern Italy and parts of northern England are prime examples. The Appalachian region of the United States is yet another.

    3. Rainer Geißler, “Nachholende Modernisierung mit Widersprüchen. Eine Vereinigungsbilanz aus modernisierungstheoretischer Perspektive,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament) no. B40 (2000): 21–29.

    4. Between 1991 and 1998, net fiscal transfers from West to East Germany totaled approximately DM1215 billion. Ibid, 27.

    5. “Verdienste in Deutschland,” Statistisches Jahrbuch 2007 für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt, 2007), 523.

    6. “Weniger Bevölkerung in neuen Ländern erwartet,” Frankfurter Rundschau online, May 22, 2007.

    7. “Tearing Itself Down: Depopulation in Eastern Germany,” The Economist, April 12, 2008, 59–60.

    8. Germans trod several different paths to contemporary modernity during the twentieth century. As Mitchell Ash has written, one might want to “consider the FRG and the GDR, perhaps even the Nazi regime, as different though not entirely incompatible structurings of modernity that existed not as yes or no opposites, but in definable historical relations with one another.” Mitchell G. Ash, “Becoming Normal, Modern, and German (Again?),” in Michael Geyer, ed., The Power of Intellectuals in Contemporary Germany (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 305.

    9. Nicholas Kulisch, “Out of East Germany via Bulgaria,” New York Times, March 25, 2008.

    10. Ash, op cit., 267.

    11. In what has been described as “one of the largest economic scandals ever in Germany's post-World War II history,” government officials targeted 163 wealthy Germans for hiding more than ¢27 million in Liechtenstein bank accounts to avoid paying taxes at home. http://www.spiegel.de/intemational/business/0,1518,535768,00.html and http://www.transparency.org/publications/newsletter/2008/march_2008/in_the_news/liechtenstein_bank_scandal.

    12. See the polling data reported in Katharina Sperber, “Wo bleibt die Gerechtigkeit?” Frankfurter Rundschau online, April 4, 2008.

    13. OECD, Economic Surveys: Germany (2006B-May 2006), 8.

    14. In 2007–2008, the annual inflation rate averaged 2.7 percent in the euro zone, 3.3 percent in the United States, and 2.6 percent in Britain. Germany's unemployment rate during the same period was 7.8 percent compared to 7.1 percent in the euro area, 5.2 percent in Britain, and 5.1 percent in the United States. The Economist, April 12, 2008, 109. For performance indicators from 1982 to 2005, see Table 9.4 in Chapter 9 of this text.

    15. Eurobarometer 68, Nationaler Bericht Deutschland (Fall 2007), 7–8. Thirty-five percent of eastern Germans expected to be worse off in twelve months compared to 24 percent of western Germans expressing similar expectations.

    16. In mid-April 2008 the euro was worth nearly $1.60, a significant increase in value since its introduction in January 2002 at nearly a 1:1 parity rate.

    17. “Despite her popularity, Merkel has ceased to set the agenda,” International Herald Tribune, April 16, 2008.

    18. Ibid.

    19. Franz Walter, “Im Sog der Ein-bisschen Gesellschaft,” Der Spiegel online, March 23, 2008, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0.1518.542979.00.html.

    20. In a Politbarometer poll of April 2008, two-thirds of the general public and an astonishing 61 percent of SPD supporters did not want Beck to be the SPD's chancellor candidate in 2009. (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Politbarometer, April 1, 2008, KW 14).

    21. The polling results described in this paragraph are taken from results of a Infratest dimap poll for the TV network ARD as reported in Frankfurter Rundschau online, March 11, 2008.

    22. Michael Naumann, “Wohin treibt die SPD?” Die Zeit online, no. 14 (March 27, 2008), http://www.zeit.de/2008/14/SPD-Kurs.

    23. It helped his argument that a newly elected Left Party Lower Saxony state legislator avowed her communist allegiance and approval of both the Stasi and the Berlin Wall.

    24. Naumann, ibid.

    25. Klaus Wowereit, “Meine Zeit wird kommen,” Cicero online, April 2008, http://www.cicero.de/839.php?ausgabe=04/2008.

    26. Ibid.

    27. Wolfram Weimer, “Es war einmal ein Linksruck,” Cicero online, April 2008, http://www.cicero.de/839.php?ausgabe=04/2008.

    28. The decision by the Greens to enter into this coalition government is defended by their national co-chair, Renate Künast, in “Künast verteidigt Schwarz-Grün,” Frankfurter Rundschau online, April 19, 2008, and analyzed further by Michael Schlieben, “Schwarz-Grün für Deutschland,” Die Zeit online, April 18, 2008, http://www.zeit.de/online/2008/17/scharz-gruen-reaktionen.

    29. The background for this section was detailed at greater length in Chapter 1; among the important background sources noted there were, for Germany, Simon Green, The Politics of Exclusion: Institutions and Immigration Policy in Contemporary Germany (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004). For the broader west and east European context, see Kristen Ghodsee, “Headscarves in Homeroom: Women's Islamic Dress in the ‘New’ Europe,” American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, NewsNet 47, no. 4 (August 2007): 1–6 (on Bulgaria), and on western Europe but especially Great Britain, see the symposium “Engaging with Islamism in Britain and Europe,” Political Science & Politics 41, no. 1 (January 2008): 11–42. See also the sources cited in chapter one: Timothy A. Byrnes and Peter J. Katzenstein, eds., Religion in an Expanding Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Jytte Klausen, The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

    30. Wolfgang Schäuble, “Der Islam ist Teil Deutschlands und Teil Europas” (Beilage zur Wochenzietung Das Parliament) 56, no. 40/41 (October 2/9, 2006): 15. This text is from Bundestag proceedings.

    31. We have pointed to Akin's work in discussing political and general culture in Chapter 4. For a more recent account of his social standing as a cultural intermediary, see Nicholas Kulisch, “A Hand That Links Germans and Turks,” New York Times, January 6, 2008, MT9.

    32. Of course, these are indeed real problems, and they involve real differences in values. One particular case of honor killings, for example, shook Berlin in 2006. It involved the murder of a Turkish (actually, Kurdish) woman who had fled from an arranged marriage in Turkey. She was killed by a brother (the family lived in Berlin) who was selected for the job because of his youth—so that he would fall under juvenile justice laws. German reaction to the relatively mild sentence of nine years was to press for deportation of the family. A leader of the Berlin Greens, in a typical reaction, declared that if the family refused to accept German values and legal norms, one should tell them to leave. The family applied for custodial care of the victim's son; Berlin child welfare officials objected that this would be contrary to the child's best interests. See “Das Verfahren,” Tagesspiegel online, April 18, 2006; “Familie Sürücü soll gehen,” Berliner Zeitung online, April 18, 2006; “Fall Sürücü kommt vor das Familiengericht,” ibid. It is important to note that Turkish women activists denounced the light sentence: “Türkinnen halten die Strafe für zu milde,” Tagesspiegel online, April 20, 2006.

    33. Faruk Sen and Dirk Halm, “Wanted: The Chance to Become German,” Atlantic Times, April 2008, 3.

    34. In an interview Ertekin Özcan, head of Turkish-German PTA societies, stressed the role of parents' social background, not ethnicity, as a handicap to their children's education. “Mangelnde Bildung ist kein türkisches Phänomen,” Frankfurter Rundschau online, May 3, 2006.

    35. The German dimension of this is examined by Simon Green in “Rethinking Immigrant Integration in Germany,” AICGS Advisor online, December 21, 2006. Karin L. Johnson, in “Religion and Politics: The European Debate,” AICGS Issue Brief no. 15 online, May 2007, explores the larger European pattern.

    36. Mark Landler, “Germans Split over a Mosque and the Role of Islam,” New York Times online, July 5, 2007. What critics see as a symbol of a separatist minority, its proponents, including its German architect, see as a step toward integration. Paul Böhn, “Die Moschee steht für Toleranz,” Cicero online, May 2006. http://www.cicero.de/97.php?ress_id=4&item=2152. For the parallel dispute in Munich, see Mark Landler, “In Munich, Provocation in a Symbol of Foreign Faith,” New York Times online, December 8, 2006.

    37. See the interview with Ekin Deligöz in ‘“Es ist ein Symbol der Unterdrückung”’ (Beilage zur Wochenzietung Das Parliament) 56, no. 46 (November 13, 2006): 3. She was then the object of death threats. See Jörg Lau, “Die Macht der frechen Frauen,” Die Zeit online, no. 4, 2006.

    38. “Symbol der Unterdrückung,” Der Spiegel online, October 15, 2006.

    39. See the interview with an Iranian-born theologian, head of the Muslim Academy in Germany, Hamideh Mohaghegi, in “Wie Muslimas sich kleiden, sollen sie frei entscheiden dürfen,” Frankfurter Rundschau online, November 4, 2006.

    40. “Deutsche Schüler bekommen Islamunterricht,” ibid, March 13, 2008.

    41. Martina Fietz, “Fietz fragt: Lale Akgün, SPD-Bundestagsabgeordnete zur Islamkonferenz,” Cicero online, March 2008, http://www.cicero.de/839.php?ausgabe=03/2008.

    42. “Ministerin sucht Bündnis mit Christen,” Frankfurter Rundschau online, April 20, 2006.

    43. These and the data in the following paragraphs are taken from an extremely instructive series in Die Zeit, in which Germany's Turks were both polled and interviewed. Jörg Lau, “Wir wollen hier rein!” Die Zeit online, no. 12 (March 13, 2008), http://www.zeit.de/2008/12//Tuerken-Umfrage.

    44. Data from the Stastitisches Jahrbuch 2007; see also “Zahl der Ein-wanderer sinkt unter 600 000,” Frankfurter Rundschau online, July 7, 2006, and Vera Gaserow, “Weniger Zuwanderer,” ibid, January 18, 2005. Gaserow points out that immigration from Turkey did not consist largely of wives in arranged marriages with Turkish-German men, a point often cited as a major obstacle to integration.

    45. Ibid.

    46. Mary Hampton, “‘The Past, Present, and the Perhaps': Is Germany a ‘Normal Power’?” Security Studies 1 (2000): 179–202.

    47. For an incisive analysis and survey of Germany's international position in the wake of Schröder's assertion of Germany's enhanced position, see Gunther Hellmann, “Von Gipfelstürmern und Gratwanderern: ‘Deutsche Wege’ in der Außenpolitik,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament) no. 11 (March 8, 2004), online. Hellmann identified a number of useful projects wherein Germany could exert a due but not excessive measure of influence, such as the “Weimar Triangle” of France, Germany, and Poland, where Berlin could use its influence to bridge the supposed “old Europe”—“new Europe” divide.

    48. Steven Erlanger and Steven Lee Myers, “Allies Upset as Bush Moves off NATO Script,” International Herald Tribune online, April 3, 2008.

    49. Charles S. Maier, “America among Empires? Imperial Analogues and Imperial Syndrome,” GHI Bulletin no. 41 (Fall 2007): 25.

    50. For pointed arguments—military, historical, economic, moral—against the Afghan deployment, see Wolfram Weimar, “Raus aus Afghanistan!” Cicero online, April 2008, http://www.cicero.de/839.php?ausgabe=04/2008. How widely these critics' views have penetrated the political establishment may be seen in a survey of Bundestag defense experts from all parties reported in Martina Fietz, “Raus aus Afghanistan, aber …,” ibid. Note that a special Green Party congress called to decide the party's stand on reauthorizing the Afghanistan deployment voted against such approval, thereby overturning the recommendation of the party leadership and Bundestag faction. See “Klares Nein zu Afghanistan-Leitantrag,” http://Tagesschau.de online, September 16, 2007.

    51. The argument we offer here is drawn from James Sheehan's recent account of Europe's transformation from (following Harold Laswell) garrison states to civilian states. Sheehan traces this development from the rise of mass armies and public ideals of military heroism after 1815 to its replacement after 1945 by notions of economic and social security and individual achievement. See James Sheehan, Where Have All the Soldiers Gone? The Transformation of Modern Europe (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2008), especially chs. 8, 9, and the Epilogue.

    52. Ibid, 200–201. Sheehan quotes then German president Richard von Weizsäcker as declaring—on the very occasion, October 3, 1990, when Germany celebrated recovery of full sovereignty in a unified country—that “Today sovereignty means participating in the international community.”

    53. This suggests that German-American relations will improve under another U.S. president and as the Iraq War winds down, although the era of unquestioning German acceptance of American leadership (if it ever existed!) will not reappear. Joschka Fischer makes these points in a recent essay, “Wird alles wieder gut?” Die Zeit online, January 14, 2008.

    54. Sheehan, op cit., 223–224.

    55. Nicholas Kulish, “Efforts to Restore Shine to Medal Tarnished by Nazis,” New York Times, March 20, 2008. Kulish quotes Berlin political scientist Christoph Zürcher, who asserted, “In the German political culture, it is simply not possible to express esteem for young soldiers.”

    56. Sheehan, op cit., 180.

    57. Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003). Cooper was awarded the Orwell Prize (the preeminent annual British prize for political writing) for the book for his “distinguished contribution to honesty and clarity in public language.”

    58. Ibid, 16.

    59. For example, conflicts in Chechnya in Russia and Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom.

    60. Ibid, 22.

    61. Ibid, 27.

    62. Roger Cohen, “The Cold War as Ancient History,” New York Times, February 4, 2008, and “Mauer? Welche Mauer?” Frankfurter Rundschau online, December 27, 2007.

    Further Reading

    Black, C.E.The Dynamics of Modernization. New York: Harper and Row, 1966.
    Dahrendorf, Ralf. Society and Democracy in Germany. New York: W.W. Norton, 1967.
    Huntington, Samuel. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.
    Huntington, Samuel. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993.
    Inglehart, Ronald. The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977.
    Inglehart, Ronald. Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.
    Inglehart, Ronald. Modernization and Postmodernization Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997.
    Linz, Juan J., and AlfredStepan. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1996.
    Moore, Barrington, Jr.Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. With a new foreword by EdwardFriedman and James C.Scott. Boston: Beacon Press, 1993.
    Rustow, Dankwart A.A World of Nations. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1967.
    Historical Background
    Craig, Gordon. The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640–1945. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956.
    Craig, Gordon. Germany, 1866–1945. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967.
    Elon, Amos. The Pity of It All: A History of Jews in Germany, 1743–1933. New York: Metropolitan Books (Henry Holt), 2002.
    Holborn, Hajo. A History of Modern Germany: The Reformation. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961.
    Jarausch, Konrad H., and MichaelGeyer. Shattered Past: Reconstructing German Histories. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003.
    Wende, Peter. A History of Germany. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2005.
    Winkler, Heinrich August. Der lange Weg nach Westen, 2 vols. Munich: C. H. Beck, 2000.
    The Weimar and Nazi Eras, 1918–1945
    Bracher, Karl Dietrich. The German Dictatorship. New York: Praeger, 1970.
    Bracher, Karl Dietrich. Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republic. Stuttgart: Ring, 1977.
    Evans, Richard J.The Coming of the Third Reich. London: Penguin Books, 2004.
    Friedländer, Saul. Nazi Germany and the Jews: The Years of Persecution 1933–1939. New York: HarperCollins, 1997.
    Friedländer, Saul. The Years of Extermination: Nazi Germany and the Jews, 1939–1945. New York: HarperCollins, 2008.
    Gay, Peter. Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider. New York: Harper and Row, 1970.
    Gay, Peter. My German Question: Growing Up in Nazi Berlin. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.
    Kershaw, Ian. Hitler: 1889–1936 Hubris and Hitler: 1936–1945 Nemesis. New York: Norton, 2000.
    MacMillan, Margaret. Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World. New York: Random House, 2002.
    Mühlberger, Detlef. The Social Bases of Nazism, 1919–1933. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
    Postwar Germany
    Brandt, Willy. In Exile: Essays, Reflections and Letters, 1933–1947. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971.
    Edinger, Lewis J.Kurt Schumacher: A Study in Personality and Political Behavior. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965.
    Fulbrook, Mary. The Divided Nation: A History of Germany, 1918–1990. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.
    The Federal Republic, 1949–1990
    Adenauer, Konrad. Erinnerungen, 1955–1959. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1967.
    Gunlicks, Arthur. Local Government in the German Federal System. Durham: Duke University Press, 1986.
    Merkl, Peter H.The Origin of the West German Republic. New York: Oxford University Press, 1965.
    Merkl, Peter H.The Federal Republic at Fifty: The End of a Century of Turmoil. London: Macmillan, 1999.
    Smith, Gordon, et al., eds. Developments in German Politics. Durham: Duke University Press, 1990.
    Smyser, W.R.From Yalta to Berlin: The Cold War Struggle over Germany. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999.
    Stern, Fritz. Five Germanys I Have Known. New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2006.
    German Democratic Republic
    Dennis, Michael. The German Democratic Republic. London: Pintor Publishers, 1988.
    Edwards, G.E.GDR Society and Social Institutions: Facts and Figures. London: Macmillan, 1985.
    Fulbrook, Mary. Anatomy of a Dictatorship: Inside the GDR, 1949–1989. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
    Fulbrook, Mary. The People's State: East German Society from Hitler to Honecker. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005.
    Kopstein, Jeffrey. The Politics of Economic Decline. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997.
    Krisch, Henry. German Politics under Soviet Occupation. New York: Columbia University Press, 1974.
    Krisch, Henry. The German Democratic Republic: The Search for Identity. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985.
    McAdams, James. East Germany and the West: Surviving Détente. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511521874
    McAdams, James. Germany Divided: From the Wall to Unification. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.
    Plenzdorf, Ulrich, and RüdigerDamann, Ein Land, genannt die DDR. Frankfurt am/Main: M.S. Fischer Verlag, 2005.
    Rueschemeyer, Marilyn, and ChristianeLeme, eds. The Quality of Life in the German Democratic Republic. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1989.
    Sandford, Gregory. From Hitler to Ulbricht: The Communist Reconstruction of East Germany, 1945–1946. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983.
    Stern, Carola. Ulbricht. Eine Politische Biographie. Cologne: Kiepenheuer and Witsch, 1963.
    Woods, Roger. Opposition in the GDR under Honecker 1971–1985. London: Macmillan, 1986.
    Unification and Germany Since 1990
    Anderson, Christopher, KarlKaltenthaler, and WolfgangLuthardt, eds. The Domestic Politics of German Unification. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1993.
    Clay, Clemens, and William E.Paterson, eds. The Kohl Chancellorship. London: F. Cass, 1998.
    Dennis, Mike, and EvaKolinsky, eds. United and Divided: Germany since 1990. New York: Berghahn Books, 2004.
    Fischer, Marc. After the Wall: Germany, the Germans, and the Burdens of History. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995.
    Glaessner, Gert-Joachim. The Unification Process in Germany: From Dictatorship to Democracy. London: Pinter Publishers, 1992.
    Hampton, Mary N.The Wilsonian Impulse: U.S. Foreign Policy, the Alliance and German Unification. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996.
    Hampton, Mary N., and ChristianSoe, eds. Between Bonn and Berlin: German Politics Adrift?Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999.
    Hancock, M. Donald, and Helga A.Welsh, eds. German Unification: Process and Outcomes. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994.
    Huelshoff, Michael, AndreiMarkovits, and SimonReich, eds. From Bundesrepublik to Deutschland: German Politics after Unification. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993.
    Kolinsky, Eva. Women in Contemporary Germany: Life, Work and Politics,
    2nd revised ed.
    Providence, R.I.: Berg, 1993.
    Ladd, Brian. The Ghosts of Berlin: Confronting German History in the Urban Landscape. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226467603.001.0001
    McAdams, James. Judging the Past in Unified Germany. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
    Merkl, Peter H.German Unification in the European Context. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993.
    Sinn, Gerlinde, and Hans-WenerSinn. Jumpstart: The Economic Unification of Germany. Cambridge: MIT University Press, 1993.
    Taylor, Frederick. The Berlin Wall: A Word Divided, 1961–1989. New York: HarperCollins, 2006.
    Wise, Michael Z.Capital Dilemma: Germany's Search for a New Architecture of Democracy. New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1998.
    Political and Popular Culture
    Almond, Gabriel, and SidneyVerba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, An Analytical Study. Boston: Little, Brown, 1965.
    Baker, Kendall L., Russell J.Dalton, and KaiHildebrandt. Germany Transformed: Political Culture and the New Politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981.
    Conradt, David P.“Changing German Political Culture”. In The Civic Culture Revisited, Gabriel A.Almond and SidneyVerba, eds. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1989.
    Conradt, David P.The German Polity,
    ed. New York: Pearson-Longman, 2005.
    Dalton, Russell J.Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies,
    ed. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2006.
    Verba, Sidney. “The Remaking of German Political Culture”. In Political Culture and Political Development, LucianPye and SidneyVerba, eds. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965.
    Jarausch, Konrad H.After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945–1955. Translated by BrandonHunziker. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195127799.001.0001
    Ramet, Sabrina Petra. Social Currents in Eastern Europe: The Sources and Consequences of the Great Transformation,
    ed. Durham: Duke University Press, 1995.
    Taberner, Stuart, and FrankFinlay, eds. Recasting German Identity: Culture, Politics, and Literature in the Berlin Republic. Rochester, N.Y.: Camden House, 2002.
    Constitutional Principles, Political Institutions, and Decision Processes
    Braunthal, Gerhard. The West German Legislative Process. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972.
    Green, Simon, and William E.Paterson, eds. Governance in Contemporary Germany. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
    Gunlicks, Arthur B.Local Government in the German Federal System. Durham: Duke University Press, 1986.
    Gunlicks, Arthur B.The Länder and German Federalism. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2003.
    Klein, Hans, ed. The German Chancellors. Chicago: Edition Q, 1996.
    Kommers, Donald. Constitutional Jurisprudence in the Federal Republic of Germany. Durham: Duke University Press, 1989.
    Kommers, Donald. Judicial Politics in West Germany. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1976.
    Loewenberg, Gerhard. Parliament in the German Political System. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966.
    Mayntz, Renate, and Fritz W.Scharpf. Policy-Making in the German Federal Bureaucracy. New York: Elsevier, 1965.
    Rogowski, Ralf, and ThomasGawron, eds. Constitutional Courts in Comparison: The U.S. Supreme Court and the German Constitutional Court. New York: Berghahn Publishers, 2002.
    Political Parties, Interest Groups, and Social Movements
    Braunthal, Gerhard. The Federation of German Industry in Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965.
    Braunthal, Gerhard. The West German Social Democrats, 1969–1982. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983.
    Braunthal, Gerhard. Parties and Politics in Modern Germany. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996.
    Dalton, Russell J., ed. The New Germany Votes: Unification and the Creation of a German Party System. Providence, R.I.: Berg, 1993.
    Dalton, Russell J., ed. Germans Divided: The 1994 Bundestag Elections and the Evolution of the German Party System. Washington, D.C.: Berg, 1996.
    Frankland, Gene E., and DonaldSchoonmaker. Between Protest and Power: The Green Party in Germany. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992.
    Grebing, Helga. The History of the German Labour Movement. London: Oswald Wolff, 1969.
    Heidenheimer, Arnold J.Adenauer and the CDU. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-8810-4
    Hockenos, Paul. Joschka Fischer and the Making of the Berlin Republic: An Alternative History of Postwar Germany. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
    Langenbacher, Erich, ed. Launching the Grand Coalition: The 2005 Bundestag Elections and the Future of German Politics. New York: Berghahn Books, 2006.
    Lees, Charles. The Red-Green Coalition in Germany: Politics, Personality and Power. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2000.
    Merkl, Peter, ed. Western European Party Systems. New York: Free Press, 1980.
    Potthoff, Heinrich, and SusanneMiller. The Social Democratic Party of Germany, 1848–2005. Bonn: J.H. W. Dietz Nachf., 2006.
    Wildenmann, Rudolf. Partei und Fraktion. Meisenheimer/Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1955.
    Economic Policy
    Katzenstein, Peter J., ed. Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978.
    Lehmbruch, Gerhard, and Philippe C.Schmitter, eds. Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1982.
    Schmitter, Philippe C., and GerhardLehmbruch, eds. Trends toward Corporatist Intermediation. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1979.
    Siebert, Horst. The German Economy: Beyond the Social Market. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005.
    Social Policy and Security
    Byrnes, Timothy A., and Peter J.Katzenstein, eds. Religion in an Expanding Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491917
    Fetzer, Joel S., and J.Christopher Soper. Muslims and the State in Britain, France and Germany. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
    Flora, Peter, and Arnold J.Heidenheimer, eds. The Development of the Welfare State in Europe and America. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1981.
    Green, Simon. The Politics of Exclusion: Institutions and Immigration Policy in Contemporary Germany. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2004.
    Heidenheimer, Arnold J., HughHeclo, and CarolynTeich Adams. Comparative Public Policy: The Politics of Social Choice in America, Europe, and Japan,
    ed. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990.
    Klausen, Jytte. The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
    Mattil, Birgit. Pension Systems: Sustainability and Distributional Effects in Germany and the United Kingdom. Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag, 2006.
    Rein, Martin, and WinfriedSchmähl, eds. Rethinking the Welfare State. The Political Economy of Pension Reform. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2004.
    Taylor-Gooby, Peter, ed. New Risks, New Welfare: The Transformation of the European Welfare State. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/019926726X.001.0001
    Foreign Policy and Military Security
    Ash, Timothy G.In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent. New York: Random House, 1993.
    Banchoff, Thomas. The German Problem Transformed: Institutions, Politics and Foreign Policy, 1945–1995. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999.
    Clemens, Clay, ed. NATO and the Quest for Post-Cold War Security. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997.
    Hanrieder, Wolfram F.West German Foreign Policy, 1949–1969. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980.
    Katzenstein, Peter J., ed. Tamed Power. Germany in Europe. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997.
    Merkl, Peter H.German Foreign Policies, East and West. Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-Clio Press, 1977.
    Merkl, Peter H.The Distracted Eagle: The Rift between America and Old Europe. New York: Routledge, 2005.
    Pond, Elizabeth. After the Wall: American Policy toward Germany. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1990.
    Sheehan, James J.Where Have All the Soldiers Gone? The Transformation of Modern Europe. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2008.
    Web Sites
    Official Government Web Sites
    http://europa.eu: Official gateway to the European Union arranged by activities, institutions, documents, and services
    http://www.bundesregierung.de: Useful gateway to ministries and other agencies
    http://www.bundestag.de: Extensive information on legislative matters and party affairs, such as finances
    http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de: Site includes all federal, state, and European election returns
    http://www.destatis.de/jahrbuch/jahrbuch2006_downloads.htm: The annual Statistical Yearbook, which includes demographic, economic, social and other data
    Each party has a Web site with a URL on this pattern:
    http://www.spd.de (for the Left party, it is http://www.die-linke.de)
    Some important dailies:
    Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung:http://www.faz.net.de
    Frankfurter Rundschau:http://www.fr-online.de
    Neues Deutschland:http://www.nd-online.de
    Süddeutsche Zeitung:http://www.sueddeutsche.de
    Important weeklies and monthlies:

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