Arrow's Impossibility Theorem

Arrow's impossibility theorem is a proposition that it may be impossible to create a consistent collective decisionmaking rule. Consistent collective decision making treats individuals fairly and equitably and increases the likelihood that people will accept the outcome of a social decision. The theorem provides insights into the complexities of social decision making and the difficulties inherent in improving the voting process.

Difficulty in achieving consistent collective decisions is particularly evident when society is made up of more than one person and there are at least three choices being considered. Nobel Prize–winning economist Kenneth Arrow postulates that a voting scheme should satisfy six exhaustive axioms. First, the voting scheme should produce the same result regardless of the configuration of individual voter preferences. If pairwise voting (Choice A ...

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