This volume presents the reader with a stimulating rich tapestry of essays exploring the nature of action and intentionality, and discussing their role in human development. As the contributions make clear, action is an integrative concept that forms the bridge between our psychological, biological, and sociocultural worlds. Action is also integrative in the sense of entailing motivational, emotional, and cognitive systems, and this integration too is well represented in the chapters. Action is defined, and distinguished from behavior, according to its intentional quality. Thus, a constantly recurring theme in the volume involves the dialectic of action-intentionality, and specifically the questions of how and when these concepts are to be distinguished.
Chapter 1: Revisiting Individuals as Producers of Their Development: From Dynamic Interactionism to Developmental Systems
Revisiting Individuals as Producers of Their Development: From Dynamic Interactionism to Developmental Systems
The nature-nurture issue was resolved in the mid-1950s, at least insofar as the field of human development is concerned. Introductory psychology and child development textbooks still cast the study of nature and nurture in the form of what Anastasi (1958) terms the “Which one?” or “How much of each?” questions (e.g., Feldman, 1998; Gray, 1998; Lahey, 1998; Meyers, 1998; Papalia, Olds, & Feldman, 1998). In addition, sociobiologists (e.g., Rushton, 1987) and behavioral geneticists (e.g., Rowe, 1994) continue to make concerted efforts to keep intellectually alive a failed conception of nature as split from nurture (see Overton, 1998). Nevertheless, [Page ...