In this new edition, author Steven J. Cann once again enlivens the topic of United States administrative law through the use of recent and “classic” legal cases to make it accessible and interesting to students. Administrative Law, Fourth Edition is an engaging casebook that presents a unique problem-solving framework that contrasts democracy with the administrative state. This novel approach places the often complex subject matter of U.S. administrative law into a more comprehensible context. The Fourth Edition has been completely updated and revised and includes many new cases to reflect changes in the law since the year 2000. Each chapter begins with an interesting case that introduces key concepts followed by a summary of the principles, doctrines, and legal tests used by the courts in that area of administrative law.
New cases in the Fourth Edition include: Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 2004. President Bush's Secretary of Interior made a decision to allow off-road vehicles in wilderness areas.; Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 2004. This is the Supreme Court's most recent sexual harassment case.; Correctional Services Corporation v. Malesko, 2001. Correctional Services Corporation is a private company that contracts with the federal government to run halfway houses. An employee's reckless disregard caused the plaintiff to have another heart attack.; Whitman v. American Trucking Association, 2001. The case involves the EPA's enforcement of the Clean Air Act and is the Supreme Court's most recent delegation of power case.
Administrative Law is an essential tool for those seeking to understand, or obliged to work within, its general principles. It is an excellent textbook for advanced undergraduate and graduate students studying administrative law in departments of political science and public administration.
Chapter 4: Control of Agencies by Default: The Courts and Administrative Law
Control of Agencies by Default: The Courts and Administrative Law
So far, Chapter 1 introduced you to the concept of the administrative state and raised questions about democratic accountability. In Chapter 2, the argument was made that the president (especially Republican presidents) may possess the will to control agency rule making, but the office simply lacks the raw constitutional power to do so. In Chapter 3, you learned that although Congress possesses the power to control agency rule making, it generally lacks the will to exercise that power. As with presidents, Republican majorities in Congress may be possessed of more of a will to control bureaucracy than Democrats, but they have not had the votes to ...