Congress and the Nation, 2001-2004, Vol. XI: The 107th and 108th Congresses

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    Editors' Note

    Congress and the Nation Vol. XI presents a record of major governmental developments during the first term of President George W. Bush, from 2001 through 2004. This four-year period—from his inauguration after the controversial 2000 election that left Republicans and Democrats bitterly divided through his reelection in 2004—was one of the most tumultuous in modern times.

    The defining event of the period—an event certain to echo throughout U.S. domestic and foreign policy long after Bush leaves office—was the attack of September 11, 2001, by a group of nineteen men who commandeered four commercial jetliners and flew two into the World Trade Center towers in New York City, destroying them, and another into the Pentagon outside Washington, D.C., causing extensive damage. The fourth crashed in a rural area of Pennsylvania after the passengers, apparently aware of what had already happened on the East Coast, overpowered the hijackers. That airliner was thought to be headed for the U.S. Capitol. Nearly 3,000 persons died that day.

    Sept. 11 changed entirely the complexion of the Bush administration, which launched, in the president's words, “a war on terror.” The conflict was one of global proportions against a shadowy enemy driven by a reading of Islam that demonized the West, particularly the United States, and lay outside the traditional historic teachings of that religion. The response of the United States and other nations that experienced related terrorism proved complicated because, unlike in earlier wars, they had not been attacked by a “state,” as a nation is traditionally understood. The nonstate nature of the enemy presented new challenges for the West.

    In the immediate aftermath of the attacks on U.S. soil, bipartisanship characterized the support shown the president. Support for his policies carried into the new year, but the bipartisan atmosphere in Washington and the nation evaporated as the 2002 midterm elections approached. The president and his allies in Congress pursued an aggressive domestic and foreign policy agenda, much of it rooted in a conservative political ideology and a muscular approach to U.S. interests and options throughout the world. The Republican administration repeatedly cited the war on terror as justification for many of its most ambitious proposals, including U.S. military intervention abroad, a vast new homeland security department, the far-reaching USA PATRIOT Act (which critics argued unnecessarily jeopardized civil liberties), and expansive claims of executive privilege concerning the sharing of information with Congress and detention of individuals allegedly associated with terrorism. Democrats and a few Republicans, however, found their voice to criticize much of the administration's agenda. By the end of Bush's first term, the bitter and divisive political conditions rivaled those of the Vietnam war years, the Watergate scandal that drove President Richard Nixon from office, and the impeachment of President Bill Clinton in his last years in the White House.

    The Sept. 11 attacks gave rise to two wars: one in Afghanistan—whose leaders tolerated and received support from al Qaeda's presence there—and the other in Iraq, ostensibly over the issue of weapons of mass destruction. The former received wide support because al Qaeda operated from Afghan territory and had established training camps there. The Iraq war was an entirely different matter, coloring Bush's presidency for the remainder of his first term and into his second. Bush ordered the United States to war—a “preventive” one of choice on the grounds that Iraqi president Saddam Hussein was developing and that Iraq probably already possessed weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and biological agents and nuclear devices. Critics noted that the war represented a major departure from past U.S. policy. That shift, and the Bush administration's assertion that the U.S. government essentially be the sole arbiter of when such a war should occur, strained relations with many long-standing U.S. allies, especially in Europe. The invasion of Iraq, which Congress had endorsed, quickly toppled Hussein's government, but produced an unstable nation plagued by an insurgency that adopted wide-scale indiscriminate killings of soldiers and civilians as a tactic.

    The Bush administration based the invasion on its thesis that the United States had the power, justification, and responsibility to act preemptively against nations with weapons of mass destruction that could be used against Americans or U.S. interests or otherwise posed a threat to the country. Bush offered as another justification for the war the contention that Hussein might provide his alleged weapons to terrorists. Yet another justification relied on a view of the world, particularly the Middle East, that nations, once freed from the control of dictators, would embrace democracy and democratic institutions, in time producing stability and peace where neither had thrived before. Bush provided these shifting rationales as circumstances demanded—when it looked increasingly likely that no weapons would be found, and none were, and when Hussein was shown not to be linked to al Qaeda or its leader, Osama bin Laden.

    Although the war, with its many justifications, initially garnered widespread support in the United States, skepticism grew as the conflict dragged on and as other nations continued to reject the Bush administration's aggressive foreign policy. The ongoing violence and instability in Iraq fueled this skepticism, as did the mounting evidence that the administration had carefully planned and well executed a war to oust Hussein, but had failed to plan for administering postwar Iraq. As doubts spread among Americans, Bush's approval ratings began to fall significantly. They reached a point near the end of his term at which Democrats, sensing that he might be vulnerable in the 2004 campaign, began to feel more comfortable criticizing his administration.

    The increasingly unpopular war in Iraq represented only one source of the growing partisan divide of the period. In Congress, the Republicans forged ahead with a disciplined effort, primarily in the House, to push the GOP and White House agenda with little or no regard for participation by the Democrats. The party divisions in both chambers essentially mirrored the national political divide witnessed in the 2000 election returns. Unlike Republicans in the Senate, the Republicans in the House held a majority throughout Bush's first four years. Their disciplined leaders and cohesive rank and file excluded the Democrats from any meaningful participation in the legislative process. In defending their tactics, Republicans recalled that they had had little say during the decades that Democrats controlled the House. Regardless, the Republicans' approach produced results. In the House, they passed much of the GOP agenda, although sometimes only by arm-twisting and increasingly by using rarely seen tactics, such as late-night sessions. Some important votes occurred in the early hours of the day, and in one instance, the GOP leadership held open a roll call vote for hours while they rounded up enough votes for passage. These tactics contributed significantly to increasing partisan bitterness.

    Matters were less auspicious for the Republicans in the Senate. In another remarkable event of the period, the 107th Congress convened with the Senate evenly split at 50–50. Vice President Dick Cheney, by virtue of his constitutional authority to break ties, gave Republicans control of the chamber. In June 2001, disaffected GOP senator James M. Jeffords of Vermont left the party to become an independent and to caucus with the Democrats. With a one-vote majority, Democrats took control of the Senate and all its committees. This development, as much as any, thwarted the disciplined effort in the House to push through the GOP agenda. Stalemate hampered much of the remainder of the 107th Congress, although some bills passed, such as the legislation that emerged in the aftermath of Sept. 11 and a bipartisan education bill.

    Taking control of both chambers at the 2002 midterm elections, Republicans handed Bush some high-profile victories in its first session, but by the second session, with the 2004 elections approaching, they accomplished little. A notable exception was the sweeping overhaul of the nation's intelligence apparatus following an investigation into the Sept. 11 attacks.

    One of the more interesting developments of the four-year period, and one with likely repercussions for years to come, was the evolution of the Republican Party from a traditional bastion of fiscal rectitude and advocate of limited federal government to almost the opposite. The party's apparent disregard of the combined effect of large tax cuts (often enacted with Democratic support) and vastly expanded government outlays epitomized this transformation. This outlook had sent the federal budget into deficit by fiscal 2002 after several years of surplus. Although much of the increased spending went to the military and for homeland defense, some kept afloat such programs as farm subsidies that budget hawks argued were unwise given the government's financial constraints. Passage of Bush's proposal for a prescription drug program for senior citizens, enacted at the end of 2003, highlighted the GOP's deviation from its traditional underpinnings. Projections predicted the program's ultimate cost ballooning into hundreds of billions of dollars. Conservative commentators scathingly debunked it as a huge entitlement antithetical to GOP principles.

    Congress and the Nation Vol. XI records this period to help students, researchers, scholars, and others track its major events. In addition to discussing the successes and travails of President Bush, this volume focuses heavily on the legislative activities of the U.S. Congress and its members. In telling this story, the editors include the political, social, economic, electoral, and other significant trends that influenced the action of Congress's 535 members as well as the president. The chapters touch on earlier events as needed in addition to presenting detailed chronologies of congressional action in major areas.

    Chapter 1, “Politics and National Issues,” provides an overview of the period and its principal players. It features a legislative summary of each session of the 107th and 108th Congresses and discussion of the elections held during this period. The chapter forms a framework for the legislative chapters that follow. The concluding chapter, 16, focuses on the Bush presidency. These two chapters together outline the more detailed material in the other chapters.

    Chapters 2 through 14, focusing on public policy, provide details on legislative issues, proposals, and bills; accounts of legislative and executive actions; lobbying activity; and key votes on selected issues. “Homeland Security Policy,” chapter 3, is a new addition to this series. Chapter 15 examines Congress as an institution.

    The book continues a series launched by Congressional Quarterly in 1965 with the publication of Congress and the Nation Vol. I, a 2,000-page reference covering national government and politics from 1945 through 1964. Each succeeding volume covers governmental action during a four-year presidential term: Congress and the Nation Vol. II, 1965–1968; Congress and the Nation Vol. III, 1969–1972; Congress and the Nation Vol. IV, 1973–1976; Congress and the Nation Vol. V, 1977–1980; Congress and the Nation Vol. VI, 1981–1984; Congress and the Nation Vol. VII, 1985–1988; Congress and the Nation Vol. VIII, 1989–1992; Congress and the Nation Vol. IX, 1993–1996; and Congress and the Nation Vol. X, 1997–2001. With the publication of this volume, librarians, historians, political scientists, journalists, and students have for research eleven volumes spanning more than half a century of Congressional Quarterly's reporting on national government, elections, and public policy.

    How to Use This Book

    The Summary Table of Contents following this Editors' Note presents the overall organization of the volume. The detailed Table of Contents(p. xi) provides an outline of each chapter and is followed by a list of the many tables, figures, and boxed features in the book. To find a specific topic within a chapter, the reader should consult the Index(p. 1085). Throughout the book, cross-references are provided to related subjects in other chapters (and to other volumes of Congress and the Nation for historical context). Such references speed research across an array of subjects and are particularly useful because Congress often legislates bills that cover a number of topics or that affect related topics.

    The Appendix(p. 765) contains a variety of supplementary materials, including a glossary of congressional terms; an explanation of how a bill becomes law; key Senate and House votes (highlighted in boldface in the legislative chapters), with charts showing how each member voted; lists of committee and subcommittee chairs; biographical data on members of Congress between 2001 and 2005; profiles of cabinet members and other senior officials; controversial nominations; presidential vetoes; and major presidential speeches and messages to Congress as well as other important documents. In addition, the appendix includes extensive charts—including presidential, House, Senate, and gubernatorial election returns for the period—and tables record special elections and members who switched parties. The appendix also includes a complete list of public laws enacted during the four years.

    This volume was prepared under the direction of editors at CQ Press, a division of Congressional Quarterly Inc. A group of veteran Congress and the Nation authors, many of whom covered Congress for Congressional Quarterly and other Washington news organizations, prepared and edited the chapters and appendix. The principal contributors were John Felton, Martha Gottron, David Hosansky, Ken Jost, Kerry Kern, Colleen McGuiness, Ann O'Connor, Julie Rovner, and David Tarr, who also served as volume editor for this edition. Special appreciation is due to two staff members of the Congressional Research Service at the Library of Congress: Judy Schneider reviewed, corrected, and expanded the glossary of congressional terms in the appendix, and Walter Oleszek reviewed and edited the explanation of the legislative process, also in the appendix.

    At CQ Press, Tim Arnquist and January Layman-Wood provided invaluable research on committees, trends in government spending, and other issues, and Layman-Wood ably shepherded the manuscript through review and compilation before forwarding to the editing and production team. Sally A. Ryman effectively brought the material together during production. Indexing Partners LLC compiled the index. Doug Goldenberg-Hart was the sponsoring editor.

    CQ Press editors also wish to express their thanks to the dedicated reporters and editors of the CQ Weekly and CQ Almanac for their assistance.

    CQ Press Editors

    March 2006

  • Appendix

    Appendix

    The Legislative Process in Brief

    Note: Parliamentary terms used below are defined in the glossary.

    Introduction of Bills

    A House member (including the resident commissioner of Puerto Rico and nonvoting delegates of the District of Columbia, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and American Samoa) may introduce any one of several types of bills and resolutions any time the House is in session by handing it to the clerk of the House or placing it in a box called the hopper. A senator usually introduces a measure by presenting it, along with a formal statement, to a clerk at the presiding officer's desk.

    As the usual next step in either the House or Senate, the bill is numbered, referred to the appropriate committee, labeled with the sponsor's name, and sent to the Government Printing Office so that copies can be made for subsequent study and action. House and Senate bills may be jointly sponsored and carry several lawmakers' names. Print and electronic versions of the bill are available to the public. A bill written in the executive branch and proposed as an administration measure usually is introduced by the chairman of the congressional committee that has jurisdiction, as a courtesy to the White House.

    Bills—Prefixed with HR in the House, S in the Senate, followed by a number. Used as the form for most legislation, whether general or special, public, or private.

    Joint Resolutions—Designated H J Res or S J Res. Subject to the same procedure as bills, with the exception of a joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution. The latter must be approved by two-thirds of both houses and then sent directly to the administrator of general services for submission to the states for ratification instead of being presented to the president for his approval.

    Concurrent Resolutions—Designated H Con Res or S Con Res. Used for matters affecting the operations of both houses. These resolutions do not become law.

    Resolutions—Designated H Res. or S Res. Used for a matter concerning the operation of either house alone and adopted only by the chamber in which it originates.

    Committee Action

    With few exceptions, bills are referred to the appropriate standing committees. The job of referral formally is the responsibility of the Speaker of the House and the presiding officer of the Senate, but this task usually is carried out on their behalf by the parliamentarians of the House and Senate. Precedent, statute, and the jurisdictional mandates of the committees as set forth in the rules of the House and Senate determine which committees receive what kinds of bills. Bills are technically considered “read for the first time” when referred to House committees.

    When a bill reaches a committee it is placed on the committee's calendar. Failure of a committee to act on a bill is equivalent to killing it and most fall by the legislative roadside. The measure can be withdrawn from the committee's purview by a discharge petition signed by a majority of the House membership on House bills, or, for example, by adoption of a special resolution in the Senate. Discharge attempts rarely succeed and the Senate procedure is rarely used.

    The first committee action taken on a bill may be a request for comment on it by interested agencies of the government. The committee chairman may assign the bill to a subcommittee for study and hearings, or it may be considered by the full committee. Hearings may be public, closed (executive session) or both. A subcommittee, after considering a bill, reports to the full committee its recommendations for action and any proposed amendments.

    The full committee then votes on its recommendation to the House or Senate. This procedure is called “ordering a bill reported.” Occasionally a committee may order a bill reported unfavorably; most of the time a report, submitted by the chairman of the committee to the House or Senate, calls for favorable action on the measure since the committee can effectively “kill” a bill by simply failing to take any action.

    After the bill is reported, the committee chairman instructs the staff to prepare a written report. The report describes the purposes and scope of the bill, explains the committee revisions, notes proposed changes in existing law and, usually, includes the views of the executive branch agencies consulted. Often committee members opposing a measure issue dissenting minority statements that are included in the report.

    Usually, the committee “marks up” or proposes amendments to the bill. If they are substantial and the measure is complicated, the committee may order a “clean bill” introduced, which will embody the proposed amendments. The original bill then is put aside and the clean bill, with a new number, is reported to the floor.

    The chamber must approve, alter, or reject the committee amendments before the bill itself can be put to a vote.

    Floor Action

    After a bill is reported back to the house where it originated, it is placed on the calendar.

    There are four legislative calendars in the House, issued in one cumulative calendar titled Calendars of the United States House of Representatives and History of Legislation. The House calendars are:

    The Union Calendar to which are referred bills raising revenues, general appropriations bills, and any measures directly or indirectly appropriating money or property. It is the Calendar of the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union.

    The House Calendar to which are referred bills of public character not raising revenue or appropriating money.

    The Private Calendar to which are referred bills for relief in the nature of claims against the United States or private immigration bills that are passed without debate when the Private Calendar is called the first and third Tuesdays of each month.

    The Discharge Calendar to which are referred motions to discharge committees when the necessary signatures are signed to a discharge petition.

    There is only one legislative calendar in the Senate and one “executive calendar” for treaties and nominations submitted to the Senate.

    Debate

    A bill is brought to debate by varying procedures. In the Senate the majority leader, in consultation with the minority leader and others, schedules the bills that will be taken up for debate. If it is urgent or important it can be taken up in the Senate either by unanimous consent or by a motion agreed to by majority vote.

    In the House, precedence is granted if a special rule is obtained from the Rules Committee. A request for a special rule usually is made by the chairman of the committee that favorably reported the bill. The request is considered by the Rules Committee in the same fashion that other committees consider legislative measures. The committee proposes a resolution providing for the consideration of the bill. The Rules Committee reports the resolution to the House where it is debated and voted on in the same fashion as regular bills.

    The resolutions providing special rules are important because they specify how long the bill may be debated and whether it may be amended from the floor. If floor amendments are banned, the bill is considered under a “closed rule.”

    When a bill is debated under an “open rule,” germane amendments may be offered from the floor. Committee amendments always are taken up first but may be changed, as may all amendments up to the second degree; that is, an amendment to an amendment to an amendment is not in order.

    Duration of debate in the House depends on whether the bill is under discussion by the House proper or before the House when it is sitting as the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union. In the former, the amount of time for debate occurs under the one-hour rule, which allows members to hold the floor for one hour each. In practice, the members first recognized to speak moves the previous question after an hour, which the House almost always approves and which ends further debate. In the Committee of the Whole the amount of time specified in the special rule for general debate is equally divided between proponents and opponents. At the end of general debate, the bill is often read section by section for amendment if it is considered under an open rule. Debate on an amendment is limited to five minutes for each side; this is called the “five-minute rule.” In practice, amendments regularly are debated more than ten minutes, with members gaining the floor by offering pro forma amendments or obtaining unanimous consent to speak longer than five minutes.

    Senate debate usually is unlimited. It can be halted or limited only by unanimous consent, by certain laws, by adoption of a motion to table, or by “cloture,” which requires a three-fifths majority of the entire Senate except for proposed changes in the Senate rules. The latter requires a two-thirds vote.

    The House considers almost all important bills within a parliamentary framework known as the Committee of the Whole. It is not a committee as the word usually is understood; it is the full House meeting under another name for the purpose of speeding action on legislation. Technically, the House sits as the Committee of the Whole when it considers any tax measure or bill dealing with public appropriations. After adoption of a special rule, the Speaker declares the House resolved into the Committee of the Whole and appoints a member of the majority party to serve as the chairman. Instead of the required quorum of 218 for the House, the rules of that chamber permit the Committee of the Whole to meet when a quorum of 100 members is present on the floor and to amend and act on bills. When the Committee of the Whole has concluded consideration of a bill for amendment, it “rises,” the Speaker returns as the presiding officer of the House and the member appointed chairman of the Committee of the Whole reports the action of the committee and its recommendations. The Committee of the Whole cannot pass a bill; instead it reports the measure to the full House with whatever amendment it has adopted. The full House then may pass or reject the bill—or, on occasion, recommit the bill to committee. Amendments adopted in the Committee of the Whole may be put to a second vote in the full House.

    Votes

    Voting on bills may occur repeatedly before they are finally approved or rejected. The House votes on the rule for the bill and on various amendments to the bill. Voting on amendments often is a more illuminating test of a bill's support than is the final tally. Sometimes members approve final passage of bills after vigorously supporting amendments that, if adopted, would have scuttled the legislation.

    The Senate has three different methods of voting: an untabulated voice vote, a standing vote (called a division), and a recorded roll call to which members answer “yea” or “nay” when their names are called. The House also employs voice and standing votes, but since January 1973 yeas and nays have been recorded by an electronic voting device, eliminating the need for time-consuming roll calls.

    After amendments to a bill have been voted upon it is “read for the third time.” Then a vote may be taken on a motion to recommit the bill or joint resolution to committee. If carried, which rarely occurs, this vote is usually a death blow to the bill. Rejection of the motion to recommit is followed by a vote on final passage of the bill. The final vote is followed by a pro forma motion to reconsider, which is automatically laid on the table. With that, the bill has been formally passed by the chamber.

    Action in Second Chamber

    After a bill is passed it is sent to the other chamber. This body may then take one of several steps. It may pass the bill as is—accepting the other chamber's language. It may send the bill to committee for scrutiny or alteration, or reject the entire bill, advising the other house of its actions. Or it simply may ignore the bill submitted while it continues work on its version of the proposed legislation. Frequently, one chamber may approve a version of a bill that is greatly at variance with the version already passed by the other house and then substitute its contents for the language of the other, retaining only the latter's bill number.

    Often the second chamber makes only minor changes. If these are readily agreed to by the other house, the bill then is routed to the president. However, if the opposite chamber significantly alters the bill submitted to it, the measure usually is “sent to conference.” The chamber that has possession of the “papers” (engrossed bill, engrossed amendments, messages of transmittal) requests a conference and the other chamber may agree to it. If the second chamber does not agree, the bill dies. Unless other parliamentary actions take place. For example, a senator could reoffer the rejected bill as a nonrelevant amendment to another measure. If both chambers agreed to the nonrelevant amendment, the president could sign the legislative package into law.

    Conference Action

    A conference works out conficting House and Senate versions of a legislative bill. The conferees usually are senior members from the committees that managed the legislation who are appointed by the presiding officers of the two houses. Under this arrangement the conferees of one house have the duty of trying to maintain their chamber's position in the face of amending actions by the conferees (also referred to as “managers”) of the other house.

    The number of conferees from each chamber may vary, from single to double or even triple digits depending on the length or complexity of the bill and the number of committees involved. But a majority vote controls the action of each group so that a large representation does

    not give one chamber a voting advantage over the other chamber's conferees.

    Theoretically, conferees are not allowed to write new legislation in reconciling the two versions before them, but this curb sometimes is bypassed. Many bills have been put into acceptable compromise form only after new language was provided by the conferees. Frequently the ironing out of difficulties takes days or even weeks. Conferences on complex and controversial bills sometimes are particularly drawn out.

    As a conference proceeds, conferees reconcile differences between the versions, but generally they grant concessions only insofar as they remain sure that the chamber they represent will accept the compromises. Occasionally, uncertainty over how either house will react, or the positive refusal of a chamber to back down on a disputed amendment, results in an impasse, and the bills die in conference even though each was approved by its sponsoring chamber.

    When the conferees have reached agreement, they prepare a conference report embodying their recommendations (compromises) and a joint explanatory statement. The report, in document form, must be submitted to each house. The conference report must be approved by each house. Consequently, approval of the report is approval of the compromise bill. In the order of voting on conference reports, the chamber that asked for a conference yields to the other chamber the opportunity to vote first.

    Final Action

    After a bill has been passed by both the House and Senate in identical form, all of the original papers are sent to the enrolling clerk of the chamber in which the bill originated. The clerk then prepares an enrolled bill, which is printed on parchment paper.

    When this bill has been certified as correct by the secretary of the Senate or the clerk of the House, depending on which chamber originated the bill, it is signed first (no matter whether it originated in the Senate or House) by the Speaker of the House and then by the president of the Senate. It is next sent to the White House to await action.

    If approving of the bill, the president signs it, dates it, and usually writes the word “approved” on the document. If the president does not sign it within ten days (Sundays excepted) and Congress is in session, the bill becomes law without his signature.

    If Congress adjourns sine die at the end of the second session, the president can pocket veto a bill and it dies without Congress having the opportunity to override.

    A president vetoes a bill by refusing to sign it and, before the ten-day period expires, returning it to Congress with a message stating his reasons. The message is sent to the chamber that originated the bill. If no action is taken on the message, the bill dies. Congress, however, can attempt to override the president's veto and enact the bill, “the objections of the president to the contrary notwithstanding.” Overriding a veto requires a two-thirds vote of those present in each chamber, who must number a quorum and vote by roll call.

    If the president's veto is overridden by a two-thirds vote in both houses, the bill becomes law. Otherwise it is dead.

    When bills are passed finally and signed, or passed over a veto, they are given law numbers in numerical order as they become law. There are two series of numbers, one for public and one for private laws, starting at the number “1” for each two-year term of Congress. They are then identified by law number and by Congress—for example, Private Law 10, 109th Congress; Public Law 33, 109th Congress (or PL 109-33).

    Appendix

    Key Votes

    Each year Congressional Quarterly selects a series of key votes on major issues. An issue is judged by the extent to which it represents one or more of the following:

    • A matter of major controversy.
    • A test of presidential or political power.
    • A decision of potentially great impact on the nation and lives of Americans.

    For each series of related votes on an issue only one key vote is usually chosen. This vote is the roll call in the House or Senate that in the opinion of Congressional Quarterly was the most important in determining the outcome.

    2001 Key Votes
    Senate

    1. Ashcroft Nomination

    Within hours of his nomination, Attorney General John Ashcroft emerged as the most controversial pick for President George W. Bush's cabinet. Opponents and supporters waged a vigorous and sometimes nasty debate for a month over whether Ashcroft was too deeply ideological to be the nation's top law enforcement official, leading to the closest vote of any successful cabinet nomination in decades. Liberal interest groups, including People for the American Way and the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, mobilized against him, hoping to recreate their 1987 defeat of the Supreme Court nomination of Robert Bork. Conservative groups, such as the American Conservative Union, joined forces to defend Ashcroft and others. (Action on nomination, p. 759)

    The divisiveness of the debate provided an early challenge to the Bush administration's pledge to “change the tone in Washington” but the implications of the vote went beyond political symbolism. Bush was seeking to assert his authority after winning a controversial election and Democrats were eager to demonstrate their power to shape the national agenda, particularly in a Senate divided equally between fifty Republicans and fifty Democrats. Ashcroft had served one term as a senator from Missouri and was defeated for reelection in 2000. During his time in the Senate, he established himself as a strong voice for the conservative movement, introducing legislation to ban most abortions and voting against gun control, for example. He briefly toyed with running for president.

    Opponents also tried to make much of a 1998 interview Ashcroft granted to Southern Partisan, published by the League of the South, a group that supported southern independence and that some accused of promoting racist views. A quote from the article made it appear Ashcroft endorsed the group's agenda but he said he had no knowledge of the League's activities. Ashcroft's opponents also questioned his opposition to President Bill Clinton's judicial nominations, focusing in particular on his efforts as a U.S. senator in 1999 to block the nomination of Ronnie L. White, a Missouri Supreme Court Justice whom Clinton had chosen for a federal judgeship. White had written dissents in several capital cases, which Ashcroft said made him unfit to be a federal judge because he “voted to give clearly guilty murders new trials.” White's supporters argued that Ashcroft only opposed White leading up to his close reelection bid, when the death penalty and prosecuting murderers could be a useful political tool.

    During two days of questioning by his former colleagues on the Senate Judiciary Committee, Ashcroft was repeatedly asked if he could set aside his personal views, including abortion, and enforce laws such as one protecting abortion providers from violent protesters. “I think it's fair to say that I know the difference between an enactment role and an enforcement role,” he said. Despite such assurances, Democrats on the committee were not convinced. “It's very hard to change your stripes or change your spots,” said Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif.

    But Republicans held their members and picked up a few Democrats. In committee voting only one Democrat, Russell D. Feingold of Wisconsin, voted for Ashcroft's nomination. He said he wanted to give Ashcroft the benefit of the doubt on questions of his character and the intentions behind his actions as a senator.

    The Senate on Feb. 1 confirmed Ashcroft as attorney general by a vote of 58–42: R 50–0; D 8–42. Although eight Democrats voted for him, as a party they had made an important point about their ability to hang together against enormous political pressure to let the president choose his cabinet. By keeping the nomination from getting sixty votes—a threshold majority that Senate procedures require to end debate on contentious legislation and force a vote—Democrats proved they would be a force in future debates, including the shaping of the Bush tax plan in the spring. (Vote, p. 812)

    2. Ergonomics Rules

    Republicans and the business community had long opposed the idea of workplace rules on ergonomics and the Clinton administration's attempt, late in the president's term, to implement new regulations. When the proposed rules changes were published in fall 2000, business lobbyists set a top priority on blocking implementation. But it was only through a stealth campaign in the first months of the Bush administration and the use of a little-noticed 1996 congressional review law that GOP leaders were able to overturn the regulation before Democrats had time to marshal a defense. (Legislative details, p. 565)

    The ergonomics regulation had taken effect Jan. 16, 2001, and enforcement would have begun Oct. 14. It required employers to educate their workers about ways to prevent injuries from repetitive motion such as typing, sorting, or lifting heavy loads. If a worker reported an injury, the rule required employers to reconfigure their workplaces in order to prevent a recurrence. Workers who reported injuries lasting seven days or longer would have been able to receive compensation of up to 90 percent of their salary for as long as ninety days if they were unable to work.

    Organized labor had sought such rules for more than a decade but business groups said the Clinton regulation would cost U.S. companies more than $100 billion a year. In the fall of 2000 Republicans tried to include language in the fiscal 2001 Labor–Health and Human Services–Education spending bill (PL 106-554) barring the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) from finalizing the ergonomics policy. But the Democratic White House outmatched Republicans by allowing OSHA to publish the final rule while the labor spending bill was still mired in negotiations.

    The behind-the-scenes campaign to defeat the rule in January and February of 2001 was orchestrated by Don Nickles, R-Okla., who was the assistant majority leader of the Senate at the time, in concert with a coalition of business groups. Nickles' weapon was a 1996 law, the Congressional Review Act, which he had written with Harry Reid, D-Nev., and tucked into a broader regulatory overhaul measure that was enacted as part of a bill raising the debt limit (PL 104-121). The law allowed Congress to overturn a major regulation within a certain time limit if both houses passed a joint resolution of disapproval by a simple majority vote. The law limited debate and amendments and further prohibited the administration from writing a new rule in “substantially the same form” as one that Congress rejected.

    Nickles and the business groups concentrated on winning over centrist Democrats, such as John B. Breaux of Louisiana, with a pitch that the ergonomics rule would be onerous for business, particularly for small business. Eventually, six Democrats crossed over, five of them from the South, enabling Republicans to pass a resolution of disapproval (S J Res 6—PL 107-5), 56–44: R 50–0; D 6–44. The House sealed the fate of the ergonomics rule by passing the resolution the following day. Democrats were thunderstruck. “I'm still trying to figure out what the hell happened,” said one Democratic aide after the Senate vote. (Vote, p. 812)

    3. Campaign Finance

    The Senate embarked March 19, 2001, on the first wide-open debate of campaign finance laws in almost a decade. That the debate happened at all was a testament to the determination and political skills of John McCain, R-Ariz., and Russell D. Feingold, D-Wis., who had long labored to bring their campaign finance bill (S 27) to a vote. The arrival of a Senate debate on campaign finance ended years of stalling tactics by opponents of the legislation, who had succeeded in keeping the matter off the floor through a mix of filibusters and threats. The House had twice passed a bill similar to the one McCain and Feingold proposed, so it was widely believed Senate passage would ensure that campaign finance laws would be rewritten for the first time in nearly 30 years. (Legislative details, p. 731)

    As floor debate began, the question was whether McCain and Feingold could hold together the fragile bipartisan coalition that had allowed them to force the extraordinary two-week debate in the first place. The Senate's Republican leadership had long opposed the legislation, as had powerful outside interests on the left and the right. But as the battle neared, the Democrats, who had always been the chief proponents of a McCain-Feingold bill, suddenly got nervous. In particular, Democrats were preparing to bolt and bring down the bill over amendments related to the issue of “hard money,” the contributions to individual political candidates. The primary goal of the McCain-Feingold legislation was to ban the large and unregulated “soft money” contributions to political parties that the two sponsors viewed as corrupting the political system. But to attain support for closing off that pipeline of cash, McCain and Feingold knew they would have to address demands from some in Congress to raise the limits on hard money. The limits on direct-to-candidate contributions had stood at $1,000 per candidate per election since 1974, and Republicans, who had long raised more hard money than Democrats, demanded it be raised.

    Democrats balked. The Democratic Party had come to rely on soft money to make up for the GOP's hard-money advantage, and Democrats were increasingly worried that banning it would put them at a financial disadvantage. Raising the limits on hard money at the same time, in their view, would make matters even worse. “Raising hard money [limits] will split our caucus big time,” said Tom Daschle, D-S.D., who was then minority leader. “It's so anti-reform, and secondly, it so greatly advantages Republicans.” Daschle reluctantly voted for a compromise, hammered out by Fred Thompson, R-Tenn., and Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif., to double the limit on contributions to candidates to $2,000 per election and raise the limit on contributions to national parties to $25,000 per year. But sixteen members of his caucus said no, and some continued to complain about the deal.

    Republicans accused Democrats of hypocrisy, of looking for an excuse to vote against a soft-money ban now that it seemed likely to become law. “It sounds like people who are looking for the exit sign in the tall grass,” Thompson said. That accusation stung, and it ultimately helped save the bill. Even with elements of their base opposed to the bill and their own careers perhaps at stake, Democrats found they had painted themselves into a corner. Saying no to McCain-Feingold was no longer an option. “We've taken so strong a position as a party in favor of this bill and against soft money that we've got to stay the course,” said Joseph I. Lieberman, D-Conn.

    On April 2, the Senate passed the bill, believing at the time that the House already had the votes to endorse the Senate action. Only three Democrats voted no, but twelve Republicans crossed over to support the legislation. The vote was 59–41: R 12–38; D 47–3. McCain and Feingold had won the first round. (Vote, p. 812)

    4. Budget Resolution/Education Spending

    That the House would pass President Bush's $1.6 trillion ten-year tax cut was never in doubt but the Senate's 50–50 split between the two parties put the bill's fate in that chamber in the hands of a few moderates of both parties who preferred a smaller figure. The fiscal 2002 congressional budget resolution (H Con Res 83), which set the parameters for the size of the tax cut and provided filibuster protection in the Senate for the subsequent tax cut legislation, became a key battleground. The tax cut was Bush's campaign centerpiece and the first crucial test of his Capitol Hill clout following a bitterly contested electoral victory. His hopes for securing all of the tax cut he sought were dashed when a handful of Republicans defected on an amendment to the budget resolution offered by Tom Harkin, D-Iowa, to reduce the tax cut by $448 billion—with the amount to be divided evenly between education funding and additional reduction of the national debt. The budget that ultimately emerged from the Senate called for a tax cut of $1.3 trillion. The Senate adopted Harkin's amendment April 4 on a key vote of 53–47: R 4–46; D 49–1. (Vote, p. 812)

    Senate Budget Committee Chairman Pete V. Domenici, R-N.M., had been unable to move a budget resolution through a panel divided 11–11, forcing the GOP to use special budget rules allowing the measure to go directly before the Senate after April 1. In the weeks leading to the floor debate, Bush tried to pressure Senate Democrats by appearing in campaign-style rallies for the tax cut in states such as Louisiana, Georgia, South Dakota, and Montana. Those states, all easily carried by Bush, were represented respectively by Democrats Mary L. Landrieu, Max Cleland, Tim Johnson, and Max Baucus—all of whom faced reelection in 2002.

    The drama continued through the start of the Senate debate, during which there was more action behind the scenes than on the floor. Vice President Richard B. Cheney, White House budget director Mitchell E. Daniels Jr., and other White House officials descended on the Capitol to hunt for Democratic defections and to press Republican moderates to commit to Bush's plan. John B. Breaux, D-La., who had been the subject of intense personal lobbying by Bush, took the lead among Senate moderates in trying to limit the size of Bush's tax cut. While floor debate continued, he held a news conference to unveil his $1.3 trillion tax cut proposal as a starting point for negotiation. Breaux promised that at least one Republican would join him at the press event. He knew Lincoln Chafee, R-R.I., was on board but because Georgia Democrat Zell Miller had pledged his support for Bush's plan, Breaux needed one more Republican to turn the tide.

    In the moments leading up to the news conference, moderate Republican James M. Jeffords of Vermont had been in another room of the Capitol, in the end stages of several days of talks with Senate GOP leaders and White House negotiators. Jeffords was pressing for a deal to increase special education funding, a pet cause of his, but his fellow Republicans declined to meet his demands. Jeffords' dramatic arrival at Breaux's side after the conference was under way signaled the demise of Bush's hopes for getting all of his tax cut into the budget resolution. (A few weeks later, Jeffords would leave the GOP, handing control of the Senate to the Democrats.)

    Breaux's amendment was never put to a vote. Instead, senators left the conference to vote on the Harkin amendment, which was adopted with the help of Republicans Chafee, Jeffords, and Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania. When it was clear the amendment would be adopted, Majority Leader Trent Lott, R-Miss., switched from a “no” to a “yes” for a procedural reason: It allowed him to move to reconsider the vote later in the debate if he could find enough people to switch. But that never happened. With the size of the tax cut reduced, moderate Democrats joined the bandwagon and the budget resolution passed, 65–35.

    In the wake of the Senate's action, news media accounts tended to portray it as a loss for Bush and an episode mishandled by White House strategists. In the end, the conference report on the budget called for a $1.4 trillion tax cut—more than three-quarters of what initially came before the Senate.

    5. Tax Cuts

    Nowhere did the vagaries of the 50–50 Senate, which lasted from January through May, create more of a high-stakes balancing act than in the writing of the 2001 tax cut law. With the economy already showing signs of weakness as the year began, a broad majority existed in Congress for devoting some of the surplus to a potentially stimulative tax cut. But there the agreement ended—not only between the two parties but also, especially in the Senate, within the Republican as well as Democratic caucuses. The multifaceted dynamic guaranteed that a bipartisan compromise, written to appeal to moderate senators in each party, was the only way to assure that President Bush would win the broad tax cut that was the top priority for his first year in office. (Legislative details, pp. 86–87, 89)

    The first threshold question—how deep to cut—was settled in the fiscal 2002 budget resolution. Effectively written by the centrists, it set a limit of $1.4 trillion through fiscal 2011 by saying anything above that would have to muster the support of sixty senators, a political impossibility at the time. At that point, Republican leaders considered advancing a bill designed to reflect Bush's wishes as closely as possible given the budget restraint, in the hope it could be pushed to passage with almost exclusively GOP votes. At the same time, Democratic leaders considered mounting a campaign to stop the drive for tax legislation outright, principally by refusing to cooperate with the GOP. Instead, a package designed to win over moderates in both parties was cobbled together by the leaders of the Finance Committee, Charles E. Grassley, R-Iowa, and Max Baucus, D-Mont. While following the outline of Bush's plan, it was modified to stay within the confines of the budget. (The rate cuts, for example, were not as deep as the president wanted.) Room was made for additional provisions designed to appeal to the more liberal Republicans, such as allowing poorer parents to claim part of the child tax credit, and more conservative Democrats, primarily an expansion of tax breaks for education.

    The key moment came May 23, when the Senate passed the bill by a vote of 62–38: R 50–0; D 12–38. The vote showed that Grassley and Baucus had found the formula for a tax package that could claim to have “broad bipartisan support.” Not only did their trade-offs succeed in sustaining the support of all Republicans, it also reflected the year's apogee of prominence for the centrist Democrats, a dozen of whom (24 percent of all Democratic senators) voted for the legislation. (Vote, p. 812)

    The tally also signaled that the deepest tax cut in a generation would happen, and that Bush would score his first big legislative triumph, sooner than almost anyone had predicted. Only twenty-four days elapsed between when the ceiling for the tax cut was set and when the Senate cleared the legislation (PL 107-16)—unusually fast for such wide-ranging, expensive, and politically precarious legislation.

    The same dozen Democrats who voted for the original bill voted for the final version as well, a reflection of how closely the latter resembled the former. To make sure of that, two of the four lawmakers who cut the deal with the White House were Baucus and John B. Breaux of Louisiana, a leader of centrist Senate Democrats. Baucus and five other Democrats who backed the bill were up for reelection in 2002, and all of them expected competitive races. Only two Democrats seen as vulnerable in 2002, Iowa's Tom Harkin and Minnesota's Paul Wellstone, voted “no” May 23.

    Two Republicans who embraced the initial bill spurned the final deal, however: John McCain of Arizona, who opposed deep tax cuts when he ran against Bush for the party's 2000 presidential nomination, and fiscal moderate Lincoln Chafee of Rhode Island. But another pivotal moderate, James M. Jeffords of Vermont, supported the package—his vote for initial Senate passage coming before he announced he was abandoning the GOP to become an Independent, thereby giving Senate control to the Democrats. As a result, the climactic vote for the tax cut also stands as a high-water mark for the short-lived period—the first since 1954—of unilateral Republican control of the legislative and executive branches.

    6. Patients' Rights

    Immediately after becoming Senate majority leader in June, Tom Daschle, D-S.D., said a patients' bill of rights, left on the back burner by Republicans during the first part of the year, would be the first major piece of legislation he would bring to the floor. On June 19 Democrats began debate on a broad managed-care overhaul bill (S 1052) drafted by Edward M. Kennedy, D-Mass., John McCain, R-Ariz., and John Edwards, D-N.C. To ensure a vote on final passage, Daschle threatened to keep the Senate in session through the July 4 recess, if necessary, to finish. The Kennedy-McCain-Edwards measure was designed with all the provisions that patients' rights advocates had been pushing for years, including requirements that plans cover visits to specialists and emergency rooms, as well as a stipulation that insurers be prohibited from imposing restrictions on what doctors could tell their patients about treatment options. (Legislative details, p. 475)

    The biggest controversy, as always, was over liability. The bill proposed, for the first time, to allow patients to sue their health plans in federal court for damages if harmed or injured by a health plan's coverage decision. The bill capped civil damages at $5 million in federal court but economic and non-economic damages were unlimited. The debate, and resulting vote, put Republicans in a tough position. Polls had shown that a managed-care overhaul was popular with voters but businesses and the insurance industry lobbied heavily against it. A Republican version encompassing broad “principles” laid out by the Bush administration clearly did not have the votes to pass. But Democrats also faced a complex strategic calculation in bringing the bill to a vote. They knew Bush would oppose their version, and, indeed, the White House issued a veto threat during the first week of debate. That meant a choice for Daschle and his party. They had to decide whether to call Bush's bluff and pass a bill anyway, or try to work it out in advance to ensure his signature. They chose the former course, partly because they figured that the bill they passed would be their opening bid in a conference to reconcile it with whatever was produced by the GOP-controlled House.

    During the two weeks of Senate debate, Republicans proposed amendment after amendment designed to change the bill's liability provisions. Most of them failed. However, GOP moderates were successful in attaching amendments designed to make the bill more acceptable to business, especially large employers. One such amendment, sponsored by Olympia J. Snowe, R-Maine, would allow employers who appointed a “designated decision maker” for medical decisions to be shielded from lawsuits. Big business groups and their Republican allies had seized on the issue, painting the bill as one that would make large employers—not just less-popular insurance companies—vulnerable to higher costs. As Minority Whip Don Nickles, R-Okla., said: “Employers beware. There's language in this bill that will bankrupt you.” The Snowe amendment gave some cover to Republicans who were concerned about the bill's potential effect on employers. Along with three Republicans, Democrat Ernest F. Hollings of South Carolina opposed her amendment.

    But on final passage Daschle—in his first big test as majority leader—held his caucus together, with no Democrats opposing the bill. It passed June 29 by a vote of 59–36: R 9–35; D 50–0; I 0-1. In addition to McCain, eight Republicans voted for the final product, including three who were up for reelection in 2002: Susan Collins of Maine, Gordon H. Smith of Oregon, and John W. Warner of Virginia. Republican-turned-Independent James M. Jeffords of Vermont—the senator whose party switch enabled Democrats to bring the measure to the floor in the first place—was not among the supporters. (Vote, p. 812)

    7. Farm Bill

    As its opening foray into rewriting what both parties viewed as a badly flawed farm law, the Senate engaged in a surprisingly parti-san fight over how much short-term relief to provide producers—transforming the debate into one that was at least as much about fiscal discipline as about agriculture policy. Farm bill differences are usually regional in nature but an uncertain surplus picture, combined with the political pressure of drafting a new law heading into an election year, led Republican and Democratic leaders to stake out different positions on the question of how much to boost direct government payments to farmers beyond the subsidies they were already due. (Legislative details, p. 449)

    Democrats, newly in control of the Senate, wanted to spend $7.4 billion, painting themselves as the better advocates for the nation's farmers. Republicans, backed by a veto threat from President Bush, cloaked themselves in the mantle of fiscal restraint as they fought successfully to keep the bill within the confines of the fiscal 2002 budget resolution (H Con Res 83), which set aside $5.5 billion for the supplemental farm package. The turning point came as Congress was pressing to clear a path to its month-long August recess. Agriculture Committee Chairman Tom Harkin, D-Iowa, called up his $7.4 billion version of the bill and—when it became clear Republican leaders were intent on stopping the additional $1.9 billion in funding—moved to invoke cloture, thereby curtailing the debate and limiting amendments. Harkin needed sixty votes to get his way but came up eleven short on the key vote Aug. 3. Only two Republicans took his side in favor of the more generous package, and they were offset by two Democrats who voted with the GOP. The tally was 49–48: R 2–46; D 46–2; I 1–0. (Vote, p. 812)

    By showing that the Democrats could not muster the three-fifths majority needed to get their way, the vote signaled that Republicans, although in the minority, had sufficient muscle to help Bush hold the line on spending. In the end, however, the outcome was dictated by bureaucratic deadline as much as political will. Under the budget resolution, the Department of Agriculture had only until Sept. 30 to provide whatever extra aid Congress authorized during fiscal 2001, and newly authorized government checks can take weeks to process and deliver. As a result, many believed that the opportunity to provide supplemental assistance would be lost if Congress did not act before its August break.

    Harkin and Majority Leader Tom Daschle, D-S.D., initially saw the time constraint as leverage that would help persuade Bush and Republicans to drop their resistance to the more generous package. Republicans saw the same deadline as a way to compel the Democrats to drop a proposal that—in the face of a veto threat and clear opposition from the House, which had given voice vote approval to the less costly plan—could not quickly become law. Once it became evident to Democrats that their pressure tactics were not working, they suggested they might wait and continue their fight in September. But hours after their bid to limit debate failed, they gave up and allowed the Senate to clear the House-passed measure (HR 2213) by voice vote. Still, the midyear farm aid law (PL 107-25) marked the fourth time in as many years that Congress had stepped in to provide direct payments to farmers—a total of $31.5 billion since 1997—on top of federal support they received under the 1996 farm law (PL 104-127), which had been geared toward weaning farmers from federal subsidies and providing them instead with fixed payments to help them adjust to a more free market system.

    8. Use of Force Resolution

    Unified in its anger over the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks at the World Trade Center and Pentagon, the Senate acted swiftly in unanimously approving a resolution (S J Res 23) giving President Bush the power to pursue and punish the perpetrators. The resolution authorized the president to “use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations or persons he determined planned, authorized, committed or aided” the attacks or against the nations that harbored the terrorists. The Senate adopted the resolution by a vote of 98–0: R 47–0; D 50–0; I 1–0. (Vote, p. 812)

    Congress gave Bush free rein to pursue his subsequent military campaign against alleged mastermind Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda terrorist network, as well as the Taliban regime in Afghanistan that sheltered the group. But the resolution blurred the lines separating the president's and Congress' respective constitutional roles in initiating military hostilities.

    Lawmakers also put off a debate over whether Bush's plan to conduct a global war against terrorism extended to countries beyond Afghanistan, particularly Iraq. Conservatives, such as Republican Policy Committee Chairman Larry E. Craig of Idaho, argued for passing a declaration of war or a broad resolution to give Bush unfettered power to prosecute terrorism around the world. “I'm not for putting a lot of strings on it,” said Republican Jon Kyl of Arizona, a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee. “Are we going to be able to give the president enough flexibility to act if we put a lot of restrictions in legislation?” That view was shared by the White House, which initially proposed that it also be granted “all necessary and appropriate force” to “deter and pre-empt any future acts of terrorism or aggression against the United States.” But many lawmakers, especially Democrats, believed that would go too far and would infringe on congressional authority. They feared that an open-ended commitment would come back to haunt them, much as an earlier generation came to lament its support for the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin resolution (PL 88-408). That resolution was cited by the Johnson and Nixon administrations as congressional authorization for waging the Vietnam War.

    Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Joseph R. Biden Jr., D-Del., said lawmakers had struck an appropriate balance between the two branches of government while ensuring congressional prerogative. “We gave the president all the authority he needed without giving up our constitutional right to decide whether force should be used,” Biden said.

    9. Base Closings

    The Senate approved President Bush's proposal to close surplus military bases after repeatedly rejecting requests by President Clinton for nearly identical legislation. But in a bid to ease House concerns, the Senate delayed the start of the process until 2005. Lawmakers repeatedly had fought efforts to shutter bases, fearing that installations economically important to their states might be targeted. But in September, fourteen senators made an about-face on the issue, supporting Bush where they had opposed Clinton either for political reasons or in the belief that their bases would be on the hit list. (Legislative details, p. 315)

    Clinton and Bush made the same argument for closing more bases: the Pentagon was wasting billions of dollars trying to maintain unnecessary facilities. But a new argument was offered during debate on the fiscal 2002 defense authorization bill (S 1438). Base-closing proponents said the savings were even more important as the military waged war against terrorism and faced new duties in homeland defense after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. Base-closing opponents, led by Jim Bunning, R-Ky., challenged the Pentagon's statement that previous closings had yielded significant savings. They said another round would be ill-timed amid a recession and as the services were deciding what deployments might be needed to fight terrorism. The key vote occurred on an amendment by Bunning to delete the base-closing provision from the defense bill. It was tabled (killed) by a vote of 53–47: R 21–28; D 31–19; I 1–0. (Vote, p. 812)

    Although Democrats provided the majority of the support for an initiative by a Republican president, the difference between this vote and the Senate's 63–35 rejection of a similar proposal in June 2000 was the number of members—eight Republicans and six Democrats—who switched from opposition to support. John W. Warner of Virginia, ranking Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, had voted against Clinton's plans although he acknowledged that additional bases needed to be closed. He argued that Clinton had politicized the process in 1995 by ordering the Air Force to have private contractors take over aircraft overhaul depots in vote-rich California and Texas, even though the base-closing commission had recommended they be shut down.

    Other lawmakers switched because bases that once looked vulnerable now appeared safe. Majority Leader Tom Daschle, whose state of South Dakota was home to Ellsworth Air Force Base, voted against closure in 2000 amid talk that Ellsworth might be a target. But the base's future seemed more certain when the Air Force announced in June that it was one of two at which B-1 bomber operations would be consolidated. This time, Daschle voted for base closings.

    10. Antiterrorism

    In the Senate, all the real debate on the antiterrorism package proposed by Attorney General John Ashcroft took place behind closed doors. Some members privately expressed concern about the breadth of the bill but the power of a popular president and public fears of more terrorist attacks helped push it to passage with very few changes and only one senator voting no. The debate over the Bush administration's tactics in the home-front war on terrorism would continue on Capitol Hill but the lopsided vote in the Senate sent an important signal early on that Congress would give wide latitude to the White House in dealing with the crisis. (Legislative action, p. 187)

    On Sept. 19 Ashcroft asked Congress to give him broader powers to investigate acts of terrorism and other crimes. He argued that limitations in existing law tied his hands and made it far too difficult to track the persons responsible for Sept. 11 attack. He wanted to update the laws to make it easier to track Internet communications, get nationwide search warrants for terrorism investigations, authorize more secret searches of a suspect's residence, and indefinitely detain aliens he believed were national security risks. He also wanted investigators to be able to give information to intelligence agents and receive information in turn.

    Almost as soon as the request arrived on Capitol Hill, senators began closed-door discussions on the provisions. The talks, led by Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick J. Leahy, D-Vt., and the panel's ranking Republican, Orrin G. Hatch of Utah, included administration representatives nearly from the start. That was in contrast to the House, where Judiciary Committee Chairman F. James Sensenbrenner Jr., R-Wis., negotiated largely among committee members to come up with a bill. Although the House Judiciary Committee produced a bipartisan bill, it was never brought to the floor. Members instead voted on a bill much closer to the measure finally agreed on by the Senate negotiators.

    After weeks of negotiations, and several breakdowns, Leahy and others announced Oct. 4 that they had reached a deal. The agreement gave the administration most of what it sought, although senators did delete a provision that would have allowed U.S. government officials to use the results of unconstitutional wiretaps by foreign governments. The bill incorporating the deal (S 1510) was introduced by Majority Leader Tom Daschle, D-S.D., on Oct. 4. It skipped committee and went straight to the floor, where it passed 96–1 on Oct. 11 with less than three hours of actual debate. Daschle told his colleagues to vote against amendments offered by Russell D. Feingold, D-Wis., not because he opposed the substance of the amendments but in order to preserve the carefully negotiated compromise with the administration. Feingold was the only dissenting vote.

    After the House passed its version Oct. 12, members spent about a week working out a compromise. The final bill (HR 3162) included much of the Senate bill but also contained a key House-passed end to the authorization for many of the most contentious parts of the bill after four years. The Senate took up the final bill Oct. 25, the day after the House passed it. The Senate cleared the bill for the president 98–1: R 49–0; D 48–1; I 1–0. The president signed it the next day. Feingold again was the only no vote; Mary L. Landrieu, D-La., did not vote. (Vote, p. 812)

    House

    1. Ergonomics Rules

    House Republican leaders were eager to follow their Senate counterparts in 2001 in overturning a controversial Clinton administration regulation on workplace ergonomics. After weeks of careful groundwork, Republicans had sprung their trap in the Senate on March 6 before Democrats could respond with a procedural defense. They had an easier time in the House the next day, where the GOP controlled the rules more tightly.

    The debate over ergonomics and repetitive motion injuries in factories and offices had been going on for more than a decade. Democrats, with their staunch support of organized labor, generally favored new rules; Republicans generally opposed the idea, since it could cost business dearly. The Clinton administration published a final ergonomics rule in fall 2000, preempting a Republican effort to block the rule in the fiscal 2001 Labor–Health and Human Services–Education spending bill (PL 106-554). House Republicans were eager to push through a repeal as one of the first acts of the session. (Legislative details, p. 565)

    The ergonomics regulation had taken effect Jan. 16 and enforcement would have begun Oct. 14, 2001. It required employers to educate workers about ways to prevent injuries from repetitive motion such as typing, sorting, or lifting heavy loads. It required employers to make changes in their workplaces if a worker reported a repetitive motion injury. Business groups, which said the requirement would have cost U.S. companies more than $100 billion a year, made it a top goal to overturn the rule before it took effect.

    Working behind the scenes, House Republicans and business groups persuaded some centrist Democrats to support overturning the regulation using a little-noticed 1996 law, the Congressional Review Act, which was enacted as part of a debt-limit extension (PL 104-121). When the House took up the bill March 7, sixteen Democrats, fourteen of them from the South, supported overturning the ergonomics regulation, more than offsetting the thirteen Republicans, many of them from the Northeast and upper Midwest, who sided with labor and voted to keep the regulation. The vote was 223–206: R 206–13; D 16–192; I 1–1. (Vote, p. 814)

    Some centrist Democrats justified their votes in 2001 against the Clinton-era regulation by saying they would push for legislation that would require the Labor Department to issue narrower ergonomics policies. However, those bills did not move through either chamber. Democrats were particularly frustrated that Republicans used the Congressional Review Act because it also banned the administration from writing another regulation that had “substantially the same form.” Later in the year, Labor Secretary Elaine L. Chao held hearings on the ergonomics issue, but the agency did not issue a new round of worker safety regulations that employers would have to implement.

    2. Tax Cuts

    With Republicans simultaneously controlling the Capitol and the White House for the first time in five decades, and with evidence of an economic downturn already apparent, a tax cut in 2001 seemed to be a certainty as the year began. Its potential scope and speed remained largely unknown, however, until the narrow but united majority of Republicans won a vote that displayed the House's ability to deliver to President George W. Bush the type of tax cut that was the centerpiece of his campaign.

    Because the Constitution stipulates that revenue bills must originate in the House, it was certain the debate on the Bush tax plan would start in the more receptive of the two congressional chambers. It was left to House GOP leaders—and in particular Bill Thomas, R-Calif., the new chairman of the Ways and Means Committee—to decide how best to leverage a bipartisan willingness to cut taxes. As the year began, Democratic leaders had lined up behind a $900 million plan—signaling they were willing to go more than halfway toward Bush's $1.6 trillion package of cuts over ten years. (Legislative details, pp. 86–87, 89)

    But rather than easing into the tax cut issue with negotiations on a broad package or an easy vote on a minimally controversial tax cut—or simply waiting until the administration had settled its macro disputes over fiscal policy—the GOP took a decidedly different tack: it arranged to make the year's most politically difficult vote on taxes the first vote on taxes. By vaulting past the most difficult hurdle first, party leaders believed, they would help build a sense of inevitability for the deepest tax cut in a generation.

    The day after the president sent his first budget outline to Congress, and without any consultation with Democrats, the House GOP started moving its version of Bush's most contentious and costly tax proposal: the first across-the-board reduction of personal income tax rates in fifteen years, with the sharpest reduction for those with the highest incomes. The Republican legislation (HR 3) would have reduced revenues by $958 billion through fiscal 2011, three-fifths the total of Bush's entire proposal. The bill presented the House not only with its first vote on the new president's platform but also with a vote on the central element of his economic program. The vote March 8 to pass the measure was 230–198: R 219–0; D 10–197; I 1–1. (Vote, p. 814)

    The vote demonstrated not only the outcome of the Bush tax package but also the nature of partisanship in the House and the continued differences between the House and Senate. House GOP leaders learned that their caucus was united behind the Bush tax cut. They learned that, even with the narrowest majority since the 83rd Congress, they could push through one of the most contentious bills of the year without even pretending to collaborate with Democrats—and that more than a handful of Democrats would vote with them anyway. (Most of the ten who did so had just been reelected in politically competitive districts; the House votes on other central elements of the Bush plan—tax relief for parents and ending the estate tax—drew many more Democratic votes; twenty-eight Democrats eventually voted for the reconciliation package that became law in June.)

    The rate cut vote also showed House GOP leaders that their main argument, that quick action was needed to deliver a boost to a sagging economy, could triumph over the two most politically potent counterarguments. Liberals maintained that the Bush tax cut, especially the personal income rate cut, was inappropriately tilted to the rich. Most of the party's conservatives argued that it was wrong to cut taxes before setting an overall budget framework that could balance the demands on what was, at the time, a robust federal surplus.

    Business lobbyists and others hoping to include their special interests in the tax bill also took a lesson from the vote: their priorities would have to wait because the House GOP was only interested in writing its own version of the president's program. Finally, the clarity of the vote allowed House leaders early in the year to pass off to the Senate the job of balancing all the debate's competing pressures. The Senate's 50–50 split at the time, combined with rules that essentially require any proposal of controversy to win sixty supporters, always meant it would be a more difficult ground for the tax cut fight.

    3. Education

    President Bush's education overhaul plan turned almost entirely on an idea that had enemies in both parties: annual testing in reading and math for children in grades three through eight. As a result the White House knew it had a fight on its hand when Reps. Peter Hoekstra, R-Mich., and Barney Frank, D-Mass., teamed up in May to try to delete that element from the House education overhaul bill (HR 1). (Legislative details, p. 540)

    There would have been little point to the overhaul bill without the annual testing. The idea was to hold states, school districts, and schools accountable for how much students learn, with rewards for the best schools and penalties for the worst. To do that, there had to be a yardstick for measuring students' progress. Annual tests were the best available yardstick, supporters of the Bush plan said, and they were essential to allow the bill's multilayered “accountability” system to work.

    It quickly became clear, however, that the annual testing offered something for everyone to hate. Conservatives thought it was a backdoor way to establish the national test they all feared, just four years after they defeated President Bill Clinton's plans for voluntary national tests in reading and math. Liberals argued that children were being forced to take too many tests already, and warned that standardized tests were unfair to poor and minority students. It was a powerful undercurrent of opposition, and even though the education bill had been approved by the House Education and the Workforce Committee by a strong bipartisan vote of 41–7, members remained nervous over the issue. When Hoekstra and Frank announced they would offer an amendment on the House floor to remove the testing requirement, administration officials feared the opposing bipartisan forces would join together.

    The alliance of Hoekstra, a conservative, and Frank, a liberal, captured the wide spectrum of opposition to the annual tests. Both argued that the tests would impose an unfair mandate on the states and that they would represent a heavy-handed federal role in education, which traditionally was a state and local responsibility. All along, the Bush administration and the House bill's main authors—Education and the Workforce Chairman John A. Boehner, R-Ohio, and top Democrat George Miller of California—had to negotiate with Republicans and Democrats to keep them from offering divisive amendments that could destroy the bill's fragile bipartisan support. They swung into action to make sure Hoekstra and Frank did not attract enough support to cut out the bill's centerpiece.

    White House Chief of Staff Andrew H. Card Jr. and presidential adviser Karl Rove discouraged conservatives from voting for the amendment. Boehner and Miller spoke passionately on behalf of the testing provision. The Business Roundtable sent out an e-mail alert asking its members to urge lawmakers to oppose the amendment, warning that it would “take the teeth out of the bill.” Ultimately, the vote was not as close as the bill's supporters had feared. The Hoekstra-Frank amendment was rejected May 22 by a vote of 173–255: R 52–166; D 119–89; I 2–0. (Vote, p. 814)

    However, the amendment did draw the support of 119 Democrats, including some of the most powerful ones in the House: Minority Leader Richard A. Gephardt of Missouri, Minority Whip David E. Bonior of Michigan, and David R. Obey of Wisconsin, the ranking member of the Appropriations Committee. Still, the fact that the testing survived the onslaught of so many opponents was a defining moment for the education bill. At that moment, it became clear that nothing could stand in the bill's way—because even the most unpopular provision was not fatal.

    4. Campaign Finance

    Plenty of members, Republicans and Democrats alike, had qualms about the campaign finance legislation that reached the House floor July 12. But when the bill (HR 2356) came crashing down, tangled in a dispute over the rule (H Res 188) for debate, each side blamed the other for the failure. There was room for both parties to portray events in the light that best suited them. In the end, there were no votes for or against the bill in the House, nothing to put members clearly on record. The vote on the rule was open to interpretation. (Legislative details, p. 733)

    In the weeks leading up to the debate, the sponsors of the campaign finance bill—Democrat Martin T. Meehan of Massachusetts and Republican Christopher Shays of Connecticut—had worked to fine-tune their bill so that it closely matched the Senate-passed version (S 27) sponsored by John McCain, R-Ariz., and Russell D. Feingold, D-Wis. The goal was to avoid a conference committee, where supporters of the bill feared hostile Republican leaders would have another chance to kill it.

    But from the start a critical Senate compromise dogged Democrats in the House. In exchange for banning “soft money,” the unregulated contributions to political parties, McCain and Feingold had agreed to raise the limits on “hard money,” or direct-to-candidate contributions. Democrats already were having second thoughts about banning soft money as the 2002 midterm elections approached. Raising the limits on hard money, where the GOP has long had the edge, gave them one more reason to say no to the bill. The fractures were most visible in the Congressional Black Caucus, whose thirty-six members said soft money was crucial to get-out-the-vote and voter registration efforts in minority communities. Republican leaders, who opposed Shays-Meehan, unveiled a rival bill aimed at those fears, driving another wedge into the Democratic caucus. The bill (HR 2360) would have capped, rather than banned, soft money.

    Meanwhile, House Minority Leader Richard A. Gephardt, D-Mo., who had taken flak for not fighting visibly enough for Shays-Meehan, lobbied his caucus to stay behind the bill. He was still working to secure votes when the dispute over the rule for debate came to a head July 12. Shays and Meehan had asked the House Rules Committee to bundle fourteen last-minute changes to their bill—aimed mostly at bringing it in line with the Senate version—into a single “manager's amendment.” The Rules Committee refused and said each of the changes would be voted on separately on the floor. Shays, Meehan, and their supporters angrily accused the Republican leadership of trying to bring down the bill with a complicated, obstacle-strewn rule. Republicans countered that Democrats were looking for a face-saving way to scuttle the bill because they did not have the votes to pass it.

    Speaker J. Dennis Hastert, R-Ill., offered to compromise on the rule but he withdrew after conservatives in his caucus demanded that the original rule go forward. In the end, the rule for debating campaign finance legislation in the House was rejected 203–228: R 201–19; D 1–208; I 1–1. It was the first time Hastert lost a vote on a rule, which is typically seen as a matter of party loyalty from which members have little room to deviate. (Vote, p. 814)

    With the defeat of the rule, campaign finance dropped from the House agenda; Hastert promptly said he had no intention of giving the debate another chance. Shays-Meehan supporters quickly began collecting signatures on a “discharge petition” to force the bill back to the floor under rules more to their liking, and by Sept. 11, they were just nine names short of the 218 they needed. Then the terrorist attacks put it all on hold. The petition was good for the duration of the 107th Congress, so Shays and Meehan had time for another push in 2002 but that would be an election year, which could further complicate their efforts.

    5. Arsenic Standards

    Early in spring 2001 when President Bush was coming under fire from environmental lobbyists for his industry-favoring policies, there was one decision that became a rallying cry—Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator Christine Todd Whitman's announcement that stricter standards for arsenic in drinking water would be delayed.

    Arsenic occurred naturally in the soil and water, but it also was released by some industrial processes. Studies had linked long-term exposure to arsenic in drinking water to cancer of the bladder, lungs, skin, kidney, liver, and prostate. Polls showed that most people roundly supported a Clinton administration regulation that would have lowered the allowable standard from fifty parts per billion—the level that had been permitted for decades—to ten parts per billion. The lower standard had been recommended by the European Union and the World Health Organization. The dangers of arsenic were not a new topic for Congress. Five years earlier, lawmakers had directed the administration to study the health risks associated with arsenic as part of its safe drinking water amendments (PL 104-182).

    Mining and chemical companies opposed the more stringent Clinton regulations. They had argued that science did not support such a tough policy. The regulation also was opposed by officials from many of the 3,000 towns that would have to update their water systems. When Whitman insisted that the regulation be put on hold, she said the EPA should take the time to make sure the policy, which was not slated to take effect until 2006, was founded in science, though she herself supported the more stringent standard. Environmentalists pounced on her announcement as a sign that the White House was abandoning the policy and, as many lobbyists put it, trying to allow more cancer-causing chemicals in the public's water.

    The Bush administration had delayed or reversed several orders and regulations that Clinton had issued in the waning days of his term, but none of Bush's decisions resonated as the one on arsenic did. Amid a flood of news stories and polls, it was clear that the new administration had miscalculated. Congress was not long in making the point that Bush had gone too far. On July 27 House Democrats succeeded in attaching an amendment to the fiscal 2002 appropriations bill (HR 2620) for the departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to prohibit the EPA from weakening the Clinton standards for arsenic in drinking water. With nineteen Republicans crossing party lines, the amendment, offered by Minority Whip David E. Bonior, D-Mich., was adopted 218–189: R 19–182; D 198–6; I 1–1. (Vote, p. 814)

    The administration did not admit defeat but it retreated in the following months. At the EPA's request, the National Academy of Sciences studied the issue and its report, completed in September, found that arsenic in drinking water was more harmful to humans than previous studies had indicated. The report suggested that the government consider arsenic limits even more restrictive than those proposed by Clinton. Following this report, Whitman announced Oct. 31 that the EPA would, after all, adopt the Clinton standard.

    6. Human Cloning

    The House drew a new line on how far it was willing to go in restricting biomedical research July 31, passing a comprehensive ban on cloning human embryos either for reproductive purposes or to develop medical treatments. The 265–162 vote for the ban (HR 2505), sponsored by Dave Weldon, R-Fla., reflected the growing discomfort many lawmakers felt with the prospect of scientists creating human embryos so their cells could be harvested for medical purposes. (Legislative details, p. 493)

    But the precise extent of the discomfort was evident just before the vote on the Weldon measure when the House in a key vote rejected a substitute amendment by James C. Greenwood, R-Pa., that would have outlawed cloning for the purpose of starting a pregnancy but allowed it to create tissue for medical research. The amendment was defeated 178–249: R 25–194; D 153–53; I 0–2. (Vote, p. 814)

    The cloning votes were intertwined with the separate but related issue of whether the government should fund stem cell research. Researchers in 1998 had announced the ability to isolate primitive human stem cells from days-old embryos. The so-called master cells were capable of evolving into bone, muscle, and virtually every kind of human tissue, giving researchers hope they might be able to develop healthy replacement cells to cure such afflictions as juvenile diabetes, spinal cord injuries, and Parkinson's disease.

    However, the field was controversial because extracting stem cells involved destroying embryos—an act that antiabortion forces equated with taking a life. Stem cells currently were extracted from leftover embryos developed through in vitro fertilization. Research opponents maintained that human embryos soon could be cloned solely for the purpose of supplying stem cells, pointing to plans by the Worcester, Mass., biotechnology company Advanced Cell Technologies to conduct such “therapeutic cloning.”

    The Greenwood substitute served as a referendum on that procedure. Supporters suggested that the extraction of stem cells offered a high-resolution view of early human development that might force Congress to change its position on when life begins. During an often emotional four hours of debate, some noted that the act of making cells divide in a petri dish alone would not ensure that they developed into an embryo unless they were implanted in a womb. They urged members not to impose what they considered onerous new regulations, such as the Weldon ban, on a still-developing field.

    The substitute lost by an unexpectedly large margin thanks to intense lobbying by antiabortion groups, which dubbed the Greenwood provision a “clone to kill” bill. Some skeptics also questioned how one could practically enforce the Greenwood provision and ensure that an embryo created for research purposes was not later implanted in a surrogate mother without violating doctor-patient confidentiality agreements.

    The cloning debate did not break precisely along the lines of past abortion votes. Fifty-three Democrats joined with 194 Republicans and two Independents to reject the Greenwood measure. Some lawmakers on both sides of the debate expressed discomfort afterward at having to assimilate complicated technical information and parse the differences between what the Weldon and Greenwood measures would do. Greenwood and biotechnology industry officials suggested the outcome ironically would give lawmakers more leeway to support embryonic stem cell research, allowing conservatives to support the medical promise of using stem cells from leftover embryos in fertility clinics and still appear to be taking a firm line against human cloning. The separate congressional debate over funding stem cell research was settled in August, when President Bush endorsed limited federal funding for the work.

    7. Drilling in Arctic National Wildlife Refuge

    The issue of whether to open the coast of Alaska's Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) to oil and natural gas exploration had divided lawmakers and pitted environmentalists against oil companies and Alaska officials for more than forty years. Despite the West Coast's electricity shortage earlier in 2001 environmentalists were confident they had the upper hand, pointing to polls showing that a majority of Americans opposed drilling in the distant refuge because of the potential ecological harm. However, the House defeat of a proposal to ban drilling showed how the combined lobbying of the White House, House Republican leaders, energy industries, and labor unions could outmaneuver and overwhelm environmental groups. (Legislative details, p. 414)

    Environmentalists described the coastal plain as an important birthing place for caribou, a feeding ground for snow geese, and a den site for polar bears. They also noted it would take as long as ten years to begin piping oil from the refuge, and that even then, it would be of little help to California and other states that got less than 1 percent of their power from oil-fired plants. However, Bush decided earlier in his administration to talk up the benefits of ANWR as a way to help wean the United States from its dependence on foreign oil. He appointed Vice President Richard B. Cheney to head an energy task force that recommended in May that a portion of the refuge be opened for exploration.

    The House Resources Committee subsequently included the ANWR language in a bill that was combined with three other measures to form an omnibus energy package (HR 4) developed in response to the Cheney task force's report. Environmentalists and their allies in Congress promised to remove the language on ANWR, arguing that opening the refuge would permanently alter it no matter how carefully the work was done. But proponents of drilling framed the debate in economic rather than environmental terms. The International Brotherhood of Teamsters ran a series of radio advertisements claiming that opening the refuge would create as many as 750,000 jobs.

    Environmentalists disputed the figures but the idea of stimulating employment through increased domestic energy production as unemployment began creeping higher for the first time in years resonated with some undecided lawmakers. “I was moved by the prospects … for some jobs,” said Jack Quinn, R-N.Y., a moderate with close ties to organized labor. To win over other lawmakers concerned about the possible environmental damage, House Republican leaders encouraged them to support two amendments that critics said were intended to provide political cover. One would split future oil and gas royalties evenly between the state of Alaska and the federal government, instead of giving Alaska 90 percent. The other would limit the ground that could be covered by oil production facilities in the refuge to 2,000 acres. Both amendments were adopted.

    However, the decisive amendment by Edward J. Markey, D-Mass., to remove the ANWR language from the bill was rejected by a vote of 206–223: R 34–186; D 171–36; I 1–1. After the vote, opponents of drilling were consoled by its dim prospects in the Senate where Democrats held the majority and put off energy legislation for the year. But ANWR supporters in the House lamented that their intensive lobbying did not register. “It was a tough coalition to beat,” Markey said after the vote, “the oil and gas industry, the building trades, the president of the United States, and millions of dollars of lobbying.” (Vote, p. 814)

    8. Patients' Rights

    One of the most intriguing parts of the managed-care story in 2001 was how the bill came to the House floor in the first place. After the Senate passed its bill in June House leaders promised to bring patients' rights legislation to a vote before the August recess. Beyond that, they were stuck. The White House, House Speaker J. Dennis Hastert, R-Ill., and other GOP leaders liked a bill (HR 2315) produced by Ernie Fletcher, R-Ky. However, the Republicans did not have enough support for House passage.

    The more popular measure was one (HR 2563) sponsored by Republicans Charlie Norwood of Georgia and Greg Ganske of Iowa and Democrat John D. Dingell of Michigan. It would expand Americans' ability to sue health maintenance organizations (HMOs) in federal courts and allow plaintiffs to collect civil damages of up to $5 million and unlimited economic and noneconomic damages. Patients also could sue insurers in state courts, with damage caps set by individual states. For years, federal employee benefits law had limited such suits to federal courts, and damages were limited to the cost of denied care. (Legislative details, p. 475)

    Republican House leaders were never happy that Norwood, a dentist, and Ganske, a surgeon, were in the other camp, but the GOP leadership had come to accept it as a fact of managed-care politics. On Aug. 1, Norwood appeared in the White House briefing room with the president and announced a “compromise.” Dingell and Ganske were furious. House leaders were jubilant: the measure produced by Norwood and the president was one they could support. The key provision concerned liability. The deal would allow suits in state courts over HMO medical decisions and cap liability at $1.5 million for noneconomic damages and $1.5 million for punitive damages, which would be allowed only if a HMO had ignored the decision of an independent review panel.

    Hastert quickly brought the Ganske-Dingell bill to the floor the next day with the intention of having the Norwood-Bush deal offered as an amendment. But the House burst into a fiercely partisan and sometimes personal debate, with Ganske accusing Norwood of “free-lancing” and Norwood defending himself by saying his deal with Bush was the only way to get a managed-care bill enacted. The tension was palpable when the Norwood amendment itself came up. Said Ganske: “This is the nitty-gritty of the debate. We have sort of been fooling around until we get to the Norwood amendment.” Both sides worked furiously to win votes. The White House and insurance companies lobbied for adoption of the amendment; the American Medical Association and some state officials, who feared the Norwood-Bush deal would preempt state laws, worked against it. Dingell, Ganske and their supporters argued that the Norwood-Bush deal was more beneficial to insurance companies than to consumers.

    The Norwood-Bush deal was criticized by all sides—conservatives, moderates, and Democrats. Many who voted for it said they did so just to get a bill to conference. Ultimately, the amendment was successful because it did one thing no patients' rights legislation had done: It gave much-needed cover to Republicans who wanted to vote for a patients' rights bill while also supporting their president. The amendment was adopted Aug. 2, 218–213: R 214–6; D 3–206; I 1–1. (Vote, p. 814)

    Three GOP members who had cosponsored the original Norwood-Dingell-Ganske bill followed Norwood: Bob Barr of Georgia, Benjamin A. Gilman of New York, and Steve Horn of California. The bill, as amended, passed the House 226–203 shortly after. For his part, Norwood insisted the deal he cut with Bush was not the final word, and suggested changes could be made in conference. “I know this isn't the final bill, and so do you,” he told his colleagues. “I know there are words that need to be changed.”

    9. Use of Force Against Terrorists

    Intent on pursuing Osama bin Laden and rooting out terrorism after the Sept. 11 attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C., the House overwhelmingly approved a resolution (H J Res 64) giving President Bush the authority to punish those behind the assaults—with one lone voice of dissent. The vote, which reflected the strong bipartisan anger stemming from the attacks, was 420–1: R 214–0; D 204–1; I 2–0. (Legislative details, p. 187; Vote, p. 814)

    Following the vote, the House passed an identical Senate resolution (S J Res 23) by voice vote, clearing it for the president. The resolution authorized the president to “use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations or persons he determined planned, authorized, committed or aided” the attacks or the nations that harbored them. In clearing the measure, Congress gave Bush the power to launch the subsequent military campaign against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, suspected of protecting bin Laden and the al Qaeda terrorist network. Left unclear were answers to the longtime questions about the constitutional roles of the president and Congress in initiating military operations.

    Rep. Barbara Lee, D-Calif., voted against the resolution after attending a prayer service at the Washington National Cathedral. Lee cited the words of the Rev. Nathan D. Baxter, an Episcopal priest and the Cathedral dean, who counseled, “Let us also pray for divine wisdom as our leaders consider the necessary actions for national security, that despite our grief we may not become the evil we deplore.” Lee, whose district included Berkeley, with its long-standing antiwar perspective added, “Somebody has to say this in the U.S. Congress. And if we all vote in one way, no one does that.”

    Lawmakers put off debate over whether Bush's global war against terrorism extended beyond Afghanistan to countries such as Iraq. Conservatives, such as Bob Barr, R-Ga., had argued for passing a declaration of war or a broad resolution to give the president unlimited power to prosecute terrorism around the world. That view was shared by the White House, which initially proposed that it also be granted “all necessary and appropriate force” to “deter and preempt any future acts of terrorism or aggression against the United States.” But many lawmakers, particularly Democrats, believed that went too far. They feared that an open-ended commitment would come back to haunt them, much as an earlier generation came to regret its support for the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin resolution (PL 88-408). That resolution was cited by the Johnson and Nixon administrations as congressional authorization for waging the Vietnam War. “We need to tread very cautiously,” said Alcee L. Hastings, D-Fla. “We shouldn't cave in and say ‘fire at will.’”

    10. Farm Bill

    The debate over how to rebuild the federal safety net under the farm economy while it was in the middle of a devastating downturn led to one of the clearer choices in the House in 2001 between taking an “old” or a “new” approach. Farm-state lawmakers and commodity groups sought to enhance the array of subsidies available to those who grew grains and oilseeds. But urban and suburban members, who typically stayed in the background during farm bill debates, joined with conservation and sportsmen's groups to mount a serious challenge to that system by proposing conservation programs from which all farmers could benefit. (Legislative details, p. 812)

    The debate occurred on a farm bill (HR 2646) being written to update the 1996 farm law (PL 104-127), enacted by a new Republican congressional majority eager to implement an agenda that the GOP said brought them to power in the 1994 elections. The aim in that legislation was to wean farmers from the federal subsidies that were among the longest lasting legacies of the New Deal, but that goal went largely unmet as falling crop prices worldwide compelled Congress to provide supplementary aid almost every year since.

    Republican House Agriculture Committee Chairman Larry Combest and ranking Democrat Charles W. Stenholm, both Texans, proposed abandoning the 1996 law and providing an additional $73.5 billion over the next ten years for farm programs, three-fifths of it to subsidize farmers of the nation's major export commodities: corn, wheat, soybeans, other grains and oilseeds, rice, and cotton. The benefits of doing so would be concentrated mostly on the large, profitable farms of the Great Plains, Upper Midwest, and deep South.

    The alternative was to expand the reach, rather than the generosity, of federal farm aid by increasing the spending on conservation programs—such as those that paid farmers to idle environmentally sensitive land and to protect wildlife and wetlands—which were not confined to any particular region or type of farm. This drew the support of environmentalists, antisprawl groups, and other groups. Wisconsin Democrat Ron Kind, a member of the Agriculture panel, teamed up with two leading environmentalists among House Republicans, Sherwood Boehlert of New York and Wayne T. Gilchrest of Maryland, as well as Michigan Democrat John D. Dingell, arguably the most powerful advocate of gun owners' rights in the House, to propose taking $19 billion of the subsidy payments in the Combest-Stenholm bill and spending it instead on conservation.

    As the vote approached, the White House signaled sympathy with the environmentalist approach, releasing a report that emphasized the importance of conservation programs and issuing a harsh critique of the commodity-centric Agriculture Committee measure. With the new approach gaining momentum, Combest threatened to scuttle the entire bill if the Kind-Boehlert-Dingell amendment were adopted. Although their plan drew bipartisan support—one-quarter of the Republicans voted for it, as did seven out of ten Democrats—it was narrowly rejected the night of Oct. 4. The key vote was 200–226: R 54–161; D 145–64; I 1–1. (Vote, p. 814)

    With the alternative swept aside, the House voted overwhelmingly the next day to pass the more traditional, subsidy-focused farm bill. But the closeness of the vote helped shape the Senate debate later in the year and seemed destined to influence the outcome when a compromise was written in 2002. Even in failure, the amendment's proponents “changed American farm politics forever,” said Mike Casey of the Environmental Working Group, which lobbied hard for the plan. “They basically said suburban America and Northeast coastal areas have a stake in what farm policy looks like, and never again are farm-state legislators going to be able to say, ‘We are the committee; we know what we're doing; shut up and sit down.’”

    11. Antiterrorism

    Overwhelming votes of support in the House for antiterrorism legislation in October belied the measure's troubled path. A group of Democrats and Republicans voiced misgivings that the legislation sought by the Bush administration sacrificed civil liberties for greater police powers, and the group even drew up a bipartisan alternative, though it went nowhere. In the end, the vast majority of House members supported the drive to give the Bush administration greater powers to track, investigate and prosecute those accused of terrorism and other crimes. (Legislative details, p. 187)

    Attorney General John Ashcroft first went to Congress just eight days after the Sept. 11 attacks with a request for a package of broad new authorities that would allow his investigators to track communications over the Internet, secretly search a suspect's home, and obtain a nationwide warrant for searches in terrorism investigations. Liberal groups immediately denounced the move as a power grab, noting that much of the enhanced authority had been requested by previous administrations—and rejected by Congress—well before the terrorist attacks. Some conservatives also said they were worried the administration was reaching too far. Ashcroft and others defended the request, saying the new dangers that terrorism posed required new tools for law enforcement.

    House Judiciary Committee Chairman F. James Sensenbrenner Jr., R-Wis., staked his committee's claim on the Ashcroft proposal, arguing that it should proceed through the regular legislative process. He won approval from the GOP House leadership to take the bill through committee, so long as it moved quickly to the floor. Sensenbrenner began negotiations with his committee's ranking Democrat, John Conyers Jr. of Michigan, and others. They came up with a compromise bill that dropped some of the most controversial proposals in the administration's package, such as provisions to broaden the circumstances under which secret searches of suspects' property and the indefinite detention of aliens would be allowed. The Judiciary Committee then met and approved the bill (HR 2975) unanimously, a rare occurrence for the normally fractious committee.

    In the meantime, top members of the Senate Judiciary Committee were negotiating their own version of the bill, this time with Justice Department and White House participation. These negotiations produced a bill much more to the administration's liking, a bill the Senate passed after little real debate. As the House prepared to debate the Judiciary Committee's version, the White House began to pressure the GOP leadership and Sensenbrenner to bring to the floor a package closer to Ashcroft's proposal. In the wake of the strong Senate vote, House leaders complied, scuttling the committee provisions in favor of language closer to the Senate bill.

    They did retain one key provision from the committee to end the authority for certain sections of the bill. The “sunset” was set at five years. After the rule to bring the substitute bill to the floor was narrowly adopted, 214–208, the House passed the revised bill (HR 2975), 337–79. At that point, it was clear the administration would get what it wanted. On Oct. 24, after negotiations with the Senate, the House brought a final version of the bill (HR 3162) to the floor. It gave the administration broader authority to do secret searches, for example, but it retained the House-passed sunsets, shortened to four years. The House passed it 357–66: R 211–3; D 145–62; I 1–1. (Vote, p. 814)

    12. Aviation Security

    After the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, it seemed only a matter of time before Congress would remove the low-paid private security personnel who screened passengers and baggage at the nation's airports and put federal workers in charge—something airlines had resisted for decades, citing higher costs. While many members of Congress were ready to let the federal government assume the responsibility and cost in the wake of the attacks, a group of House conservatives stood in the way, led by Texas Republicans Richard Armey, the majority leader, and Tom DeLay, the majority whip. Creating as many as 28,000 new federal jobs would not guarantee better security, they argued, but it would increase the size of the federal government and the membership of federal employee unions largely loyal to Democrats.

    The debate tied up House action on a broad aviation security package for more than six weeks as Armey and DeLay refused to budge. A bill (HR 3150) eventually drafted by the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee would have given the president the option of having private or government screeners. (Legislative details, p. 199)

    When the Senate passed an aviation security bill of its own (S 1447) on Oct. 11 to make all screeners federal employees, it appeared the House Republican effort was doomed. The Senate bill passed 100–0, showing the broad support for federalization. President Bush, though he said he preferred having a choice on airport security, indicated he would sign the Senate bill if the House passed it. Facing a big loss, and amid intensive lobbying for federalization by airline pilots and organized labor, Armey and DeLay persuaded the White House to support their effort. Bush, along with Transportation Secretary Norman Y. Mineta and Rep. John L. Mica, R-Fla., chairman of the House Transportation Subcommittee on Aviation, lobbied intensively. They targeted members who had not announced their support for the Republican bill, including conservative Southern “Blue Dog” Democrats and undecided New Yorkers who wanted additional help for New York City.

    DeLay and Armey persuaded the Rules Committee to design a floor procedure that allowed a vote on the Senate bill first, which Democrats wanted. But it also allowed the Republicans to offer a manager's amendment that they could alter at the last minute to include whatever deals they reached with wavering members for their support. When the amendment finally was offered, it included liability limits for several organizations affected by the attacks, including Boeing Co., the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, which built and operated the World Trade Center, and jet engine manufacturers General Electric Co. and Pratt & Whitney. It included security waivers for passengers carrying musical instruments and even a provision that would have required airlines to carry live animals, such as baby chicks, in their freight. In the end, the strategy worked. The House voted on Nov. 1 to reject the Senate bill 214–218: R 8–211; D 205–6; I 1–1. (Vote, p. 814)

    Three of the six dissenting Democrats—Luis V. Gutierrez and Rod R. Blagojevich of Illinois and Solomon P. Ortiz of Texas—represented districts with large immigrant populations. They said they voted against the Senate bill because of a requirement that screeners be U.S. citizens for five years. The vote showed the tactical skill of DeLay and Armey and their ability to persuade the administration to back their play. But Bush's support was as short-lived as the House victory. In conference with the Senate, Republicans agreed to make all airport screeners federal employees, and Bush signed the bill Nov. 19, three days after Congress cleared it.

    13. Fast-Track Trade Authority

    Securing fast-track trade negotiating authority from Congress was one of President Bush's top priorities but convincing lawmakers to go along was expected to be a challenge. The decades-old authority, which had been granted to presidents beginning with Gerald Ford but was withheld from President Bill Clinton in 1994, allowed the executive branch to negotiate trade agreements and then bring them to Congress for an up-or-down vote without amendments and under mandatory deadlines. Opposition to the legislation (HR 3005), which the Bush White House renamed trade promotion authority, cut across regional lines. Democrats had become the main obstacle to its passage. They feared that free trade agreements with less-developed countries could weaken labor standards and environmental protection in the United States and its trading partners. Democrats were joined in this view by a small but significant group of Republicans who primarily represent industrial districts. (Legislative details, p. 150)

    Republican leaders in the House began their fast-track campaign for the year in June. In an effort to firm up votes, Speaker J. Dennis Hastert, R-Ill., called for a vote before the August recess but the vote was canceled when it became clear the measure would not pass. The issue returned in late September as the White House portrayed free trade as an important part of the war on terrorism but that backfired as a public relations gambit and Democrats easily blocked a fast-track markup. In November GOP leaders tentatively scheduled another floor vote but again put it off.

    Both sides dug in for a showdown in early December. House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Bill Thomas, R-Calif., had marked up a fast-track bill Oct. 9 with the help of three protrade Democrats—Cal Dooley of California, William J. Jefferson of Louisiana, and John Tanner of Tennessee. That was enough for Thomas to call it a bipartisan measure. It also included some labor and environmental protection as negotiating goals in trade agreements, a provision that many Democrats sought. But most protrade Democrats, who were members of the New Democratic Coalition, still did not like the bill because they said it was out of date. They said it was too focused on manufacturing and agriculture trade when other issues, such as antitrust and intellectual property, had become just as important.

    In the week leading up to the House vote, GOP leaders decided to focus their lobbying on wavering Republicans rather than trying to attract more Democrats, which had been a failed strategy of the past. The shift proved to be pivotal. The lobbying was intense. Select Republicans were invited to travel with Bush on Air Force One and were promised projects and provisions in the trade bill and other measures. Republican Reps. Jim DeMint of South Carolina and Robin Hayes of North Carolina changed their positions and supported the bill after party leaders pledged to try changing the sub-Saharan African and Caribbean Basin trade preference law (PL 106-200) enacted in 2001, to help protect textile dyeing and finishing industries in their districts. The promise also extended to the Andean nations trade bill (HR 3009), which had been passed by the House but was pending in the Senate.

    As tough as the lobbying got, the debate kept pace. On the floor Dec. 6, Republican leaders infuriated Democrats by saying that rejecting fast-track would undermine Bush's standing in the global community in the midst of a war. Some Democrats, including protraders from high-tech districts suffering from increased unemployment, said they could not support the bill without an economic stimulus measure (HR 3090) to help workers laid off after Sept. 11, a measure that had stalled. The vote ran extremely close and was held open while final deals were struck with Republicans from the textile South. The moment the yeas edged past the nays, the vote was closed and victory was declared 215–214: R 194–23; D 21–189; I 0–2. (Vote, p. 814)

    2001 Senate Brief Descriptions

    1. Ashcroft Nomination/Confirmation

    Confirmation of President Bush's nomination of John Ashcroft of Missouri to be attorney general. Confirmed 58–42: R 50–0; D 8–42 (ND 6–35, SD 2–7), Feb. 1, 2001. A “yea” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    2. S J Res 6. Ergonomics Rule Disapproval/Passage

    Passage of the joint resolution disapproving the ergonomics rule promulgated in 2000 by the Labor Department during the Clinton administration, stating the rule would have no force or effect. Passed 56–44: R 50–0; D 6–44 (ND 1–40, SD 5–4), March 6, 2001.

    3. S 27. Campaign Finance Overhaul/Passage

    Passage of the bill to ban “soft-money” donations to political parties, prohibit corporate and union general treasury funds from being spent on issue ads, and require disclosure of individuals who pay for issue ads that run within sixty days of a general election or thirty days of a primary. It also prevented certain issue ads from targeting specific candidates within the sixty-day and thirty-day periods. The bill, as amended, increased the individual contribution limit per candidate to $2,000 per election, the individual limit to national parties to $25,000 per year and the individual aggregate limit to $37,500 per year. Passed 59–41: R 12–38; D 47–3 (ND 40–1, SD 7–2), April 2, 2001.

    4. H Con Res 83. Fiscal 2002 Budget Resolution/Education Spending

    Harkin, D-Iowa, amendment to the Domenici, R-N.M., substitute amendment. The Harkin amendment reduced the size of the tax cut by $448 billion and increased education spending by $224 billion over ten years. It also provided an increase of approximately $224 billion for debt reduction over ten years. Adopted 53–47: R 4–46; D 49–1 (ND 41–0, SD 8–1), April 4, 2001. A “nay” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    5. Hr 1836. Tax Cut Reconciliation/Passage

    Passage of the bill to reduce income tax rates and make other tax cuts totaling $1.4 trillion over eleven years. The bill reduced rates in the top four income tax brackets, retained the 15 percent bracket and created a new 10 percent bracket. It set the standard deduction for married couples and the income eligible for the 15 percent rate bracket at double that of singles beginning in 2005, gradually repealed the estate tax, doubled the $500 per child tax credit by 2011, and made the research and development credit permanent. Annual limits on contributions to Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) were increased to $5,000 by 2011. Passed 62–38: R 50–0; D 12–38 (ND 7–34, SD 5–4), May 23, 2001. A “yea” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    6. S 1052. Patients' Rights/Passage

    Passage of the bill to provide federal protections, such as access to specialty and emergency room care, and allow patients to appeal a health plan organization's decision on coverage and treatment. It also permitted patients to sue health insurers in state courts over quality-of-care claims and at the federal level over administrative or non-medical coverage disputes. Federal-level economic and non-economic damages could not be capped, and punitive damages were capped at $5 million. State damages were to be determined by state law. Passed 59–36: R 9–35; D 50–0 (ND 41–0, SD 9–0); I 0–1, June 29, 2001. A “nay” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    7. S 1246. Fiscal 2001 Supplemental Agriculture Assistance/Cloture

    Motion to invoke cloture (thus limiting debate) on the bill to authorize $7.4 billion in additional economic assistance to farmers in fiscal 2001. Motion rejected 49–48: R 2–46; D 46–2 (ND 37–2, SD 9–0); I 1–0, Aug. 3, 2001. Three-fifths of the total Senate (sixty) is required to invoke cloture.

    8. S J Res 23. Use of Force Authorization/Passage

    Passage of the joint resolution to authorize the president to use all necessary and appropriate force against the nations, organizations, or people he determines planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred Sept. 11, 2001, or that harbored such organizations or people, to prevent future acts of terrorism against the United States. Passed 98–0: R 47–0; D 50–0 (ND 41–0, SD 9–0); I 1–0, Sept. 14, 2001. A “yea” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    9. S 1438. Fiscal 2002 Defense Authorization/Base Closures

    Warner, R-Va., motion to table (kill) the Bunning, R-Ky., amendment that eliminated the provision in the bill authorizing an additional round of base realignment and closures in 2003. Motion agreed to 53–47: R 21–28; D 31–19 (ND 25–16, SD 6–3); I 1–0, Sept. 25, 2001.

    10. Hr 3162. Anti-Terrorism Authority/Passage

    Passage of the bill to expand law enforcement authority to investigate suspected terrorists. The bill allowed disclosure of wiretap information among certain government officials, authorized limited disclosure of secret grand jury information to certain government officials, and allowed the detention of foreigners suspected of having ties to terrorism. It also made it easier for law enforcement to track voice and Internet communications using surveillance techniques and strengthened laws to combat money laundering. Most of the bill's intelligence-gathering provisions were to end, or “sunset,” after four years. Passed (thus cleared for the president) 98–1: R 49–0; D 48–1 (ND 40–1, SD 8–0); I 1–0, Oct. 25, 2001. A “yea” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    2001 House Brief Descriptions

    1. S J Res 6. Ergonomics Rule Disapproval/Passage

    Passage of the joint resolution to provide for congressional disapproval of the ergonomics rule submitted by the Labor Department during the Clinton administration, stating the rule would have no force or effect. Passed 223–206: R 206–13; D 16–192 (ND 2–152, SD 14–40); I 1–1, March 7, 2001.

    2. Hr 3. Income Tax Reduction/Passage

    Passage of the bill to lower federal income taxes by restructuring the five existing tax brackets into four: 10 percent, 15 percent, 25 percent, and 33 percent. Passed 230–198: R 219–0; D 10–197 (ND 3–150, SD 7–47); I 1–1, March 8, 2001. A “yea” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    3. Hr 1. Esea Reauthorization/Testing Requirement

    Hoekstra, R-Mich., amendment to strike provisions mandating state reading and math tests for students in grades three through eight. The amendment retained existing law requiring states to test students in all subjects in which the states had developed standards. Rejected 173–255: R 52–166; D 119–89 (ND 91–63, SD 28–26); I 2–0, May 22, 2001. A “nay” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    4. Hr 2356. Campaign Finance Overhaul/Rule

    Adoption of the rule (H Res 188) to provide for House floor consideration of the bill to ban “soft-money” donations to national political parties but allow up to $10,000 in soft-money donations to state and local parties for voter registration and get-out-the-vote activity. The bill prevented issue ads from targeting specific candidates within sixty days of a general election or thirty days of a primary. The bill maintained the existing individual contribution limit of $1,000 per election for House candidates but raised it to $2,000 for Senate candidates. Both limits were indexed for inflation. Rejected 203–228: R 201–19; D 1–208 (ND 1–154, SD 0–54); I 1–1, July 12, 2001.

    5. Hr 2620. Fiscal 2002 Va–Hud Appropriations/Arsenic Standards

    Bonior, D-Mich., amendment to ban use of funds in the bill to delay national drinking water regulations for arsenic or to further a rule to raise arsenic levels under those regulations. Adopted 218–189: R 19–182; D 198–6 (ND 151–2, SD 47–4); I 1–1, July 27, 2001. A “nay” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    6. Hr 2505. Human Cloning Ban/Substitute

    Greenwood, R-Pa., substitute amendment to ban human cloning to begin a pregnancy but allow the cloning of embryos for medical research as long as a researcher registers with the Department of Health and Human Services. The bill made it illegal to receive or transport the products of cloning if they would be used to begin a pregnancy. The ban on reproductive cloning was to expire in ten years. Rejected 178–249: R 25–194; D 153–53 (ND 118–35, SD 35–18); I 0–2, July 31, 2001. A “nay” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    7. Hr 4. Energy Plan/Alaskan Refuge Drilling Ban

    Markey, D-Mass., amendment to maintain the existing prohibition on oil drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge by striking language opening the reserve up to development. Rejected 206–223: R 34–186; D 171–36 (ND 141–13, SD 30–23); I 1–1, Aug. 1, 2001. A “nay” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    8. Hr 2563. Patients' Rights/Provider Liability

    Norwood, R-Ga., amendment to limit liability and damage awards when a patient is harmed by denial of health care. It allowed a patient to sue a health maintenance organization (HMO) in state court but specified that federal, not state, law would govern. An employer could remove cases to federal court. It limited noneconomic damages to $1.5 million. Punitive damages were limited to the same amount and only allowed when a decision maker failed to abide by a grant of benefits by an independent medical reviewer. Patients were authorized to seek court reviews when an independent reviewer found against them, but the patients were required to produce clear and convincing evidence to overturn the decision. Adopted 218–213: R 214–6; D 3–206 (ND 2–153, SD 1–53); I 1–1, Aug. 2, 2001. A “yea” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    9. H J Res 64. Use of Force Authorization/Passage

    Passage of the joint resolution to authorize the president to use all necessary and appropriate force against the nations, organizations, or people he determines planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred Sept. 11, 2001, or that harbored such organizations or people, to prevent future acts of terrorism against the United States. Passed 420–1: R 214–0; D 204–1 (ND 150–1, SD 54–0); I 2–0, Sept. 14, 2001. (Under a unanimous consent agreement, the House subsequently passed an identical Senate resolution (S J Res 23), clearing the measure for the president.) A “yea” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    10. Hr 2646. Farm Bill/Conservation

    Boehlert, R-N.Y., amendment that would shift $1.9 billion from the bill's fixed and countercyclical payments to farm and undeveloped land conservation programs, including the Farm and Ranchland Protection Program and the Wildlife Habitat Incentives Program. The measure also would increase the amount of land that could be included in various preservation programs. Rejected 200–226: R 54–161; D 145–64 (ND 132–23, SD 13–41); I 1–1, Oct. 4, 2001.

    11. Hr 3162. Antiterrorism Authority/Passage

    Sensenbrenner, R-Wis., motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill to expand law enforcement's power to investigate suspected terrorists. The bill allowed disclosure of wiretap information among certain government officials, authorized limited disclosure of secret grand jury information to certain government officials, and authorized the detention of foreigners with suspected ties to terrorism. It also made it easier for law enforcement to track voice and Internet communications using surveillance techniques and strengthened laws to combat money laundering. Most of the bill's intelligence-gathering provisions were to end after four years. Motion agreed to 357–66: R 211–3; D 145–62 (ND 103–50, SD 42–12); I 1–1, Oct. 24, 2001. A two-thirds majority of those present and voting (282 in this case) was required for passage under suspension of the rules. A “yea” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    12. Hr 3150. Aviation Security/Democratic Substitute

    Oberstar, D-Minn., amendment to federalize passenger and baggage screeners at the country's 140 largest airports and give the Justice Department responsibility for airport and airline security. HR 3150 included additional security provisions similar to those in the underlying bill but did not broaden liability caps. Rejected 214–218: R 8–211; D 205–6 (ND 154–3, SD 51–3); I 1–1, Nov. 1, 2001. A “nay” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    13. Hr 3005. Trade Promotion Authority/Passage

    Passage of the bill to allow expedited negotiation and implementation of trade agreements between the executive branch and foreign countries. The bill included provisions requiring increased consultations with Congress on any proposed changes of tariffs for imports of sensitive agriculture products and on trade disparities for textile products. Passed 215–214: R 194–23; D 21–189 (ND 7–150, SD 14–39); I 0–2, Dec. 6, 2001. A “yea” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    2002 Key Votes
    Senate

    1. Farm Bill

    A basic tenet of the politics of agriculture in Congress is that the fault lines are always regional and hardly ever ideological. The most notable exception came in 1996 when the newly ascendant Republicans won enactment of a law (PL 104-127) designed to wean farmers from a federal subsidy system. But in the 107th Congress, there was never much doubt that the 1996 law would be repudiated. The big questions were how much more to spend and—reviving the regional battles of old—which commodities to treat a bit better than others. The first question was answered in 2001. In October, the House passed a farm, conservation, nutrition, and rural development package promising a double-digit increase in spending for the new decade. The Senate took up the bill (HR 2646) and by year's end signaled it would seek to spend even more. The question became what else the Senate would need to do to advance the bill, especially in an election year in which some of the most competitive Senate races were in farming or ranching states. (Legislative details, p. 449)

    Republican senators from farm states sharply criticized the farm bill that two Midwest Democrats—Majority Leader Tom Daschle of South Dakota and Agriculture Committee Chairman Tom Harkin of Iowa—had written. The bill was pushed to relatively easy passage Feb. 13 but only after it was altered to get the support of more senators. That was the key agriculture policy vote of the year—because it set the stage for negotiations during the next two months on a six-year farm bill (PL 107-171) that generally maintained the regional deals embodied in the Senate measure. The vote was 58–40: R 9–38; D 48–2; I 1–0. (Vote, p. 830)

    A $2 billion support program for small dairy farmers persuaded Maine's two Republican senators, Susan Collins and Olympia J. Snowe, as well as Pennsylvania Republican Arlen Specter to support the bill. The hefty dairy program also won over James M. Jeffords, I-Vt. Similarly, a $4.4 billion program for peanut farmers brought the Republican Senate delegations from Alabama and Virginia, while also guaranteeing the support of Georgia's two Democratic senators, Zell Miller and Max Cleland.

    Daschle and Harkin were able to keep almost all of the remaining Democratic senators in line by warning that if their bill did not pass quickly, under the congressional budget rules, the $73.5 billion in additional spending that had been earmarked by Congress in 2001 was at strong risk of evaporating. Democratic senators who were not from states with large agricultural sectors were warned that a vote against the bill could cost Democrats control of the Senate. Only two Democrats voted against the Senate bill: Jon Corzine of New Jersey, who viewed the package as too expensive; and Blanche Lincoln of Arkansas, who did not find the benefits for the rice and cotton farmers of her state sufficiently generous.

    2. Fuel Economy Standards

    Senate debate on an omnibus energy bill (HR 4) in 2002 mirrored a seeming contradiction in the national psyche: Americans believed it more important to protect the environment than to drill for more oil but were unwilling to give up their big, fuel-guzzling vehicles in order to reduce demand. Mindful of voter ambivalence, Congress had done little to force the issue. Corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards adopted in 1975 had been largely unchanged since 1985. Between 1995 and 1999, House Republicans added language to annual transportation spending laws blocking even a study of new standards.

    As President George W. Bush took office, however, the situation appeared to be changing. Faced with growing political pressure to emphasize conservation, leading Republicans said they were willing to consider higher CAFE standards. In the House-passed energy bill, this translated into a modest increase: a requirement that automakers implement changes to save 5 billion gallons of oil over the next six years. In the Senate, plans were being laid for a more ambitious CAFE goal. Democrat John Kerry of Massachusetts and Republican John McCain of Arizona drafted a proposal to require all classes of cars and light trucks to average 36 miles per gallon (mpg) by 2015, a jump of between 5 mpg and 10 mpg across the fleets. Proponents contended that automakers had or were developing the technology to make such a figure attainable. (Legislative details, p. 414)

    As the Senate debate approached, the auto industry lobbied hard for more flexibility, similar to the approach in the House bill. Opponents of the Kerry-McCain plan argued that higher fuel efficiency would mean smaller, lighter, and more dangerous cars—and fewer jobs for autoworkers. Left unsaid was that expensive sport utility vehicles, with their high-profit margins, had become crucial to automakers' finances. The opponents of higher CAFE standards decided their best approach was to offer an alternative. The amendment—by Carl Levin, D-Mich., and Christopher S. Bond, R-Mo.—would have required the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to increase mileage standards for light trucks, including sports utility vehicles (SUVs), within fifteen months and for cars within two years.

    Industry officials said the Levin amendment ensured that some increase would occur, but not under the “aggressive” timetable envisioned by Kerry and McCain. The choice was cast as between a mandate that would be imposed by Congress, at the cost of jobs and vehicle safety, and a more considered decision by an agency that would have to take economics into consideration. A phalanx of interests, including the auto industry, unions, rural and suburban minivan and truck drivers, and business lobbyists, converged on Capitol Hill to lobby—and on March 13 the amendment by Levin and Bond was adopted, 62–38: R 43–6; D 19–31; I 0–1. (Vote, p. 830)

    3. Campaign Finance

    The battle over whether to rewrite the campaign finance law on the books since the Watergate scandal in the 1970s had stretched over more than a decade, through one veto and hundreds of votes. Even after the measure (HR 2356) was passed by the House on Feb. 14 and came roaring into the Senate, most lawmakers expected one last fight on the floor. Mitch McConnell, R-Ky., long the bill's leading opponent who had filibustered earlier campaign finance measures, was reticent about his plans. Majority Leader Tom Daschle, D-S.D., prepared to muscle it through the chamber with a complicated series of procedural votes designed to break a filibuster. (Legislative details, p. 734)

    McConnell managed to delay action on the bill for more than a month and forced its supporters to prove they had the sixty votes required to overcome a filibuster. But he had conceded defeat even before the bill reached the floor. The March 20 vote to clear the legislation was 60–40: R 11–38; D 48–2; I 1–0, as one in five Republicans broke from their leadership to support enactment. President Bush signed the bill into law (PL 107-155) on March 27. (Vote, p. 830)

    As examples of questionable fundraising practices on both sides piled up, supporters of an overhaul shaped and reshaped their legislation, making compromises and dropping some proposals as politically unpalatable. Abandoned, for example, was a provision that would have banned contributions from political action committees, which was included in the first campaign finance bill introduced in 1995 by Sens. John McCain, R-Ariz., and Russell D. Feingold, D-Wis.

    The center of the final bill—the ban on soft money and restrictions on political advertising funded with those unregulated contributions—took shape gradually. The final pieces began coming together during the 2000 elections. McCain made campaign finance the foundation of his presidential race, boosting him and the cause to national prominence. His popularity and tenacity helped keep the bill moving forward. When the 107th Congress began, turnover in the Senate, where McCain and Feingold had been blocked for years by filibusters, shifted the balance of power. Seven senators who voted to block the 1999 campaign finance bill were replaced by supporters of McCain and Feingold. Another five Republicans who had opposed the measure in the past switched their votes. The first to announce a change of heart was Thad Cochran of Mississippi, who said he had watched his colleagues struggle against a tide of opposition money and concluded that McCain had been right.

    4. Federal Election Standards

    Before the terrorism of Sept. 11, 2001, and the anthrax attacks later that year, perhaps the most immediate crisis the 107th Congress promised to address were the defects in election procedures seen in the 2000 president race, which had cast doubt on the outcome of the presidential contest and deepened voter skepticism about the reliability and fairness of the entire electoral process. But it was not until seventeen months after that election—when the Senate in April passed an election overhaul bill embodying a set of carefully balanced trade-offs—that Republicans and Democrats cemented a pact that would carry the legislation through a summer of negotiations to President Bush's desk. (Legislative details, p. 727)

    To ensure that eligible voters would not again be denied the right to vote, Democrats wanted to set the first federal standards for conducting elections and provide money to help carry out those requirements. They likened the effort to a revival of the civil rights legislative campaigns of the 1960s. After fits and starts, the House passed a bipartisan bill (HR 3295) at the end of 2001 that set broad minimum standards while giving states considerable flexibility in deciding how to meet them. And at the same time, it appeared that a similar bridging of the breach had been accomplished in the Senate. The key was a willingness by Democrats to include antifraud protections as a condition of winning Republican support. Sen. Christopher S. Bond, R-Mo., blamed fraud for defeats of Republican colleagues in both the Senate and gubernatorial races in Missouri the year before, so the only election bill that he and many other Republicans would support was one that would make it “easier to vote and harder to cheat.”

    As soon as the compromise (S 565) came to the Senate floor in February, however, the antifraud provisions ran into trouble. Democrats Charles E. Schumer of New York and Ron Wyden of Oregon argued that the language—to require voters who had registered by mail to produce proof of identity and residency when they voted for the first time—would have disenfranchised poor and minority voters. Civil rights and voting rights group took their side. Schumer and Wyden tried to replace the language they disliked with language allowing new voters to vouch for their identities with a signature. The Senate, by 46–51, rejected a move that would have tabled, and thereby killed, the Democrats' alternative. That was the moment that almost caused the fragile deal to unravel. Republicans refused to continue work on the bill unless the amendment was withdrawn, and the legislation was pulled from the floor for a month.

    Ultimately, however, Democrats decided they had to leave the antifraud provisions in the bill for it to pass. The best Schumer and Wyden could get was an exception allowing voters in Oregon and Washington—where most voting was conducted by mail—to submit their driver's license numbers or part of their Social Security numbers to prove their identities. When the bill returned to the floor in April, the nearly unanimous support for the package's basic bargain—easier access to the polls in return for tougher rules to restrict fraud—was made clear. The vote for passage was 99–1: R 48–1; D 50–0; I 1–0. (Vote, p. 830)

    The vote would not be the last hurdle for the bill. Conference negotiations almost fell apart several times but the trade-off that had been finalized by the Senate proved to be enough to keep Democrats and Republicans talking. Ultimately, it was the trade-off at the core of the measure (PL 107-252) that Bush signed Oct. 29—almost two years after the disputed election that moved election issues high onto the public agenda.

    5. Arctic National Wildlife Refuge

    The promise of oil beneath the coastal plain of Alaska's Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) was a centerpiece of President Bush's energy strategy and the focus of nearly two years of debate in the 107th Congress. In 2001 the oil industry, the administration, its congressional allies, and the Teamsters Union framed the debate in economic terms—energy independence and jobs—and were able to win House passage of an energy bill (HR 4) that would allow oil and gas exploration on ANWR's coast, with actual development limited to 2,000 acres. (Legislative details, p. 416)

    Shaken by the House vote, environmental groups poured resources into stopping the proposal in the Senate. They recruited officials from other unions to fight the plan and aired pleas from celebrities not to allow drilling in ANWR. Environmental groups—citing polls showing that a majority of Americans feared that drilling would pose ecological harm—made it clear that senators who voted for drilling would be held accountable in November. Those who favored drilling also had lost some momentum by the time of the debate in the spring. Bush did not publicly insist that he would veto an energy bill without an ANWR drilling provision. Concerns about an electricity shortage on the West Coast had subsided and gasoline prices were down, easing the pressure for more energy resources.

    Through weeks of Senate debate, the parties maneuvered for advantage. Republicans repeatedly demanded Senate action while avoiding a vote by failing to submit an ANWR amendment because they lacked the sixty votes required to shut off a promised Democratic filibuster. After threatening to file for cloture on the entire energy bill, which would have precluded an ANWR amendment, Majority Leader Tom Daschle, D-S.D., finally brought the issue to a head April 18, arranging a vote on whether to bring the debate on the ANWR question to a close. Sixty votes were required, and proponents of the drilling came up fourteen short. The defection of eight Republicans denied the amendment sponsors even the simple majority they might have cited in conference as evidence of Senate support for drilling. The vote on invoking cloture was 46–54: R 41–8; D 5–45; I 0–1. (Vote, p. 830)

    6. Fast-Track Trade Procedures

    Since fast-track trade authority lapsed in 1994, deep congressional divisions over the impact of free trade on U.S. industry and the environment prevented the White House from regaining broad latitude to negotiate trade deals. Fast-track authority required Congress to vote for or against a trade agreement within ninety days of its receipt from the president but prohibited amendments.

    Soon after entering office in 2001 President Bush made renewing fast track one of his top international policy objectives. Dubbing it “trade promotion authority,” Bush said he needed to assure trading partners that Congress would not tinker with deals after they had been negotiated. Most Democrats and some Republicans feared that the U.S. would lose manufacturing jobs to overseas competitors paying lower wages and operating under weaker environmental standards. But House Republican leaders managed to pass their fast-track bill (HR 3005) by a single vote in December 2001. (Legislative details, p. 150)

    While the Senate normally was more inclined to support trade liberalization, Democratic leaders had to consider the concerns of their political base in the labor and environmental communities. Majority Leader Tom Daschle of South Dakota and Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus of Montana decided that the best way to appease those groups was to compel Bush and the GOP to accept—as a condition of reviving fast track—a substantial expansion of Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) programs, which provided financial assistance and job training to workers who were laid off as a consequence of foreign competition.

    The White House expressed support for a generous TAA package but not the most conservative Republicans in the Senate, who described an expansion as essentially a government handout for industries that were dying because they could no longer stay competitive in their markets. Particularly troublesome for those senators was a proposed subsidy for trade-displaced workers to help them cover the cost of medical insurance. Negotiations among Baucus, Finance Committee ranking Republican Charles E. Grassley of Iowa, and Phil Gramm, R-Texas, dragged on until the White House persuaded Gramm to accept a compromise. It called for a $12 billion TAA expansion over ten years that included a tax credit—but not a direct subsidy—for health care.

    But the legislation before the Senate (HR 3009) faced other hurdles. Mark Dayton, D-Minn., and Larry E. Craig, R-Idaho, won solid backing for an amendment that would allow the Senate to strip trade pacts, by a simple majority vote, of any language that would undercut U.S. antidumping laws. The vote came even though business groups turned out en masse to oppose the amendment, pledging campaign retribution against supporters. Bush said he would veto the entire trade package if the Dayton-Craig language were retained. The year's most important trade vote in the Senate, therefore, came May 23 on passage of trade legislation written with the policy objectives of both parties in mind. With the Democrats split almost evenly and the Republicans breaking eight-to-one in favor, the vote was 66–30: R 41–5; D 24–25; I 1–0. (Vote, p. 830)

    The tally gave Bush's trade agenda substantial momentum but it also demonstrated the resolve of Senate Democrats to influence U.S. trade policy—and the willingness of the Republicans to go along. The Senate-passed bill became the framework for the measure ultimately enacted (PL 107-210). Much of the TAA expansion was retained at Democratic insistence and the Dayton-Craig provision was removed. The Senate vote to clear the bill was nearly the same as its vote for initial passage, 64–34.

    7. Tax Cut Extension: Estate Tax

    Since the day in June 2001 that President Bush put his signature on the deepest tax reduction in a generation, its sunset provision—the ended all the reductions at the end of the decade—had been labeled by the statute's Republican proponents as its most noteworthy blemish. While efforts to extend all or parts of the law (PL 107-16) came up short in 2002, the Senate did cast one ballot that buoyed advocates' hope of someday making the year's cut “permanent.” Neither the president, nor his allies at the Capitol, ever intended to confine the duration of the tax reductions. But budget rules and the limits of Republican power in the 107th Congress forced the GOP to agree that the package would expire altogether on Dec. 31, 2010. The $1.4 trillion total was set by a congressional budget resolution, meaning that all of the revenue had to be forgone within the ten-year time frame of that budget—unless, as a practical matter, three-fifths of the entire Senate was willing to create an exception. (Legislative details, p. 93)

    No such Senate supermajority existed in 2001, which is why the sunset provision was part of the law. Moreover, in light of the return of federal budget deficits and the polarizing effect of the tax debate in an election year, the votes to extend the cuts were still lacking in 2002. Although House Republicans pushed through such a bill (HR 586) along party lines in April, any similar measure was doomed in the Senate. Political pragmatists in the GOP were willing to settle for something less: a Senate test vote on indefinitely extending one broadly popular provision. Although the chance of winning even that was low, the GOP viewed such a vote as an opportunity to draw a clear distinction in the minds of voters between themselves and most Democrats.

    For their campaign, the GOP chose the repeal of the estate tax, which had a broad and bipartisan base of support but also the shortest life span under the law. After a gradual reduction in the top rate from 55 percent to 46 percent by 2007, the tax would be wiped off the books altogether—but only for heirs of people who died in 2010. Only a few thousand people annually would be affected by the tax's resurrection the following year, because the great majority of estates (those valued at less than $675,000) were exempt from taxation before the 2001 law and because a majority of the tax was paid on inherited stocks, bonds, real estate or other nonbusiness assets. Still, Republicans successfully painted the debate as a fight to preserve family farms and family-controlled small businesses, which drew support from Democrats who represented farm country or large numbers of small businesses.

    The test vote, in the GOP view, allowed the party to win no matter the outcome: either enough politically vulnerable Democrats would be pressed to vote “yes” to create an upset victory, or the Republicans would have an issue to use against those senators in the midterm elections. Majority Leader Tom Daschle, D-S.D., promised to allow the year's key Senate vote on tax policy in return for a loosening of Senate Republican objections to the year's energy legislation (HR 4). On June 12 senators voted to waive the budgetary restrictions preventing an extension of the estate tax repeal. The vote was 54–44: R 45–2; D 9–41; I 0–1. (Vote, p. 830)

    Although insufficient to advance the tax cutters' quest—sixty votes were required to prevail—the vote allowed Republicans to boast that a solid Senate majority favored the idea. At the same time, Democrats claimed some success at resisting the GOP maneuver. Only three of the fourteen Democratic senators then seeking reelection—Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus of Montana, Max Cleland of Georgia, and Mary L. Landrieu of Louisiana—voted with the Republicans. Six of the twelve Democrats who had voted to enact the tax law in 2001 voted against allowing an extension of the estate tax repeal.

    8. Terrorism Insurance

    In the wake of the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, which resulted in an estimated $40 billion in insurance claims, commercial property and casualty insurers said that—absent a federal backstop—they would no longer routinely insure businesses, sports stadiums, and skyscrapers against the risk of such catastrophic terrorism. The House passed a bill (HR 3210) in November 2001 to make the federal government the insurer of last resort, but the Senate remained hamstrung over the question of whether to ban punitive damages in civil lawsuits arising from terrorist acts. Such a ban, which was included in the House bill, was unacceptable to Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle, D-S.D. He stopped a Senate Banking Committee compromise that would have barred such awards. But Senate Republicans, such as Phil Gramm of Texas and Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, said a ban was necessary to prevent trial lawyers from profiting from terrorism. (Legislative details, p. 204)

    For months, Republicans thwarted Daschle's attempts to bring a bill without a punitive damages ban to the floor. They finally relented in June after senior Bush administration officials sent a letter to Minority Leader Trent Lott, R-Miss., saying they would recommend that Bush not sign a bill that “leaves the American economy and victims of terrorist acts subject to predatory lawsuits and punitive damages.” Republicans took the letter as a sign that Bush would not abandon them during House-Senate conference negotiations. They allowed Daschle to bring a bill (S 2600) to the floor that did not ban punitive damages but stipulated that such awards would not be insured losses subject to government aid. But the key vote—because it displayed the united resolve of Senate Democrats to stick to their position in subsequent conference negotiations—came on June 18 when the Senate voted to pass the bill. The vote was 84–14: R 34–14; D 49–0; I 1–0. (Vote, p. 830)

    That overwhelming show of support for the bill demonstrated that most Senate Republicans cared more about establishing a federal terrorism insurance program than about setting new ground rules for tort law. The vote also reflected that Senate Democrats were prepared to steadfastly oppose the addition of a punitive damages ban during negotiations with the White House, which was eager to complete the bill as a means of helping stimulate the economy. The White House relented on the issue of punitive damages when it became clear that Senate Democrats would not agree to language specifying that federal legislation would not necessarily infringe on state legal standards. That was important because a handful of states already banned punitive damages awards. Bush then successfully lobbied congressional Republicans, especially the House GOP leaders who strongly supported a punitive damages ban, to swallow their misgivings and adopt the conference report. The president signed the bill (PL 107-297) on Nov. 26.

    9. Corporate Regulation

    The year 2002 began with indignant lawmakers lining up to castigate current and former executives of the bankrupt Enron Corp. Numerous congressional investigations and legislative proposals were not far behind as Congress responded to a series of corporate scandals. But by early summer, momentum for legislative action had dissipated. In April the House had passed a Bush administration-backed bill (HR 3763) that was dismissed by critics as a tepid response to a debilitating crisis in investor confidence. The administration's push for creation of a Department of Homeland Security, along with a burgeoning Middle East crisis, diverted attention from the corporate accounting issue, and from an effort by Senate Banking Committee Chairman Paul S. Sarbanes, D-Md., to move a more stringent bill. Some Democrats fretted that Sarbanes had squandered the corporate accountability mandate by waiting until May to unveil his bill and until June to begin a markup. (Legislative details, p. 130)

    Then came the June 25 revelation that telecommunications giant WorldCom Inc. improperly counted $3.9 billion in expenses as capital costs. Literally overnight, corporate fraud legislation went from a sidetracked casualty of gridlock to must-pass legislation that practically no one on Capitol Hill or in the administration dared to oppose. By the time Sarbanes' bill reached the Senate floor after the July 4th recess, a crackdown on corporate cheating had become unstoppable. Several amendments were adopted during a week of debate, including one offered by Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick J. Leahy, D-Vt., that mandated prison terms for shareholder fraud and obstruction of justice involving document shredding. Across the Capitol, House Financial Services Committee Chairman Michael G. Oxley, R-Ohio, dryly observed that at that moment “summary execution would get about eight-five votes.”

    When the vote came not a single senator voted against the most sweeping corporate regulatory measure since the Depression—a clear signal that the Senate's approach would be very nearly the package that became law. That vote July 15 to pass the bill was 97–0: R 46–0; D 50–0; I 1–0. (Vote, p. 830)

    Senate Democrats rode that wave of support through a quick conference with the House. The absence of dissent in the Senate, combined with President Bush's insistence that Congress send him a bill before it left town for its August recess, allowed Senate Democrats to largely dictate to Republicans the terms of the conference report. Just two weeks after the vote, Bush signed a law (PL 107-204) closely tracking the Senate's bill, with creation of an oversight board to set standards for audits and oversee the accounting industry, and a prohibition on auditors providing other services to the publicly traded companies they audit.

    10. Medicare Prescription Coverage

    After the House passed a bill June 28 to create a Medicare prescription drug benefit, the pressure was on the Democrats who led the Senate to respond in kind. In the middle of July, Majority Leader Tom Daschle, D-S.D., called up a bill (S 812) designed to speed government approval of less expensive generic drugs, using it as a vehicle for a floor fight over a Medicare prescription drug benefit. (Legislative details, p. 486)

    All year Daschle had blocked the Finance Committee from considering a Medicare drug bill because he knew centrists John B. Breaux, D-La., and James M. Jeffords, I-Vt., would side with panel Republicans to report a version similar to the House bill (HR 4954)—an approach opposed by a majority of Senate Democrats. But he also knew, well before the floor debate began, that his own side lacked the sixty votes needed to overcome procedural hurdles. As the floor debate unfolded, it was clear there was still a “fundamental divide,” as Daschle called it, over whether private insurance companies or the government-run Medicare program should deliver a drug benefit to senior citizens. Off the floor, sponsors of competing plans worked to develop a compromise—just as they had earlier in the year. But one by one, alternative proposals, including fallback plans seeking to bridge the partisan divide, were rejected. Neither side could muster the sixty votes necessary to waive budget points of order that were raised because most plans exceeded the $300 billion, ten-year cost that had been sanctioned in the fiscal 2002 budget resolution.

    A proposal by Democrats Bob Graham of Florida, Zell Miller of Georgia and Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts failed to surmount the point of order, 52–47. A competing amendment—known as the “tripartisan plan” because it was sponsored by Republican Charles E. Grassley of Iowa along with Breaux and Jeffords—was defeated by a vote of 48–51. A far more limited plan by Chuck Hagel, R-Neb., and John Ensign, R-Nev., failed on a different procedural challenge, 51–48. It offered a discount card to help low-income Medicare beneficiaries buy drugs and capped out-of-pocket costs based on a sliding income scale.

    By the end of the week both sides voiced frustration at the stalemate and the atmosphere appeared good for a compromise. Graham, working with Republican Gordon H. Smith of Oregon, attempted to build on the Hagel proposal with a $400 billion, ten-year plan that would cover all Medicare recipients who earned up to double the poverty level and those with annual drug bills in excess of $3,300. The proposal was endorsed by AARP, the biggest lobbying group for senior citizens and those nearing retirement. While AARP preferred a more comprehensive program, with four days left before the August recess, the Graham-Smith amendment was seen as the last best chance for a Medicare prescription drug benefit to pass the Senate in the 107th Congress. The vote on this plan—technically another vote on whether to waive a budget point of order—would be key.

    Sponsors believed that members' fear of going home empty-handed would outweigh their objections to this particular proposal. But it also failed by a vote of 49–50: R 4–44; D 45–5; 0–1. The closeness of the vote again showed the philosophical divide on Medicare, though a handful of senators on both sides voted against the majority of their party. The vote was a setback for Daschle and the Democrats, who believed they had moved as far as they could to win GOP support. But opponents, most of them Republicans, continued to insist that the issue should be returned to the Finance Committee where they knew they could prevail on their preferred version. (Vote, p. 830)

    11. Independent Sept. 11 Commission

    By the time they were called on to decide whether to launch an independent investigation of government lapses before the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, senators were more than ready to take up another tool to force additional answers out of the Bush administration. At the time of the vote, Sept. 24, 2002, the House and Senate Intelligence committees had been at work for almost four months on their joint inquiry into government intelligence failures before the attacks, and they were receiving few answers they viewed as credible. Lawmakers such as Richard C. Shelby of Alabama, the ranking Republican on Senate Intelligence, had begun to accuse the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other covert agencies of stonewalling and blocking the release of information in hopes of waiting out the inquiry, scheduled to close early in 2003. (Investigation details, p. 180)

    Slowly senators began reexamining legislation (S 1867) originally put forward by Joseph I. Lieberman, D-Conn., and John McCain, R-Ariz., in December 2001. The bill proposed an independent commission with subpoena powers and the power to investigate all branches of the government to see what, if anything, could have been done to prevent the four hijackings that resulted in the worst terrorist attack ever on the United States. Lieberman, chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee, had won his panel's backing for the proposal in March. But the measure languished as Lieberman failed to secure any promises from the Senate leadership to bring it to the floor.

    Momentum started to build in July, and in the House as well. Tim Roemer, D-Ind., a member of the House Intelligence Committee, also had grown dissatisfied with the pace of the congressional probe. Blocked by the Republican leadership from winning a vote on broad language similar to Lieberman's, Roemer nonetheless was able to secure adoption in the House of a proposal to create an independent commission with the narrow mandate of reviewing the intelligence agencies' implementation of recommendations from the joint House-Senate inquiry and from other investigations.

    Within weeks it became clear the sentiment existed in Congress to go beyond that. By the time Congress left for its August recess several Republican senators, including Fred Thompson of Tennessee and Pat Roberts of Kansas, indicated that they would support an independent investigation similar to Lieberman's original proposal. Four days before the vote took place, the White House publicly reversed course to signal it would support the idea. As a result, the Senate majority was overwhelming. With only eight of the president's most loyal allies in dissent, the Senate voted to make the creation of an independent commission with a broad mandate part of a larger bill (HR 5005) to establish a Homeland Security Department. The vote was 90–8: R 41–8; D 48–0; I 1–0. (Vote, p. 830)

    But the homeland security bill quickly became tied up in a parti-san dispute about workers' rights and did not move further until after the election. In the interim proponents of a broadly constituted commission—prodded by families of the victims of Sept. 11—learned that White House support for an independent panel did not necessarily mean the president supported the kind of commission envisioned by Congress. The level of support in the Senate vote Sept. 24 served as crucial leverage in getting the administration to compromise on some of its demands about the scope and powers of the probe. The pressure ultimately yielded an agreement in the lame-duck session under the fiscal 2003 intelligence authorization law (PL 107-306), which President Bush signed Nov. 27, to create an eighteen-month probe with a chairman appointed by the president and a majority of its members appointed by supporters of an aggressive investigation.

    12. Homeland Security

    The most divisive issue blocking the creation of a new Homeland Security Department pitted federal employees' unions against the White House over “management flexibility” that gave the department authority to write its own personnel rules. As the midterm election neared the debate escalated from a philosophical difference into an increasingly acerbic and entrenched political fight. The venue was the Senate floor, where the bill (HR 5005) had languished since the House passed its version in July. (Legislative details, p. 182)

    In the weeks before Election Day moderates tried to broker a compromise over the president's powers to remove employees from their collective bargaining agreements on national security grounds. Bush wanted to preserve authority the president possessed since 1962 to prevent the unionization of intelligence and national security workers. Unions, fearful the president would use the powers to eliminate them from the new department, wanted to narrow the exemption to employees who were given substantially new jobs as part of the reorganization. The pleas by moderates to step up negotiations were drowned out by the rhetoric of Republicans and Democrats, each blaming the other for stalling the bill. GOP leaders said Democrats were more interested in protecting the power of their top union contributors than in protecting national security. Democratic leaders charged that Republicans only wanted an election issue, not a compromise.

    Majority Leader Tom Daschle, D-S.D., resorted to a tactic he rarely used—and had chastised Republicans for employing extensively in the past. He “filled the amendment tree,” a parliamentary maneuver in the Senate that allows one side to shut down a debate by preventing any additional motions or amendments from being offered. Reflecting the partisan tenor of the moment the Senate voted along nearly precise party lines Sept. 26 to reject a bid to push the debate toward a conclusive action. The key vote came on a bid to invoke cloture, and thereby restrict debate, on the Democratic version of the homeland measure, by Governmental Affairs Committee Chairman Joseph I. Lieberman of Connecticut. The vote was 50–49: R 1–48; D 48–1; I 1–0. The majority was ten short of the sixty votes required for cloture. (Vote, p. 830)

    The vote was pivotal because it heralded the high-water mark for whatever momentum the Democrats had built for fundamentally reshaping the homeland bill—and especially its labor provisions—to their liking. Because the Democrats were unable to draw any more GOP votes to their cause, the outcome made it clear that the decisive issue in the debate would not be resolved before the election. Republicans refused to allow further action unless promised that their version of the employment language, the one Bush insisted on, would not be altered. Democratic leaders hoped that on Election Day the voters might revive the momentum in their direction. In fact, the opposite happened. The Democrats lost control of the Senate for the 108th Congress, in part because swing voters in some close races signaled that they did not like the party's prounion emphasis. Soon after, Republicans were able to leverage substantial victories on the measure (PL 107-296) that Bush signed Nov. 25.

    13. Iraq Use-of-Force Resolution

    Little disagreement existed between President Bush and his civilian leaders in the Pentagon over the president's desire to confront Iraq. But throughout August and September there were reports hints that Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, the Vietnam war veteran who rose to the rank of chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had misgivings about another Persian Gulf conflict. In the Senate, senior members of the Foreign Relations Committee reflected Powell's cautionary view, in part because of the good relations the top diplomat had cultivated in Congress since taking over at State. Powell's Democratic and Republican allies were looking out for his interests even if he was unwilling to express his doubts publicly.

    Faced with Bush's request for far-reaching authority to challenge Iraq and embodied by the initial resolution (H J Res 45) the White House sent to Congress on Sept. 19, Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Joseph R. Biden Jr., D-Del., and Richard G. Lugar, R-Ind., joined forces in writing a narrower measure. It would have limited the war authorization to efforts to uncover and disarm Iraq's nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. It also would have required the president, before using force, to either win backing of the U.N. Security Council or state that the threat was “so grave” that immediate action was warranted—an approach that emphasized the need for diplomacy. Separately, Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin, D-Mich., wrote a proposal that would condition U.S. action against Iraq on U.N. support. (Legislative details, p. 238)

    Bush sought to reach a compromise with Senate Democratic leaders in order to quash any public opposition and to strengthen his hand in negotiations about Iraq at the U.N. Security Council, with Powell and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice negotiating with the senators. When that failed, Bush turned to House Minority Leader Richard A. Gephardt, D-Mo., a possible presidential rival in 2004 who had taken a hard line toward Iraq earlier in the year. Gephardt and Bush compromised on a resolution that would give the president the broadest latitude on deciding if and when to go to war against Iraq. Once the two reached agreement Oct. 1 all momentum for the Biden-Lugar and Levin alternatives was gone, and passage of the Bush-Gephardt resolution was assured. Sen. Robert C. Byrd, D-W.Va., was one of the few to muster a voice in opposition, saying expediency had won in a “fateful decision. It involves the treasure of this country. It involves the blood of our fighting men and women.”

    But hours after the Senate on Oct. 10 overwhelmingly rejected Byrd amendments to limit the authorization the chamber voted resoundingly to clear the measure (PL 107-243) that gave the president the authority he sought. The vote was 77–23: R 48–1; D 29–21; I 0–1. (Vote, p. 830)

    House

    1. Campaign Finance

    After the Senate passed its version of the campaign finance bill in March 2001, supporters of the companion legislation in the House (HR 2356) faced uncertainty and restlessness among Democrats. House Democrats had provided most of the votes for passage of similar bills twice before, in 1998 and 1999. But with the Senate hurdle overcome and the legislation closer to becoming law, some Democrats were uneasy with key provisions: a ban on unregulated “soft money” contributions from businesses, unions, and wealthy individual to the political parties. Another concern of some Democrats was the bill's increased limits on “hard money” contributions—regulated donations given directly to candidates—that Republicans were better at obtaining. (Legislative details, p. 734)

    The measure stalled in the House in July 2001 when Democrats and a few Republicans voted down a rule for floor consideration that was drafted by GOP leaders. The rule made it difficult for sponsors Christopher Shays, R-Conn., and Martin T. Meehan, D-Mass., to alter their bill on the floor to bring it in line with the Senate-passed measure, which they were eager to do to avoid sending it back to the Senate for another debate. On Jan. 24, 2002, after months of effort, Shays and Meehan gathered the last of the 218 signatures they needed on a “discharge petition” to bring their bill to the floor under debate rules more to their liking. The sponsors also had the benefit of momentum created by the collapse of Enron Corp., a giant energy-trading company, and revelations about the company's network of political giving and legislative influence.

    GOP leaders were preparing a series of amendments they hoped would sink the bill. Their goal was to attach amendments that the Senate would never accept, while also providing political cover for lawmakers who wanted to say they had voted for a change in the system. In the end, the momentum for the campaign finance overhaul designed by Meehan and Shays—and their Senate counterparts, John McCain, R-Ariz., and Russell D. Feingold, D-Wis.—proved unstoppable. The Shays-Meehan coalition largely held in the House, while mixed signals from the White House undercut efforts to unify House Republicans against the legislation. Speaker J. Dennis Hastert, R-Ill., asked President George W. Bush for help before the debate began but Bush chose to keep his distance. Just as the battle on the House floor was beginning Feb. 13, White House spokesperson Ari Fleischer signaled that Bush would sign any bill that would improve the campaign finance system.

    Not long after, the president himself said he was endorsing nothing but would look closely at whatever Congress sent him. By then, supporters of the bill were on their way to victory. Despite the intense pressure Republican leaders put on their caucus and more than fourteen hours of maneuvering on the floor aimed at bringing down the bill, the House rejected every amendment that bill supporters feared would force a conference with the Senate. The climax—and key vote—came in the early morning hours of Feb. 14, 2002, when forty-one Republicans joined the solid majority in the House to pass the bill. Only twelve Democrats voted no. The vote was 240–189: R 41–176; D 198–12; I: 1–1. The campaign finance bill was on its way back to the Senate, which cleared it on March 20. Bush called the measure “flawed” but signed it (PL 107-155) a week later. (Vote, p. 832)

    2. Broadband/Internet Service

    Telecommunications legislation was among the most technically intricate and heavily lobbied measures in Congress. When legislation came to the floor, the parliamentary maneuvering was just as intense. A single major telecommunications bill was considered by Congress in 2002. It was sponsored by House Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman Billy Tauzin, R-La., and ranking panel Democrat John D. Dingell of Michigan. It attracted considerable attention and lobbing from the telecommunications industry and consumer groups. Nevertheless, in spite of the importance to public policy and the complex issues involved, the key vote came on an obscure procedural question without precedent in ninety-two years.

    The Tauzin-Dingell bill (HR 1542) deregulated interstate high-speed Internet services provided over telephone lines by the four regional Bell companies—Verizon, SBC Communications, BellSouth, and Qwest Communications—and allowed them to offer the services without opening their local telephone markets to competitors, which was a requirement under a sweeping 1996 telecommunications policy law (PL 104-104). (Legislative details, p. 373)

    As the bill was readied for floor action, a complex strategy evolved. Christopher B. Cannon, R-Utah, and John Conyers Jr. of Michigan, the senior Democrat on the House Judiciary Committee, wanted to offer an amendment to restore the state and federal regulatory authority that the legislation would remove. Steve Buyer, R-Ind., and Edolphus Towns, D-N.Y., countered with an amendment to restore some of the Federal Communications Commission's regulatory authority but still keep the deregulatory-friendly spirit of the bill. The pivotal decision was for Buyer and Towns to ask that their amendment be considered as a second-degree amendment to Cannon-Conyers, meaning that Buyer-Towns would be voted on first, and if it were adopted, the Cannon-Conyers language would not be voted on at all.

    As the debate proceeded in the House, everyone waited for the expected sequence to take place. But Cannon did not offer his amendment during the time allocated. There was much puzzlement on the floor until Cannon's ally, Edward J. Markey, D-Mass., offered a motion to recommit, or send, the bill back to committee with instructions to add the Cannon-Conyers language. His reasoning, Markey said, was that Cannon-Conyers deserved an up-or-down vote, and this was the only way to accomplish that. Buyer was upset because his move to block Cannon-Conyers had been countered. A recommittal motion is typically a tool used by lawmakers in the minority party. But this bill was hardly typical—members of both parties were on each side of the bill.

    The showdown commenced when the presiding officer, Ray LaHood, R-Ill., ordered a vote on the “previous question,” essentially moving to stop debate on the Markey recommittal motion. If approved, the vote on the Markey motion could proceed. But it failed, 173–256: R 62–157; D 109–99; I 2–0. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) called the episode “an unusual parliamentary process,” marking the first time since 1910 that a motion on the previous question on a motion to recommit was defeated. (Vote, p. 832)

    More immediately, the vote was a harbinger that Markey—the leading opponent of the regional Bells' efforts—did not have nearly enough votes to derail the Tauzin-Dingell bill. Soon after another rare occurrence came into play. Buyer and Towns were allowed to add their amendment to Markey's recommittal motion and to the bill itself without need for a separate recorded vote on their measure. Some protested that the recommittal process was being abused but in the end the underlying bill passed, 273–157, a tally that closely mirrored the outcome of the key vote on Markey's parliamentary maneuver.

    3. Defense Authorization

    The usual partisan divide in Congress over defense spending had been muddled since the presidency of Bill Clinton when vigorous economic activity provided ample tax revenues for government spending. Democrats, traditionally suspicious of big increases in the military, went along with larger defense authorizations as long as there was enough money to fund domestic programs. But that political equation changed in 2001 when the large tax cuts that were President Bush's top priority and a stalled economy slashed projected federal budget surpluses. Bush insisted that domestic spending be kept tight at the same time that he proposed a $30 billion increase over the fiscal 2001 budget for defense—the last Clinton defense plan.

    The 2001 House vote on the fiscal 2002 defense authorization bill may not have reflected members' fundamental policy views because it came two weeks after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. Rather, the vote on the fiscal 2003 defense authorization bill was a better test of House Democrats' resolve for challenging the size of the defense budget. Although the House version of the bill amounted to $13 billion less than Bush requested, that difference reflected some technical bookkeeping decisions. Essentially, the bill endorsed Bush's request for a $45 billion increase in defense spending—the largest since the Vietnam war in the 1960s and early 1970s. More than two-thirds of the Democrats voted for it. (Legislative details, p. 320)

    The House GOP leadership barred consideration of several floor amendments, including one that would have cut $1.8 billion from the F-22 fighter program and another that would have eliminated $475 million authorized for the Army's Crusader cannon, which Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld had decided to cancel but which the House version of the defense authorization bill (HR 4546) approved. But the Democrats made their stand on a narrow collection of issues. They presented a series of amendments designed to restrict the administration's study of the use of tactical nuclear weapons in wartime. They also proposed several amendments that would have restrained Bush's missile defense program, though none that would have reduced the $7.8 billion antimissile budget for fiscal 2003.

    The House, splitting largely along party lines, rejected all of these amendments. In the end, in a vote that ensured the Bush administration an unimpeded road to an enormous military build-up, the House passed the bill May 10 by a vote of 359–58: R 212–1; D 146–56; I 1–1. (Vote, p. 832)

    4. Welfare Reauthorization

    The 104th Congress ended more than sixty years of unfettered public assistance by writing a landmark welfare law (PL 104-193) in 1996 that tied payments to tough new work requirements. It was the most sweeping social policy change won by the Republicans who had won congressional majorities in the 1994 elections. Many Democrats, who thought the terms of the overhaul were too tough, predicted that a future Congress would regret the harshness of the changes and face revisions.

    But in 2002, most members of the 107th Congress, in both parties, demonstrated that they were generally satisfied with the basics of the measure, mindful that welfare caseloads had declined by more than half since its enactment. Instead, they debated whether work or education and training would best lead welfare recipients out of poverty, and how much flexibility states should be given to run the programs. (Legislative details, p. 521)

    With major provisions slated to end Sept. 30, Congress needed to reauthorize the law or let it expire. President Bush made reauthorization a 2002 priority, calling for even tougher work rules for adult recipients and significant funding for programs that promote marriage. House Republicans wrote a bill (HR 4737) that tracked Bush's priorities and—they knew—would serve as the most conservative possible counterweight to what they expected would be a much softer welfare bill coming out of the Democratic-controlled Senate.

    The GOP proposed requiring recipients to work forty hours a week, up from thirty in existing law. States would be required to have at least 70 percent of their recipients employed by 2007, up from 50 percent required under the 1996 law. House Democrats said that while recipients should be required to work, they should also be given more opportunities to take vocational training or attend adult education classes. They argued that many adults still on welfare were the toughest cases—drug-addicted, mentally ill, or illiterate—who could not easily find employment.

    By the time the debate reached the House floor May 16, any hope that the House might find a middle ground had been abandoned. Instead, the debate broke along party lines, and featured well-used partisan disagreements over social policy. Only fourteen conservative Democrats voted for the GOP bill and only four Republicans voted against it. The vote was 229–197: R 214–4; D 14–192; I 1–1. (Vote, p. 832)

    Despite the partisan character of the debate and of the vote, the bill's passage demonstrated a recognition on Capitol Hill, even among some Democrats, that there would be no retreat from the 1996 decision to require work of welfare recipients. The Senate Finance Committee later amended the House bill to retain the thirty-hour work requirement and provide for $5.5 billion in child care funding but the measure died anyway, forcing lawmakers to pass a temporary extension into 2003.

    5. Discretionary Spending Limit

    A single House procedural vote on a spring evening heralded one of the most bruising annual fights over discretionary spending in modern times. The outcome was set in such intractable divisions—between Republican factions in Congress, between the House and the Senate, and between Congress and President Bush—that the year ended with none of the domestic spending bills enacted for fiscal 2003.

    The vote came after the House Republican majority had adopted a budget resolution (H Con Res 353) that endorsed Bush's budget proposal, with an overall limit on discretionary spending of $759 billion. That figure included Bush's request for a $10 billion defense reserve fund to be spent at the administration's discretion, an idea Congress quickly rejected. (Legislative details, p. 63)

    Bush had proposed a big increase in defense spending but not even an inflationary increase for the rest of government. Republicans on the Appropriations Committee reluctantly supported the budget resolution, expecting to be able to exceed the spending limit later in the process or to negotiate a higher level with the Senate. Senate Budget Committee Democrats marked up a budget (S Con Res 100) calling for about $9 billion more in nondefense spending than the House. Their plan had little chance of adoption on the floor, however, lacking any Republican support and facing the threat of Democratic defections. Majority Leader Tom Daschle, D-S.D., never brought a budget up for debate but the Senate Appropriations Committee pressed ahead, marking up bills with the Senate Budget Committee's $768 billion grand total as their target.

    With no prospect that a final budget would be written, Republican House appropriators sought to ignore their version. They began talking openly about producing spending bills with a total roughly equivalent to the Senate's more expensive bottom line. House leaders soon came under pressure, from the White House as well as from fiscal conservatives in their ranks, to hold the appropriators in check. To that end, Republican leaders called on the House to cast another vote committing itself to living under the spending ceiling in its budget. Although by itself the language they proposed would have imposed no enforceable restraint on spending, appropriators from both parties were furious. It was an unusual move, and the appropriators feared that the provision's adoption would doom them to a year of frustration—unable to win passage of domestic spending bills written under the ceiling.

    The key vote came May 22 on a procedural measure setting the rules for floor debate on the fiscal 2002 supplemental appropriations bill (PL 107-206). Republican leaders had drafted the rule so that, if adopted, it would automatically attach the spending limit language to the popular appropriations bill. The only option that GOP appropriators had was to defeat the rule for consideration of the supplemental bill. Such procedural matters are normally considered party loyalty votes but in this case GOP leaders were stung by a handful of defections. Appropriations subcommittee chairmen Sonny Callahan of Alabama and Jim Kolbe of Arizona went against their party, as did fellow GOP appropriator Roger Wicker of Mississippi. Three other Republican appropriators registered their protest by voting “present”: Zach Wamp of Tennessee, George Nethercutt of Washington, and Henry Bonilla of Texas, another subcommittee chairman. Several other GOP appropriators waited until late in the roll call to vote, forcing party leaders to work hard to head off other defections. But in the end, the rule was adopted, 216–209: R 214–3; D 1–205; I 1–1. (Vote, p. 832)

    While its Senate counterparts, operating under a higher spending ceiling, approved all thirteen of their fiscal 2003 spending bills on unanimous votes, the House committee never tried to mark up two of the largest domestic spending bills, one covering the Commerce, Justice, and State departments and the other for the Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education departments. The House passed only five of the thirteen bills, and the 107th Congress adjourned with only two measures enacted: defense and military construction.

    6. Medicare Prescription Coverage

    Congressional Republicans, especially the more conservative ones who ran the House, had long espoused a limited role for government in health care. To the extent that they had in the past supported a prescription drug benefit for Medicare, it had been a modest offering. A House-passed plan in 2000 would have cost $40 billion over five years.

    In this context it was significant when Republican leaders decided in summer 2002 that it was imperative for the House to pass a Medicare drug benefit with a cost estimated at $350 billion over ten years. Taking action would send the powerful message that the GOP-led House could deliver a Medicare drug bill before the Democratic-led Senate on one of the Democrats' core campaign issues. If the Senate did act, the House would be ready with its conference position. (Legislative details, p. 486)

    But it turned out that the Republican plan (HR 4954), cosponsored by Ways and Means Chairman Bill Thomas of California and Energy and Commerce Chairman Billy Tauzin of Louisiana, was not the easy election-year sell that House leaders thought it would be. First, they had to wrestle with demands from rural Republicans and others in the rank and file that the bill include $30 billion over ten years for health care providers. There was pressure to spare doctors and other health care professionals from more payment cuts scheduled under the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (PL 105-33).

    Next, leaders had to squelch a group of about three dozen Republican dissidents who had joined with Democrats in seeking provisions that would lower drug costs by directly restricting how the pharmaceutical industry does business. Those provisions included one to allow the wholesale importation of drugs sold more cheaply in Canada, and another to tighten patent laws to make it more difficult for manufacturers of brand-name drugs to impede low cost generic competition.

    The legislation would have allowed Medicare enrollees to purchase private insurance policies covering prescription drugs, beginning in 2005, with a monthly premium estimated at $33. Patients would pay the first $250 of their drug costs each year, 20 percent of costs from $251 to $1,000, and 50 percent of the next $1,000. The patient would have to pay all drug costs from $2,001 to $3,700, after which insurers would pay the entire cost. The bill offered subsidies for low-income seniors to reduce or eliminate their insurance premiums and limit their copayments.

    AARP, the nation's largest advocacy group for Americans age fifty and older, criticized the plan as a poor deal for Medicare enrollees. Democrats denounced it as a sellout to the insurance industry. Negotiations among Republicans over provider payments, drug pricing, and other issues of contention continued right up to the point when the rule for debate came to the House floor. Thomas, Tauzin, and Speaker J. Dennis Hastert of Illinois led a two-hour GOP conference meeting to try to sell members on the bill. More than two dozen Republicans expressed concerns about the bill.

    GOP leaders tried to “educate” the dissidents into supporting the bill and, when necessary, leaned a little harder. Policy aides from the White House visited members' offices. At one point during the week, Hastert threatened to hold the House in session into the weekend, delaying the start of the Fourth of July recess if necessary, to act on the bill. To maintain control and force Democrats into an up-or-down vote, the Rules Committee barred amendments on the floor. The 218–213 vote to adopt that closed rule for floor debate gave GOP leaders confidence they had the votes to pass the bill. It also allowed Hastert to declare victory as the House voted 221–208 on June 28 to pass the bill: R 212–8; D 8–199; I 1–1. (Vote, p. 832)

    The measure never became law but it demonstrated that House Republicans were willing to expand the scope of benefits under the 1965 Medicare program to meet demands of seniors, provided they could do so through private insurers rather than the government.

    7. Independent September 11 Commission

    Hopes seemed dim for much of the year for those persons—most vocally the families of people who died in the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks—who wanted an independent commission to conduct a broad inquiry into government actions that not only failed to prevent those. Such a panel, in their view, would have looked at everything from immigration policy to federal construction standards.

    Although a joint inquiry into the attacks by the House and Senate Intelligence committees was well under way by summer, some members of the House panel, led by Democrat Tim Roemer of Indiana, believed a broader investigation was necessary. They had come to this conclusion because the congressional inquiry was limited to the actions of covert agencies and because some panel members were not convinced they were receiving candid answers from the intelligence community. (Attack investigations, p. 181)

    Roemer, backed by lawmakers in both parties, threatened to amend the fiscal 2003 intelligence authorization legislation (HR 4628) to include authorization for an independent panel with the power to investigate any government policy or program that might have contributed to the ability of the terrorists' to carry out the attacks on Sept. 11, 2001. Roemer's proposal was based on legislation (S 1867) first put forward in the Senate in late 2001 by Joseph I. Lieberman, D-Conn., and John McCain, R-Ariz. As chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee, Lieberman had managed to get the measure through his panel in March 2002 but he was unable to secure a promise from the Senate leadership to bring the bill to the floor.

    Momentum for their cause did not grow after revelations in May that FBI headquarters had ignored warnings—received in the summer of 2001 from an agent in Phoenix—hinting that terrorists were taking flight lessons with the intention of piloting jets into buildings. In addition, the White House opposed an independent investigation, especially while Congress was conducting its inquiry. Under pressure from the White House, the GOP leadership wrote a rule for debate on the House's intelligence bill that allowed only a narrow amendment. Roemer responded with an amendment proposing a commission to review intelligence agency efforts to implement recommendations by the joint House-Senate inquiry and other investigative panels. It also provided for the commission to review resource allocation, recommend organizational changes, and determine technological needs in the intelligence community.

    Roemer and his supporters saw the amendment as an opening for authorizing a broader independent inquiry later, and that is what happened. On July 25 the House adopted the amendment with twenty-five Republicans—many of whom had not indicated support for a probe in the past—opposing the president and the GOP leadership and voting for the idea of an independent commission. The vote was 219–188: R 25–183; D 193–4; I 1–1. (Vote, p. 832)

    The vote demonstrated that Congress did not want its inquiry to be the final word on the matter. By the time lawmakers returned from their August recess, the White House was preparing to reverse its position by expressing willingness to work out a deal with them on some sort of independent commission. On Sept. 24 the Senate applied more pressure, voting 90–8 to create a panel with a broad mandate as part of its version of the homeland security bill (HR 5005). Negotiations stretched into November as probe backers and the White House bickered about the details of the new commission's scope and makeup. A compromise was finally reached under which the president would name the chairman of the panel but members of Congress who backed the commission would name most of its members. The president signed the provision into law as part of the intelligence authorization bill Nov. 27.

    8. Homeland Security

    The debate over creating a Homeland Security Department evolved into a bitter political fight over a issue not directly related to the national security: the rights of federal workers. The administration insisted on authority to write personnel rules for the new department that eliminated standard civil service protections. Democrats, longtime allies of federal workers' unions, ardently disagreed.

    In particular, the two sides were at odds over the administration's view that in designing a new personnel system, it should have the broad power to fire and transfer workers and exempt some department employees from union representation on national security grounds. Organized labor argued that the administration was using homeland security as a smoke screen to gut collective bargaining protections. The administration tried to give assurances that existing protections, such as fair labor standards and civil rights rules, would apply in the new department. But labor groups and their Democratic friends were not mollified, and it was becoming increasingly clear that the question of workers' rights would be central to the outcome of the legislation creating the new security department. (Legislative details, p. 176)

    After a nine-member Select Committee on Homeland Security in the Republican-controlled House reported out a bill (HR 5005) that accommodated most of the administration's wishes, Constance A. Morella, R-Md., offered an amendment during floor debate that would have stipulated that workers transferred to the new department would retain their collective bargaining rights, unless their job descriptions were significantly changed. The White House branded the language a nonstarter, saying it would diminish powers that presidents had enjoyed since 1962, when John F. Kennedy asserted his authority to exclude unions from agencies primarily concerned with intelligence, investigations or security. The authority was codified by the 1978 Civil Service Reform Act (PL 95-454).

    Faced with the prospect of moderate Republicans siding with Morella's amendment on worker rights, House Republican leaders sought to give wavering lawmakers an alternative. They arranged for Christopher Shays, R-Conn., to offer an amendment before Morella's that similarly would affirm union members' rights but would allow the president a waiver to set aside collective bargaining agreements that could have an “adverse impact” on the department's ability to keep the nation secure. All but two Republicans voted for the language, while eleven conservative Democrats crossed over to vote for it as well, and it was adopted 229–201.

    Morella then offered her amendment. The eight-term congresswoman faced a tough reelection fight in a predominantly Democratic district that is home to thousands of federal workers. She proposed effectively nullifying the waiver that would have been created under the Shays amendment. Morella raised the possibility of an “arbitrary” application of the national security waiver of collective bargaining rights, saying federal workers needed more ironclad assurances they would retain their rights.

    With the Shays amendment adopted, the vote on Morella's proposal offered a clear indication of the depth of House support for taking the union point of view—and rebuffing the president—in resolving the workers' rights dispute. But on the key vote, Morella persuaded only four moderate Republicans to join her, while seven Democrats voted against her language. As a result it was rejected on July 26 by a vote of 208–222: R 5–214; D 202–7; I 1–1. (Vote, p. 832)

    Senate Democrats included language virtually identical to Morella's in the homeland security bill approved by the Governmental Affairs Committee but it was dropped in negotiations over the final version of the legislation. Morella lost her bid for a ninth term in November in a district that had been reconfigured by Democrats in Maryland to favor a Democratic candidate.

    9. Fast-Track Trade Procedures

    After the Senate in May joined the House in passing legislation to revive fast-track procedures for congressional action on trade deals, the stage was set for a summer of contentious conference negotiations. The main stumbling block to an easy deal was the Senate bill (HR 3009), which included a ten-year, $12 billion expansion of Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) programs for those who lost their jobs as a consequence of expanded trade. Many Republicans viewed TAA as an overly generous entitlement for workers in outdated industries. (Legislative details, p. 150)

    Even after House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Bill Thomas, R-Calif., and Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus, D-Mont., settled a bizarre public spat over which of them would chair the conference (Thomas prevailed), disagreements over the worker provisions continued to impede progress. Though supportive of the bill's central purpose—giving the president the power to reach trade agreements with other nations that Congress could reject or endorse but not tinker with—GOP fiscal conservatives were reluctant to embrace the TAA expansion as a price for their support.

    Democrats in both chambers threatened to oppose any bill that did not include something as generous as the Senate TAA package. In addition, as the midterm elections approached, labor and environmental groups were becoming increasingly vocal in their opposition to the fast-track bill. With Democrats newly emboldened by the backlash against corporate accounting scandals, GOP leaders were talking about delaying the final vote on the trade bill until a postelection, lame-duck session.

    At that point the White House ratcheted up the pressure for a compromise, pushing hard to get a bill on President Bush's desk before the congressional August recess. A frenzied week of conference negotiations followed, culminating in a three-hour, closed-door session late the evening of July 25 between Thomas and Baucus. The House chairman agreed to accept most of the Senate TAA package. The Senate chairman agreed to a revision of Senate language that would have allowed the Senate to amend trade deals if they affected U.S. anti-dumping laws.

    Still, the conference report fate was by no means assured. Administration officials showed up to lobby probusiness Democrats. Bush himself came to the Capitol to rally the House Republican rank and file to support the top trade objective of his presidency. +Textile state lawmakers, who proved vital in the original House vote, were not convinced the conference report protected their industries adequately. House appropriators were angry that the package, which did not go through their committee, would expand federal spending in a way they could not control.

    But Bush's persistence—and some last-minute deals—paid off. The president telephoned to assuage Appropriations Committee Chairman C. W. Bill Young, R-Fla. Five probusiness Democrats—Adam Smith and Rick Larsen of Washington, Ellen O. Tauscher and Jane Harman of California, and Harold E. Ford Jr. of Tennessee—resisted pressure from their party leadership and voted for the conference agreement after having opposed the initial House bill in December. Amid all the narrow but potentially decisive crosscurrents the GOP leadership navigated the fragile deal to a bare embrace. After an overnight debate that started the Friday that the chamber's summer recess was to begin, the House adopted the conference report with essentially one vote to spare. The final tally shortly after 3 a.m. on Saturday, July 27, was 215–212: R 190–27; D 25–183; I 0–2. (Vote, p. 832)

    10. Iraq Use-of-Force Resolution

    One of President Bush's central themes after he took office was the threat he said was posed to U.S. national security by Iraq's attempts to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. In his 2002 State of the Union address, Bush included Iraq as part of an “axis of evil”—a trio of nations including Iran and North Korea, all of which were trying to acquire unconventional weapons. Bush warned that the United States had no choice but to confront this threat. The president went much further in a speech he delivered in June at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. There, Bush explained that his administration would confront unconventional threats with a policy of military preemption. This new policy—unprecedented in U.S. history—meant that Bush was prepared to wage war against countries to prevent them from developing and using weapons of mass destruction against the United States.

    Congress worried that Bush was leading the country to war without its approval, and lawmakers insisted that he submit a war resolution to Congress. At first White House officials said Bush did not need congressional approval to defend the country. However, in early September, he agreed to submit a resolution. Once Bush made it clear he would respect Congress' role in the decision to use force against Iraq, he was assured a victorious vote. Despite deep reservations about Bush's policy toward Iraq, many lawmakers—Democrats and Republicans—were reluctant to vote against the popular president on a matter of national security on the eve of midterm elections. (Legislative details, p. 238)

    For Bush, however, the issue was his margin of victory on Capitol Hill. He did not want a repeat of the 1991 Persian Gulf War resolution (PL 102-1), in which Congress narrowly gave his father, President George Bush, approval to end Iraq's occupation of Kuwait. He also wanted strong bipartisan support to strengthen his hand in negotiations with the United Nations, which had yet to vote on its own resolution to deal with Iraq.

    As the White House and lawmakers negotiated for mutually acceptable wording, Bush was unable to reach a compromise with Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle, D-S.D. As a result, Bush struck a deal with House Minority Leader Richard A. Gephardt, D-Mo., that gave him broad authority for launching a war against Iraq and a free hand to act without approval from the United Nations. With Gephardt on the president's side and Daschle politically isolated, the House easily passed a measure (H J Res 114) authorizing military action against Iraq by a vote of 296–133: R 215–6; D 81–126; I 0–1. (Vote, p. 832)

    11. Abortion Opponents' Rights

    A single provision in a comprehensive overhaul of the nation's bankruptcy code provided abortion opponents with their most significant victory of the year. On a late-session procedural move to bring a conference report to the House floor, antiabortion forces showed they held at least as much influence over Republicans as did financial services lobbyists. But their action also guaranteed that another year would pass without the enactment of a bankruptcy bill under discussion since 1997. (Legislative details, p. 481)

    The provision that caught their attention was aimed at preventing abortion protesters from filing for bankruptcy to avoid paying court-ordered judgments. It resulted from painstaking negotiations between Sen. Charles E. Schumer, D-N.Y., who wanted a strict crackdown on such practices, and Rep. Henry J. Hyde, R-Ill., who was more sympathetic to abortion foes. The language provoked enough concern among Hyde's antiabortion colleagues that they stalled consideration of the conference agreement on the bill (HR 333) in August. But in November, with the election recently behind them, Republican leaders thought it was a good bet they could win a majority for the measure. A “yes” vote in the House was sure to be matched by a vote to clear the bill by the Senate.

    To protect the conference agreement from parliamentary attacks, House GOP leaders wrote a resolution to set the rules for floor debate Nov. 14. Votes in favor of the rule were slow in coming, and many that showed up on the electronic tally in the “aye” column soon switched to “nay.” In the well of the House, Republicans were caught in a tug of war between their leadership, which was trying to make good on a promise to their financial services industry backers, and their conservative colleagues, who were never willing to stray too far from the antiabortion forces that made up their base of political support. In the end, the antiabortion side won the votes of two-fifths of the Republicans that day, more than enough to counterbalance the one-quarter of the Democrats who voted with the rest of the GOP to keep the bill alive. The rejection of the rule killed the bankruptcy bill for the 107th Congress. The vote was 172–243: R 124–87; D 48–155; I 0–1. (Vote, p. 832)

    2002 Senate Brief Descriptions

    1. Hr 2646. Farm Bill

    Passage of the bill to reauthorize federal agriculture programs for five years, including $2 billion in direct federal subsidies to milk producers, and to reestablish programs that supply payments to farmers when commodity prices fall below a specified level. Passed 58–40: R 9–38; D 48–2 (ND 40–1; SD 8–1); I 1–0, Feb. 13, 2002. A “nay” was a vote in support of the president's position

    2. S 517. Fuel Economy Standards

    Levin, D-Mich., amendment to the Daschle, D-S.D., substitute amendment to strike the CAFE standard in the substitute and replace it with language directing the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to set a new standard in fifteen months. Adopted 62–38: R 43–6; D 19–31 (ND 14–27, SD 5–4); I 0–1, March 13, 2002.

    3. Hr 2356. Campaign Finance Overhaul

    Passage of the bill to ban “soft money” donations to national political parties but allow up to $10,000 in soft money donations to state and local parties for voter registration and get-out-the-vote activity, to increase the individual contribution limit from $1,000 to $2,000 per election for House and Senate candidates, and to index future contributions for inflation. Passed (thus cleared for the president) 60–40: R 11–38; D 48–2 (ND 40–1, SD 8–1); I 1–0, March 20, 2002.

    4. S 565. Federal Election Standards

    Passage of the bill to impose detailed voting-procedure requirements on states including requiring states to let voters verify their votes before casting ballots, allowing voters to change their ballots before submitting their votes, and notifying voters if they vote for more than one candidate for an office. Passed 99–1: R 48–1; D 50–0 (ND 41–0, SD 9–0); I 1–0, April 11, 2002.

    5. S 517. Artic National Wildlife Refuge

    Motion to invoke cloture (thus limiting debate) on Murkowski, R-Alaska, amendment to allow oil and gas development in a portion of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge if the president certified to Congress that production in the area is in the nation's economic and security interests. Limited the amount of surface disturbances to 2,000 acres, imposed an export ban on oil produced from the refuge, and designated an additional 1.5 million acres as wilderness in exchange for opening to drilling approximately 1.5 million acres of nonwilderness in the coastal plain region of the refuge. Motion rejected 46–54: R 41–8; D 5–45 (ND 2–39, SD 3–6); I 0–1, April 18, 2002. Three-fifths of the total Senate (sixty) was required to invoke cloture.

    6. Hr 3009. Fast-Track Trade Procedures

    Passage of the bill to extend duty-free status to certain products from Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru; renew the president's fast-track trade negotiation authority; and reauthorize and expand a program to provide retraining and relocation assistance to U.S. workers hurt by trade agreements. Passed 66–30: R 41–5; D 24–25 (ND 16–24, SD 8–1); I 1–0, May 23, 2002. A “yea” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    7. Hr 8. Tax Cut Extension: Estate Tax

    Gramm, R-Texas, motion to waive the Budget Act with respect to the Conrad, D-N.D., point of order against the Gramm amendment that would permanently extend the repeal of the estate tax contained in the $1.4 trillion tax cut enacted in 2001. Motion rejected 54–44: R 45–2; D 9–41 (ND 4–37, SD 5–4); I 0–1, June 12, 2002. A three-fifths majority vote (sixty) of the total Senate was required to waive the Budget Act. A “yea” was a vote in support of the president's position. (Subsequently the point of order was sustained and the Gramm amendment fell.).

    8. S 2600. Terrorism Insurance

    Passage of the bill to require the federal government to reimburse insurance companies for 90 percent of catastrophic losses related to terrorism between $10 billion and $100 billion in 2002, with an option to renew the program the following year to cover 90 percent of claims between $15 billion and $100 billion. Passed 84–14: R 34–14; D 49–0 (ND 40–0, SD 9–0); I 1–0, June 18, 2002.

    9. S 2673. Corporate Regulation, Accounting

    Passage of the bill to require more complete disclosure of corporate finances and overhaul regulation of the accounting industry, establish a new oversight board to police accounting firms, and forbid firms from providing investment banking, management consulting and other services for publicly traded companies. S 2673 created new criminal penalties for shareholder fraud and obstruction of justice involving document shredding and required chief executive officers and chief financial officers to attest to the accuracy of financial statements included in SEC filings. Passed 97–0: R 46–0; D 50–0 (ND 41–0, SD 9–0); I 1–0, July 15, 2002.

    10. S 812. Medicare Prescription Coverage

    Graham, D-Fla., motion to waive the Budget Act on legislation to provide prescription drug coverage for Medicare recipients, provide coverage for drug costs above a certain expense amount, make all recipients eligible for a discount of 5 percent or more on prescription drugs, and allow individuals to import prescription drugs from Canada under certain conditions. Motion rejected 49–50: R 4–44; D 45–5 (ND 38–3, SD 7–2); I 0–1, July 31, 2002. A three-fifths majority vote (sixty) of the total Senate was required to waive the Budget Act.

    11. Hr 5005. Commission to Investigate Sept. 11 Attacks

    Lieberman, D-Conn., amendment to establish the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States to investigate the facts and circumstances relating to the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks with an initial report in six months and a final report within one year. Adopted 90–8: R 41–8; D 48–0 (ND 39–0, SD 9–0); I 1–0, Sept. 24, 2002.

    12. Hr 5005. Homeland Security Department

    Motion to invoke cloture (thus limiting debate) on the Lieberman, D-Conn., amendment to create a cabinet-level Homeland Security Department charged with protecting domestic security. Motion rejected 50–49: R 1–48; D 48–1 (ND 41–0, SD 7–1); I 1–0, Sept. 26, 2002. Three-fifths of the total Senate (sixty) was required to invoke cloture.

    13. H J Res 114. Iraq Use of Force Resolution

    Passage of the joint resolution to authorize the use of force against Iraq. Passed 77–23: R 48–1; D 29–21 (ND 21–20, SD 8–1); I 0–1, Oct. 11, 2002 (in the session that began and the Congressional Record dated Oct. 10, 2002). A “yea” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    2002 House Brief Descriptions

    1. Hr 2356. Campaign Finance Overhaul

    Passage of the bill to ban “soft money” donations to national political parties but allow up to $10,000 in soft money donations to state and local parties for voter registration and get-out-the-vote activities. The bill barred issue ads from targeting specific candidates within sixty days of a general election or thirty days of a primary. The bill also increased the individual contribution limit from $1,000 to $2,000 per election for House and Senate candidates, both of were indexed for inflation thereafter. Passed 240–189: R 41–176; D 198–12 (ND 150–6, SD 48–6); I 1–1, Feb. 14, 2002 (in the session that began and the Congressional Record dated Feb. 13, 2002).

    2. Hr 1542. High-Speed Internet Access

    Motion to order the previous question (thus ending debate and possibility of amendment) on the Markey, D-Mass., motion to recommit the bill to the House Energy and Commerce Committee with instructions to add language that would maintain the ability of the states and the Federal Communications Commission to enforce current telecommunications law regulations over the entry of regional telephone companies (the so-called Baby Bells) into the high-speed Internet access market. Motion rejected 173–256: R 62–157; D 109–99 (ND 98–56, SD 11–43); I 2–0, Feb. 27, 2002.

    3. Hr 4546. Fiscal 2003 Defense Authorization

    Passage of the bill to authorize $383.4 billion for defense programs for fiscal 2003, including the president's request of $7.8 billion for missile defense systems and $7.3 billion for counterterrorism programs. It provided $475 million for the Crusader artillery system, exempted military activities from certain environmental regulations, and included an average 4.7 percent pay increase for military personnel. Passed 359–58: R 212–1; D 146–56 (ND 100–51, SD 46–5); I 1–1, May 10, 2002 (in the session that began and the Congressional Record dated May 9, 2002).

    4. Hr 4737. Welfare Reauthorization

    Passage of the bill that to authorize $16.5 billion to renew the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families block grant program through fiscal 2007 and require new welfare aid conditions. The bill required individuals to work forty hours per week (up from thirty in existing law) to be eligible for assistance and require states to have 70 percent or more of their families working by 2007. It authorized additional funding for child care and marriage promotion activities and allowed states to combine different types of block grants but barred them from using a waiver to transfer funds from one welfare account to another. Motion agreed to 229–197: R 214–4; D 14–192 (ND 7–147, SD 7–45); I 1–1, May 16, 2002. A two-thirds majority of those present and voting (282 in this case) was required for passage under suspension of the rules. A “yea” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    5. Hr 4775. Fiscal 2002 Supplemental Appropriations

    Adoption of the rule (H Res 428) to permit House floor consideration of the bill to provide $28.8 billion in supplemental appropriations for fiscal 2002, more than half of which was intended for military operations. Adopted 216–209: R 214–3; D 1–205 (ND 1–153, SD 0–52); I 1–1, May 22, 2002.

    6. Hr 4954. Prescription Drug Coverage

    Passage of the bill covering prescription drug costs for Medicare recipients through private insurance policies beginning in 2005 at an estimated cost of $350 billion over ten years. Patients were to pay a $33 monthly premium, with a $250 annual deductible. HR 4954 specified that patients would pay 20 percent of drug costs from $251 to $1,000 and 50 percent of the next $1,000, all costs from $2,001 to $3,700; after reaching that level insurers would pay the entire cost. Subsidies were provided to reduce premiums and co-payments for low-income patients. Passed 221–208: R 212–8; D 8–199 (ND 6–148, SD 2–51); I 1–1, June 28, 2002 (in the session that began and the Congressional Record dated June 27, 2002).

    7. Hr 4628. Establish Commission on Sept. 11 Attacks

    Roemer, D-Ind., amendment to establish a National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States to investigate the terrorist attacks that occurred on Sept. 11, 2001. Adopted 219–188: R 25–183; D 193–4 (ND 145–1, SD 48–3); I 1–1, July 25, 2002 (in the session that began and the Congressional Record that was dated July 24, 2002). A “nay” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    8. Hr 5005. Homeland Security/Union Membership

    Morella, R-Md., amendment to give federal employees who transferred into the Homeland Security Department the right to join a union if they were under union protection before the transfer. Allowed the president to exempt employees from union membership when duties were directly related to the war on terrorism. Rejected 208–222: R 5–214; D 202–7 (ND 153–2, SD 49–5); I 1–1, July 26, 2002. A “nay” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    9. Hr 3009. Trade Promotion Authority

    Adoption of the conference report on the bill to allow special trade promotion authority for congressional consideration of trade agreements reached before June 1, 2005, and extend duty-free status to certain products from Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. The bill reauthorized and expanded a program to provide retraining assistance to U.S. workers hurt by trade agreements, created a 65 percent tax credit for health insurance costs for displaced workers, and authorized a five-year extension of the Generalized System of Preferences. Adopted 215–212: R 190–27; D 25–183 (ND 11–143, SD 14–40); I 0–2, July 27, 2002 (in the session that began and the Congressional Record dated July 26, 2002). A “yea” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    10. H J Res 114. Use of Force

    Passage of the joint resolution to authorize the use of force against Iraq and require the administration to report to Congress that diplomatic options had been exhausted no later than forty-eight hours after military action began. Passed 296–133: R 215–6; D 81–126 (ND 49–105, SD 32–21); I 0–1, Oct. 10, 2002. A “yea” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    11. Hr 333. Bankruptcy Overhaul/Abortion

    Adoption of the rule (H Res 606) to provide for House floor consideration of the conference report on the bill requiring debtors able to repay $10,000 or 25 percent of their debts over five years, to file under Chapter 13 of the bankruptcy statute, which required a reorganization of debts under a repayment plan, instead of seeking to discharge debts under the more consumer-friendly Chapter 7. HR 333 also prevented persons protesting abortion and other issues from declaring bankruptcy to avoid paying court-ordered fines and judgments. Rejected 172–243: R 124–87; D 48–155 (ND 24–127, SD 24–28); I 0–1, Nov. 14, 2002.

    2003 Key Votes
    Senate

    1. Clean Air Act

    The administration of George W. Bush proposed in December 2002 a regulatory change to reinterpret a provision of the 1990 Clean Air Act (PL 101-549) that required some new or expanded power plants and factories to install updated antipollution equipment. The administration's plan allowed power plants and factories greater leeway to make changes under “routine maintenance,” which did not require federal review or new pollution control equipment.

    An amendment to a fiscal 2003 omnibus appropriations bill (H J Res 2—PL 108-7), offered by John Edwards, D-N.C., would have delayed the proposed pollution control regulations for six months. It also would have required a National Academy of Sciences study “to determine the effects of the final rule on air pollution and human health.” Critics—including Northeastern Republican senators who would prove pivotal on a number of environmental issues throughout the year—said the rule would allow power plants to pollute more, costing states more for environmental cleanup. The administration disputed that and said power plants were now discouraged from performing routine maintenance because of the burdensome regulations. (Legislative details, p. 437)

    Christine Todd Whitman, administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) at the time, lobbied undecided members on Jan. 21, the night before the Senate vote. Her biggest challenge was to persuade northeastern Republicans. The coal-burning factories and power plants targeted by the pollution controls were concentrated in the Midwest and parts of the South but their emissions often were carried by easterly winds to the Northeast and fell to the ground as acid rain. She did not succeed: all five northeastern Republicans and independent James M. Jeffords of Vermont voted for the amendment. However the administration brought a handful of southern Democrats to its side: the four senators from Louisiana and Arkansas, and Zell Miller of Georgia. The final vote against the Edwards amendment was 46–50: R 6–45; D 39–5; I 1–0. (Vote, p. 847)

    The regional breakdown of New England Republicans opposing the president and some southern Democrats backing him reflected Senate sentiment on environmental issues in 2003, a division that later would be repeated on omnibus energy legislation, global warming, and an air pollution proposal from the president. Before the Edwards amendment was defeated, the Senate adopted, 51–45, an alternative offered by James M. Inhofe, R-Okla., chairman of the Environment and Public Works Committee, calling for the same study but allowing the new rules to take effect in March. Democrats claimed they were pleased with the closeness of the vote. They expected to return to the issue during 2004, and they gained a partial victory when implementation of the rule was blocked by a federal court on Christmas Eve.

    2. First Estrada Cloture Vote

    The use of the filibuster in the Senate had historically been focused on legislation; it was only rarely employed on nominations from the president. Only one judicial nomination had been successfully filibustered: the proposed elevation of Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas to chief justice of the United States was blocked in 1968 when a motion to stop debate and bring his nomination to a vote was defeated. Fortas then withdrew his candidacy. Before 2003 judicial candidates were rejected on occasion but no lower-court nomination had been blocked by a filibuster. Senators had tried to conduct filibusters against nominees to the U.S. Courts of Appeals but eventually votes were held on each of the nominees.

    Senate Democrats knew this history as they mulled in early 2003 trying to block a vote on Miguel A. Estrada, a lawyer in private practice nominated for a seat on the influential Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. To do so successfully, Democrats needed forty-one votes against invoking cloture. Senate rules require sixty votes to end prolonged debate and bring an issue or nomination to a vote. Many Democrats argued that Estrada might be too conservative and, unlike most appellate nominees, he had not built a dossier of opinions that set out his legal philosophy. The Bush administration had rebuffed Democratic requests for access to some of Estrada's memos and work papers from the time he served in the solicitor general's office during the Clinton administration. (Nomination details, p. 623)

    GOP leaders began debate on Estrada's nomination Feb. 4 but did not schedule a vote immediately. For weeks, the nomination was the main business on the Senate floor as Republican leaders weighed how to go forward. Many in the GOP caucus were reluctant to vote on—and risk losing—a motion to invoke cloture. Some Democrats were concerned that a filibuster would someday haunt the party when it was once again in control of the presidency. But others argued that Estrada's confirmation would encourage the Bush administration to send similar conservative judicial nominations as vacancies occurred. Democrats by Feb. 11 had secured more than the necessary forty-one votes to continue the filibuster but Republican leaders did not schedule a vote until March 6 and then fell five votes short in invoking cloture: 55–44: R 51–0; D 4–43; I 0–1. (Vote, p. 847)

    The vote showed that even as the minority party Democrats could exert some control over who was seated on the federal bench. It also raised the stakes in the already rancorous struggle over the shape of the judiciary. Democrats used the same strategy to block five other nominations in 2003. Republicans sought to invoke cloture to force a vote on those candidates and Estrada a total of fifteen more times over the year but they never got any closer to the sixty votes they needed. On Sept. 4 Bush withdrew Estrada's nomination at the candidate's request after seven attempts to bring his name to a vote were defeated.

    Use of filibusters to block judicial nominations added to already existing tensions in the usually civilized Senate. Twice during the year an angry and frustrated Majority Leader Bill Frist, R-Tenn., scheduled a series of back-to-back cloture votes on contentious nominees. He also proposed a plan to change Senate rules that would make it more difficult to sustain a filibuster of a presidential nominee. (Details, p. 625)

    3. Arctic National Wildlife Refugee

    President Bush's energy plan, first released in 2001, focused largely on increasing domestic production of oil, gas, and coal to reduce the nation's dependence on foreign oil. A main element of Bush's plan was oil drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refugee (ANWR), a remote area on Alaska's northern coast. But efforts in the 107th Congress to authorize drilling in ANWR were blocked in the Senate by environmentalists, who argued that it would harm wildlife in the refuge. Supporters of the plan countered that it would provide a new source of energy and create hundreds of thousands of jobs. (Legislative details, p. 432)

    After an attempt to break a Democratic filibuster mustered just forty-six votes in 2002, Republican leaders tried a new approach in the 108th Congress. They sought to sidestep a filibuster by including a provision in the Senate version of the budget resolution (S Con Res 23) to provide de facto authority for oil drilling in ANWR by assuming there would be $2.1 billion in revenue in fiscal 2004 from federal royalties from energy leases in the refuge. Revenue and spending provisions in the budget resolution were protected from filibusters.

    GOP leaders then set about winning the simple majority needed to keep the language from being stripped from the resolution. They targeted four senators they thought might be wavering—Arkansas Democrats Mark Pryor and Blanche Lincoln, and Republicans Gordon H. Smith of Oregon and Norm Coleman of Minnesota. But all four later voted against allowing ANWR drilling. On March 19, 2003, the Senate voted to adopt an amendment by Barbara Boxer, D-Calif., stripping the ANWR language from the budget resolution. The vote was 52–48: R 8–43; D 43–5; I 1–0. (Vote, p. 847)

    4. Tax Cut Limitations

    Bush began the fiscal 2004 budget cycle with a politically ambitious proposal—$1.5 trillion in tax cuts over the next decade including an eleven-year, $726 billion “economic growth” package. Released amid dire predictions about a soaring federal budget deficit and less than two years after the 2001 tax cut (PL 107-16), the plan immediately drew fire from Democrats and skepticism from some Republicans. Bush's plan called for accelerating implementation of the 2001 tax law and eliminating taxes on stock dividends. House and Senate Republican budget writers agreed to put the recommendations in a budget “reconciliation” package. By doing so they would give the tax cut package protection against Democratic-led filibusters in the closely divided Senate. (Legislative details, p. 105)

    But in early March, as Senate Budget Chairman Don Nickles, R-Okla., and his conservative-dominated panel constructed a procedural blueprint (S Con Res 23) for Bush's plan, Senate centrists began to formulate an alternative proposal. They supported some tax cuts to invigorate the economy but concluded that a plan as expensive as Bush's was inappropriate given the deficit and the costs of the looming war in Iraq. The group, led by Democrat John B. Breaux of Louisiana with Republicans George V. Voinovich of Ohio and Olympia J. Snowe of Maine, decided the tax cut package should be pared down by more than half, to $350 billion.

    Doubt existed that the group would stay unified and bring other Democrats and a few Republicans to their plan. Some Democrats were opposed to any tax cut but many nonetheless backed the moderates' smaller reduction as an acceptable alternative to Bush's plan. But when one of them—Ernest F. Hollings of South Carolina—refused to sign on it was clear the plan would be just short of fifty-one votes. Several Democrats then withdrew their support and the amendment was defeated, 38–62.

    Republican leaders were anxious to complete a budget resolution quickly but Democrats, angry that GOP leaders were pushing for a final budget vote before the Bush administration released the cost of its expected Iraq war spending supplemental, forced Majority Leader Bill Frist, R-Tenn., to suspend debate until the following week. The delay, as it turned out, breathed new life into Breaux's proposal. Over the weekend, the administration announced that its supplemental request would be for $74.7 billion, a staggering figure that came just as U.S. troops began to encounter strong resistance in Iraq.

    When the Senate returned to the budget debate, Breaux decided to try again. He knew that despite the lopsided setback of the previous week, he was really only one or two votes short, and that most Democrats opposed to any tax cuts would support his $350 billion ceiling if they were certain it would be adopted. Hollings did not rule out switching his vote, and Republican moderate Lincoln Chafee of Rhode Island said that while he opposed new tax cuts, he would provide the winning vote if needed to help shrink the package.

    Breaux tweaked his amendment, adding nonbinding language that would earmark the revenue saved by reducing the tax cuts for Social Security. On March 25 Breaux brought his new amendment to the floor and surprised Senate Republican leaders. Hollings, Chafee, and another holdout, Tom Harkin, D-Iowa, voted for the amendment, prompting other Democrats to follow suit. The vote to adopt the amendment was 51–48: R 3–48; D 47–0; I 1–0. (Vote, p. 847)

    5. Prescription Drugs Through Medicare

    In two previous Congresses, the Senate had been the graveyard for Medicare prescription drug bills passed by the House. In both 2000 and 2002 the House passed bills under which private companies would develop drug plans for seniors but the Senate never considered them. Democrats and Republicans could not get past their fundamental differences over how to structure a Medicare prescription drug program. Democrats thought it should be an addition to the Medicare program, available to all; Republicans preferred a private-sector approach.

    That stalemate was broken in 2003 when Finance Chairman Charles E. Grassley, R-Iowa, and ranking Democrat Max Baucus of Montana drafted their bill (S 1) that split their differences. Among the provisions in their bill was one that would guarantee that a government-run “fallback” plan would be available to seniors who did not have a choice of at least two private drug plans in their area. (Legislative details, p. 497)

    Senators from both parties had reasons to oppose the bill. Conservative Republicans disliked the idea of creating a new $400 billion entitlement for prescription drug coverage—particularly without a larger role for the private sector and stronger measures to control costs. Democrats saw gaping holes in the bill's coverage: under the Finance Committee measure, beneficiaries would have to pay all of their prescription drug costs between $4,500 and $5,813 a year because Medicare would not have enough money available to pay those costs. They warned that premiums would vary across the country, meaning some seniors might have to pay well above the national average of $35 a month. Democrats also knew that the passage of a bill while Republicans held the White House and majorities in the House and Senate would deprive Democrats of the chance to do it their way—even though a Medicare prescription drug benefit was originally their idea.

    But it was the backing of one Democrat—Sen. Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts—that made it possible for leaders to sustain any rebellion against the bill. Kennedy, who has exercised a leadership role on health care in the Democratic caucus for many years, believed that it would be a mistake to miss the chance to put a program in place, which he contended could be improved later. When the measure reached the Senate floor Republican and Democratic leaders did their best to maintain the bipartisan balance. Democrats offered amendments to provide more generous benefits in the bill but they did not raise serious objections when the amendments were defeated. Majority Leader Bill Frist, R-Tenn., said he hoped for a bigger private-sector role but he also urged his GOP colleagues to avoid changes that would jeopardize strong Democratic support.

    As the Senate moved toward final passage late the night of June 26, a last-minute threat to the bill developed in the form of an amendment by Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif., and Don Nickles, R-Okla., to tie Medicare premiums to beneficiaries' incomes. Kennedy, who said he believed Medicare's broad public support would be jeopardized if wealthy seniors had to pay more than others, opposed the amendment. In a shouting match on the floor with Feinstein and Rick Santorum, R-Pa., he threatened to hold the bill hostage unless the amendment was defeated. To appease Kennedy, senators engineered a defeat of the amendment by voice vote, in which Democrats prevailed by yelling “no” at the top of their lungs. Only a handful of liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans did not to back the legislation on the final vote. The Grassley-Baucus bill won strong bipartisan support when the Senate voted in the early morning hours of June 27, 76–21: R 40–10; D 35–11; I 1–0. (Vote, p. 847)

    The bipartisan approach did not last beyond the passage of the Senate bill. In drafting the final measure with the House Republican negotiators excluded all Democrats except two centrists: Baucus and John B. Breaux, D-La. That allowed them to write a conference report more acceptable to conservative Republicans. But it lost the support of most Democrats, including Kennedy. By that time, however, the Medicare bill had risen from the Senate graveyard—and in doing so, it had picked up the momentum it needed to survive final negotiations and become law.

    6. Overtime Rules

    Democratic Sen. Tom Harkin of Iowa had a hunch that he could defeat Bush administration efforts to streamline the nation's labor laws. Harkin knew that organized labor had spent the August recess lobbying intensely against a proposed Labor Department rule that would change the eligibility for overtime pay but he needed a little scheduling help to ensure victory. The proposed rule would make 1.3 million low-income workers eligible for overtime pay for the first time. But it also would strip about 650,000 white-collar workers of their eligibility for overtime pay, according to the department. Opponents argued that as many as 8 million workers would lose their overtime rights under the proposal. (Legislative details, p. 574)

    The AFL-CIO launched a grassroots effort targeting vulnerable incumbents and senators from states with a large union membership. The union ran ads in support of an amendment Harkin planned to offer to the Labor–Health and Human Services (HHS)–Education spending bill (HR 2660), which would ban funding for any rule that would take away overtime pay eligibility. The commercials aired in Maine, Ohio, Missouri, and nationally on CNN. The House had narrowly defeated a similar measure by three votes in July.

    Holding up a vote on the amendment, the Republican leadership was miffed that Democrats wanted to dictate the timing of the vote to ensure that all four Senate Democratic presidential aspirants could attend. The four—Joseph I. Lieberman of Connecticut, John Kerry of Massachusetts, John Edwards of North Carolina, and Bob Graham of Florida—missed votes during 2003 while campaigning in early primary states. But given the importance of the vote to organized labor all four said they would be there when a time was set for the vote.

    Under pressure to move appropriations measures through the Senate, Majority Leader Bill Frist, R-Tenn., finally agreed to set the vote for Sept. 10. Democrats were united, with only Zell Miller of Georgia voting against the amendment. Meanwhile, six Republicans defected. Of that number, three—Lisa Murkowski of Alaska, Ben Nighthorse Campbell of Colorado, and Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania—were up for reelection in 2004 in states where organized labor was a powerful political force. The amendment was adopted 54–45: R 6–44, D 47–1; 1–0. (Vote, p. 847)

    The vote was a major rebuke for the administration, as key GOP lawmakers voted with Democrats. They included Specter, who was sponsor of the Senate's version of the Labor-HHS-Education bill (S 1356), and Senate Appropriations Chairman Ted Stevens of Alaska. Moderate Republicans Lincoln Chafee of Rhode Island and Olympia J. Snowe of Maine also voted with Harkin. Frist's decision to go ahead with the vote was made with the assurances that the White House would veto the bill if the Harkin amendment were included in a final House-Senate conference report on the spending bill. He felt confident that the Harkin amendment could not survive with Republicans in charge of the conference negotiations. Despite months of campaigning by Specter to keep the rider in the bill, Frist's gambit paid off as Republicans stripped the Harkin amendment in an omnibus spending package (HR 2673) that included the Labor-HHS-Education bill.

    7. Media Ownership

    When the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) decided June 2, 2003, to allow media conglomerates to own more television stations and newspapers, complaints flooded congressional offices after critics said the changes could allow a handful of corporations to gain control over most of the nation's media outlets. Efforts in Congress to overturn the new rules initially were given little chance of success. GOP leaders supported the FCC changes, and the Bush administration threatened to veto such legislation if it were passed. But in the Senate, a bipartisan coalition of opponents to the FCC's changes led by Byron L. Dorgan, D-N.D., and Trent Lott, R-Miss., resorted to a rarely used legislative maneuver to force a roll-call vote in their chamber. (Legislative details, p. 389)

    On July 15 Dorgan introduced a joint resolution of disapproval (S J Res 17) to reverse the FCC ruling. The resolution was permitted under the 1996 Congressional Review Act (PL 104-121), which allowed Congress to overturn new federal regulations with a simple majority vote of both houses and the president's signature. It had been successfully used only once, when a Republican Congress repealed workplace ergonomics regulations put in place at the end of the Clinton administration. The law contained a provision to allow expedited consideration of the resolution in the Senate—but not the House. Dorgan easily obtained the thirty signatures needed under the law to discharge the resolution from committee and bring it directly to the Senate floor. The law limited debate to ten hours and prohibited amendments. (Details, p. 389)

    Sen. George Allen, R-Va., and other supporters of the FCC's changes argued that they were needed to update outmoded regulations written before the advent of the Internet and 500-channel cable television systems. But it was clear from the start of the debate they were outnumbered. In a rebuke to FCC Chairman Michael K. Powell, the Senate passed the resolution Sept. 16 by a vote of 55–40: R 12–38; D 42–2; I 1–0. The combination of twelve GOP senators joining forty-two Democrats and the Senate's single independent was widely seen as a strong message to the White House that the FCC's rule was not going to stand with Congress. While the resolution did not pass the House it did lay the groundwork for a compromise approved later that reversed part of the FCC's actions. (Vote, p. 847).

    8. Iraq Reconstruction

    The White House enjoyed strong support on its Iraq policy from the Republican majorities in both chambers in 2003, despite rising U.S. casualties, mounting criticism over postwar planning from Democrats, and two ongoing congressional inquiries into the quality of prewar intelligence on Iraq. But the Bush administration received an unwelcome surprise when it tried to sell to Congress its $87 billion supplemental budget request for Iraq and Afghanistan. Growing concern in both parties over the higher-than-expected price tag became apparent Oct. 16 when the Senate narrowly voted to convert $10 billion out of the measure's $20.3 billion slice for reconstruction into a loan. It was the first major setback for the administration on Iraq, made more significant by the defections of eight GOP senators. (Legislative details, p. 291)

    The White House vigorously opposed the proposal, arguing that it would be unfair to saddle Iraq with even more obligations on top of its external debt, which was estimated to be about $125 billion. But the amendment's sponsors, centrist Democrats Evan Bayh of Indiana and Ben Nelson of Nebraska, included a provision that many senators saw as a “win-win” sweetener: if Iraq's lenders forgave 90 percent of the country's bilateral debt, the $10 billion loan would be converted into a grant. That measure drew praise from those Democrats who wanted to ease Iraq's debt burden, while the loan component attracted several fiscal conservatives in the GOP who faced constituent opposition to the bill's cost.

    Before the vote, the White House lobbied undecided senators, some of whom were invited to the White House to meet with Bush. But several of those lawmakers later said those tactics backfired. Indeed, when the amendment finally came to the floor, it won the support of eight Republicans, including close White House allies such as Lindsey Graham of South Carolina and Saxby Chambliss of Georgia. Only four Democrats opposed it. The vote was 51–47: R 8–43; D 42–4; I 1–0. (Vote, p. 847)

    9. ‘Partial Birth’ Abortion

    For eight years, social conservatives pushed for a federal law criminalizing a procedure they called “partial birth” abortion. But until 2003 the effort always ended short of success: abortion foes twice succeeded in pushing a partial-birth ban through Congress but were never able to muster an override of President Bill Clinton's vetoes of the legislation. With Republicans controlling both chambers of Congress and the White House in 2003, supporters of the ban were confident of victory, with passage in the House all but guaranteed and a promise from President Bush to sign the bill into law. The only potential obstacles lay in the Senate, where abortion rights advocate Barbara Boxer, D-Calif., insisted on a full debate on the issue before every vote—including procedural tallies. Supporters of legal abortion tried to limit the scope of the ban through a handful of amendments. (Legislative details, p. 510)

    The effort to enact the ban in the 108th Congress also was the first time the bill had come before the Senate since the Supreme Court's decision in 2000 to strike down a similar law in Nebraska. But with Bush's endorsement, opponents of the ban lost some of the cover they had during the Clinton administration. In the past, those members could vote for the measure—avoiding the ire of the antiabortion lobby—even though they disagreed with it because they knew Clinton would veto it.

    Although the 2003 debate and votes on the bill (S 3) had the potential to put some senators—particularly Republicans and the chamber's newest members—in the tricky spot of having to weigh when life begins and how far to curtail a woman's legal right to an abortion, the Senate passed the bill with relative ease March 13 by a vote of 64–33, sending it on to the House. The House on June 4 passed its version of the legislation (HR 760) by a vote of 282–139. When the conference agreement came before the Senate in October, supporters and opponents acknowledged the bill would be approved. The House already had adopted the conference report 281–142 on Oct. 2. The Senate cleared for the president on Oct. 21 by a vote of 64–34: R 47–3; D 17–30; I 0–1. (Vote, p. 847)

    10. Class Action Lawsuits

    Conservative lawmakers and business lobbyists spent much of 2003 trying to round up a filibuster-proof sixty-vote Senate majority for a measure to make it easier to remove class action lawsuits from state courts and send them to federal courts. Supporters of the legislation (S 1751) pushed it as a needed reform for the civil tort system, which backers of the bill portrayed as badly abused by trial lawyers who filed specious cases in plaintiff-friendly state courts. Opponents countered that the bill would make it more difficult, and more expensive, for wronged parties to seek legal redress. (Legislative details, p. 608)

    The House passed its version of the bill (HR 1115) 253–170 on June 12 and Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, R-Tenn., repeatedly promised to bring the measure to a vote in 2003. For months, business lobbyists publicly counted fifty-seven votes in the Senate for the bill. Privately, they said that while several more senators were prepared to vote for it, those lawmakers would not publicly declare their intentions for fear of criticism from opponents.

    The Senate showdown came Oct. 22, when Frist decided to test the math by forcing a vote to end a filibuster on a procedural motion to take up the legislation, the one item on the GOP's so-called tort reform agenda that has the best chance of being enacted. Months earlier, on July 9, the Senate rejected a motion to invoke cloture on another lawsuit-related bill that would cap noneconomic damages for pain and suffering and punitive damages in medical malpractice lawsuits.

    The October class action vote was enmeshed in end-of-session partisanship. Senate Democrats complained about being mostly shut out of conference negotiations on Medicare prescription drug legislation (PL 108-173) and a major energy bill (HR 6). They buttressed their claim of heavy-handedness by the GOP by pointing to the fact that the class action bill Frist brought to the floor was not the one (S 274) approved in April by the Judiciary Committee. The new version incorporated a change made at the behest of Arlen Specter, R-Pa., regarding “mass action” lawsuits.

    As a result the outcome was uncertain when Frist called for a vote on the cloture motion. As lobbyists paced outside the Senate chamber, Mary L. Landrieu, D-La.—whom supporters of the bill long had counted as an ally—approached Frist with a list of changes she wanted made. When Frist would not promise Landrieu that she could get what she wanted, she voted against limiting debate. Landrieu's vote proved decisive when the roll call was one short of the sixty needed. The vote was 59–39: R 50–1; D 8–38; I 1–0. (Vote, p. 847)

    11. Cuba Travel Ban

    When the Senate last voted in 1999 to lift the ban on traveling to Cuba, the amendment was tabled 55–43. In 2003, however, the Senate for the first time voted to lift the ban by including a provision in the fiscal 2004 Transportation-Treasury spending bill (HR 2989). The amendment was offered by Byron L. Dorgan, D-N.D., whose fellow Farm Belt senators were among the most vehement foes of the travel ban. Twenty of them voted against tabling the amendment, while just four of those voting to kill it—all of them Republicans—were from the same region—Norm Coleman of Minnesota, Peter G. Fitzgerald of Illinois, Charles E. Grassley of Iowa, and Richard G. Lugar of Indiana. (Legislative details, p. 299)

    Agricultural interests saw an untapped market in Cuba and made the case that economic engagement—rather than isolation—was the way to change the behavior of Fidel Castro's government. Supporters of the travel ban in Congress and administration officials argued that easing sanctions on the island nation would do little to alter Castro's behavior but would provide him with currency he otherwise could not get. The Bush administration took a strong stand against lifting sanctions on the communist regime, particularly heading into an election year when Florida's electoral votes were considered central to a presidential victory. Even so, for the fourth straight year the House also voted to lift the travel ban.

    The motion to table the Dorgan amendment was rejected Oct. 23 by 36–59: R 30–19; D 6–39; I 0–1. Subsequently, the amendment was adopted by voice vote. Support for easing sanctions from majorities in both chambers was not enough to overcome a veto threat, and the GOP leadership stood with the administration. The provision lifting the travel ban was stripped out in the conference committee on legislation. (Vote, p. 847)

    12. ‘Healthy Forests’ Initiative

    Many observers were skeptical that Congress could pass forest-thinning legislation, a White House environmental priority that President Bush highlighted in his State of the Union speech in January 2003. Bush's “Healthy Forests” initiative was intended to restrict environmental reviews and legal challenges for projects designed to thin forests and remove the debris that fuels wildfires. The House passed a bill based on Bush's plan without difficulty in May but environmental groups disliked the measure; their influence in the Senate was thought strong enough to scuttle the measure.

    Senate Democrats voiced significant discontent with the House-passed bill, saying it would permit clear-cutting of older, larger trees deep in the nation's forests and would not provide enough protections for communities with the highest risks for wildfire. The standoff looked like a repeat of 2002, when GOP attempts to add elements of Bush's forest plan to the fiscal 2003 Interior appropriations bill bogged down in the Senate. Democrats had countered with a proposal to limit logging to areas near communities. Neither side was able to win the sixty votes necessary to avoid the other's filibuster, and the measure died. This time, however, two Democrats—Sens. Dianne Feinstein of California and Ron Wyden of Oregon—joined with Republicans who were determined to avoid a stalemate. In a series of meetings that included Forest Service officials, the bipartisan group wrote a new version of the bill. (Legislative details, p. 433)

    The revised Senate measure, released at the end of September, authorized $760 million a year for thinning—the House had not specified an amount—and proposed that at least 50 percent of the money be spent in areas within a half mile of communities at risk for wildfires. It also required protection of old-growth trees. It proposed a limit of three environmental reviews for thinning projects, instead of the one recommended by the House. Preliminary court injunctions would be limited to sixty days rather than forty-five days as in the House bill.

    Initially, it was not clear whether the compromise was enough to appease environmentalists. Democrats Jeff Bingaman of New Mexico and Tom Harkin of Iowa placed holds on the measure, blocking the unanimous consent needed to bring it up. Both said they needed more time to review the language. With a busy schedule near the end of the session, the measure appeared to be stalled. But raging wildfires in Southern California began to capture headlines just a few days later, putting opponents on the defensive. Bingaman and Harkin dropped their objections, and the measure was passed Oct. 30 in a rare show of environmental bipartisanship. The vote was 80–14: R 50–0; D 30–13; I 0–1. The final bill, which was easily cleared Nov. 21, retained almost all of the Senate compromise. (Vote, p. 847)

    13. Faa Reauthorization

    The Bush administration's campaign to privatize thousands of federal government jobs became a major point of conflict in Congress, leading even some Republicans to challenge the White House. The issue of contracting out air traffic control jobs within the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was particularly sensitive because of its implications—real or imagined—for aviation safety. The administration touched off congressional action with a decision early in the year to reclassify air traffic control as a commercial rather than an inherently governmental function—even though it did not plan to immediately privatize any of the jobs. The House included language in its version of the FAA reauthorization bill (HR 2115) to ban further privatization of air traffic controllers. The Senate version would have banned privatizing controllers or support staff. (Legislative details, p. 382)

    However, with the White House threatening to veto any bill that restricted its ability to privatize the air traffic control system, Republican conferees met hastily July 24 and agreed to replace the proposed ban. Instead, the conference agreement allowed for the privatization of sixty-nine airport control towers, most of them at secondary airports or in small cities, with further privatization to be allowed after Oct. 1, 2007. Following a revolt in the House, the conference report was rewritten to delete any mention of privatization and was finally adopted by the House. But Senate Democrats threatened a filibuster, noting that the bill's silence on privatization would allow the FAA to privatize all or part of the air traffic control system at its discretion.

    In an effort to end the threat to the bill, FAA Administrator Marion C. Blakey wrote a letter promising that the administration “has no plans to privatize the national air traffic control system” for a year. The guarantee, which arrived Nov. 17 even as the Senate was voting on whether or not to cut off the debate, applied only to air traffic controllers, not to support staff at control towers and flight service stations as the Senate wanted. It did not satisfy opponents of privatization, and the motion to invoke cloture was rejected, 45–43: R 42–3; D 3–39; I 0–1. (Vote, p. 847)

    Finally, the administration sent a letter Nov. 21 that met lawmakers' demands for a one-year moratorium on any new privatization of air traffic control personnel. Just minutes later, the Senate cleared the conference report by voice vote. The issue was settled for a year although labor unions and their Democratic supporters vowed to try to get a permanent prohibition on privatization written into law in 2004.

    14. Energy Policy

    Almost three years after President Bush proposed a new national energy policy, weeks of sometimes bitter negotiations finally yielded in November what Republican leaders described as a saleable compromise: a package designed to stimulate domestic production of oil, gas, and ethanol; improve management of the nation's electricity grid in the aftermath of a crippling summertime blackout; and create thousands of jobs to bolster the economy. But less than a week after a deal was struck, the measure had been consigned to indefinite legislative limbo—sunk, probably for the rest of the 108th Congress, mainly by a provision that took up just twenty-four lines in the 571-page conference report embodying the deal (HR 6—H Rept 108-375). (Legislative details, p. 425)

    That wording shielded producers of methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) from defective product lawsuits, including some already in the courts. MTBE was used to make fuel burn more cleanly but had been found to contaminate groundwater when it leaks from pipes or storage tanks. Senate negotiators had agreed to the liability limitations at the insistence of Republican House Majority Leader Tom DeLay, who represented a district in Texas, home to many of the nation's MTBE producers.

    Sen. Charles E. Schumer, D-N.Y., had been threatening for more than a month to lead a filibuster against any bill with such a liability waiver, which he maintained would transfer billions of dollars in MTBE cleanup costs from the industry to consumers. But GOP leaders believed they could pull together the sixty votes needed to invoke cloture and shut down a filibuster by loading the bill with special-interest provisions—from ethanol subsidies to earmarks for spending on parochial energy initiatives. They also sought to defuse opposition by deleting the most contentious provisions under consideration: to permit oil and gas drilling in Alaska's Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, for example, or to inventory oil reserves in the Outer Continental Shelf off the nation's coasts, where drilling was prohibited.

    The conference report went through the House on Nov. 18 even as Schumer's filibuster campaign gained momentum. Judd Gregg of New Hampshire led a coalition of Republicans who took to the Senate floor to support the filibuster. Majority Leader Bill Frist, R-Tenn., was able to muster fifty-eight votes—more than sufficient to pass the bill, but two shy of the sixty required to end a filibuster. Thirteen Democrats, mostly from oil- or ethanol-producing states, voted for cloture, but that was not enough to overcome the defection of six Republicans, all but one from the Northeast. The final vote Nov. 21 was 57–40: R 44–7; D 13–32; I 0–1. (Vote, p. 847)

    House

    1. Fiscal 2004 Budget Resolution

    The most pressing business for the reassembled GOP majority at the start of the 108th Congress was to pass the second major tax cut of George W. Bush's presidency in an attempt to stimulate the slumping national economy. The House Republican's fiscal 2004 budget resolution (H Con Res 95) was an important part of the plan. It called for initiating a fast-track budget reconciliation process to allow the Senate—under Republican control after the 2002 elections—to pass the tax measure by a simple majority vote instead of facing the usual sixty-vote margin required in budget matters.

    While the primary objective was passage of the tax plan, the measure sparked an internal GOP debate over cutting spending. That debate came as the White House issued a forecast for a record federal budget deficit—even before knowing the costs of a war in Iraq. Jim Nussle, R-Iowa, chairman of the House Budget Committee, drafted a budget plan that would force a 1 percent cut in virtually all mandatory spending programs, including Medicare and Medicaid, the federal-state health care plans for the elderly and the poor. (Legislative details, p. 66)

    The savings in entitlement programs, which would have required a separate reconciliation bill, were to total $467 billion over ten years but would have reduced the allocation available for a prescription drug benefit—a priority Bush objective—to only $28 billion. The Nussle draft also included the full $726 billion over eleven years for the Bush tax plan. Nussle's plan was met with a rebellion by Republican moderates that forced House leaders to rewrite the measure before bringing it to the floor. As modified for floor debate, most of the cuts for Medicare and popular veterans' programs were dropped. Even so, it took considerable pressure by GOP leaders to advance the measure, which was adopted by a vote of 215–212: R 214–12; D 1–199; I 0–1. (Vote, p. 849)

    2. Tax Reductions

    House Republicans won final approval May 23 for a $330 billion tax cut, the third largest in U.S. history. Though many Republicans were angry that the final bill was less than half the size of the $726 billion tax cut originally sought by President Bush, they closed ranks to adopt the conference report in the face of almost unanimous Democratic opposition. (Legislative details, p. 105)

    The House initially endorsed a $726 billion tax cut package as part of the fiscal 2004 budget resolution, but Senate moderates succeeded in reducing the cost to $350 billion including revenue-raising offsets. House and Senate negotiators compromised on a $550 billion plan, which the House reluctantly accepted. But as the Senate was about to vote on the final budget resolution, Finance Chairman Charles E. Grassley, R-Iowa, announced that to get the support of Senate centrists, he had promised—with the support of Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, R-Tenn.—that any tax reconciliation package would cost no more than $350 billion.

    House Republicans were furious about the deal and pressed ahead with a $550 billion tax cut bill (HR 2), while the Senate approved a $350 billion version. In conference, Thomas agreed to accept a $350 billion cap but insisted that in return the House deserved a stronger role in determining the content of the tax cut. He won agreement for a plan to reduce the tax rate on both dividends and capital gains to 15 percent for most taxpayers, in lieu of Bush's original proposal to end dividend taxes. Under existing law, dividends were taxed as regular income at a top rate of 38.6 percent, and certain capital gains were taxed at 20 percent.

    Most Democrats strongly opposed the plan, citing its tilt toward taxpayers who are better off and its impact on the deficit at a time when the war in Iraq was already requiring billions in deficit spending. On the final vote only seven Democrats backed the conference report and just one Republican opposed it. That vote was 231–200: R 224–1; D 7–198; I 0–1. (Vote, p. 849)

    3. Overtime Pay

    The Bush administration in 2003 moved into the contentious area of labor relations by issuing a preliminary rule in March to change overtime pay rules that critics said were outdated and confusing. The proposed rule allowed 1.3 million low-income workers who were exempt under existing law from overtime pay to be eligible for such premium compensation. But the Labor Department said that under the rule about 650,000 white-collar workers would lose their eligibility for overtime pay. Opponents said as many as 8 million workers, mostly white-collar professionals such as paralegals, engineers, and dental hygienists, would lose their right to overtime pay.

    Democrats, traditionally sympathetic to the interests of organized labor, moved to block the change. Democratic Rep. David R. Obey of Wisconsin on July 10 offered an amendment to the fiscal 2004 Labor–Health and Human Services (HHS)–Education appropriations bill (HR 2660) that would bar funding to implement the rule. On the roll call on Obey's amendment, Democrats lost only three “no” votes. Meanwhile, fourteen labor-friendly Republicans voted with the Democrats. (Legislative details, p. 574)

    House Republican leaders exerted pressure on wavering members to avoid an embarrassing defeat. GOP leaders noted that the regulations had not been thoroughly updated in more than twenty-five years and that the change would help workers who earned less than $22,100, a majority of whom were women and minorities. The GOP leaders held the vote open for several minutes until they gained a few extra votes for victory. They told undecided lawmakers that the White House had threatened to veto the bill if it included the Obey amendment, thus putting at risk money in the bill for education and medical research. The final vote was 210–213: R 14–210; D 195–3; I 1–0. (Vote, p. 849)

    Lawmakers representing hard-hit manufacturing areas remained upset about the rule. The House Oct. 2 voted 221–203 to instruct its conferees on the Labor-HHS-Education spending conference to accept a Senate amendment that would ban funding to implement the rule. This time twenty-one Republicans voted for the measure, including eight who voted with GOP leadership in July. Ultimately, however, the Senate amendment was removed from the conference report on the bill.

    4. Patriot Act Search Warrants

    The broad antiterrorism law (PL 107-56) enacted in 2001, weeks after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, came under increasing scrutiny in 2003, both on Capitol Hill and across the United States. House and Senate lawmakers from both parties introduced several bills to scale back parts of the law, known as the Patriot Act. The most tangible sign of congressional misgivings about the scope of the act came in July, when the House voted on an amendment to the fiscal 2004 spending bill for the Commerce, Justice, and State departments and the judiciary (HR 2799). (Legislative details, p. 219)

    The amendment, by C. L. “Butch” Otter, R-Idaho, barred the Justice Department from spending fiscal 2004 funds to seek and execute search warrants without first notifying the targets, as allowed under the law. Otter who was one of only three Republicans to vote against the Patriot Act in 2001. The amendment aimed at Section 213 of the law, often called the “sneak and peek” provision. That section allowed judges to give federal agents the power to conduct searches under court order and inform the targets of such searches “within a reasonable period.” Previously, agents were required to tell targets of search warrants either at the beginning of the search or soon thereafter. Critics said the delayed notification was a violation of the Fourth Amendment, which protects people against unreasonable searches and seizures.

    The vote on July 22 was the first taken regarding the Patriot Act since its enactment. Even though most did not expect the amendment to survive conference negotiations, it still allowed lawmakers to record their position on the scope of the law, specifically on one of its most controversial provisions, two years after Sept. 11. Almost all of the chamber's Democrats and roughly half of its Republicans supported the Otter amendment, which the House adopted 309–118: R 113–114; D 195–4; I 1–0. In November, the Commerce, Justice, and State departments bill was folded into an omnibus appropriations measure (HR 2673). During conference negotiations on that bill, Republican congressional leaders removed Otter's language from the Commerce, Justice, and State portion of the bill. (Vote, p. 849)

    5. Head Start Reauthorization

    House Republican leaders tried in early the morning of July 25 to pass a Head Start reauthorization bill that allowed eight states to manage the early childhood development program in tandem with local activities. The leadership won by a single vote but it was a fleeting victory. The hard-fought vote, combined with strong opposition in the Senate, indicated that President Bush's plan for more local control of Head Start would proceed no further in the 108th Congress.

    Bush had proposed restructuring Head Start as part of his February budget, including a plan to turn significant control over to the states. The administration argued that change was critical because low-income children in the program were lagging behind their peers in math and literacy skills when they enter elementary school. House sponsor Michael N. Castle, R-Del., had to rewrite the controversial proposal twice, reducing it to a small pilot program in order to mollify GOP moderates who faced intense pressure from a grassroots coalition of groups that opposed the bill. (Legislative details, p. 000)

    The opposition was led by the National Head Start Association, which represented Head Start workers and parents with children in the program. They were joined by other family advocacy and education groups including the American Civil Liberties Union and Catholic Charities USA. Opponents argued the bill was the first step in converting Head Start into a block grant program that no longer had federal standards. With Democrats united in opposition, the GOP whip operation had a fight on its hands. Slowly, they pulled wavering members back into the fold. To help ensure victory, Majority Leader Tom DeLay, R-Texas, dispatched an aide to get John Sullivan, R-Okla., who was under doctor's orders for bed rest after a car accident damaged his eyesight July 23. Sullivan was pushed into the chamber in a wheelchair shortly before 1 a.m. and helped to stand so he could vote.

    Sullivan's vote—combined with the absences of Democrats Richard A. Gephardt of Missouri, who was seeking his party's nomination for president, and Ed Pastor of Arizona—provided a one-vote victory for the Castle bill. The final tally was 217–216: R 217–12; D 0–203; I 0–1. A more bipartisan Senate bill won approval from the Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee in October. At the insistence of key committee Republicans, the pilot project was left out. (Vote, p. 849)

    6. Drug Reimportation

    Mounting complaints about prescription drug prices put many lawmakers in the uncomfortable position of wanting to address an important consumer issue without imposing price controls. One widely discussed proposal would allow consumers, pharmacists, and drug wholesalers to import drugs from countries where prices often were less than in the United States. In exchange for her support of a House Republican Medicare drug bill (HR 1) that passed by one vote, Rep. Jo Ann Emerson, R-Mo., struck a deal with GOP leaders to hold a vote on a drug importation measure (HR 2427) and give lawmakers an opportunity to demonstrate they were doing something about high drug costs. The vote also allowed bill supporters to align themselves with a growing number of states and localities that are considering importation as a means to curb the costs of public health programs. (Legislative details, p. 508)

    The bill permitted importation of FDA-approved drugs from FDA-approved facilities in twenty-five industrialized countries. It was strenuously opposed by a bipartisan majority of senators and the Bush administration, which said it could bring counterfeit, ineffective, or adulterated medicines into the U.S. that would endanger consumers. An unusual mix of coalitions formed for and against the bill. Conservative Republicans such as Dan Burton of Indiana and Jeff Flake of Arizona sided with many Democrats who said it is not fair for U.S. taxpayers to finance drug research and then pay more than consumers in other countries to buy those drugs. But liberal Democrats, such as John D. Dingell of Michigan and Robert Menendez of New Jersey, the party's conference chairman, joined with the FDA and drug companies to oppose the bill. The FDA maintained it could not verify that imported medicines were safe.

    A variety of factors worked in the bill's favor. Wavering members did not want to go home for the August recess empty-handed on the issue. Many from border states knew constituents and relatives who traveled to Canada or other countries to save on drug expenses. Some Republicans also were miffed that GOP leaders, such as House Majority Leader Tom DeLay, R-Texas, actively worked against the bill after promising Emerson her vote. The showdown came early the morning of July 25. Emerson and allies Gil Gutknecht, R-Minn., and Rahm Emanuel, D-Ill., argued that a vote for the legislation was a vote for consumers and against the drug industry. They prevailed by a wide margin. The bill passed by a vote of 243–186: R 87–141; D 155–45; I 1–0. (Vote, p. 849)

    But just hours later, fifty-three senators signed a letter opposing the bill, repeating concerns it would lead to unsafe drugs. The issue was later addressed in the Medicare drug bill by allowing importation from Canada if the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) said the practice was safe and saved consumers money. Bush's HHS secretary, Tommy G. Thompson, had already said he could not guarantee the safety of imported drugs. The Medicare bill also called for a study on safety and trade issues surrounding importation.

    7. District of Columbia School Vouchers

    Conservatives for many years had advocated using tax dollars to help students escape substandard public education systems by transferring to private schools but only once had Congress passed a measure that would have created vouchers to start such an effort. That bill, limited solely to the District of Columbia, was vetoed by President Bill Clinton in 1998.

    With Republicans controlling the White House and both chambers of Congress, voucher supporters saw 2003 as a new opportunity to enact the first federally funded school voucher program in the country. President Bush's fiscal 2004 budget sought $75 million for voucher pilot programs in several cities. But that broad plan was set aside by his GOP congressional allies, who chose to focus their energies only on a $10 million experiment in Washington. The shift came a month after Anthony Williams, the city's Democrat mayor, said he would back vouchers if equal infusions of money for the city's public and charter schools were provided through the annual appropriations bill for the city. (Legislative details, p. 549)

    The mayor's support allowed Republicans to neutralize the argument that they would be imposing vouchers on an unwilling city, although Democrats continued to point out that many city officials opposed the plan and that the local government could implement a voucher program at any time. Proponents sold vouchers as a means of giving underprivileged children, particularly minorities, the same educational opportunities as their wealthier counterparts. The plan had the backing of Cardinal Theodore E. McCarrick, the Roman Catholic archbishop of Washington. Most of the voucher recipients would be expected to attend Catholic schools.

    Teacher unions, school administrators, most Democrats, and a cadre of moderate Republicans remained adamantly opposed to spending public money on private schools. Some argued that sending tax dollars to religiously affiliated schools would violate the constitutional separation of church and state; others complained that sending public money out of the education system was tantamount to giving up on public schools just when strict and expensive new standards had been put in place by the 2001 education overhaul law.

    Instead of writing voucher provisions into the D.C. spending bill (HR 2765), GOP leaders opted to hold a floor vote on an amendment incorporating the plan into the bill—a move that, if successful, would make clear the House's position in favor of vouchers. Such a vote would be particularly important because of the level of opposition in the Senate, where sixty supporters would be needed to cut off a filibuster.

    On the House floor, the voucher amendment, by Government Reform Chairman Thomas M. Davis III, R-Va.—whose panel has jurisdiction over policies for the nation's capital—appeared headed for defeat the afternoon of Sept. 5. But as was the case on several close votes during the year, at least one Republican flipped from “no” to “yes” in the closing minutes of the roll call, securing a razor-thin 205–203 victory for GOP leaders: R 201–14; D 4–188; I 0–1. (Vote, p. 849)

    A subsequent vote to strip the program died on a tie vote. The next week, Democrats were able to demand a revote on the Davis amendment and it proved just as dramatic. John Linder, R-Ga., had to be retrieved from a party for his sixty-first birthday to cast a tie-breaking vote reaffirming the amendment's adoption. But the initial House vote remained the bellwether moment for the voucher campaign. After maneuvering around a Democratic filibuster in the Senate, the language survived for inclusion in the legislation combining the D.C. measure and six other fiscal 2004 appropriations bills into an omnibus conference report. The House adopted the conference report on the omnibus Dec. 8.

    8. Federal Job Outsourcing

    Declining to back down in the face of a veto threat, the House voted to block White House plans to contract out thousands of federal jobs to private workers. The vote came on an amendment to the fiscal 2004 appropriations bill for the Transportation and Treasury departments. The White House's Office of Management and Budget (OMB) announced May 29 that it was revising the regulation, known as Circular A-76, governing the outsourcing of government work. OMB said the purpose was to encourage federal agencies to expand competitive bidding for more than 800,000 federal jobs. Members made several attempts to scuttle the outsourcing plan, each time meeting with a veto threat. (Legislative details, p. 690)

    An attempt to amend the Interior appropriations bill in July was reduced to a provision blocking studies on privatizing two small projects. In another effort, the House-passed bill to reauthorize the Federal Aviation Administration included a ban on privatizing air traffic controllers. The most direct attack was undertaken by Chris Van Hollen, a freshman Democrat whose Maryland district was home to thousands of federal employees. His amendment to the Transportation-Treasury appropriations bill (HR 2989) specified simply that “none of the funds made available by this act may be used to implement the revision to Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76 made on May 29, 2003.”

    Ernest Istook, R-Okla., chairman of the Appropriations panel that wrote the bill, warned members against supporting the amendment. “If you want to try to kill the bill and all that it does for transportation in the U.S., go ahead and vote,” he said. “This bill is too important for that. If this bill were to be vetoed … bulldozers across the country would stop.” But twenty-six Republicans, most with large constituencies of federal workers in their districts, joined Van Hollen, giving him enough votes to prevail Sept. 9 on a vote of 220–198: R 26–195; D 193–3); I 1–0. (Vote, p. 849)

    Language similar to the Van Hollen amendment was offered on the Transportation-Treasury bill in the Senate but was rejected, 47–48. The amendment was dropped in conference but the fight over limiting the administration's privatization plans was one of the last issues settled in negotiations on the year-end omnibus appropriations package, which included the Transportation-Treasury bill. At White House insistence, most of the privatization language was dropped. However, two significant provisions survived: federal jobs would no longer automatically be considered for privatization every five years, and jobs could not be privatized if those jobs would then be sent overseas.

    9. ‘Do Not Call’ Registry

    In a legislative body not known for quick action, House passage of a bill authorizing the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to create and enforce a do-not-call list for telemarketers was as remarkable as it was sudden. Less than forty-eight hours after a federal judge issued a decision stopping the FTC from launching the registry, the House passed a bill (HR 3161) rescuing the list and lending it explicit statutory authority. (Legislative details, p. 391)

    The FTC list allowed people to register telephone numbers they do not want telemarketers to call. The FTC was authorized to punish violators with fines of $11,000 per call. The program generated widespread interest as soon as the FTC began allowing people to register phone numbers in late June. By September, 50 million phone numbers had already been registered. The service was scheduled to take effect Oct. 1, but several telemarketing companies and industry trade groups opposed it, saying the barrier to calls would violate their free speech rights and eliminate millions of telemarketing jobs. On Sept. 23, a district court judge in Oklahoma answered their concerns, ruling the FTC had overstepped its authority in creating the list.

    The public outcry, swift and loud. resonated with lawmakers across the political spectrum because the idea of banning unwanted phone calls was widely popular across the country. On Sept. 24, the day after the court ruling, Billy Tauzin, R-La., chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, met with aides at noon and ordered them to draw up legislation explicitly authorizing the FTC to launch the registry. Getting the bill to the floor was another matter. House leaders opposed inserting language into a continuing resolution aimed at keeping the government funded after Oct. 1. To draw immediate attention to the issue, Tauzin turned to the news media. He called a 3 p.m. press conference to attack the decision by the Oklahoma court.

    That set off a flurry of press releases and statements from lawmakers expressing outrage at the decision. By 5:30 p.m., House leaders agreed to take up the legislation the following day on the floor. At 6:25 p.m., Tauzin signed off on the legislation, which was handed to him by an aide while he was doing a live interview on CNN. The next day, Sept. 25, the House passed the bill on a vote of 412–8: R 219–5; D 192–3; I 1–0. (Vote, p. 849)

    The Senate followed suit, clearing the measure 95–0 later in the day. However, within minutes after the House passed the bill, a federal judge in Denver put the do-not-call registry again on hold, ruling that it violated the free speech rights of telemarketers because it exempted charitable organizations. Bush signed the bill anyway on Sept. 29, and a federal appeals court ruled Oct. 7 that the FTC could begin enforcing the list while the case was argued.

    10. ‘Partial Birth’ Abortion

    After the 2002 elections, which placed the Senate, House and White House in Republican hands, abortion foes confidently predicted they would soon see enactment of a federal ban on a procedure they called “partial birth” abortion. The House had backed the legislation for some time. In the 104th and 105th Congresses, the House not only had passed legislation outlawing the procedure but then mustered the necessary two-thirds supermajority to override President Clinton's vetoes of the measure. The Senate failed to override those vetoes. In June the House easily passed the legislation (HR 760) by a vote of 282–139 after supporters fended off an amendment to rewrite the bill so it applied only to abortions done after a fetus would be viable outside the womb. (Legislative details, p. 510)

    The House took up the measure again in October, when it considered the conference report on the bill. What made this vote historic was that both opponents and supporters acknowledged the measure would soon become law. In floor speeches and news conferences, lawmakers on both sides of the issue focused more on the court battles to come than on trying to change the outcome on the House floor. The House on Oct. 2 adopted the conference report by a vote of 281–142: R 218–4; D 63–137; I 0–1. (Vote, p. 849)

    With that action, the House sent the conference report to the Senate, which cleared the measure by a vote of 64–34. Although Bush signed the bill into law (PL 108-105) on Nov. 5, several court challenges immediately blocked its enforcement.

    11. Iraqi Reconstruction Loans

    With the U.S. economy faltering and concern about the cost of the Iraq conflict escalating, a number of Democrats and Republicans argued for converting some U.S. military and reconstruction aid to that country into loans. The House became the main battlefield—and the burial ground—for a proposal to turn part of the $18.6 billion in reconstruction aid into loans. President Bush and House Republican leaders led the opposition to the measure, which was defeated in the House. (Legislative details, p. 291)

    While there was support in the Senate for the loan idea, the House showed it would back the president despite bipartisan concerns about the rapidly increasing cost of the war. The House vote strengthened the president's hand as House and Senate negotiators went into conference. And when the House's position ultimately prevailed, it helped secure an even stronger position for Bush to conduct the war. For many members, the political stakes involved in the vote were considerable. Loan supporters said it made no sense to them or their constituents to increase deficit spending when oil-rich Iraq would soon be an economic power, thanks to U.S. help. But Bush insisted on providing all the money as a grant, saying Iraq already faced too much debt. He argued that his efforts to persuade other countries to forgive Iraqi debt would ring hollow if the United States added to Iraq's debt burden.

    To push that view, Bush pressured members, especially Republican loyalists who were leaning in favor of the loan idea, to stay with him. As a result, several House Republicans dropped plans to offer loan amendments to their version of the supplemental (HR 3289) despite grassroots appeal of the idea. Only one loan amendment received Rules Committee permission for a floor vote. That amendment, which came up for a vote Oct. 16, was sponsored by David R. Obey of Wisconsin, ranking Democrat on the Appropriations Committee, and Tom Lantos of California, ranking Democrat on the International Relations Committee. The House rejected it, with many Republicans who had praised the loan idea voting against the amendment under intense pressure from the GOP leadership. The vote was 200–226: R 18–208; D 181–18; I 1–0. (Vote, p. 849)

    The House action also gave Republican senators a chance to vote for the loan idea, assured that the proposal would be dropped in conference. On Oct. 16 eight Republican senators joined forty-two Democrats and one independent in a 51–47 vote to attach a loan amendment to their version of the supplemental (S 1689). But as expected, the House position prevailed in conference.

    12. Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit

    When Congress set aside $400 billion for a Medicare prescription drug bill in the fiscal 2004 budget (H Con Res 95), many lawmakers saw it as an opportunity that could not be passed up. The 2004 elections would make it difficult to put the issue off for another year, and passage of the bill would give President Bush a domestic victory and hand a traditionally Democratic issue to the Republicans. The House and Senate passed differing versions of Medicare drug legislation within hours of each other on June 27. The House passed HR 1 by just one vote, 216–215, while the Senate measure (S 1) had far more bipartisan support and passed by 76–21. (Legislative details, p. 497)

    A conference agreement, reached Nov. 15, after weeks of late-night and weekend meetings, scaled back some of the most contentious proposals urged by conservatives, including one known as “premium support” to require the traditional Medicare program to compete with private health plans on price. Instead, conferees opted for a limited pilot program starting in 2010. An endorsement from the AARP, the nation's largest advocacy group for older Americans, helped send some wavering lawmakers over to the side of the bill's supporters. The measure also included billions of dollars for health care providers in rural areas, money that helped the measure attract bipartisan support from rural states.

    Nevertheless, the outcome was in doubt. With the House voting first on the conference agreement, the result in that chamber would be decisive and free up Senate moderates to vote for the bill. Speaker J. Dennis Hastert, R-Ill., decided to schedule a vote the night of Friday, Nov. 21. Thus began perhaps the most remarkable and controversial—Democrats called it infamous—voting exercise of the 108th Congress, an event that carried on through the night and required many extensions of the time normally allowed for a roll call. As late as that evening, Hastert called the bill's chances only “tenuous.” GOP conservatives were holding firm against the huge new entitlement expansion, and the leadership could count on only about ten defections from the Democratic side—making victory in the narrowly divided House far from assured.

    Rep. Doc Hastings, R-Wash., presiding over the House, finally called for a fifteen-minute vote on the bill at 3 a.m. on Nov. 22. Shortly before 4 a.m., 215 “yes” votes had been recorded and the tally in the “no” column had ticked up to 219. Democrats, however, were concerned that any outward signs of mirth might spur some GOP members to change their votes and erase the fragile lead. By 5 a.m., the board had changed only once more when Rep. Ernest Istook, R-Okla., changed his vote to “yes.” The tally then remained unchanged for nearly an hour, while the Republican whip operation—aided by Bush on the phone and Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy G. Thompson on the floor—continued to press its case. For at least a half hour, Hastert and Thompson flanked conservative Nick Smith, R-Mich., and Bush called him on his cell phone. But Smith, who was retiring after the 108th Congress, refused to change his “no” vote. Rep. Jo Ann Emerson, R-Mo., voted quickly and left the floor to avoid a repeat of the June vote on the House version of the Medicare bill, when leaders persuaded a tearful Emerson to change her vote to “yes” despite her opposition to the portion of the bill that essentially banned the importation of prescription drugs from foreign countries, where they are often cheaper. Emerson later returned to the floor to watch the proceedings but hid behind a banister on the Democratic side to avoid having to discuss her vote with the leadership.

    With the vote stalled at 216–218, Republican Reps. Charles W. “Chip” Pickering Jr. of Mississippi and Barbara Cubin of Wyoming, two conservatives who supported the bill, began to spread word to fellow conservatives that if the measure were not adopted, Democrats would force a House vote on a more moderate version of Medicare legislation. Rep. C. L. “Butch” Otter of Idaho and six other Republicans who voted against the bill gathered in a room off the floor. Pickering told the group that the Democrats would be able to gather 218 signatures on a discharge petition to force their version of a drug bill to the floor. Otter was also being lobbied on his cell phone by the president.

    At 5:51 a.m., Otter switched his vote from no to yes. Then Republican Trent Franks of Arizona did the same. Their decisions put the “yes” votes at 218 and transferred victory from the Democrats to the Republicans. Democrat David Wu of Oregon, who had held back because he did not want to decide the issue, then voted “yes.” When the victory became obvious, others switched sides and the report was adopted two hours and fifty-one minutes after the vote had started. The final tally: 220–215: R 204–25; D 16–189; I 0–1. The bill weathered a filibuster attempt in the Senate and was cleared 54–44 on Nov. 25. Bush signed the measure into law Dec. 8. (Vote, p. 849)

    2003 Senate Brief Descriptions

    1. H J Res 2. Clean Air

    Edwards, D-N.C., amendment to authorize a National Academy of Sciences study of new rules regarding the New Source Review (NSR) section of the Clean Air Act and delay implementation of those rules for six months. Rejected 46–50: R 6–45; D 39–5 (ND 36–0, SD 3–5); I 1–0, Jan. 22, 2003. A “nay” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    2. Estrada Nomination

    Motion to invoke cloture (thus limiting debate) on the motion to proceed to a vote on President Bush's nomination of Mi-guel A. Estrada of Virginia to be a judge for the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Motion rejected 55–44: R 51–0; D 4–43 (ND 1–38, SD 3–5); I 0–1, March 6, 2003. Three-fifths of the total Senate (sixty) is required to invoke cloture. A “yea” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    3. S Con Res 23. Arctic National Wildlife Refugee

    Boxer, D-Calif., amendment to strike language in the concurrent resolution to give procedural protection to legislation authorizing oil drilling in part of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in Alaska. Adopted 52–48: R 8–43; D 43–5 (ND 37–2, SD 6–3); I 1–0, March 19, 2003. A “nay” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    4. S Con Res 23. Tax Cut Limitations

    Breaux, D-La., amendment to reduce tax cuts protected by reconciliation instructions to $350 billion and create a $396 billion Social Security reserve account for use in implementing future legislation to strengthen Social Security. Adopted 51–48: R 3–48; D 47–0 (ND 39–0, SD 8–0); I 1–0, March 25, 2003. A “nay” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    5. S 1. Prescription Drug Benefit

    Passage of the bill to authorize $400 billion over ten years to create a prescription drug benefit for Medicare recipients beginning in 2006. Passed 76–21: R 40–10; D 35–11 (ND 29–8, SD 6–3); I 1–0, June 27, 2003 (in the session that began and the Congressional Record dated June 26, 2003).

    6. Hr 2660. Overtime Pay Regulations

    Harkin, D-Iowa, amendment to prohibit funds in the bill from being used to promulgate or implement any regulation that would take away eligibility for overtime for any worker. Adopted 54–45: R 6–44; D 47–1 (ND 39–0, SD 8–1); I 1–0, Sept. 10, 2003. A “nay” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    7. S J Res 17. Media Ownership Rule

    Passage of the joint resolution to provide for congressional disapproval of the Federal Communications Commission broadcast media ownership rule that would allow media conglomerates to own more television stations, stating the rule would have no force or effect. Passed 55–40: R 12–38; D 42–2 (ND 37–0, SD 5–2); I 1–0, Sept. 16, 2003. A “nay” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    8. S 1689. Iraq Reconstruction Loans

    Bayh, D-Ind., amendment to provide $10.3 billion as a grant to rebuild Iraq and structure an additional $10 billion as a loan that would be converted to a grant if 90 percent of all bilateral debt incurred by the former Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein has been forgiven by other countries. Adopted 51–47: R 8–43; D 42–4 (ND 34–3, SD 8–1); I 1–0, Oct. 16, 2003. A “nay” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    9. S 3. “Partial Birth” Abortion Ban

    Adoption of the conference report on the bill to ban a medical procedure opponents called “partial birth” abortion. The procedure would be allowed only if it is necessary to save a woman's life. Those who unlawfully performed the procedure would face fines and up to two years in prison. Adopted (thus cleared for the president) 64–34: R 47–3; D 17–30 (ND 11–28, SD 6–2); I 0–1, Oct. 21, 2003. A “yea” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    10. S 1751. Class Action Lawsuits

    Motion to invoke cloture (thus limiting debate) on the motion to proceed to the bill to overhaul class action litigation rules by allowing class actions with at least 100 plaintiffs to be removed to federal courts from state courts when at least $5 million was at stake and when fewer than two-thirds of class members, as well as the primary defendants, were citizens of the state in which the case was filed. Motion rejected 59–39: R 50–1; D 8–38 (ND 6–32, SD 2–6); I 1–0, Oct. 22, 2003. Three-fifths of the total Senate (sixty) was required to invoke cloture.

    11. Hr 2989. Cuba Travel Ban

    Stevens, R-Alaska, motion to table (kill) the Dorgan, D-N.D., amendment to prohibit any funds in the bill from being used to enforce a ban on U.S. citizens traveling to Cuba. Motion rejected 36–59: R 30–19; D 6–39 (ND 4–33, SD 2–6); I 0–1, Oct. 23, 2003. A “yea” was a vote in support of the president's position. Subsequently, the amendment was adopted by voice vote.

    12. Hr 1904. Forest Thinning/Passage

    Passage of the bill to authorize $760 million for thinning dense forests on up to 20 million acres of federal land at high risk of catastrophic wildfire. The legislation limited preliminary court injunctions against logging projects to sixty days, subject to renewal once the court had reviewed them; required federal agencies to fully maintain or contribute to the restoration of old-growth trees; and reduced the number of reviews required by the National Environmental Policy Act. Passed 80–14: R 50–0; D 30–13 (ND 23–13, SD 7–0); I 0–1, Oct. 30, 2003. A “yea” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    13. Hr 2115. Faa Reauthorization

    Motion to invoke cloture (thus limiting debate) on the conference report on the bill to reauthorize the Federal Aviation Administration for fiscal 2004–2007. The legislation authorized $62 billion over four years for aviation programs and extended for the same period the requirement that all revenue credited to the Aviation Trust Fund each year must be spent on aviation programs. Motion rejected 45–43: R 42–3; D 3–39 (ND 2–33, SD 1–6); I 0–1, Nov. 17, 2003. Three-fifths of the total Senate (sixty) was required to invoke cloture.

    14. Hr 6. Energy Policy

    Motion to invoke cloture (thus limiting debate) on the conference report on the bill to implement a comprehensive national policy for energy conservation, research, and development. The legislation authorized $25.7 billion in tax breaks over ten years and authorized $18 billion in loan guarantees for a natural gas pipeline from Alaska. Ethanol producers were required to more than double output by 2012. Makers of the gasoline additive MTBE were protected from liability but had to cease production of the additive by 2015. The legislation also imposed reliability standards for electricity transmission networks and eased restrictions on utility ownership and mergers. Motion rejected 57–40: R 44–7; D 13–32 (ND 8–30, SD 5–2); I 0–1, Nov. 21, 2003. Three-fifths of the total Senate (sixty) was required to invoke cloture. A “yea” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    2003 House Brief Descriptions

    1. H Con Res 95. Fiscal 2004 Budget Resolution

    Adoption of the concurrent resolution to set broad spending and revenue targets for the following ten years including: $1.3 trillion in tax cuts; $265 billion in mandatory spending reductions; $775.4 billion in discretionary spending for fiscal 2004; a reduction of 1 percent from the existing level in discretionary funding unrelated to defense and homeland security; a $400 billion, ten-year reserve fund for Medicare overhaul; and a prescription drug benefit. Adopted 215–212: R 214–12; D 1–199 (ND 0–145, SD 1–54); I 0–1, March 21, 2003 (in the session that began and the Congressional Record dated March 20, 2003).

    2. Hr 2. Tax Reductions

    Adoption of the conference report on the bill to provide $350 billion in tax reductions over eleven years, including: $20 billion in state aid that consisted of $10 billion for Medicaid and $10 billion to be used at states' discretion; a new top tax rate of 15 percent on capital gains and dividends through 2008 (5 percent for lower-income taxpayers through 2007 and no tax in 2008); acceleration of income tax cuts enacted in 2001 and scheduled to take effect in 2006; an increase in the child tax credit to $1,000 through 2004, establishing the standard deduction for married couples at a level double that for a single filer through 2004; and business tax breaks increasing the deduction that small businesses may take on investments to $100,000 through 2005. Adopted 231–200: R 224–1; D 7–198 (ND 1–147, SD 6–51); I 0–1, May 23, 2003 (in the session that began and the Congressional Record dated May 22, 2003). A “yea” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    3. Hr 2660. Overtime Pay

    Obey, D-Wis., amendment to block the use of funds for the Labor Department to implement a department proposal to allow employers to more easily reclassify some workers as “executive, administrative or professional employees,” exempt from overtime pay. Rejected 210–213: R 14–210; D 195–3 (ND 141–1, SD 54–2); I 1–0, July 10, 2003. A “nay” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    4. Hr 2799. Patriot Act Search Warrants

    Otter, R-Idaho, amendment to bar the use of funds to implement a provision of the 2001 antiterrorism act that allowed the government to delay giving notice to an individual that a search warrant had been obtained to search that person's premises. Adopted 309–118: R 113–114; D 195–4 (ND 143–2, SD 52–2); I 1–0, July 22, 2003.

    5. Hr 2210. Head Start Reauthorization

    Passage of the bill to reauthorize the Head Start program through fiscal 2008 including $6.9 billion in fiscal 2004, establish a pilot program to allow eight states to coordinate their state preschool programs with Head Start centers, and allow religious organizations operating Head Start programs to consider religion as a factor in hiring teachers. Passed 217–216: R 217–12; D 0–203 (ND 0–146, SD 0–57); I 0–1, July 25, 2003 (in the session that began and the Congressional Record dated July 24, 2003). A “yea” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    6. Hr 2427. Importation of Prescription Drugs

    Passage of the bill to require the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to establish a program for the importation of FDA-approved prescription drugs from FDA-approved facilities in twenty-five countries. Passed 243–186: R 87–141; D 155–45 (ND 115–30, SD 40–15); I 1–0, July 25, 2003 (in the session that began and the Congressional Record dated July 24, 2003). A “nay” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    7. Hr 2765. District of Columbia School Vouchers

    Tom Davis, R-Va., amendment to authorize a school voucher program in the District of Columbia making students who were residents of the District and whose family income was under 185 percent of the federal poverty level eligible for up to $7,500 in funds to attend a private elementary or high school in the District. Adopted 205–203: R 201–14; D 4–188 (ND 1–136, SD 3–52); I 0–1, Sept. 5, 2003.

    8. Hr 2989. Federal Job Outsourcing

    Van Hollen, D-Md., amendment to prohibit funds in the Transportation and Treasury appropriations bill from being used to implement an Office of Management and Budget rule allowing an agency to determine whether tasks performed by federal workers should be contracted to private companies. Adopted 220–198: R 26–195; D 193–3 (ND 138–1, SD 55–2); I 1–0, Sept. 9, 2003. A “nay” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    9. Hr 3161. “Do Not Call” Registry

    Passage of the bill to give the Federal Trade Commission explicit authority to create a “do not call” list, begin enforcing it Oct. 1, 2003, and impose fines on violators. Passed 412–8: R 219–5; D 192–3 (ND 140–2, SD 52–1); I 1–0, Sept. 25, 2003.

    10. S 3. “Partial Birth” Abortion Ban Report

    Adoption of the conference report on the bill to ban a medical procedure opponents referred to as “partial birth” abortion, allowing the procedure only when it was necessary to save a woman's life, and imposing fines and up to two years in prison. Adopted 281–142: R 218–4; D 63–137 (ND 32–111, SD 31–26); I 0–1, Oct. 2, 2003. A “yea” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    11. Hr 3289. Iraqi Reconstruction Loans

    Obey, D-Wis., amendment to require half of all reconstruction aid to Iraq to be in the form of loans. Rejected 200–226: R 18–208; D 181–18 (ND 129–15, SD 52–3); I 1–0, Oct. 16, 2003. A “nay” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    12. Hr 1. Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit

    Adoption of the conference report on the bill to create a prescription drug benefit for Medicare recipients beginning in 2006 and make structural changes to the program allowing beneficiaries to obtain coverage through traditional Medicare or a private health plan. Adopted 220–215: R 204–25; D 16–189 (ND 5–143, SD 11–46); I 0–1, Nov. 22, 2003 (in the session that began and the Congressional Record dated Nov. 21, 2003). A “yea” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    2004 Key Votes
    Senate

    1. Surface Transportation Spending

    An election-year debate over federal highway and public transit spending demonstrated how local political interests often trump party alliances. In a rare affront to President George W. Bush, Senate Republicans voted by a 2-to-1 margin in February 2004 to return a generous amount of federal transportation dollars to the states despite administration entreaties to hold to a much harder line on spending.

    The degree of overwhelming bipartisan support for the highway measure (S 1072) appeared more than sufficient to override a threatened presidential veto. But it never came to that; nettlesome policy disputes with the House meant the president never had to even consider a veto. That was because the $256 billion administration proposal sent to Capitol Hill in early February was not going to pass in any event. Politically influential states in the fast-growing South and Southwest—including Florida, South Carolina, Texas, Arizona, and Nevada—were developing a voracious appetite for transportation funds and wanted at least 95 cents back from each gasoline tax dollar they send to Washington. Currently, they got a minimum of 90.5 cents to the dollar. (Legislative details, p. 387)

    But under the White House plan these “donor” states would get more money only if billions of dollars were shifted away from a number of Northeastern and northern Plains states that already used more highway dollars than they put into the Highway Trust Fund. Although typically seen as a solid Republican fiscal conservative, James M. Inhofe of Oklahoma, the chairman of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, sided with prohighway spenders, saying more infrastructure financing paid important dividends later because it boosted safety, created jobs, and helped the economy stay strong. Bush administration officials said they did not disagree with Inhofe's premise but argued the federal budget deficit and a still tentative economy meant that the transportation bill had to meet three tests to win enactment: it could not increase the deficit; it could not raise taxes, including the federal excise tax on gasoline; and it could not use borrowing.

    Supporting the administration in the Senate was a small group of fiscal conservatives including Oklahoma's other senator, Republican Budget Chairman Don Nickles. But the fiscal conservatives were in the minority. Majority Leader Bill Frist, R-Tenn., sympathetic to the arguments of the dissenters but anxious to get a bill passed, brought the measure to a vote the evening of Feb. 12. It passed by a lopsided 76–21; R 34–17; D 41–4; I 1–0. By the end of the year, however, the Senate's fiscal conservatives got their way when the legislation stalled in a House-Senate conference committee; lawmakers could not find a way to overcome the White House objections over the spending level or the concerns of lawmakers from the donor states. (Vote, p. 864)

    2. Medical Malpractice Liability

    Bill Frist of Tennessee, a heart and lung transplant surgeon for most of his professional life, wanted to make improving the health care system the signature achievement of his first term as the Senate's Republican majority leader. After shepherding the creation of a Medicare prescription drug benefit into law (PL 108-173) in 2003, he made limitations on medical malpractice liability his top health care priority for 2004. (Legislative details, p. 517)

    But Frist's campaign went nowhere, even after he narrowed his objective to shielding some of the most politically sympathetic medical specialists—obstetricians, gynecologists, and nurse midwives—from multimillion-dollar punitive damages and framed his campaign as an effort to improve medical care for women. Despite Frist's efforts, the bill stalled mostly on party lines.

    Frist sought to cap noneconomic damage awards in all medical malpractice lawsuits at $250,000, arguing that would achieve two objectives: help slow increases in doctors' insurance premiums, which have driven some of them into early retirement, and hold down health costs by limiting the practice of “defensive medicine” that involved ordering tests or procedures with marginal benefit because of the fear of future lawsuits. The House passed a comprehensive bill shielding all doctors in 2003; it came to a halt in the Senate when Frist's bid to limit debate on that narrow bill (S 2061) came up a dozen votes short of the sixty required for invoking cloture. The vote was 48–45: R 47–3; D 1–41; I 0–1. Only one Democrat, Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia, stood with him, while three Republicans went against him: Michael D. Crapo of Idaho, Richard C. Shelby of Alabama, and Lindsey Graham of South Carolina. (Vote, p. 864)

    After his narrow proposal stalled, Frist sought to revive his campaign one more time by pressing a bill (S 2207) that would have limited punitive damages against emergency room doctors and trauma center personnel as well as obstetricians and gynecologists. But that legislation died in April as another cloture vote once again came up far short of success. That vote was 49–48.

    3. Extension of Assault Weapons Ban

    Gun rights advocates believed they were in position to win at least one significant success in Congress during the year. Their primary goal was enactment of legislation to bar, with some exceptions, lawsuits against the manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and importers of firearms and ammunition. The purpose was to limit attempts at making the gun industry financially liable for the consequences of gun violence—cases that usually failed but nevertheless required defendants to spend large sums on legal expenses.

    The House passed its version of the legislation (HR 1036) with ease in April 2003. As the Republican leaders prepared to put the companion measure (S 1805) on the Senate floor eleven months later, the National Rifle Association (NRA) pressed its senatorial allies to vote against a series of expected “killer” amendments. The White House, for its part, issued a statement of administration policy encouraging the Senate to pass the bill essentially untouched. (Legislative details, p. 615)

    But that effort failed almost from the outset. On the first amendment offered, senators voted overwhelmingly to buck the gun lobby's wishes and require the sale of a child safety lock with every handgun transaction. When the debate resumed March 2, the Senate delivered the final blow to the bill, voting to renew prohibitions against a collection of semiautomatic assault weapons that was enacted in 1994 but due to expire in six months. The vote to add the assault weapons ban to the bill was 52–47: R 10–41; D 41–6; I 1–0. (Vote, p. 864)

    Gun control advocates were able to build support for the amendment, eventually winning the votes of ten Republicans, by capitalizing on the electorate's heightened concerns about terrorism in an election year. But even a few hours before the vote, the proposal's principal sponsors—Democrats Dianne Feinstein of California and Charles E. Schumer of New York—predicted they would not prevail. Mindful that the vote would be close, they worked to ensure that everyone in their caucus was on hand—including John Kerry of Massachusetts, who by then had all-but-formally secured his party's presidential nomination, and John Edwards of North Carolina, the eventual vice-presidential nominee, who abandoned his presidential bid later that night after a final series of primary and caucus losses.

    On two fronts, the ballot was a high-water mark in the 108th Congress for the advocates of gun control—and their first substantive legislative success at the Capitol in five years. Soon after the language was added, the sponsors of the underlying bill turned against the measure and engineered its defeat.

    4. ‘Pay as You Go’ Budget Rules

    From the beginning of 2004 top Republicans warned that a fiscal 2005 budget resolution might never be finished, in large part because of disagreements between the party's moderates and conservatives over tax policy. In an election year when the Congressional Budget Office at the start of the year was projecting a record federal deficit of $477 billion, the stage was set for a particularly bumpy budget debate. (Legislative details, p. 61)

    Senate GOP leaders said that President Bush's most ambitious tax cut plans had no chance until he won a second term. Instead, leaders sought to focus their efforts on extending a trio of popular tax breaks set to expire at the end of 2004—a $1,000 per child tax credit, an expanded 10 percent tax bracket, and tax relief for married couples. Senate Budget Chairman Don Nickles, R-Okla., proposed a budget blueprint (S Con Res 95) that would have provided procedural “reconciliation” protections for $82.6 billion in tax cuts, enough to cover extending those three breaks and little more.

    Even this modest plan met with skepticism from several GOP moderates and deficit hawks who said that the deepening deficit would make it difficult for them to support the proposal. Instead, the moderates lined up behind an amendment by Wisconsin Democrat Russell D. Feingold to reinstate pay-as-you-go language requiring that any new tax cuts or new entitlement spending program be offset by accompanying tax increases or spending cuts—or face being struck down on the Senate floor, at least during the five-year period covered by the budget resolution, by a point of order that could be overcome only with the support of sixty or more senators. Nickles's included a less-stringent version of the pay-as-you-go requirement in his budget resolution. It required that new entitlement spending be offset unless sixty senators in effect voted otherwise. It did not subjected the tax cuts called for within the budget blueprint to the same rule.

    But that was not enough to win over fellow Republicans Olympia J. Snowe and Susan Collins of Maine, Lincoln Chafee of Rhode Island, and John McCain of Arizona. When the Senate voted on the Feingold amendment March 10, those four joined forty-six Democrats and Independent James M. Jeffords of Vermont in voting for it. In a defeat that momentarily stunned GOP leaders, the amendment was adopted, 51–48: R 4–47; D 46–1; I 1–0. Zell Miller of Georgia was the only Democrat to vote against it. (Vote, p. 864)

    The vote sealed the fiscal policy impasse for the year. For only the third time in the three decades of modern budget law, no annual congressional budget resolution was adopted by Congress in 2004. House conservatives made clear they were adamantly opposed to placing any restrictions on tax cuts in a compromise budget document. Weeks of tortured conference negotiations followed before Senate and House GOP leaders settled on a one-year budget deal that would exempt the three proposed tax cut extensions from pay-as-you-go rules. When all four of the pivotal Senate GOP moderates spurned that language as well, the talks collapsed.

    5. Criminalization of Harm to a Fetus

    Social conservatives in Congress had tried without success since 1999 to create a new category of crimes against a fetus. Proponents described the effort as a law-and-order campaign but opponents of abortion rights quietly hoped that their cause would be strengthened if the fetus were recognized under federal law as an entity distinct from the pregnant woman. The House passed such a bill twice by comfortable margins, in 1999 and 2001, but the Senate never took up the legislation. The cause gained momentum in April 2003 when the bodies of Laci Peterson and the fetus she had carried nearly to term washed ashore near San Francisco. Peterson's husband, Scott, was eventually charged under state law with two counts of murder because California is one of thirty states with fetal homicide laws.

    The extensive coverage of the case made a federal version of such a law politically attractive but timing was an issue. Because other pressing items were on their agenda in 2003—including the enactment of the law (PL 108-105) that criminalized a procedure described as “partial birth” abortion—social conservatives decided to wait until the election year. The House passed the legislation (HR 1997) Feb. 26, 2004, with 254 votes, essentially the same number that had backed the measure in the House the previous two times. (Legislative details, p. 513)

    Some abortion rights advocates wanted an aggressive effort to again stop the bill in the Senate. However, mindful that the Peterson case was giving support for the measure, Democrats who generally aligned themselves with abortion rights decided they did not want to erect too many procedural roadblocks. After just one day of substantive debate the Senate March 25 cleared the legislation by a comfortable margin, 61–38: R 48–2; D 13–35; I 0–1. (Vote, p. 864)

    Only two abortion rights Republicans, Lincoln Chafee of Rhode Island and Olympia J. Snowe of Maine, voted against the bill. Democrats joined them by a ratio of 2-to-1; among those voting “no” were John Kerry of Massachusetts and John Edwards of North Carolina, who later in the year became the party's national ticket. Among the thirteen Democrats voting for it, however, where Minority Leader Tom Daschle of South Dakota and Minority Whip Harry Reid of Nevada.

    The bill defined an “unborn child” as “a member of the species homo sapiens, at any stage of development, who is carried in the womb.” Opponents said that was a clear attempt to lay the legal groundwork for neutralizing Roe v. Wade, the 1973 Supreme Court decision that legalized abortion. In that landmark case, Supreme Court Justice Harry A. Blackmun, writing for the majority, concluded that “the unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense” and that the court was not ruling on “the difficult question of when life begins.”

    6. Child Care for Welfare Recipients

    Eight years after the enactment of the legislation revising federal welfare programs, lawmakers continue to argue over the proper formula to assist the nation's remaining 2 million welfare families escape poverty. They reached no resolution in 2004 but a lopsided Senate vote in March reflected the balancing of “carrots” and “sticks” that was needed to get a welfare policy rewrite through the Republican-run Congress. Most lawmakers characterized the 1996 law (PL 104-193) as a success. That legislation ended more than sixty years of guaranteed cash assistance for recipients and ushered in new work requirements and a five-year limit on benefits. Caseloads fell by more than half after enactment, although some skeptics of the law believed the decline had as much to do with prosperous economic times during that decade as with the changes in the welfare system.

    President Bush and his congressional GOP allies argued that work was the most important ingredient to help people move from a handout to a paycheck. This view was reflected in the version of the welfare reauthorization (HR 4) passed by the House in 2003; it increased the work requirement for adult participants to a full forty hours a week, up from thirty hours in existing law. The House measure also contained $1 billion in additional child care funding and a $200 million White House initiative to promote healthy marriages to the poor. (Legislative details, p. 525)

    But in the Senate, Democrats and some moderate Republicans contended that increasing the length of the required workweek by one-third would hamper the ability of welfare recipients to keep in order other aspects of their lives such as child care, transportation, and education that were considered essential to employment. Finance Committee Chairman Charles E. Grassley, R-Iowa, who believe that a forty-hour workweek requirement could not pass the Senate, moved a bill through his panel that raised the threshold to thirty-four hours.

    To win committee approval, Grassley promised moderate Republican Olympia J. Snowe of Maine that she could offer an first amendment to provide $6 billion in additional mandatory child care funding over the next five years. Snowe maintained that current spending was only enough to serve one in seven families eligible for that type of assistance. The White House opposed Snowe's proposal on the ground that the extra money could go not to welfare families but to families who had left the welfare rolls but continued to have incomes low enough to make them eligible for the subsidies. The Senate, however, sided overwhelmingly with Snowe. Her amendment was adopted 78–20: R 31–19; D 46–1; I 1–0. (Vote, p. 864)

    Three out of every five Republicans from across the GOP ideological spectrum broke with the White House and voted for the language, including Grassley, Majority Leader Bill Frist of Tennessee, and nearly all Republicans facing tough reelection campaigns. Grassley hoped the Snowe amendment would be the sweetener to win Democrats' support for the underlying bill. But Democrats refused to allow a final vote unless they were given an opportunity to vote on an amendment to raise the minimum wage. When GOP leaders rebuffed that request, the bill fell into limbo for the rest of the year.

    7. Overtime Regulations

    Supporters of a Bush administration plan to change overtime pay rules for millions of workers were aware that they faced a heated battle in Congress. The White House had been on the defensive on the issue since March 2003 when it first proposed a comprehensive rewrite of overtime pay rules, including a reordering of the job descriptions that would be eligible for premium pay. It was the first overhaul of the overtime provisions in the Fair Labor Standards Act in more than fifty years. That law established the forty-hour workweek. (Legislative details, p. 574)

    Senate Democrats were aided by the support of a few Republicans sympathetic to labor unions to hand the Bush administration a politically embarrassing defeat on the workplace issue in May. The victory was short-lived. Congress later allowed the new regulations to take effect but the effort to highlight the issue was helpful to the Democrats in several ways. Sen. John Kerry of Massachusetts, the party's presidential nominee, was able to use it to solidify his support among labor union members and to portray President Bush as insensitive to the concerns of working Americans. The party's Senate candidates also were given ammunition for attacking Republicans from high-unemployment states.

    It was also the second time in six months that Democrats won a Senate vote on the issue but were unable to alter the underlying policy. In September 2003 senators voted to block implementation of any Labor Department rule that would take away existing overtime eligibility from any worker. But that language—which had been added to the fiscal 2004 spending package for the department—was dropped at the last minute at the insistence of the White House.

    Sensing congressional uneasiness, the Labor Department revised its proposed regulations in April, declaring that more workers would retain overtime eligibility than would have under the initial rules. But the alterations did not satisfy the labor unions. They claimed that the altered rule would take overtime eligibility away from as many as 6 million workers—a figure the administration said was wildly exaggerated. As a condition of allowing a rewrite of the corporate tax code (S 1637) to move through the Senate, Democrats won the right to offer an amendment, by Iowa's Tom Harkin, nearly identical to the one adopted the previous fall.

    Fearing a vote against the president, Republican leaders offered a competing amendment. Judd Gregg of New Hampshire, chairman of the Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee, said his proposal would protect overtime pay eligibility for employees in fifty-five professions who were not expressly protected in the final rule. The Gregg amendment was meant to siphon the support of the six Republicans who voted for the Harkin amendment in 2003—and, in fact, it was adopted without a single dissenting vote. But senators nonetheless voted on May 4 to adopt Harkin's amendment as well. The vote was 52–47: R 5–46; D 46–1; I 1–0. (Vote, p. 864)

    Republicans Lisa Murkowski of Alaska, Ben Nighthorse Campbell of Colorado, Lincoln Chafee of Rhode Island, Olympia J. Snowe of Maine, and Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania crossed party lines to vote with all the Democrats except Zell Miller of Georgia. Senate Appropriations Chairman Ted Stevens of Alaska was the only Republican who voted with Harkin in 2003 but returned to the GOP fold this year. Conferees later dropped the language from the final version of the corporate tax bill and the overtime rules took effect Aug. 23.

    8. Base Closure Delay

    Congress agreed in 2001 to President Bush's request for another round of military base closings and realignments but only if the changes were delayed until 2005, thereby requiring Bush to win reelection if he wanted to control the process. In the intervening period a group of lawmakers from both parties fought doggedly to modify or delay the process further. But their campaign began to collapse after they narrowly lost a pivotal Senate vote in the spring. As happened four other times since the process was created in 1988, the commissions would review a Pentagon plan for proposed closures and draw up a final list, which would take effect unless Congress voted to reject it entirety. That never happened with previous base closing plans.

    Opposition to additional base closures was generally been stronger in the House where many lawmakers stand for reelection every two years in districts with economies dominated by the presence of military installations. But because plenty of senators, in both parties, had similar concerns the Senate, votes on the topic were close and the debates heated. In the House, the Armed Services Committee wrote a fiscal 2005 defense authorization bill in May that delayed all base closings for two years, until 2007. The next week, the Senate was called on to decide whether to go along with the House or side with the president, who was insisting on proceeding with base closures in 2005. By the narrowest of margins, they sided with Bush.

    The vote came May 18 on an amendment to the Senate's defense authorization bill (S 2400) by Trent Lott, R-Miss. It limited the 2005 round to U.S. overseas bases and permitted no domestic closures before 2007, and then only under a new series of requirements. In a vote during which partisanship was replaced almost entirely by parochialism the amendment was rejected, 47–49: R 21–29; D 26–19; I 0–1. (Vote, p. 864)

    The following day the White House threatened to veto any defense authorization bill that delayed or blocked the 2005 round. The House emphatically ignored that warning however, when 259 lawmakers voted against an amendment that would have scratched the delaying language from the defense authorization bill and kept the base closing schedule on course. The Senate considered its defense bill off and on for another five weeks before passing it June 23 but no further effort was made to challenge the 2005 base closures.

    9. Class Action Lawsuits

    Republicans lost their best chance to enact business-backed legislation to overhaul the civil litigation system when a cloture vote that would have sped passage of the bill (S 2062) failed. The vote was the pivotal test of each party's ability to use Senate rules to advance its election-year legislative agenda. By stalling the bill the minority Democrats demonstrated that they would not be steamrolled, even though many of them supported the bill, and the majority Republicans subsequently arranged for the Democrats to offer some of their amendments as a price for moving high-profile legislation. The bill would have shifted more class action lawsuits from state to federal courts, which advocates said would reduce the number of suits moved to jurisdictions where large financial judgments were commonplace. (Legislative details, p. 608)

    By the time the measure reached the Senate floor it had the support of all fifty-one Republicans and a dozen Democrats, together more than enough senators to invoke cloture and limit debate. But the bill's wide support made it attractive for unrelated amendments as the legislative year neared conclusion. Majority Leader Bill Frist, R-Tenn., insisted that adding provisions that were not germane to the bill would consume too much of the Senate's limited time and make it more difficult to push the bill through a conference with the House. Minority Leader Tom Daschle, D-S.D., saw matters entirely differently. He and other Democrats wanted to use the debate on the bill to highlight their election-year priorities, proposing amendments to raise the minimum wage, extend federal unemployment insurance, and block administration-backed Labor Department rules on overtime pay.

    Rather than permit votes on the Democratic amendments, Frist used his prerogative as majority leader to “fill the amendment tree, “which meant introducing enough amendments of his own to preclude any others from being offered. The maneuver drew protests from some Republicans as well as the Democrats. Frist's last hope was a motion to invoke cloture, thereby limiting the debate to amendments germane to civil litigation. Frist pulled the bill off the floor altogether when his cloture motion fell sixteen votes short of the supermajority required. The vote was 44–43: R 42–3; D 2–39; I 0–1. (Vote, p. 864)

    Ten of the twelve Democratic supporters of the bill stuck with their party leader on this test of wills: Evan Bayh of Indiana, Jeff Bingaman of New Mexico, Maria Cantwell of Washington, Thomas R. Carper of Delaware, Christopher J. Dodd of Connecticut, Dianne Feinstein of California, Herb Kohl of Wisconsin, Mary L. Landrieu of Louisiana, Blanche Lincoln of Arkansas, and Charles E. Schumer of New York. The only Democrats who broke with Daschle were Ben Nelson of Nebraska and the perpetually iconoclastic Zell Miller of Georgia. At the same time, three Republicans who wanted to amend the bill with election-year priorities of their own broke with Frist: Larry E. Craig of Idaho, Richard C. Shelby of Alabama, and John McCain of Arizona.

    10. Gay Marriage Prohibition

    A pair of judicial rulings in 2003 convinced social conservatives that the Supreme Court would overturn a 1996 statute (PL 104-199) that defined marriage under federal law as “the union of a man and a woman.” Their efforts to make gay marriage a defining political issues led to Senate and House votes on a constitutional amendment to prohibit marriage of homosexual couples, the first taken by Congress. But the initial test vote on the proposal, in the Senate in July, showed that the conservatives were far short of the support they need to get approval of an amendment.

    In June 2003 the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a Texas law outlawing sodomy. Five months later the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that gay people had the same right to be married under that state's constitution as straight people. The rulings revived what had been a moribund campaign to make the definition of marriage part of the Constitution. Under strong pressure from social conservatives to make the issue a defining election-year theme Republican leaders agreed to put it at the top of the crowded summertime legislative agenda.

    On July 12, shortly before the opening of the Democratic National Convention in Boston, Majority Leader Bill Frist, R-Tenn., tried to call up a resolution (S J Res 40) by Wayne Allard, R-Colo., proposing a constitutional amendment defining marriage as the union of a man and a woman and specifying that neither the U.S. Constitution nor any state constitution sanctions marriages that do not comply with that definition. (Legislative details, p. 613)

    Supporters cast themselves as defenders of marriage—and, by extension, allies of children and families—not as opponents of gay rights. They argued that without a constitutional amendment judges would legalize gay marriage everywhere. Opponents said the institution of marriage was not threatened, that the Constitution was the wrong place to have the debate over the definition of marriage, and that the debate was an unnecessary diversion from more immediate domestic and foreign policy matters.

    When Republicans could not agree among themselves on the ideal language, Frist proposed votes on two versions: the one by Allard and another without the language barring judges from ruling that gays have the right to marry. When Democrats resisted, Frist moved to invoke cloture limiting debate on his motion to consider the measure. The debate was set aside after his motion was rejected, 48–50: R 45–6; D 3–43; I 0–1. (Vote, p. 864)

    The forty-eight votes were a dozen short of the sixty needed to overcome a filibuster and nineteen short of the two-thirds majority needed to approve a constitutional amendment for the states to consider. Six moderate Republicans voted against Frist; only three Democrats voted with him. The two missing senators were the party's 2004 national ticket: John Kerry of Massachusetts and John Edwards of North Carolina. In September the House fell forty-nine votes short of adopting a companion resolution.

    11. Privatization of Federal Jobs

    One of President Bush's few policies that ran into significant opposition from his party in Congress was his proposal to turn over to private enterprise more work now performed by federal employees. When Republicans with large numbers of government workers as constituents once again sided with Democrats to oppose such privatization, the administration quietly backed away from one narrow but symbolically important aspect of its plan.

    In December 2003 the Homeland Security Department set in motion a competition that could have led to the privatization of more than 1,100 immigration services jobs, a relatively small slice of the estimated 23,000 positions that the administration was considering for privatization at the time. Before long, though, the struggle between the employees of the department's Citizenship and Immigration Services bureau and the companies that might bid for their jobs spilled over into debate on the fiscal 2005 Homeland Security funding measure (HR 4567). In June the House voted by a wide margin, 242–163, to adopt an amendment to the bill preventing the department from carrying out its plans to contract-out the jobs. Some of the forty-nine Republicans in the majority had immigration services workers as constituents; others represented districts where labor unions were a potent political force. (Legislative details, p. 690)

    The Office of Management and Budget warned the Senate against following the House lead, saying the president's advisers would recommend he veto the spending bill if it restricted the administration's competitive sourcing efforts, which it said could save $1 billion over time. But Patrick J. Leahy, D-Vt., argued that the work, which included citizenship application processing, was too sensitive to be left to the private sector. He offered an amendment later that day similar to the House language that the Senate narrowly adopted 49–47: R 5–46; D 43–1; I 1–0. (Vote, p. 864)

    With the support of Pennsylvania's Arlen Specter, one of the most prolabor Republicans in the Senate, the language was retained in the conference agreement on the bill. But, almost simultaneously, Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge had a letter delivered to the conferees announcing that he was canceling the jobs competition on his own authority, making the Bush veto threat moot. The president signed the bill (PL 108-334) on Oct. 18.

    12. Extending Middle-Class Tax Cuts

    Republicans began 2004 committed to extending many of the tax breaks recently enacted as part of a package protected under special budgetary rules limiting Senate debate. Members in both parties wanted those tax cut extensions scaled back in order to reduce their cost to the government. These so-called deficit hawks were more concerned about limiting the rapidly widening gap between federal revenues and expenditures. But some of the Bush tax cuts enjoyed a broad appeal in Congress despite a record federal budget deficit. A lopsided Senate vote in September demonstrated conclusively the attraction of voting for lower taxes in an election year.

    But hopes for significant tax cuts collapsed when the annual budget resolution died early in the year over disputes about spending and revenue. Republicans then began considering a campaign strategy to benefit the GOP while creating a predicament for the Democrats, particularly their presidential candidate, John Kerry. To pay for some of his campaign initiatives, the Massachusetts senator advocated the repeal of many of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for families annually earning more than $200,000. The Republicans' strategy also promised to test the resolve of their own deficit hawks, especially in the Senate, who had worked with the Democrats to block tax cuts they regarded as overly generous budget-busters. (Legislative details, p. 111)

    At the start of summer, the White House urged senior Republicans to move ahead on an extension of popular tax cuts in July. A midsummer vote would have forced Kerry, vice presidential candidate John Edwards of North Carolina, and other Democrats to choose whether to support or oppose tax breaks right before the party's national convention.

    Just before the summer recess in August the White House spurned a deal on a $75 billion short-term extension of tax breaks nearly worked out by Senate Finance Committee Chairman Charles E. Grassley, R-Iowa. The deal had the backing of Minority Leader Tom Daschle, who was eager to bend on taxes while he waged his intense, and ultimately unsuccessful, bid for election to a fourth Senate term from South Dakota. The addition of language accelerating a scheduled increase in the refundable child tax credit helped win the support of some wavering Democratic moderates. But as the vote on the final measure (HR 1308) approached, just weeks before members were headed home to campaign, Democratic opposition collapsed altogether. Just before the roll was called Sept. 23, Kerry was on the campaign trail in Pennsylvania, where he announced his endorsement of the package as a means to help families “squeezed by the weak Bush economy.”

    On the vote the only dissent came from a trio of deficit hawks who objected to the measure's cost, $146 billion over ten years, and criticized the lack of offsets to pay for it. The Senate cleared the bill by a vote of 92–3: R 49–2; D 42–1: I 1–0. (Vote, p. 864)

    Signed into law Oct. 4 (PL 108-311), the measure extended the $1,000 per-child tax credit through 2009, the upper limit for the 10 percent income tax bracket through 2010, and tax breaks for married couples through 2008. It also extended for one year the existing income exemptions from the alternative minimum tax and extended the research and development tax credit through 2005.

    13. Intelligence-Gathering Overhaul

    In a rare display of bipartisan cooperation just one month before a strongly contested presidential election, the Senate voted overwhelmingly for legislation to reorganize the nation's intelligence system along the lines proposed by an independent commission that investigated government failings in advance of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. The Pentagon did not like the bill, House Republican leaders pushed for a different approach, and President Bush appeared ambivalent about the entire plan until late in the fall. But during the ensuing two months, the nearly unanimous support for the initial Senate measure would dictate the terms for the most important law enacted during the year. (Legislative details, p. 263)

    Many senators had reservations about the measure (S 2845) when it came to the floor. Two Senate moderates were the bill's main sponsors—Republican Susan Collins of Maine and Democrat Joseph I. Lieberman of Connecticut. Collins, who chaired the Governmental Affairs Committee, and Lieberman, the ranking Democrat, accepted the need for a powerful national intelligence director and a national counterterrorism center that were recommended by the Sept. 11 commission, which Congress had created a year after the attacks. The two worked together to overcome concerns of Armed Services and Appropriations committee members who feared they would lose control over the fifteen-agency, $40 billion intelligence system.

    In spite of sharp criticism from some of the most powerful figures in the Senate, among them Appropriations Chairman Ted Stevens, R-Alaska, Armed Services Chairman John W. Warner, R-Va., and Robert C. Byrd, D-W.Va., the ranking minority party member on Appropriations, most senators were ready to stick close to the commission's recommendations. Collins and Lieberman did not lose a single roll call on proposed amendments to their bill; either they engineered the defeat of the proposals they opposed, or they worked to modify amendments before accepting them. The bill passed on Oct 6 by 96–2: R 51–0; D 44–2; I 1–0. (Vote, p. 864)

    14. Corporate Tax Overhaul

    Business groups had watched and waited through the first three years of the Bush administration while the president won $1.7 trillion in tax cuts targeted mainly to individuals. Republican leaders repeatedly assured them that they would get their turn. It came late on the last day of the regular session in 2004, when, after a weekend of filibusters and side deals, the Senate cleared the corporate tax bill. The measure (HR 4520—PL 108-357), which was expected to reduce business taxes by $137 billion over ten years, the biggest corporate tax overhaul since 1986.

    The Senate had enthusiastically embraced its own version of the legislation, passing it 92–5 in May. That bill included the repeal of the $5 billion-a-year export subsidy; the need to end international sanctions against U.S. goods triggered by the subsidy created the need for the bill in the first place. That subsidy was replaced with $167 billion in business tax breaks. But to get it through the Senate, GOP leaders also included enough revenue-raising provisions and accounting maneuvers to declare that the entire cost had been offset.

    In assembling the final version of the bill, House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Bill Thomas, R-Calif., worked with lawmakers in both chambers to see what they would need to support the final product. He also managed to find ways to offset the cost—including shifting some expensive tax cuts to the middle-class tax bill also moving toward enactment—without losing House conservatives who viewed such provisions as tax increases.

    The final package also included a $10 billion buyout of tobacco farmers needed to secure the votes of southerners in the House but did not include federal regulation of tobacco products. The Senate in July paired the buyout with tobacco regulation but the latter was unacceptable to many House members including key leaders. Thomas calculated that he could leave regulation out and use the billions of dollars in sweeteners added to the legislation to move it through the House and then win at least the sixty votes needed to overcome any Senate filibuster. That gamble paid off with ease in the House, which adopted the conference report overwhelmingly. It worked in the Senate as well, although not before a weekend session of lengthy floor speeches during which disgruntled senators extracted even a few more symbolic concessions, all of which died at the end of the session. With all the haggling done, the Senate cleared the bill on a bipartisan a vote of 69–17: R 43–3; D 25–14; I 1–0. (Vote, p. 864)

    The centerpiece was a $77 billion tax break on manufacturing income. The legislation also provided $43 billion in tax cuts on the overseas profits of U.S. multinationals, aimed at enhancing their competitive position against foreign rivals. About $14 billion in tax breaks went to a long list of beneficiaries, from fishermen to bow and arrow makers.

    House

    1. Unemployment Benefits Extension

    Democrats in 2004 expected that they could develop a potent campaign issue at the start of the year after the Republican-run Congress declined to renew a supplemental unemployment insurance program (PL 108-26) that expired at the end of 2003. Uneasiness about the state of the economic recovery was not confined to Democrats. Some Republicans from the industrial Midwest worried about the decline of manufacturing for their constituents. House GOP leaders, however, would not permit a vote on a bill to continue the federal benefits, fearing that the measure would pass and send a skeptical message about the economy while President George W. Bush was preparing his reelection campaign. The expired program, begun when the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks contributed to a sharp economic downturn, provided thirteen extra weeks of benefits for persons who had exhausted their twenty-six weeks of state benefits. (Legislative details, p. 573)

    But George Miller of California, the ranking Democrat on the Education and the Workforce Committee, saw opportunity in early February when a bill to reauthorize the Community Services Block Grant program (HR 3030) came to the floor under procedures that allowed amendments. Miller offered an amendment to extend the federal unemployment benefits for six months; this tactic of forcing Republicans to vote on proposals of principal benefit to the working class individuals and families became a theme of Democratic legislative strategies the rest of the year.

    Republican leaders opposed the proposal, arguing that it was more about scoring political points than helping the unemployed. John A. Boehner, R-Ohio, chairman of the Education and the Workforce Committee, argued that the amendment would authorize the program without appropriate any money for it. But a majority of lawmakers—every Democrat on the House floor Feb. 4 and one-sixth of the Republican caucus—decided that it was unwise to vote against federal unemployment aid at the outset of an election year. Thirty-nine Republicans broke ranks with the GOP leadership. In an important embarrassment for the GOP leadership Miller's amendment was adopted easily by a vote of 227–179: R 39–179; D 187–0; I 1–0. (Vote, p. 866)

    The underlying bill passed by voice vote. The Senate passed its version of the community services bill later in February but the measure went no further. Most Republicans who supported the Miller amendment represented states that had lost manufacturing jobs. Others were moderates or the holders of politically competitive seats.

    2. Success of War in Iraq

    One year after the U.S.-led military coalition toppled Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq, Republicans commemorated the anniversary by writing a resolution—without any Democratic input—and using its adoption by the House as a powerful campaign document. At a time when the Democratic presidential candidate, Sen. John Kerry of Massachusetts, appeared ambivalent about the war in Iraq, Republicans worded the resolution (H Res 557) in such a way that House Democrats, by a narrow majority, concluded they had to support it. The vote highlighted the party's mixed feelings and messages about the war, making it all the more difficult for Democrats to use the conduct of the campaign as a defining issue against President Bush and congressional Republicans. To that extent, the vote helped to neutralize the war as an issue for the remaining eight months of the election year. (Legislative details, p. 283)

    The resolution was brought to the floor March 17, the first anniversary of Bush's ultimatum to Hussein to leave Iraq or face invasion. At the resolution's core was a series of statements about Saddam's regime that amounted to a human rights argument that had been only tangential to the president's rationale for invading Iraq. The resolution said nothing about the weapons of mass destruction that had been a central argument in the administration's case for war.

    The resolution affirmed that “the United States and the world have been made safer with the removal of Saddam Hussein and his regime from power in Iraq,” and acclaimed the military performance that accomplished it. It also commended the Iraqi people for their courage during Saddam's reign and their adoption of an interim constitution.

    The deftly written set of statements prompted many Democrats to conclude that supporting the language was a wiser political move than opposing it. The House adopted the resolution by a resounding 327–93: R 222–2 D 105–90; I 0–1. Thirty-six of the Democrats who in 2002 voted against the law (PL 107-243) authorizing the use of force against Iraq voted in favor of the congratulatory resolution. Nine went the other way. (Vote, p. 866)

    3. Surface Transportation Spending

    The vote in the House in spring 2004 to reauthorize surface transportation programs at generous levels marked a collision of three potent and ultimately irreconcilable political forces. There was the White House, which had a strong desire to hold down federal spending as President Bush campaigned for a second term as a fiscal conservative. There was the House GOP leadership, which had hopes of shielding the president from an embarrassing campaign season showdown with rank-and-file members of his party. There also were those very Republican lawmakers, in reelection races of their own, who wanted to bring home as much spending as possible for local highway and public transit projects before the November voting.

    There were no clear winners in that clash. The chairman of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Alaska Republican Don Young, led an overwhelming majority of House members April 2 in defying a strongly worded White House veto threat and passing a reauthorization bill (HR 3550) that far exceeded the bottom line set by the president. The vote was a bipartisan 357–65: R 162–59; D 194–6; I 1–0. (Legislative details, p. 387; Vote, p. 866)

    The huge majority showed that a presidential veto almost certainly would be overridden by Congress, especially because seven weeks earlier the Senate had voted by an even wider margin to pass a highway bill (S 1072) that was more expensive than the House bill.

    Rather than force Bush to issue the first veto of his presidency, however, the House and Senate votes signaled the end for a long-term surface transportation policy bill in the 108th Congress. Negotiators never came close to agreeing on a funding formula or spending level, and as a consequence thousands of road projects that lawmakers had hoped to see started during the summer of 2004 were delayed.

    4. Limitations on Federal Spending

    It was not the House Republican leadership's intention to permit debates on reviving expired statutory caps on appropriations or increasing entitlement programs. To do so would highlight internal party divisions or requiring scheduling legislation that was likely to be defeated. But that is exactly what happened during a floor debate on legislation (HR 4663) to impose a two-year appropriations cap on discretionary spending and institute a “pay-as-you-go” requirement on new mandatory spending. (Legislative details, p. 61)

    The measure came to the floor because a small band of GOP fiscal conservatives, led by Gil Gutknecht of Minnesota, demanded the debate as their price for supporting the fiscal 2005 congressional budget resolution (S Con Res 95). The debate was intended to highlight Republicans' commitment to hold down spending and to be a forum for votes on a variety of plans to “reform” the much criticized congressional budget process. The legislation was intended to require Congress to stick to its budget or risk across-the-board spending cuts. It would have revived statutory limits on appropriations and a pay-as-you-go law requiring offsetting spending cuts or new revenue in any legislation to increase mandatory spending.

    C.W. Bill Young, R-Fla., chairman of Appropriations, led critics against the bill, describing the proposed spending caps as an encroachment on Congress' power of the purse because the president would have a say in setting the limits. Congress had endorsed statutory spending caps on three separate occasions—in 1990, 1993, and 1997—which led some lawmakers to question why appropriators were so dead set against them now. For their part, Democrats unified against the bill for two reasons. They criticized the idea of not reviving pay-as-you-go requirements for tax cuts, and they considered the proposed lid on appropriations too tight.

    Instead, the eight-hour debate on the measure—followed by its clear defeat—was a reminder of the power of the Appropriations Committee and the lasting strength of its allies in both parties in battles against GOP spending conservatives. When the bill finally came to a vote shortly after midnight June 25, one out of three Republicans voted against it, as did every Democrat. The vote defeating the bill was 146–268: R 146–72; D 0–195; I 0–1. (Vote, p. 866)

    5. Limits on Federal Search Powers

    Members of Congress sensitive to the protection of civil liberties expressed increasing concern about many of the provisions of the three-year-old counterterrorism law known as the USA PATRIOT Act. One of the provisions they particularly disliked permitted federal law enforcement officers conducting terrorism investigations to obtain search warrants for “any tangible thing” without having to offer a detailed rationale for the search. During summer 2004 the House came close to repealing that power altogether. Although the effort did not quite succeed the vote showed that the libertarian wing of the Republican Party could combine with Democrats to reshape the Patriot Act when it was scheduled for reauthorization in the 109th Congress.

    The opportunity to limit the provision came on July 8 when the House took up the fiscal 2005 appropriations package (HR 4754) for the Justice Department. Bernard Sanders of Vermont, the one Independent in the House, proposed an amendment to prohibit the use of funds authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (PL 95-511) to acquire library circulation records, library or bookstore patron lists, Internet records, or records of book purchases. As the roll-call vote began, the number of votes in the “yea” column steadily moved upward. Before the electronic voting system's timing clock had gone to zero the tally briefly stood at 219–200 in favor of the amendment.

    But then the Republican leadership, sensing an unexpected election-year embarrassment for President Bush in the making, stepped up its efforts to defeat the proposal. As angry Democrats demanded “regular order” and chanted “shame, shame, shame,” Republicans held the vote open for thirty minutes—double the customary time for a House floor vote and long enough to convince eight Republicans and one Democrat to switch their votes to “nay.” As soon as the tally became a tie, the presiding officer, Doc Hastings, R-Wash., gaveled the voting to an end; under the rules the Sanders's amendment was rejected on the tie vote of 210–210: R 18–206; D 191–4; I 1–0. (Vote, p. 866)

    Several lawmakers who changed their votes said they were swayed not by leadership threats or promises but by a letter from a Justice Department official that Frank R. Wolf, R-Va., circulated on the floor while the voting was under way. The letter, to Judiciary Committee Chairman F. James Sensenbrenner Jr., R-Wis., the sponsor of the Patriot Act, declared that the provision Sanders had targeted was essential. No information was offered on how often library or book sales information has been used or whether it has played a role in successful prosecutions. Bush had threatened to veto the legislation if it repealed any part of the Patriot Act. Nonetheless, the Sanders amendment vote was an important gauge of Republican unease with some Patriot Act provisions. Eighteen GOP lawmakers, or 8 percent of those voting that day, went against the president's position.

    6. Mexican Identification Cards

    The divisive issue of immigration policy within the Republican Party was on display during a House debate in September 2004 over federal government position on identity cards that the Mexican government issued to its citizens living in the United States. President Bush and some members of his party supported a liberalization of immigration laws to help promote domestic economic growth, a position long advocated by many Democrats. At the start 2004, the president proposed giving millions of undocumented workers in the United States a chance to legalize their status temporarily with guest worker visas. But the proposal went nowhere, thwarted by other Republicans including influential members of Congress from border states such as such as Tom DeLay of Texas, the House majority leader. In their view, short-term security risks and the uncertain long-term economic effects of illegal immigration far outweighed any benefits to relaxing the borders. (Legislative details, p. 621)

    The “matricula consular”—or consular registration—cards issued by Mexico to its citizens living in the United States were increasingly accepted by banks and other businesses as well as by federal government agencies as a valid form of identification. The cards included the holder's name, date and place of birth, U.S. address, and photograph. Critics said that making the cards valid for so many purposes effectively condones and perhaps encourages illegal immigration—partly, they argued, because the document could be readily forged by a Mexican who is in the United States illegally.

    In July the House Appropriations Committee approved language in its fiscal 2005 Treasury Department spending bill (HR 5025) to reverse Bush administration policy and prohibit banks from accepting the matricula cards as identification by individuals hoping to open a bank account or obtain a mortgage or other financial services. Texas Republican John Culberson, who wrote the provision, said that state law enforcement agencies as well as officials of the Justice and Homeland Security departments had described the identification cards to him as an unjustified security risk. DeLay backed his argument. Many security-conscious Republicans bought that argument but there were not enough of them willing to go against the White House and the banking industry, both of which lobbied intensely to leave the policy alone.

    Bankers, who saw immigrants as a lucrative market—Latin American immigrants send billions of dollars in remittances to families back home each year, in addition to their other banking in the United States—argued that the Culberson provision would force many consumers to use underground, unregulated financial services. The Treasury contended that the identification cards actually enhance homeland security because they allow banks and law enforcement agents to keep an accurate watch on where money is flowing. The combination of Bush administration and bank support proved too strong for the opponents of the cards. Ohio Republican Michael G. Oxley, chairman of the Financial Services Committee, pushed an amendment to delete Culberson's provision, and it was adopted on a bipartisan vote of 222–177: R 49–161; D 172–16; I 1–0. (Vote, p. 866)

    7. Extending Tax Cuts for the Middle Class

    By spring 2004 disagreement within the Republican ranks over fiscal policy blocked preparation of a budget resolution this year, which meant there could be no tax cut enacted under the expedited rules of the budget process. As their second choice, House GOP leaders decided to make election-year political life more difficult for the Democrats by daring them to oppose a series of bills to extend—without revenue-raising offsets—several of this decade's more popular tax cuts beyond their scheduled expirations at the end of the year.

    As it turned out, the repeated votes quickly became a divisive issue within Democratic ranks. Democratic leaders were against the legislation, deriding the absence of offsets as a recipe for a long-term deficit disaster. But many rank-and-file members of the party, fearing constituent wrath, questioned whether Democrats should focus attention on the deficit issue. Instead, they said, their party should be joining the cause of tax relief as long as it was confined to those of low and modest incomes—part of the Democratic Party's base of electoral support. (Legislative details, p. 111)

    Republicans recognized that they could exploit the split in order to extend three expiring tax breaks for families: the $1,000-per-child tax credit, tax breaks for married couples, and the expanded 10 percent tax bracket. At the insistence of President Bush, they wrote a bill to preserve those breaks for four to six years, more than twice as long as congressional Republicans initially sought.

    To help guarantee solid bipartisan support the package was expanded to incorporate some items on the Democratic wish list, including an acceleration of the scheduled expansion of the refundable version of the child tax credit and a more generous version of that tax break for families of soldiers in combat. Including those provisions prompted two of the most senior Democrats on the Ways and Means Committee, Charles B. Rangel of New York and Sander M. Levin of Michigan, to break with their leadership and back the bill.

    The Democratic leaders continued to argue that the bill, by deepening the deficit, would do more harm than good to middle-class families in the long run. But they also made clear that rank-and-file members were free to support it if doing so would help their campaigns. Given that choice six weeks before election day, Democrats backed the bill by a ratio of nearly 2-to-1, and the vote Sept. 23 to adopt the conference agreement was a overwhelming 339–65: R 213–0; D 125–65; I 1–0. (Vote, p. 866)

    8. Gay Marriage Prohibition

    Pushed aggressively by social and religious conservatives and with the presidential election a month away, Republican leaders decided to take a vote on a constitutional amendment to prohibit gay marriage—knowing full well that the proposal would receive nothing close to the two-thirds House majority required. Nonetheless, GOP leaders took some satisfaction when the measure drew the support of a solid 55 percent of those voting. Conservative activists said they were pleased to highlight their new marquee issue close to election day and to have the tally as a baseline from which to begin the next step in their campaign.

    When President Bush called on Congress in February to send such an amendment to the states for ratification, House Republican leaders reacted cautiously. “We don't want to do this in haste,” Majority Leader Tom DeLay of Texas said at the time. That stance reflected both the difficulty DeLay knew he faced in trying to pass such a measure and the reluctance of many conservative Republicans to alter the Constitution. But social conservatives kept up a steady drumbeat of demands for a House vote. They were eager for Congress to act—and for the issue to gain prominence in the 2004 campaign—after the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled in 2003 that homosexuals have a right to marry under the state constitution and after Mayor Gavin Newsom permitted same-sex marriages in San Francisco. Nevertheless, the campaign ended in July when the Senate voted to keep alive a filibuster against a gay marriage constitutional amendment (S J Res 40). (Legislative details, p. 613)

    But in the House, with the presidential general election campaign in full swing, DeLay had a change of heart. He scheduled a House vote on a resolution (H J Res 106) by Marilyn Musgrave, R-Colo., that would constitutionally define marriage as “the union of a man and a woman.” To do so DeLay circumvented the Judiciary Committee, whose chairman, F. James Sensenbrenner Jr., R-Wis., was cool to the proposal and had declined to hold a markup. With twenty-seven Republicans voting against the idea and thirty-six Democrats voting for it, the Sept. 30 House ballot on the resolution came up forty-nine votes short of the two-thirds of lawmakers present and voting necessary for passage. The tally was 227–186: R 191–27; D 36–158; I 0–1, (Vote, p. 866)

    Still, the vote demonstrated substantial support in the House for such an amendment. It also put emphasis on the issue of gay marriage just weeks before voters in eleven states cast ballots on whether to allow gays to wed in their state. Supporters said the amendment was needed to protect the institutions of marriage and family against homosexual couples who wished to wed, and against courts inclined to allow them to do so. Opponents derided the amendment as constitutional overkill.

    9. Corporate Tax Overhaul

    It took more than two years of planning on Capitol Hill and in corporate lobbying offices to get the House vote in October 2004 on the biggest business tax policy change in almost two decades. Lawmakers and businesses strongly disagreed on the types of tax cuts that should replace an export tax break other countries considered unfair. Congress was under pressure to act in 2004 because the European Union had imposed retaliatory sanctions against U.S. products for keeping the prohibited export subsidy in effect.

    House Ways and Means Chairman Bill Thomas, R-Calif., who drafted the final bill (HR 4520—PL 108-357), assembled an assortment of tax cuts that largely rewarded domestic manufacturers and the overseas operations of multinational corporations. But few lawmakers supported tax breaks for both groups of businesses or thought they were good economic policy. (Legislative details, p. 115)

    Many House Democrats and Republicans from manufacturing districts complained that the overseas tax breaks, which Thomas insisted were necessary to help U.S. multinationals compete against foreign-owned rivals, would encourage more U.S. companies to move jobs overseas. The White House, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Congressional Budget Office all criticized the bill's $77 billion in tax cuts over a decade for manufacturing, saying that lost revenue would not help revive the ailing manufacturing sector but would encourage new tax avoidance practices while proving impossible to administer.

    Furthermore, to accommodate senators who wanted to reduce the budget deficit the bill included language designed to crack down on tax avoidance practices in an effort to raise billions of dollars needed to offset expensive tax cuts. That drew the ire of House conservatives who considered these offsets tantamount to tax increases. The remainder of the tax cuts were offset by a bit of budget legerdemain—moving some effective dates to lower costs—and by extending existing Customs user fees.

    To attract more than enough votes to guarantee enactment, Thomas added a host of sweeteners that appealed to lawmakers seeking reelection. Some of them were extraordinarily narrow and parochial, including special tax breaks for native Alaskan whalers and the owners of NASCAR race tracks. But by far the most politically compelling, and expensive, was a $10 billion buyout of tobacco farmers. That provision drew votes across party lines throughout the South, particularly in the Carolinas and Kentucky.

    Another lure was partial restoration of the federal income tax deduction for state sales taxes that was eliminated in 1986. Under this legislation, taxpayers could deduct sales taxes in lieu of local income taxes through 2005. Lawmakers of both parties from Texas, Florida, South Dakota, and Tennessee were particularly drawn to this provision because these states did not levy state income taxes. Some members criticized the “Christmas tree” approach to winning votes. “This is a blatant example of corporate welfare, full of pork for the special interests,” Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, D-Calif., said during the final House debate Oct. 7. “The oinking is so loud, the Republicans can't even think straight.”

    Yet the vote on the measure was the most bipartisan endorsement of a tax bill during President Bush's first term. The House adopted the conference report with the support of seventy-three Democrats, many from the South, and despite the opposition of sixteen Republicans. The tally was 280–141: R 207–16; D 73–124; I 0–1. (Vote, p. 866)

    10. Intelligence-Gathering Overhaul

    House Republican leaders found the limits of their political independence as the year came to an end when they bowed to White House pressure and accepted a face-saving compromise on legislation to restructure the nation's intelligence system. They had held out for two months against the Senate version of the plan, which they argued might harm military intelligence and would not do enough to slow illegal immigration. Their resistance was stiffened by the support of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air Force Gen. Richard B. Myers, and the apparent ambivalence of President Bush, who had endorsed the Senate version of the legislation but spent almost none of his political capital pushing for the enactment of a compromise bill before he stood for reelection in November. (Legislative details, p. 263)

    Initial, strong differences between House and Senate Republicans were apparent soon after the independent Sept. 11 commission—which Congress had created two years ago with a broad mandate to probe all government failings that may have precipitated the al Qaeda attacks—recommended creation of a cabinet-level office of national intelligence to oversee the nation's fifteen spy agencies and creation of a national counterterrorism center, among dozens of other steps. By October the Senate had passed a bill along the lines the commission recommended. But House GOP leaders went a different way, writing a bill that would have given a new national intelligence director more limited powers than the Senate had endorsed and included tough measures designed to reduce illegal immigration and increase law enforcement powers.

    For a time, those changes came close to transforming the House debate into another partisan spat. On Oct. 8 eight Republicans split with their party and voted with the Democrats to substitute the Senate version of the bill for the House measure. The amendment narrowly failed, 203–213. By late November, House and Senate conferees had reached an uneasy agreement on the bill but two House committee chairman remained adamantly opposed. Armed Services Chairman Duncan Hunter, R-Calif., said the new structure might interfere with military intelligence and Judiciary Chairman F. James Sensenbrenner Jr. R-Wis., complained that his immigration provisions were being dropped.

    Unable to gain the support of a sufficient number of Republicans, even though there were enough GOP and Democratic votes to adopt the conference report, Speaker J. Dennis Hastert, R-Ill., refused to bring the measure to the floor. The White House responded by shifting its lobbying into high gear. The president made public appeals, and Vice President Richard B. Cheney lobbied recalcitrant GOP lawmakers in private. Myers announced he had backed off his initial opposition to the measure—in what appeared to be a coordinated effort by the administration to weaken Hunter's position.

    House GOP leaders agreed to allow a vote on a final version of the bill (S 2845) that was written largely along the lines of the Senate measure. That compromise, however, proved far more popular on the floor than the initial version of the bill that the House had passed two months before. The vote Dec. 7 to adopt the conference report was a lopsided 336–75: R 152–67; D 183–8; I 1–0. Solid majorities in both parties backed the deal; only the most conservative one-third of Republicans and the most liberal handful of Democrats opposed it. (Vote table, p. 866)

    2004 Senate Brief Descriptions

    1. S 1072. Surface Transportation Spending

    Passage of the bill to authorize $318.9 billion in federal aid for highways, highway safety programs, and transit programs over six years including $255 billion for highways, $56.5 billion for transit, and $6 billion for safety programs, and to guarantee that states receive a 95 percent return on their Highway Trust Fund contributions by 2009. Passed 76–21: R 34–17; D 41–4 (ND 35–2, SD 6–2); I 1–0, Feb. 12, 2004. A “nay” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    2. S 2061. Medical Malpractice Liability

    Motion to invoke cloture (thus limiting debate) on the motion to proceed to consideration of the bill that would place caps on damage awards in medical malpractice lawsuits against obstetricians and gynecologists. Motion rejected 48–45: R 47–3; D 1–41 (ND 1–34, SD 0–7); I 0–1, Feb. 24, 2004. Three-fifths of the total Senate (sixty) was required to invoke cloture. A “yea” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    3. S 1805. Assault Weapons Ban

    Feinstein, D-Calif., amendment to provide a ten-year reauthorization of the assault weapons ban that was to expire in September 2004. Adopted 52–47: R 10–41; D 41–6 (ND 34–4, SD 7–2); I 1–0, March 2, 2004.

    4. S Con Res 95. ‘Pay as You Go’ Budget Rules

    Feingold, D-Wis., amendment to restore pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) rules, which required a sixty-vote margin to overcome a point of order against direct spending or revenue legislation that increased the on-budget deficit or cause an on-budget deficit, thereby requiring tax cuts and new entitlement spending to off-set with revenue increases or spending cuts. Adopted 51–48: R 4–47; D 46–1 (ND 38–0, SD 8–1); I 1–0, March 10, 2004.

    5. Hr 1997. Criminalization of Harm to a Fetus

    Passage of the bill to make it a criminal offense to injure or kill a fetus during the commission of a violent crime, and to establish criminal penalties equal to those that would apply if the injury or death occurred to the pregnant woman for those who harm a fetus regardless of the perpetrator's knowledge of the pregnancy or intent to harm the fetus. Passed 61–38: R 48–2; D 13–35 (ND 9–30, SD 4–5); I 0–1, March 25, 2004. A “yea” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    6. Hr 4. Child Care for Welfare Recipients

    Snowe, R-Maine, amendment to increase mandatory child care funding by $6 billion over the following five years. Adopted 78–20: R 31–19; D 46–1 (ND 38–0, SD 8–1); I 1–0, March 30, 2004. A “nay” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    7. S 1637. Overtime Pay Rules

    Harkin, D-Iowa, amendment to block implementation of language in a new Labor Department rule that would cause some workers to lose their eligibility for overtime pay. Adopted 52–47: R 5–46; D 46–1 (ND 38–0, SD 8–1); I 1–0, May 4, 2004. A “nay” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    8. S 2400. Base Closure Delay

    Lott, R-Miss., amendment to require the 2005 base realignment and closure round to apply only to U.S. military installations located overseas, delaying new U.S. domestic base closings until 2007. Rejected 47–49: R 21–29; D 26–19 (ND 20–16, SD 6–3); I 0–1, May 18, 2004. A “nay” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    9. S 2062. Class Action Lawsuits

    Motion to invoke cloture (thus limiting debate) on the bill to allow class action cases involving at least 100 plaintiffs to be sent to federal court if at least $5 million was at stake and fewer than two-thirds of the plaintiffs live in the same state as the defendant. Motion rejected 44–43: R 42–3; D 2–39 (ND 1–32, SD 1–7); I 0–1, July 8, 2004. Three-fifths of the total Senate (sixty) was required to invoke cloture. A “yea” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    10. S J Res 40. Gay Marriage Prohibition

    Motion to invoke cloture (thus limiting debate) on the motion to proceed to consideration of a constitutional amendment that would define marriage as consisting only of the union of a man and a woman, and to provide that the U.S. Constitution or any state's constitution could not be construed to require that marriage or any other constructs of marriage be conferred to any other union. Motion rejected 48–50: R 45–6; D 3–43 (ND 2–36, SD 1–7); I 0–1, July 14, 2004. Three-fifths of the total Senate (sixty) was required to invoke cloture. A “yea” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    11. Hr 4567. Privatization of Federal Jobs

    Leahy, D-Vt., amendment to prohibit the use of funds to privatize or contract out services provided by the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services. Adopted 49–47: R 5–46; D 43–1 (ND 36–0, SD 7–1); I 1–0, Sept. 8, 2004. A “nay” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    12. Hr 1308. Extending Middle Class Tax Cuts

    Adoption of the conference report on the bill to extend the $1,000 per child tax credit through 2009, the upper limit for the current 10 percent bracket through 2010, and tax breaks for married couples through 2008, and to provide a one-year extension of existing income exemptions from the alternative minimum tax and extend the expiring research and development tax credit through 2005. Adopted 92–3: R 49–2; D 42–1 (ND 35–0, SD 7–1); I 1–0, Sept. 23, 2004. A “yea” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    13. S 2845. Intelligence Overhaul

    Passage of the bill to reorganize fifteen U.S. intelligence agencies and create a national intelligence director with the power to freely transfer money among the CIA, National Security Agency and other defense and civilian agencies. It also would created a counterterrorism center with operational planning capabilities and a Privacy and Civil Liber-ties Oversight Board to investigate use of intelligence powers and act as a watchdog for civil liberties concerns. Passed 96–2: R 51–0; D 44–2 (ND 37–1, SD 7–1); I 1–0, Oct. 6, 2004.

    14. Hr 4520. Corporate Tax Overhaul

    Adoption of the conference report on the bill to repeal an export provision in the U.S. tax code that had been ruled an unfair subsidy by the World Trade Organization and to provide for $137 billion in new tax cuts for corporations over ten years. It also included a $10 billion buyout of tobacco farmers. Adopted 69–17: R 43–3; D 25–14 (ND 20–14, SD 5–0); I 1–0, Oct. 11, 2004.

    2004 House Brief Descriptions

    1. Hr 3030. Unemployment Benefits

    Miller, D-Calif., amendment to authorize such sums as necessary under the Community Services Block Grants program for a six-month federal program providing an additional thirteen weeks of unemployment benefits for people who had exhausted their state jobless benefits. Adopted 227–179: R 39–179; D 187–0 (ND 132–0, SD 55–0); I 1–0, Feb. 4, 2004.

    2. H Res 557. War in Iraq and U.S. Troops

    Adoption of the resolution to affirm the United States and the world are safer with the removal of Saddam Hussein and his regime from power in Iraq, to commend U.S. and coalition forces for liberating Iraq, and commend the Iraqi people on the adoption of Iraq's new interim constitution. Adopted 327–93: R 222–2; D 105–90 (ND 64–76, SD 41–14); I 0–1, March 17, 2004. A “yea” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    3. Hr 3550. Surface Transportation

    Passage of the bill to authorize $283.2 billion for federal highway, mass transit, safety, and research programs from fiscal 2004 to 2009. The funding total included $217 billion in guaranteed spending for highways, $51.5 billion for mass transit and other public transportation programs, and $11.1 billion for members' projects. It also froze funding in fiscal 2006 and beyond unless legislation were enacted to ensure that states get back at least 95 percent of the dollars their motorists send to the Highway Trust Fund by fiscal 2009. Passed 357–65: R 162–59; D 194–6 (ND 144–1, SD 50–5); I 1–0, April 2, 2004. A “nay” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    4. Hr 4663. Budget Enforcement

    Passage of the bill to set statutory caps on discretionary spending for fiscal 2005 and 2006, and institute pay-as-you-go rules to require any mandatory spending increases be offset by new revenue or other spending reductions. Rejected 146–268: R 146–72; D 0–195 (ND 0–142, SD 0–53); I 0–1, June 25, 2004 (in the session that began and the Congressional Record dated June 24, 2004). A “yea” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    5. Hr 4754. Limits on Federal Search Powers

    Sanders, I-Vt., amendment to prohibit funds from being used to make an application under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to acquire library circulation records, library patron lists, library Internet records, bookseller sales records, or bookseller customer lists. Rejected 210–210: R 18–206; D 191–4 (ND 142–2, SD 49–2); I 1–0, July 8, 2004. A “nay” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    6. Hr 5025. Mexican Identification Cards

    Oxley, R-Ohio, amendment to strike language that would prohibit the Treasury Department from using funds in the bill to implement regulations allowing financial institutions to accept Mexican “matricula consular” identification documents. Adopted 222–177: R 49–161; D 172–16 (ND 128–7, SD 44–9); I 1–0, Sept. 14, 2004. A “yea” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    7. Hr 1308. Family and Corporate Tax Breaks

    Adoption of the conference report on the bill to extend the $1,000 per child tax credit through 2009, the upper limit for the current 10 percent bracket through 2010, and tax breaks for married couples through 2008, and to provide a one-year extension of current income exemptions from the alternative minimum tax and extend the expiring research and development tax credit through 2005. Adopted (thus sent to the Senate) 339–65: R 213–0; D 125–65 (ND 83–57, SD 42–8); I 1–0, Sept. 23, 2004. A “yea” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    8. H J Res 106. Same-Sex Marriage Ban Constitutional Amendment

    Passage of the joint resolution to propose a constitutional amendment to define marriage as consisting only of the union of a man and a woman. Rejected 227–186: R 191–27; D 36–158 (ND 7–135, SD 29–23); I 0–1, Sept. 30, 2004. A two-thirds majority vote of those present and voting (276 in this case) is required to pass a joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution. A “yea” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    9. Hr 4520. Corporate Tax Overhaul

    Adoption of the conference report on the bill to repeal an export provision in the U.S. tax code that has been ruled an unfair subsidy by the World Trade Organization, and to provide $137 billion in new tax cuts for corporations over ten years and a $10 billion buyout of tobacco farmers. Adopted (thus sent to the Senate) 280–141: R 207–16; D 73–124 (ND 25–118, SD 48–6); I 0–1, Oct. 7, 2004.

    10. S 2845. Intelligence Overhaul

    Adoption of the conference report on the bill to reorganize fifteen U.S. intelligence agencies and create a new director of national intelligence to oversee all U.S. intelligence activities and determine the intelligence budget. Adopted (thus sent to the Senate) 336–75: R 152–67; D 183–8 (ND 133–7, SD 50–1); I 1–0, Dec. 7, 2004. A “yea” was a vote in support of the president's position.

    Appendix

    Congress and Its Members

    Senate Membership in the 107th Congress

    Lineup as of Jan. 3, 2001: Republicans 50, Democrats 50

    Alabama

    • Richard C. Shelby (R)
    • Jeff Sessions (R)

    Alaska

    • Ted Stevens (R)
    • Frank H. Murkowski (R) 1

    Arizona

    • John McCain (R)
    • Jon Kyl (R)

    Arkansas

    • Tim Hutchinson (R)
    • Blanche Lincoln (D)

    California

    • Dianne Feinstein (D)
    • Barbara Boxer (D)

    Colorado

    • Ben Nighthorse Campbell (R)
    • Wayne Allard (R)

    Connecticut

    • Christopher J. Dodd (D)
    • Joseph I. Lieberman (D)

    Delaware

    • Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D)
    • Thomas R. Carper (D)

    Florida

    • Bob Graham (D)
    • Bill Nelson (D)

    Georgia

    • Max Cleland (D)
    • Zell Miller (D)

    Hawaii

    • Daniel K. Inouye (D)
    • Daniel K. Akaka (D)

    Idaho

    • Larry E. Craig (R)
    • Michael D. Crapo (R)

    Illinois

    • Richard J. Durbin (D)
    • Peter Fitzgerald (R)

    Indiana

    • Richard G. Lugar (R)
    • Evan Bayh (D)

    Iowa

    • Charles E. Grassley (R)
    • Tom Harkin (D)

    Kansas

    • Sam Brownback (R)
    • Pat Roberts (R)

    Kentucky

    • Mitch McConnell (R)
    • Jim Bunning (R)

    Louisiana

    • John B. Breaux (D)
    • Mary L. Landrieu (D)

    Maine

    • Olympia J. Snowe (R)
    • Susan Collins (R)

    Maryland

    • Paul S. Sarbanes (D)
    • Barbara A. Mikulski (D)

    Massachusetts

    • Edward M. Kennedy (D)
    • John F. Kerry (D)

    Michigan

    • Carl Levin (D)
    • Debbie Stabenow (D)

    Minnesota

    • Paul D. Wellstone (D) 2
    • Mark Dayton (D)

    Mississippi

    • Thad Cochran (R)
    • Trent Lott (R)

    Missouri

    • Christopher S. Bond (R)
    • Jean Carnahan (D)

    Montana

    • Max Baucus (D)
    • Conrad Burns (R)

    Nebraska

    • Chuck Hagel (R)
    • Ben Nelson (D)

    Nevada

    • Harry Reid (D)
    • John Ensign (R)

    New Hampshire

    • Robert C. Smith (R)
    • Judd Gregg (R)

    New Jersey

    • Robert G. Torricelli (D)
    • Jon Corzine (D)

    New Mexico

    • Pete V. Domenici (R)
    • Jeff Bingaman (D)

    New York

    • Charles E. Schumer (D)
    • Hillary Rodham Clinton (D)

    North Carolina

    • Jesse Helms (R)
    • John Edwards (D)

    North Dakota

    • Kent Conrad (D)
    • Byron L. Dorgan (D)

    Ohio

    • Mike DeWine (R)
    • George V. Voinovich (R)

    Oklahoma

    • Don Nickles (R)
    • James M. Inhofe (R)

    Oregon

    • Ron Wyden (D)
    • Gordon H. Smith (R)

    Pennsylvania

    • Arlen Specter (R)
    • Rick Santorum (R)

    Rhode Island

    • Jack Reed (D)
    • Lincoln Chafee (R)

    South Carolina

    • Strom Thurmond (R)
    • Ernest F. Hollings (D)

    South Dakota

    • Tom Daschle (D)
    • Tim Johnson (D)

    Tennessee

    • Fred Thompson (R)
    • Bill Frist (R)

    Texas

    • Phil Gramm (R)
    • Kay Bailey Hutchison (R)

    Utah

    • Orrin G. Hatch (R)
    • Robert F. Bennett (R)

    Vermont

    • Patrick J. Leahy (D)
    • James M. Jeffords (R) 3

    Virginia

    • John W. Warner (R)
    • George F. Allen (R)

    Washington

    • Patty Murray (D)
    • Maria Cantwell (D)

    West Virginia

    • Robert C. Byrd (D)
    • John D. Rockefeller IV (D)

    Wisconsin

    • Herb Kohl (D)
    • Russell D. Feingold (D)

    Wyoming

    • Craig Thomas (R)
    • Michael B. Enzi (R)

    Murkowski resigned Dec. 2, 2002, after being elected governor of Alaska. On Dec. 20, 2002, he appointed his daughter, Lisa Murkowski (R) to fill the final two years of his Senate term. She began service on Dec. 20, 2002.

    Wellstone died in a place crash Oct. 25, 2002, while campaigning for reelection. Dean Barkley (Independence Party) was appointed Nov. 4, 2002, to fill the Senate seat for the remaining weeks of Wellstone's term.

    Jeffords switched from Republican to Independent effective June 5, 2001, and caucused with the Democrats. This gave Democrats a 51–49 majority and allowed them to take control of the Senate, including committee chairmanships.

    House Membership in the 107th Congress

    Lineup as of Jan. 3, 2001: Republicans 221, Democrats 211, Independent 2; Vacancy 1

    Alabama

    • 1. Sonny Callahan (R)
    • 2. Terry Everett (R)
    • 3. Bob Riley (R)
    • 4. Robert Aderholt (R)
    • 5. Robert E. “Bud” Cramer (D)
    • 6. Spencer Bachus (R)
    • 7. Earl F. Hilliard (D)

    Alaska

    • AL Don Young (R)

    Arizona

    • 1. Jeff Flake (R)
    • 2. Ed Pastor (D)
    • 3. Bob Stump (R)
    • 4. John Shadegg (R)
    • 5. Jim Kolbe (R)
    • 6. J.D. Hayworth (R)

    Arkansas

    • 1. Marion Berry (D)
    • 2. Vic Snyder (D)
    • 3. Asa Hutchinson (R)
    • (resigned Aug. 6, 2001)
    • John Boozman (R)
    • (sworn in Nov. 29, 2001)
    • 4. Mike Ross (D)

    California

    • 1. Mike Thompson (D)
    • 2. Wally Herger (R)
    • 3. Doug Ose (R)
    • 4. John T. Doolittle (R)
    • 5. Robert T. Matsui (D)
    • 6. Lynn Woolsey (D)
    • 7. George Miller (D)
    • 8. Nancy Pelosi (D)
    • 9. Barbara Lee (D)
    • 10. Ellen O. Tauscher (D)
    • 11. Richard W. Pombo (R)
    • 12. Tom Lantos (D)
    • 13. Pete Stark (D)
    • 14. Anna G. Eshoo (D)
    • 15. Michael M. Honda (D)
    • 16. Zoe Lofgren (D)
    • 17. Sam Farr (D)
    • 18. Gary A. Condit (D)
    • 19. George P. Radanovich (R)
    • 20. Cal Dooley (D)
    • 21. Bill Thomas (R)
    • 22. Lois Capps (D)
    • 23. Elton Gallegly (R)
    • 24. Brad Sherman (D)
    • 25. Howard P. “Buck” McKeon (R)
    • 26. Howard L. Berman (D)
    • 27. Adam B. Schiff (D)
    • 28. David Dreier (R)
    • 29. Henry A. Waxman (D)
    • 30. Xavier Becerra (D)
    • 31. Hilda L. Solis (D)
    • 32. Diane Watson (D)
    • 33. Lucille Roybal-Allard (D)
    • 34. Grace F. Napolitano (D)
    • 35. Maxine Waters (D)
    • 36. Jane Harman (D)
    • 37. Juanita Millender-McDonald (D)
    • 38. Steve Horn (R)
    • 39. Ed Royce (R)
    • 40. Jerry Lewis (R)
    • 41. Gary G. Miller (R)
    • 42. Joe Baca (D)
    • 43. Ken Calvert (R)
    • 44. Mary Bono (R)
    • 45. Dana Rohrabacher (R)
    • 46. Loretta Sanchez (D)
    • 47. Christopher Cox (R)
    • 48. Darrell Issa (R)
    • 49. Susan A. Davis (D)
    • 50. Bob Filner (D)
    • 51. Randy “Duke” Cunningham (R)
    • 52. Duncan Hunter (R)

    Colorado

    • 1. Diana DeGette (D
    • 2. Mark Udall (D)
    • 3. Scott McInnis (R)
    • 4. Bob Schaffer (R)
    • 5. Joel Hefley (R)
    • 6. Tom Tancredo (R)

    Connecticut

    • 1. John B. Larson (D)
    • 2. Rob Simmons (R)
    • 3. Rosa DeLauro (D)
    • 4. Christopher Shays (R)
    • 5. Jim Maloney (D)
    • 6. Nancy L. Johnson (R)

    Delaware

    • AL Michael Castle (R)

    Florida

    • 1. Joe Scarborough (R)
    • (resigned Sept. 6, 2001)
    • Jeff Miller (R)
    • (sworn in Oct. 23, 2001)
    • 2. Allen Boyd (D)
    • 3. Corrine Brown (D)
    • 4. Ander Crenshaw (R)
    • 5. Karen L. Thurman (D)
    • 6. Clifford B. Stearns (R)
    • 7. John L. Mica (R)
    • 8. Richard “Ric” Keller (R)
    • 9. Michael Bilirakis (R)
    • 10. C.W. Bill Young (R)
    • 11. Jim Davis (D)
    • 12. Adam H. Putnam (R)
    • 13. Dan Miller (R)
    • 14. Porter J. Goss (R)
    • 15. Dave Weldon (R)
    • 16. Mark Foley (R)
    • 17. Carrie P. Meek (D)
    • 18. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R)
    • 19. Robert Wexler (D)
    • 20. Peter Deutsch (D)
    • 21. Lincoln Diaz-Balart (R)
    • 22. E. Clay Shaw Jr. (R)
    • 23. Alcee L. Hastings (D)

    Georgia

    • 1. Jack Kingston (R)
    • 2. Sanford D. Bishop Jr. (D)
    • 3. Mac Collins (R)
    • 4. Cynthia A. McKinney (D)
    • 5. John Lewis (D)
    • 6. Johnny Isakson (R)
    • 7. Bob Barr (R)
    • 8. Saxby Chambliss (R)
    • 9. Nathan Deal (R)
    • 10. Charlie Norwood (R)
    • 11. John Linder (R)

    Hawaii

    • 1. Neil Abercrombie (D)
    • 2. Patsy T. Mink (D)
    • (died Sept. 28, 2002)

    Idaho

    • 1. C.L. “Butch” Otter (R)
    • 2. Mike Simpson (R)

    Illinois

    • 1. Bobby L. Rush (D)
    • 2. Jesse L. Jackson Jr. (D)
    • 3. William O. Lipinski (D)
    • 4. Luis V. Gutierrez (D)
    • 5. Rod R. Blagojevich (D)
    • 6. Henry J. Hyde (R)
    • 7. Danny K. Davis (D)
    • 8. Philip M. Crane (R)
    • 9. Jan Schakowsky (D)
    • 10. Mark Steven Kirk (R)
    • 11. Jerry Weller (R)
    • 12. Jerry F. Costello (D)
    • 13. Judy Biggert (R)
    • 14. J. Dennis Hastert (R)
    • 15. Timothy V. Johnson (R)
    • 16. Donald Manzullo (R)
    • 17. Lane Evans (D)
    • 18. Ray LaHood (R)
    • 19. David Phelps (D)
    • 20. John Shimkus (R)

    Indiana

    • 1. Peter J. Visclosky (D)
    • 2. Mike Pence (R)
    • 3. Tim Roemer (D)
    • 4. Mark Souder (R)
    • 5. Steve Buyer (R)
    • 6. Dan Burton (R)
    • 7. Brian Kerns (R)
    • 8. John Hostettler (R)
    • 9. Baron P. Hill (D)
    • 10. Julia Carson (D)

    Iowa

    • 1. Jim Leach (R)
    • 2. Jim Nussle (R)
    • 3. Leonard L. Boswell (D)
    • 4. Greg Ganske (R)
    • 5. Tom Latham (R)

    Kansas

    • 1. Jerry Moran (R)
    • 2. Jim Ryun (R)
    • 3. Dennis Moore (D)
    • 4. Todd Tiahrt (R)

    Kentucky

    • 1. Edward Whitfield (R)
    • 2. Ron Lewis (R)
    • 3. Anne M. Northup (R)
    • 4. Ken Lucas (D)
    • 5. Harold Rogers (R)
    • 6. Ernie Fletcher (R)

    Louisiana

    • 1. David Vitter (R)
    • 2. William J. Jefferson (D)
    • 3. W.J. “Billy” Tauzin (R)
    • 4. Jim McCrery (R)
    • 5. John Cooksey (R)
    • 6. Richard H. Baker (R)
    • 7. Chris John (D)

    Maine

    • 1. Tom Allen (D)
    • 2. John Baldacci (D)

    Maryland

    • 1. Wayne T. Gilchrest (R)
    • 2. Robert L. Ehrlich Jr. (R)
    • 3. Benjamin L. Cardin (D)
    • 4. Albert R. Wynn (D)
    • 5. Steny H. Hoyer (D)
    • 6. Roscoe G. Bartlett (R)
    • 7. Elijah E. Cummings (D)
    • 8. Constance A. Morella (R)

    Massachusetts

    • 1. John W. Olver (D)
    • 2. Richard E. Neal (D)
    • 3. Jim McGovern (D)
    • 4. Barney Frank (D)
    • 5. Martin T. Meehan (D)
    • 6. John F. Tierney (D)
    • 7. Edward J. Markey (D)
    • 8. Michael E. Capuano (D)
    • 9. Joe Moakley (D)
    • (died May 28, 2001)
    • Stephen F. Lynch (D)
    • (sworn in Oct. 23, 2001)
    • 10. William Delahunt (D)

    Michigan

    • 1. Bart Stupak (D)
    • 2. Peter Hoekstra (R)
    • 3. Vernon J. Ehlers (R)
    • 4. Dave Camp (R)
    • 5. James A. Barcia (D)
    • 6. Fred Upton (R)
    • 7. Nick Smith (R)
    • 8. Mike Rogers (R)
    • ++++++++9. Dale E. Kildee (D)
    • 10. David E. Bonior (D)
    • 11. Joe Knollenberg (R)
    • 12. Sander M. Levin (D)
    • 13. Lynn Rivers (D)
    • 14. John Conyers Jr. (D)
    • 15. Carolyn Cheeks Kilpatrick (D)
    • 16. John D. Dingell (D)

    Minnesota

    • 1. Gil Gutknecht (R)
    • 2. Mark Kennedy (R)
    • 3. Jim Ramstad (R)
    • 4. Betty McCollum (D)
    • 5. Martin Olav Sabo (D)
    • 6. William P. “Bill” Luther (D)
    • 7. Collin C. Peterson (D)
    • 8. James L. Oberstar (D)

    Mississippi

    • 1. Roger Wicker (R)
    • 2. Bennie Thompson (D)
    • 3. Charles W. “Chip” Pickering Jr. (R)
    • 4. Ronnie Shows (D)
    • 5. Gene Taylor (D)

    Missouri

    • 1. William Lacy Clay (D)
    • 2. Todd Akin (R)
    • 3. Richard A. Gephardt (D)
    • 4. Ike Skelton (D)
    • 5. Karen McCarthy (D)
    • 6. Sam Graves (R)
    • 7. Roy Blunt (R)
    • 8. Jo Ann Emerson (R)
    • 9. Kenny Hulshof (R)

    Montana

    • AL Denny Rehberg (R)

    Nebraska

    • 1. Doug Bereuter (R)
    • 2. Lee Terry (R)
    • 3. Tom Osborne (R)

    Nevada

    • 1. Shelley Berkley (D)
    • 2. Jim Gibbons (R)

    New Hampshire

    • 1. John E. Sununu (R)
    • 2. Charles Bass (R)

    New Jersey

    • 1. Robert E. Andrews (D)
    • 2. Frank A. LoBiondo (R)
    • 3. H. James Saxton (R)
    • 4. Christopher H. Smith (R)
    • 5. Marge Roukema (R)
    • 6. Frank Pallone Jr. (D)
    • 7. Mike Ferguson (R)
    • 8. Bill Pascrell Jr. (D)
    • 9. Steven R. Rothman (D)
    • 10. Donald M. Payne (D)
    • 11. Rodney Frelinghuysen (R)
    • 12. Rush D. Holt (D)
    • 13. Robert Menendez (D)

    New Mexico

    • 1. Heather A. Wilson (R)
    • 2. Joseph R. Skeen (R)
    • 3. Tom Udall (D)

    New York

    • 1. Felix J. Grucci Jr. (R)
    • 2. Steve Israel (D)
    • 3. Peter T. King (R)
    • 4. Carolyn McCarthy (D)
    • 5. Gary L. Ackerman (D)
    • 6. Gregory W. Meeks (D)
    • 7. Joseph Crowley (D)
    • 8. Jerrold Nadler (D)
    • 9. Anthony Weiner (D)
    • 10. Edolphus Towns (D)
    • 11. Major R. Owens (D)
    • 12. Nydia M. Velázquez (D)
    • 13. Vito J. Fossella (R)
    • 14. Carolyn B. Maloney (D)
    • 15. Charles B. Rangel (D)
    • 16. Jose E. Serrano (D)
    • 17. Eliot L. Engel (D)
    • 18. Nita M. Lowey (D)
    • 19. Sue W. Kelly (R)
    • 20. Benjamin A. Gilman (R)
    • 21. Michael R. McNulty (D)
    • 22. John E. Sweeney (R)
    • 23. Sherwood Boehlert (R)
    • 24. John M. McHugh (R)
    • 25. James T. Walsh (R)
    • 26. Maurice D. Hinchey (D)
    • 27. Thomas M. Reynolds (R)
    • 28. Louise M. Slaughter (D)
    • 29. John J. LaFalce (D)
    • 30. Jack Quinn (R)
    • 31. Amo Houghton (R)

    North Carolina

    • 1. Eva Clayton (D)
    • 2. Bob Etheridge (D)
    • 3. Walter B. Jones (R)
    • 4. David E. Price (D)
    • 5. Richard M. Burr (R)
    • 6. Howard Coble (R)
    • 7. Mike McIntyre (D)
    • 8. Robin Hayes (R)
    • 9. Sue Myrick (R)
    • 10. Cass Ballenger (R)
    • 11. Charles H. Taylor (R)
    • 12. Melvin Watt (D)

    North Dakota

    • AL Earl Pomeroy (D)

    Ohio

    • 1. Steve Chabot (R)
    • 2. Rob Portman (R)
    • 3. Tony P. Hall (D)
    • (resigned Sept. 9, 2002)
    • 4. Michael G. Oxley (R)
    • 5. Paul E. Gillmor (R)
    • 6. Ted Strickland (D)
    • 7. David L. Hobson (R)
    • 8. John A. Boehner (R)
    • 9. Marcy Kaptur (D)
    • 10. Dennis J. Kucinich (D)
    • 11. Stephanie Tubbs Jones (D)
    • 12. Pat Tiberi (R)
    • 13. Sherrod Brown (D)
    • 14. Tom Sawyer (D)
    • 15. Deborah Pryce (R)
    • 16. Ralph Regula (R)
    • 17. James A. Traficant Jr. (D)
    • (expelled July 24, 2002)
    • 18. Bob Ney (R)
    • 19. Steven C. LaTourette (R)

    Oklahoma

    • 1. Steve Largent (R)
    • (resigned Feb. 15, 2002)
    • John Sullivan (R)
    • (sworn in Feb. 27, 2002)
    • 2. Brad Carson (D)
    • 3. Wes Watkins (R)
    • 4. J.C. Watts Jr. (R)
    • 5. Ernest Istook (R)
    • 6. Frank D. Lucas (R)

    Oregon

    • 1. David Wu (D)
    • 2. Greg Walden (R)
    • 3. Earl Blumenauer (D)
    • 4. Peter A. DeFazio (D)
    • 5. Darlene Hooley (D)

    Pennsylvania

    • 1. Robert A. Brady (D)
    • 2. Chaka Fattah (D)
    • 3. Robert A. Borski (D)
    • 4. Melissa A. Hart (R)
    • 5. John E. Peterson (R)
    • 6. Tim Holden (D)
    • 7. Curt Weldon (R)
    • 8. James C. Greenwood (R)
    • 9. E.G. “Bud” Shuster (R)
    • (resigned Feb. 13, 2001)
    • Bill Shuster (R)
    • (sworn in May 17, 2001)
    • 10. Donald L. Sherwood (R)
    • 11. Paul E. Kanjorski (D)
    • 12. John P. Murtha (D)
    • 13. Joseph M. Hoeffel (D)
    • 14. William J. Coyne (D)
    • 15. Patrick J. Toomey (R)
    • 16. Joseph R. Pitts (R)
    • 17. George W. Gekas (R)
    • 18. Mike Doyle (D)
    • 19. Todd R. Platts (R)
    • 20. Frank R. Mascara (D)
    • 21. Phil English (R)

    Rhode Island

    • 1. Patrick J. Kennedy (D)
    • 2. Jim Langevin (D)

    South Carolina

    • 1. Henry E. Brown Jr. (R)
    • 2. Floyd Spence (R)
    • (died Aug. 16, 2001)
    • Joe Wilson (R)
    • (sworn in Dec. 19, 2001)
    • 3. Lindsey Graham (R)
    • 4. Jim DeMint (R)
    • 5. John M. Spratt Jr. (D)
    • 6. James E. Clyburn (D)

    South Dakota

    • AL John Thune (R)

    Tennessee

    • 1. William L. Jenkins (R)
    • 2. John J. “Jimmy” Duncan Jr. (R)
    • 3. Zach Wamp (R)
    • 4. Van Hilleary (R)
    • 5. Bob Clement (D)
    • 6. Bart Gordon (D)
    • 7. Ed Bryant (R)
    • 8. John Tanner (D)
    • 9. Harold E. Ford Jr. (D)

    Texas

    • 1. Max Sandlin (D)
    • 2. James Turner (D)
    • 3. Sam Johnson (R)
    • 4. Ralph M. Hall (D)
    • 5. Pete Sessions (R)
    • 6. Joe L. Barton (R)
    • 7. John Culberson (R)
    • 8. Kevin Brady (R)
    • 9. Nick Lampson (D)
    • 10. Lloyd Doggett (D)
    • 11. Chet Edwards (D)
    • 12. Kay Granger (R)
    • 13. William M. “Mac” Thornberry (R)
    • 14. Ron Paul (R)
    • 15. Rub Hinojosa (D)
    • 16. Silvestre Reyes (D)
    • 17. Charles W. Stenholm (D)
    • 18. Sheila Jackson-Lee (D)
    • 19. Larry Combest (R)
    • 20. Charlie Gonzalez (D)
    • 21. Lamar Smith (R)
    • 22. Tom DeLay (R)
    • 23. Henry Bonilla (R)
    • 24. Martin Frost (D)
    • 25. Ken Bentsen (D)
    • 26. Richard Armey (R)
    • 27. Solomon P. Ortiz (D)
    • 28. Ciro D. Rodriguez (D)
    • 29. Gene Green (D)
    • 30. Eddie Bernice Johnson (D)

    Utah

    • 1. James V. Hansen (R)
    • 2. Jim Matheson (D)
    • 3. Christopher B. Cannon (R)

    Vermont

    • AL Bernard Sanders (I)

    Virginia

    • 1. Jo Ann Davis (R)
    • 2. Ed Schrock (R)
    • 3. Robert C. Scott (D)
    • 4. Norman Sisisky (D)
    • (died March 29, 2001)
    • J. Randy Forbes (R)
    • (sworn in June 26, 2001)
    • 5. Virgil H. Goode Jr. (I) 1
    • 6. Robert W. Goodlatte (R)
    • 7. Eric Cantor (R)
    • 8. James P. Moran (D)
    • 9. Rick C. Boucher (D)
    • 10. Frank R. Wolf (R)
    • 11. Thomas M. Davis III (R)

    Washington

    • 1. Jay Inslee (D)
    • 2. Rick Larsen (D)
    • 3. Brian Baird (D)
    • 4. Richard “Doc” Hastings (R)
    • 5. George Nethercutt (R)
    • 6. Norm Dicks (D)
    • 7. Jim McDermott (D)
    • 8. Jennifer Dunn (R)
    • 9. Adam Smith (D)

    West Virginia

    • 1. Alan B. Mollohan (D)
    • 2. Shelley Moore Capito (R)
    • 3. Nick J. Rahall II (D)

    Wisconsin

    • 1. Paul D. Ryan (R)
    • 2. Tammy Baldwin (D)
    • 3. Ron Kind (D)
    • 4. Gerald D. Kleczka (D)
    • 5. Thomas M. Barrett (D)
    • 6. Thomas E. Petri (R)
    • 7. David R. Obey (D)
    • 8. Mark Green (R)
    • 9. F. James Sensenbrenner Jr. (R)

    Wyoming

    • AL Cubin Barbara (R)

    note: Changes that occurred during 2001 and 2002 are noted following the names of individuals who did not serve out their full terms. Members of the 107th Congress also included delegates Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, D-American Samoa; Eleanor Holmes Norton, D-District of Columbia; Robert Underwood, D-Guam; Donna M.C. Christian, D-Virgin Islands; and resident commissioner Anibal Acevedo-Vilá, D-Puerto Rico.

    Goode switched from Independent to Republican on Aug. 1, 2002.

    Membership Changes, 107th and 108th Congresses

    Senate Membership in the 108th Congress

    Lineup as of Jan. 3, 2003: Republicans 51, Democrats 48; Independent 1

    Alabama

    • Richard C. Shelby (R)
    • Jeff Sessions (R)

    Alaska

    • Ted Stevens (R)
    • Lisa Murkowski (R)

    Arizona

    • John McCain (R)
    • Jon Kyl (R)

    Arkansas

    • Blanche Lincoln (D)
    • Mark Pryor (D)

    California

    • Dianne Feinstein (D)
    • Barbara Boxer (D)

    Colorado

    • Ben Nighthorse Campbell (R)
    • Wayne Allard (R)

    Connecticut

    • Christopher J. Dodd (D)
    • Joseph I. Lieberman (D)

    Delaware

    • Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D)
    • Thomas R. Carper (D)

    Florida

    • Bob Graham (D)
    • Bill Nelson (D)

    Georgia

    • Zell Miller (D)
    • Saxby Chambliss (R)

    Hawaii

    • Daniel K. Inouye (D)
    • Daniel K. Akaka (D)

    Idaho

    • Larry E. Craig (R)
    • Michael D. Crapo (R)

    Illinois

    • Richard J. Durbin (D)
    • Peter Fitzgerald (R)

    Indiana

    • Richard G. Lugar (R)
    • Evan Bayh (D)

    Iowa

    • Charles E. Grassley (R)
    • Tom Harkin (D)

    Kansas

    • Sam Brownback (R)
    • Pat Roberts (R)

    Kentucky

    • Mitch McConnell (R)
    • Jim Bunning (R)

    Louisiana

    • John B. Breaux (D)
    • Mary L. Landrieu (D)

    Maine

    • Olympia J. Snowe (R)
    • Susan Collins (R)

    Maryland

    • Paul S. Sarbanes (D)
    • Barbara A. Mikulski (D)

    Massachusetts

    • Edward M. Kennedy (D)
    • John F. Kerry (D)

    Michigan

    • Carl Levin (D)
    • Debbie Stabenow (D)

    Minnesota

    • Mark Dayton (D)
    • Norm Coleman (R)

    Mississippi

    • Thad Cochran (R)
    • Trent Lott (R)

    Missouri

    • Christopher S. Bond (R)
    • Jim Talent (R)

    Montana

    • Max Baucus (D)
    • Conrad Burns (R)

    Nebraska

    • Chuck Hagel (R)
    • Ben Nelson (D)

    Nevada

    • Harry Reid (D)
    • John Ensign (R)

    New Hampshire

    • Judd Gregg (R)
    • John E. Sununu (R)

    New Jersey

    • Jon Corzine (D)
    • Frank R. Lautenberg (D)

    New Mexico

    • Pete V. Domenici (R)
    • Jeff Bingaman (D)

    New York

    • Charles E. Schumer (D)
    • Hillary Rodham Clinton (D)

    North Carolina

    • John Edwards (D)
    • Elizabeth Dole (R)

    North Dakota

    • Kent Conrad (D)
    • Byron L. Dorgan (D)

    Ohio

    • Mike DeWine (R)
    • George V. Voinovich (R)

    Oklahoma

    • Don Nickles (R)
    • James M. Inhofe (R)

    Oregon

    • Ron Wyden (D)
    • Gordon H. Smith (R)

    Pennsylvania

    • Arlen Specter (R)
    • Rick Santorum (R)

    Rhode Island

    • Jack Reed (D)
    • Lincoln Chafee (R)

    South Carolina

    • Ernest F. Hollings (D)
    • Lindsey Graham (R)

    South Dakota

    • Tom Daschle (D)
    • Tim Johnson (D)

    Tennessee

    • Bill Frist (R)
    • Lamar Alexander (R)

    Texas

    • Kay Bailey Hutchison (R)
    • John Cornyn (R)

    Utah

    • Orrin G. Hatch (R)
    • Robert F. Bennett (R)

    Vermont

    • Patrick J. Leahy (D)
    • James M. Jeffords (I)

    Virginia

    • John W. Warner (R)
    • George F. Allen (R)

    Washington

    • Patty Murray (D)
    • Maria Cantwell (D)

    West Virginia

    • Robert C. Byrd (D)
    • John D. Rockefeller IV (D)

    Wisconsin

    • Herb Kohl (D)
    • Russell D. Feingold (D)

    Wyoming

    • Craig Thomas (R)
    • Michael B. Enzi (R)
    House Membership in the 108th Congress

    Lineup as of Jan. 3, 2003: Republicans 229, Democrats 205, Independent 1

    Alabama

    • 1. Jo Bonner (R)
    • 2. Terry Everett (R)
    • 3. Mike D. Rogers (R)
    • 4. Robert B. Aderholt (R)
    • 5. Robert E. “Bud” Cramer (D)
    • 6. Spencer Bachus (R)
    • 7. Artur Davis (D)

    Alaska

    • AL Don Young (R)

    Arizona

    • 1. Rick Renzi (R)
    • 2. Trent Franks (R)
    • 3. John Shadegg (R)
    • 4. Ed Pastor (D)
    • 5. J.D. Hayworth (R)
    • 6. Jeff Flake (R)
    • 7. Raul M. Grijalva (D)
    • 8. Jim Kolbe (R)

    Arkansas

    • 1. Marion Berry (D)
    • 2. Vic Snyder (D)
    • 3. John Boozman (R)
    • 4. Mike Ross (D)

    California

    • 1. Mike Thompson (D)
    • 2. Wally Herger (R)
    • 3. Doug Ose (R)
    • 4. John T. Doolittle (R)
    • 5. Robert T. Matsui (D)
    • 6. Lynn Woolsey (D)
    • 7. George Miller (D)
    • 8. Nancy Pelosi (D)
    • 9. Barbara Lee (D)
    • 10. Ellen O. Tauscher (D)
    • 11. Richard W. Pombo (R)
    • 12. Tom Lantos (D)
    • 13. Pete Stark (D)
    • 14. Anna G. Eshoo (D)
    • 15. Michael M. Honda (D)
    • 16. Zoe Lofgren (D)
    • 17. Sam Farr (D)
    • 18. Dennis Cardoza (D)
    • 19. George P. Radanovich (R)
    • 20. Cal Dooley (D)
    • 21. Devin Nunes (R)
    • 22. Bill Thomas (R)
    • 23. Lois Capps (D)
    • 24. Elton Gallegly (R)
    • 25. Howard P. “Buck” McKeon (R)
    • 26. David Dreier (R)
    • 27. Brad Sherman (D)
    • 28. Howard L. Berman (D)
    • 29. Adam B. Schiff (D)
    • 30. Henry A. Waxman (D)
    • 31. Xavier Becerra (D)
    • 32. Hilda L. Solis (D)
    • 33. Diane Watson (D)
    • 34. Lucille Roybal-Allard (D)
    • 35. Maxine Waters (D)
    • 36. Jane Harman (D)
    • 37. Juanita Millender-McDonald (D)
    • 38. Grace F. Napolitano (D)
    • 39. Linda T. Sanchez (D)
    • 40. Ed Royce (R)
    • 41. Jerry Lewis (R)
    • 42. Gary G. Miller (R)
    • 43. Joe Baca (D)
    • 44. Ken Calvert (R)
    • 45. Mary Bono (R)
    • 46. Dana Rohrabacher (R)
    • 47. Loretta Sanchez (D)
    • 48. Christopher Cox (R)
    • 49. Darrell Issa (R)
    • 50. Randy “Duke” Cunningham (R)
    • 51. Bob Filner (D)
    • 52. Duncan Hunter (R)
    • 53. Susan A. Davis (D)

    Colorado

    • 1. Diana DeGette (D)
    • 2. Mark Udall (D)
    • 3. Scott McInnis (R)
    • 4. Marilyn Musgrave (R)
    • 5. Joel Hefley (R)
    • 6. Tom Tancredo (R)
    • 7. Bob Beauprez (R)

    Connecticut

    • 1. John B. Larson (D)
    • 2. Rob Simmons (R)
    • 3. Rosa DeLauro (D)
    • 4. Christopher Shays (R)
    • 5. Nancy L. Johnson (R)

    Delaware

    • AL Michael Castle (R)

    Florida

    • 1. Jeff Miller (R)
    • 2. Allen Boyd (D)
    • 3. Corrine Brown (D)
    • 4. Ander Crenshaw (R)
    • 5. Ginny Brown-Waite (R)
    • 6. Clifford B. Stearns (R)
    • 7. John L. Mica (R)
    • 8. Ric Keller (R)
    • 9. Michael Bilirakis (R)
    • 10. C.W. Bill Young (R)
    • 11. Jim Davis (D)
    • 12. Adam H. Putnam (R)
    • 13. Katherine Harris (R)
    • 14. Porter Goss (R)
    • (resigned Sept. 23, 2004)
    • 15. Dave Weldon (R)
    • 16. Mark Foley (R)
    • 17. Kendrick B. Meek (D)
    • 18. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R)
    • 19. Robert Wexler (D)
    • 20. Peter Deutsch (D)
    • 21. Lincoln Diaz-Balart (R)
    • 22. E. Clay Shaw Jr. (R)
    • 23. Alcee L. Hastings (D)
    • 24. Tom Feeney (R)
    • 25. Mario Diaz-Balart (R)

    Georgia

    • 1. Jack Kingston (R)
    • 2. Sanford D. Bishop Jr. (D)
    • 3. Jim Marshall (D)
    • 4. Denise L. Majette (D)
    • 5. John Lewis (D)
    • 6. Johnny Isakson (R)
    • 7. John Linder (R)
    • 8. Mac Collins (R)
    • 9. Charlie Norwood (R)
    • 10. Nathan Deal (R)
    • 11. Phil Gingrey (R)
    • 12. Max Burns (R)
    • 13. David Scott (D)

    Hawaii

    • 1. Neil Abercrombie (D)
    • 2. Ed Case (D)

    Idaho

    • 1. C.L. “Butch” Otter (R)
    • 2. Mike Simpson (R)

    Illinois

    • 1. Bobby L. Rush (D)
    • 2. Jesse L. Jackson Jr. (D)
    • 3. William O. Lipinski (D)
    • 4. Luis V. Gutierrez (D)
    • 5. Rahm Emanuel (D)
    • 6. Henry J. Hyde (R)
    • 7. Danny K. Davis (D)
    • 8. Philip M. Crane (R)
    • 9. Jan Schakowsky (D)
    • 10. Mark Steven Kirk (R)
    • 11. Jerry Weller (R)
    • 12. Jerry F. Costello (D)
    • 13. Judy Biggert (R)
    • 14. J. Dennis Hastert (R)
    • 15. Timothy V. Johnson (R)
    • 16. Donald Manzullo (R)
    • 17. Lane Evans (D)
    • 18. Ray LaHood (R)
    • 19. John Shimkus (R)

    Indiana

    • 1. Peter J. Visclosky (D)
    • 2. Chris Chocola (R)
    • 3. Mark Souder (R)
    • 4. Steve Buyer (R)
    • 5. Dan Burton (R)
    • 6. Mike Pence (R)
    • 7. Julia Carson (D)
    • 8. John Hostettler (R)
    • 9. Baron P. Hill (D)

    Iowa

    • 1. Jim Nussle (R)
    • 2. Jim Leach (R)
    • 3. Leonard L. Boswell (D)
    • 4. Tom Latham (R)
    • 5. Steve King (R)

    Kansas

    • 1. Jerry Moran (R)
    • 2. Jim Ryun (R)
    • 3. Dennis Moore (D)
    • 4. Todd Tiahrt (R)

    Kentucky

    • 1. Edward Whitfield (R)
    • 2. Ron Lewis (R)
    • 3. Anne M. Northup (R)
    • 4. Ken Lucas (D)
    • 5. Harold Rogers (R)
    • 6. Ernest Fletcher (R)
    • (resigned Dec. 8, 2003)
    • Ben Chandler (D)
    • (sworn in Feb. 24, 2004)

    Louisiana

    • 1. David Vitter (R)
    • 2. William J. Jefferson (D)
    • 3. W. J. “Billy” Tauzin (R)
    • 4. Jim McCrery (R)
    • 5. Rodney Alexander (D) 1
    • 6. Richard H. Baker (R)
    • 7. Chris John (D)

    Maine

    • 1. Tom Allen (D)
    • 2. Michael H. Michaud (D)

    Maryland

    • 1. Wayne T. Gilchrest (R)
    • 2. C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger (D)
    • 3. Benjamin L. Cardin (D)
    • 4. Albert R. Wynn (D)
    • 5. Steny H. Hoyer (D)
    • 6. Roscoe G. Bartlett (R)
    • 7. Elijah E. Cummings (D)
    • 8. Chris Van Hollen (D)

    Massachusetts

    • 1. John W. Olver (D)
    • 2. Richard E. Neal (D)
    • 3. Jim McGovern (D)
    • 4. Barney Frank (D)
    • 5. Martin T. Meehan (D)
    • 6. John F. Tierney (D)
    • 7. Edward J. Markey (D)
    • 8. Michael E. Capuano (D)
    • 9. Stephen L. Lynch (D)
    • 10. William Delahunt (D)

    Michigan

    • 1. Bart Stupak (D)
    • 2. Peter Hoekstra (R)
    • 3. Vernon J. Ehlers (R)
    • 4. Dave Camp (R)
    • 5. Dale E. Kildee (D)
    • 6. Fred Upton (R)
    • 7. Nick Smith (R)
    • 8. Mike Rogers (R)
    • 9. Joe Knollenberg (R)
    • 10. Candice S. Miller (R)
    • 11. Thaddeus McCotter (R)
    • 12. Sander M. Levin (D)
    • 13. Carolyn Cheeks Kilpatrick (D)
    • 14. John Conyers Jr. (D)
    • 15. John D. Dingell (D)

    Minnesota

    • 1. Gil Gutknecht (R)
    • 2. John Kline (R)
    • 3. Jim Ramstad (R)
    • 4. Betty McCollum (D)
    • 5. Martin Olav Sabo (D)
    • 6. Mark Kennedy (R)
    • 7. Collin C. Peterson (D)
    • 8. James L. Oberstar (D)

    Mississippi

    • 1. Roger Wicker (R)
    • 2. Bennie Thompson (D)
    • 3. Charles W. “Chip” Pickering Jr. (R)
    • 4. Gene Taylor (D)

    Missouri

    • 1. William Lacy Clay (D)
    • 2. Todd Akin (R)
    • 3. Richard A. Gephardt (D)
    • 4. Ike Skelton (D)
    • 5. Karen McCarthy (D)
    • 6. Sam Graves (R)
    • 7. Roy Blunt (R)
    • 8. Jo Ann Emerson (R)
    • 9. Kenny Hulshof (R)

    Montana

    • AL Denny Rehberg (R)

    Nebraska

    • 1. Doug Bereuter (R)
    • (resigned Aug. 31, 2004)
    • 2. Lee Terry (R)
    • 3. Tom Osborne (R)

    Nevada

    • 1. Shelley Berkley (D)
    • 2. Jim Gibbons (R)
    • 3. Jon Porter (R)

    New Hampshire

    • 1. Jeb Bradley (R)
    • 2. Charles Bass (R)

    New Jersey

    • 1. Robert E. Andrews (D)
    • 2. Frank A. LoBiondo (R)
    • 3. H. James Saxton (R)
    • 4. Christopher H. Smith (R)
    • 5. Scott Garrett (R)
    • 6. Frank Pallone Jr. (D)
    • 7. Mike Ferguson (R)
    • 8. Bill Pascrell Jr. (D)
    • 9. Steven R. Rothman (D)
    • 10. Donald M. Payne (D)
    • 11. Rodney Frelinghuysen (R)
    • 12. Rush D. Holt (D)
    • 13. Robert Menendez (D)

    New Mexico

    • 1. Heather A. Wilson (R)
    • 2. Steve Pearce (R)
    • 3. Tom Udall (D)

    New York

    • 1. Timothy H. Bishop (D)
    • 2. Steve Israel (D)
    • 3. Peter T. King (R)
    • 4. Carolyn McCarthy (D)
    • 5. Gary L. Ackerman (D)
    • 6. Gregory W. Meeks (D)
    • 7. Joseph Crowley (D)
    • 8. Jerrold Nadler (D)
    • 9. Anthony Weiner (D)
    • 10. Edolphus Towns (D)
    • 11. Major R. Owens (D)
    • 12. Nydia M. Velázquez (D)
    • 13. Vito J. Fossella (R)
    • 14. Carolyn B. Maloney (D)
    • 15. Charles B. Rangel (D)
    • 16. Jose E. Serrano (D)
    • 17. Eliot L. Engel (D)
    • 18. Nita M. Lowey (D)
    • 19. Sue W. Kelly (R)
    • 20. John E. Sweeney (R)
    • 21. Michael R. McNulty (D)
    • 22. Maurice D. Hinchey (D)
    • 23. John M. McHugh (R)
    • 24. Sherwood Boehlert (R)
    • 25. James T. Walsh (R)
    • 26. Thomas M. Reynolds (R)
    • 27. Jack Quinn (R)
    • 28. Louise M. Slaughter (D)
    • 29. Amo Houghton (R)

    North Carolina

    • 1. Frank W. Ballance Jr. (D)
    • (resigned June 11, 2004)
    • G. K. Butterfield (D)
    • (sworn in July 21, 2004)
    • 2. Bob Etheridge (D)
    • 3. Walter B. Jones (R)
    • 4. David E. Price (D)
    • 5. Richard M. Burr (R)
    • 6. Howard Coble (R)
    • 7. Mike McIntyre (D)
    • 8. Robin Hayes (R)
    • 9. Sue Myrick (R)
    • 10. Cass Ballenger (R)
    • 11. Charles H. Taylor (R)
    • 12. Melvin Watt (D)
    • 13. Brad Miller (D)

    North Dakota

    • AL Earl Pomeroy (D)

    Ohio

    • 1. Steve Chabot (R)
    • 2. Rob Portman (R)
    • 3. Michael R. Turner (R)
    • 4. Michael G. Oxley (R)
    • 5. Paul E. Gillmor (R)
    • 6. Ted Strickland (D)
    • 7. David L. Hobson (R)
    • 8. John A. Boehner (R)
    • 9. Marcy Kaptur (D)
    • 10. Dennis J. Kucinich (D)
    • 11. Stephanie Tubbs Jones (D)
    • 12. Pat Tiberi (R)
    • 13. Sherrod Brown (D)
    • 14. Steven C. LaTourette (R)
    • 15. Deborah Pryce (R)
    • 16. Ralph Regula (R)
    • 17. Tim Ryan (D)
    • 18. Bob Ney (R)

    Oklahoma

    • 1. John Sullivan (R)
    • 2. Brad Carson (D)
    • 3. Frank D. Lucas (R)
    • 4. Tom Cole (R)
    • 5. Ernest Istook (R)

    Oregon

    • 1. David Wu (D)
    • 2. Greg Walden (R)
    • 3. Earl Blumenauer (D)
    • 4. Peter A. DeFazio (D)
    • 5. Darlene Hooley (D)

    Pennsylvania

    • 1. Robert A. Brady (D)
    • 2. Chaka Fattah (D)
    • 3. Phil English (R)
    • 4. Melissa A. Hart (R)
    • 5. John E. Peterson (R)
    • 6. Jim Gerlach (R)
    • 7. Curt Weldon (R)
    • 8. James C. Greenwood (R)
    • 9. Bill Shuster (R)
    • 10. Don Sherwood (R)
    • 11. Paul E. Kanjorski (D)
    • 12. John P. Murtha (D)
    • 13. Joseph M. Hoeffel (D)
    • 14. Mike Doyle (D)
    • 15. Patrick J. Toomey (R)
    • 16. Joe Pitts (R)
    • 17. Tim Holden (D)
    • 18. Tim Murphy (R)
    • 19. Todd R. Platts (R)

    Rhode Island

    • 1. Patrick J. Kennedy (D)
    • 2. Jim Langevin (D)

    South Carolina

    • 1. Henry E. Brown Jr. (R)
    • 2. Joe Wilson (R)
    • 3. J. Gresham Barrett (R)
    • 4. Jim DeMint (R)
    • 5. John M. Spratt Jr. (D)
    • 6. James E. Clyburn (D)

    South Dakota

    • AL William J. Janklow (R)
    • (resigned Jan. 20, 2004)
    • Stephanie Herseth (D)
    • (sworn in June 3, 2004)

    Tennessee

    • 1. William L. Jenkins (R)
    • 2. John J. “Jimmy” Duncan Jr. (R)
    • 3. Zach Wamp (R)
    • 4. Lincoln Davis (D)
    • 5. Jim Cooper (D)
    • 6. Bart Gordon (D)
    • 7. Marsha Blackburn (R)
    • 8. John Tanner (D)
    • 9. Harold E. Ford Jr. (D)

    Texas

    • 1. Max Sandlin (D)
    • 2. Jim Turner (D)
    • 3. Sam Johnson (R)
    • 4. Ralph M. Hall (R) 1
    • 5. Jeb Hensarling (R)
    • 6. Joe L. Barton (R)
    • 7. John Culberson (R)
    • 8. Kevin Brady (R)
    • 9. Nick Lampson (D)
    • 10. Lloyd Doggett (D)
    • 11. Chet Edwards (D)
    • 12. Kay Granger (R)
    • 13. William M. “Mac” Thornberry (R)
    • 14. Ron Paul (R)
    • 15. Ruben Hinojosa (D)
    • 16. Silvestre Reyes (D)
    • 17. Charles W. Stenholm (D)
    • 18. Sheila Jackson-Lee (D)
    • 19. Larry Combest (R)
    • (resigned May 31, 2003)
    • Randy Neugebauer (R)
    • (sworn in June 5, 2003)
    • 20. Charlie Gonzalez (D)
    • 21. Lamar Smith (R)
    • 22. Tom DeLay (R)
    • 23. Henry Bonilla (R)
    • 24. Martin Frost (D)
    • 25. Chris Bell (D)
    • 26. Michael C. Burgess (R)
    • 27. Solomon P. Ortiz (D)
    • 28. Ciro D. Rodriguez (D)
    • 29. Gene Green (D)
    • 30. Eddie Bernice Johnson (D)
    • 31. John Carter (R)
    • 32. Pete Sessions (R)

    Utah

    • 1. Rob Bishop (R)
    • 2. Jim Matheson (D)
    • 3. Christopher B. Cannon (R)

    Vermont

    • AL Bernard Sanders (I)

    Virginia

    • 1. Jo Ann Davis (R)
    • 2. Ed Schrock (R)
    • 3. Robert C. Scott (D)
    • 4. J. Randy Forbes (R)
    • 5. Virgil H. Goode Jr. (R)
    • 6. Robert W. Goodlatte (R)
    • 7. Eric Cantor (R)
    • 8. James P. Moran (D)
    • 9. Rick C. Boucher (D)
    • 10. Frank R. Wolf (R)
    • 11. Thomas M. Davis III (R)

    Washington

    • 1. Jay Inslee (D)
    • 2. Rick Larsen (D)
    • 3. Brian Baird (D)
    • 4. Richard “Doc” Hastings (R)
    • 5. George Nethercutt (R)
    • 6. Norm Dicks (D)
    • 7. Jim McDermott (D)
    • 8. Jennifer Dunn (R)
    • 9. Adam Smith (D)

    West Virginia

    • 1. Alan B. Mollohan (D)
    • 2. Shelley Moore Capito (R)
    • 3. Nick J. Rahall II (D)

    Wisconsin

    • 1. Paul D. Ryan (R)
    • 2. Tammy Baldwin (D)
    • 3. Ron Kind (D)
    • 4. Gerald D. Kleczka (D)
    • 5. F. James Sensenbrenner Jr. (R)
    • 6. Tom Petri (R)
    • 7. David R. Obey (D)
    • 8. Mark Green (R)

    Wyoming

    • AL Cubin Barbara (R)

    note: Changes that occurred during 2003 and 2004 are noted following the names of individuals who did not serve out their full terms. Members of the 108th Congress also included delegates Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, D-American Samoa; Eleanor Holmes Norton, D-District of Columbia; Madeleine Z. Bordallo, D-Guam; Donna M.C. Christian, D-Virgin Islands; and resident commissioner Anibal Acevedo-Vilá, D-Puerto Rico.

    Alexander switched from Democrat to Republican on Aug. 6, 2004.

    Hall switched from Democrat to Republican on Jan. 5, 2004.

    Members of Congress, 2001–2005

    The names in this list include, alphabetically, all senators, representatives, resident commissioners and territorial delegates who served in the 107th and 108th Congresses—from Jan. 3, 2001 to Jan. 3, 2005.

    The material is organized as follows: name; relationship to other members and presidents and vice presidents; party, state (of service); date of birth; date of death (if applicable); congressional service; service as president, vice president, member of the cabinet or Supreme Court, governor, Speaker of the House, president pro tempore of the Senate, majority leader, minority leader and chairman of the Democratic or Republican National Committee.

    If the member changed parties during his or her congressional service, the party designation appearing after the member's name is that which applied at the end of such service and further information is included in the entry. Where the service date is left open, the member continued to serve in the 109th Congress (as of January 4, 2005).

    Dates of service are inclusive, starting in year of service and ending when service ends. Under the Constitution, terms of service since 1934 have been from Jan. 3 to Jan. 3. In actual practice, members have been sworn in on other dates at the beginning of a Congress. The exact date is shown (where available) if a member began or ended his or her service in midterm.

    The major sources for the following list were Congressional Quarterly's Biographical Directory of the American Congress 1774–1996; America Votes series; the CQ Almanac; American Political Leaders 1789–2000; CQ Weekly magazine and online database.

    In the list, D stands for Democrat; R, Republican, and I, Independent.

    A

    Abercrombie, Neil (D-Hawaii) June 26, 1938–; House Sept. 23, 1986–1987, 1991–.

    Acevedo-Vilá, Anibal (D-P.R.) Feb. 13, 1962–; House (Resident Commissioner) 2001–.

    Ackerman, Gary L. (D-N.Y.) Nov. 19, 1942–; House March 1, 1983–.

    Aderholt, Robert (R-Ala.) July 22, 1965–; House 1997–.

    Akaka, Daniel K. (D-Hawaii) Sept. 11, 1924–; House 1977–May 16, 1990; Senate May 16, 1990–.

    Akin, Todd (R-Mo.) July 5, 1947–; House 2001–.

    Allard, Wayne (R-Colo.) Dec. 2, 1943–; House 1991–1997; Senate 1997–.

    Allen, George F. (R-Va.) March 18, 1952–; House 1991–1993; Senate 2001–; Gov. 1994–1998.

    Allen, Thomas H. (D-Maine) April 18, 1945–; House 1997–.

    Alexander, Lamar (R-Tenn.) July 3, 1940–; Senate 2003–; Gov. 1979–1987.

    Alexander, Rodney (R-La.) Dec. 5, 1946–; House 2003–(2003–Aug. 9, 2004 Democrat).

    Andrews, Robert E. (D-N.J.) Aug. 4, 1957–; House 1990–.

    Armey, Richard (R-Texas) July 7, 1940–; House 1985–2003; House majority leader 1995–2003.

    B

    Baca, Joe (D-Calif.) Jan. 23, 1947–; House Nov. 16, 1999–.

    Bachus, Spencer (R-Ala.) Dec. 28, 1947–; House 1993–.

    Baird, Brian (D-Wash.) March 7, 1956–; House 1999–.

    Baker, Richard H. (R-La.) May 22, 1948–; House 1987–.

    Baldacci, John (D-Maine) Jan. 30, 1955–; House 1995–2003.

    Baldwin, Tammy (D-Wis.) Feb. 11, 1962–; House 1999–.

    Ballance, Frank W. Jr. (D-N.C.) Feb. 15, 1942–; House 2003–June 11, 2004.

    Ballenger, Cass (great-great grandson of Lewis Cass) (R-N.C.) Dec. 6, 1926–; House 1986–2005.

    Barcia, James A. (D-Mich.) Feb. 25, 1952–; House 1993–2003.

    Barkley, Dean (I-Minn.) Aug. 31, 1950–; Senate Nov. 12, 2002–2003.

    Barr, Bob (R-Ga.) Nov. 5, 1948–; House 1995–2003.

    Barrett, J. Gresham (R-S.C.) Feb. 14, 1961–; House 2003–.

    Barrett, Thomas M. (D-Wis.) Dec. 8, 1953–; House 1993–2003.

    Bartlett, Roscoe G. (R-Md.) June 3, 1926–; House 1993–.

    Barton, Joe L. (R-Texas) Sept. 15, 1949–; House 1985–.

    Bass, Charles (son of Perkins Bass) (R-N.H.) Jan. 8, 1952–; House 1995–.

    Baucus, Max (D-Mont.) Dec. 11, 1941–; House 1975–Dec. 14, 1978; Senate Dec. 15, 1978–.

    Bayh, Evan (son of Birch Bayh) (D-Ind.) Dec. 26, 1955–; Senate 1999–; Gov. 1989–1997.

    Beauprez, Bob (R-Colo.) Sept. 22, 1948–; House 2003–.

    Becerra, Xavier (D-Calif.) Jan. 26, 1958–; House 1993–.

    Bell, Chris (D-Texas) Nov. 23, 1959–; House 2003–2005.

    Bennett, Robert F. (R-Utah) Sept. 18, 1933–; Senate 1993–.

    Bentsen, Ken (nephew of Lloyd Bentsen) (D-Texas) June 3, 1959–; House 1995–2003.

    Bereuter, Doug (R-Neb.) Oct. 6, 1939–; House 1979–Aug. 31, 2004.

    Berkley, Shelley (D-Nev.) Jan. 21, 1951–; House 1999–.

    Berman, Howard L. (D-Calif.) April 15, 1941–; House 1983–.

    Berry, Marion (D-Ark.) Aug. 27, 1942–; House 1997–.

    Biden, Joseph R. Jr. (D-Del.) Nov. 20, 1942–; Senate 1973–.

    Biggert, Judy (R-Ill.) Aug. 15, 1937–; House 1999–.

    Bilirakis, Michael (R-Fla.) July 16, 1930–; House 1983–.

    Bingaman, Jeff (D-N.M.) Oct. 3, 1943–; Senate 1983–.

    Bishop, Rob (R-Utah) July 13, 1951–; House 2003–.

    Bishop, Sanford D. Jr. (D-Ga.) Feb. 4, 1947–; House 1993–.

    Bishop, Timothy H. (D-N.Y.) June 1, 1950–; House 2003–.

    Blackburn, Marsha (R-Tenn.) June 6, 1952–; House 2003–.

    Blagojevich, Rod R. (D-Ill.) Dec. 10, 1956–; House 1997–2003.

    Blumenauer, Earl (D-Ore.) Aug. 16, 1949–; House May 30, 1996–.

    Blunt, Roy (R-Mo.) Jan. 10, 1950–; House 1997–.

    Boehlert, Sherwood (R-N.Y.) Sept. 28, 1936–; House 1983–.

    Boehner, John A. (R-Ohio) Nov. 17, 1949–; House 1991–.

    Bond, Christopher S. (R-Mo.) March 6, 1939–; Senate 1987–.

    Bonilla, Henry (R-Texas) Jan. 2, 1954–; House 1993–.

    Bonior, David E. (D-Mich.) June 6, 1945–; House 1977–2003.

    Bonner, Jo (R-Ala.) Nov. 19, 1959–; House 2003–.

    Bono, Mary (R-Calif.) Oct. 24, 1961; House April 21, 1998–.

    Boozman, John (R-Ark.) Dec. 10, 1950–; House Nov. 29, 2001–.

    Bordallo, Madeleine Z. (D-Guam) May 31, 1933–; House (Delegate) 2003–.

    Borski, Robert A. (D-Pa.) Oct. 20, 1948–; House 1983–2003.

    Boswell, Leonard L. (D-Iowa) Jan. 10, 1934–; House 1997–.

    Boucher, Rick (D-Va.) Aug. 1, 1946–; House 1983–.

    Boxer, Barbara (D-Calif.) Nov. 11, 1940–; House 1983–1993; Senate 1993–.

    Boyd, Allen (D-Fla.) June 6, 1945–; House 1997–.

    Bradley, Jeb (R-N.H.) Oct. 20, 1952–; House 2003–.

    Brady, Kevin (R-Texas) April 11, 1955–; House 1997–.

    Brady, Robert A. (D-Pa.) April 7, 1945–; House May 28, 1998–.

    Breaux, John B. (D-La.) March 1, 1944–; House Sept. 30, 1972–1987; Senate 1987–2005.

    Brown, Corrine (D-Fla.) Nov. 11, 1946–; House 1993–.

    Brown, Henry E. Jr. (R-S.C.) Dec. 20, 1935–; House 2001–.

    Brown, Sherrod (D-Ohio) Nov. 9, 1952–; House 1993–.

    Brownback, Sam (R-Kan.) Sept. 12, 1956–; House 1995–Nov. 6, 1996; Senate Nov. 27, 1996–.

    Brown-Waite, Ginny (R-Fla.) Oct. 5, 1943–; House 2003–.

    Bryant, Ed (R-Tenn.) Sept. 7, 1948–; House 1995–2003.

    Bunning, Jim (R-Ky.) Oct. 23, 1931–; House 1987–1999; Senate 1999–.

    Burgess, Michael (R-Texas) Dec. 23, 1950–; House 2003–.

    Burns, Conrad (R-Mont.) Jan. 25, 1935–; Senate 1989–.

    Burns, Max (R-Ga.) Nov. 8, 1948–; House 2003–2005.

    Burr, Richard M. (R-N.C.) Nov. 30, 1955–; House 1995–2005; Senate 2005–.

    Burton, Dan (R-Ind.) June 21, 1938–; House 1983–.

    Butterfield, G.K. (D-N.C.) April 27, 1947–; House July 21, 2004–.

    Buyer, Steve (R-Ind.) Nov. 26, 1958–; House 1993–; Gov. 1971–1975.

    Byrd, Robert C. (D-W.Va.) Nov. 20, 1917–; House 1953–1959; Senate 1959–; Senate minority leader, 1981–1987; Senate majority leader 1977–1981, 1987–1989; pres. pro tempore 1989–1995.

    C

    Callahan, Sonny (R-Ala.) Sept. 11, 1932–; House 1985–2003.

    Calvert, Ken (R-Calif.) June 8, 1953–; House 1993–.

    Camp, Dave (R-Mich.) July 9, 1953–; House 1991–.

    Campbell, Ben Nighthorse (R-Colo.) April 13, 1933–; House 1987–1993; Senate 1993–2005 (1987–March 3, 1995, Democrat).

    Cannon, Christopher B. (R-Utah) Oct. 20, 1950–; House 1997–.

    Cantor, Eric I. (R-Va.) June 6, 1963–; House 2001–.

    Cantwell, Maria (D-Wash.) Oct. 13, 1958–; House 1993–1994; Senate 2001–.

    Capito, Shelley Moore (R-W.Va.) Nov. 26, 1953–; Houses 2001–.

    Capps, Lois D. (D-Calif.) Jan. 10, 1938–; House March 17, 1998–.

    Capuano, Michael D. (D-Mass.) Jan. 9, 1952–; House 1999–.

    Cardin, Benjamin L. (D-Md.) Oct. 5, 1943–; House 1987–.

    Cardoza, Dennis (D-Calif.) March 31, 1959–; House 2003–.

    Carnahan, Jean (D-Mo.) Dec. 20, 1933–; Senate 2001–2003.

    Carper, Thomas R. (D-Del.) Jan. 23, 1947–; House 1983–1993; Senate 2001–; Gov. 1993–2001.

    Carson, Brad (D-Okla.) March 11, 1967–; House 2001–2005.

    Carson, Julia M. (D-Ind.) July 8, 1938–; House 1997–.

    Carter, John (R-Texas) Nov. 6, 1941–; House 2003–.

    Case, Ed (D-Hawaii) Sept. 27, 1952–; House Nov. 30, 2002–

    Castle, Michael N. (R-Del.) July 2, 1939–; House 1993–.

    Chabot, Steve (R-Ohio) Jan. 22, 1953–; House 1995–.

    Chafee, Lincoln (R-R.I.) (son of John H. Chafee) March 26, 1953–; Senate Nov. 4, 1999–.

    Chambliss, Saxby (R-Ga.) Nov. 10, 1943–; House 1995–2003; Senate 2003–.

    Chandler, Ben (D-Ky.) Sept. 12, 1959–; House Feb. 24, 2004–.

    Chocola, Chris (R-Ind.) Feb. 24, 1962–; House 2003–.

    Christensen, Donna M.C. (D-Virgin Is.) Sept. 19, 1945–; House (Delegate) 1997–.

    Clay, William Lacy Jr. (son of William L. Clay) (D-Mo.) July 27, 1956–; House 2001–.

    Clayton, Eva (D-N.C.) Sept. 16, 1934–; House Nov. 4, 1992–2003.

    Cleland, Max (D-Ga.) Aug. 24, 1942–; Senate 1997–2003.

    Clement, Bob (D-Tenn.) Sept. 23, 1943–; House 1988–2003.

    Clinton, Hillary Rodham (D-N.Y.) Oct. 26, 1947–; Senate 2001–; wife of President Bill Clinton; first lady 1993–2001.

    Clyburn, James E. (D-S.C.) July 21, 1940–; House 1993–.

    Coble, Howard (R-N.C.) March 18, 1931–; House 1985–.

    Cochran, Thad (R-Miss.) Dec. 7, 1937–; House 1973–Dec. 26, 1978; Senate Dec. 27, 1978–.

    Cole, Tom (R-Okla.) April 28, 1949–; House 2003–.

    Coleman, Norm (R-Minn.) Aug. 17, 1949–; Senate 2003–.

    Collins, Mac (R-Ga.) Oct. 15, 1944–; House 1993–2005.

    Collins, Susan (R-Maine) Dec. 7, 1952–; Senate 1997–.

    Combest, Larry (R-Texas) March 20, 1945–; House 1985–May 31, 2003.

    Condit, Gary A. (D-Calif.) April 21, 1948–; House Sept. 20, 1989–2003.

    Conrad, Kent (D-N.D.) March 12, 1948–; Senate 1987–Dec. 14, 1992, Dec. 14, 1992–.

    Conyers, John Jr. (D-Mich.) May 16, 1929–; House 1965–.

    Cooksey, Jim (R-La.) Aug. 20, 1941–; House 1997–2003.

    Cooper, Jim (D-Tenn.) June 19, 1954–; House 1983–1995; 2003–.

    Cornyn, John (R-Texas) Feb. 2, 1952–; Senate Dec. 2, 2002–.

    Corzine, Jon (D-N.J.) Jan. 1, 1947–; Senate 2001–.

    Costello, Jerry F. (D-Ill.) Sept. 25, 1949–; House Aug. 11, 1988–.

    Cox, Christopher (R-Calif.) Oct. 16, 1952–; House 1989–.

    Coyne, William J. (D-Pa.) Aug. 24, 1936–; House 1981–2003.

    Craig, Larry E. (R-Idaho) July 20, 1945–; House 1981–1991; Senate 1991–.

    Cramer, Robert E. “Bud” (D-Ala.) Aug. 22, 1947–; House 1991–.

    Crane, Philip M. (brother of Daniel Bever Crane) (R-Ill.) Nov. 3, 1930–; House 1969–2005.

    Crapo, Michael D. (R-Idaho) May 20, 1951–; House 1993–1999; Senate 1999–.

    Crenshaw, Ander (R-Fla.) Sept. 1, 1944–; House 2001–.

    Crowley, Joseph (D-N.Y.) March 16, 1962–; House 1999–.

    Cubin, Barbara (R-Wyo.) Nov. 30, 1946–; House 1995–.

    Culberson, John (R-Texas) Aug. 24, 1956–; House 2001–.

    Cummings, Elijah E. (D-Md.) Jan. 18, 1951–; House April 25, 1996–.

    Cunningham, Randy “Duke” (R-Calif.) Dec. 8, 1941–; House 1991–2005.

    D

    Daschle, Tom (D-S.D.) Dec. 9, 1947–; House 1979–1987; Senate 1987–2005; Senate minority leader 1995–June 6, 2001; majority leader June 6, 2001–2003; minority leader 2003–2005.

    Davis, Artur (D-Ala.) Oct, 9, 1957–; House 2003–.

    Davis, Danny K. (D-Ill.) Sept. 6, 1941–; House 1997–.

    Davis, Jim (D-Fla.) Oct. 11, 1957–; House 1997–.

    Davis, Jo Ann (R-Va.) June 29, 1950–; House 2001–.

    Davis, Lincoln (D-Tenn.) Sept. 13, 1943–; House 2003–.

    Davis, Susan A. (D-Calif.) April 13, 1944–; House 2001–.

    Davis, Thomas M. III (R-Va.) Jan. 5, 1949–; House 1995–.

    Dayton, Mark (D-Minn.) Jan. 26, 1947–; Senate 2001–.

    Deal, Nathan (R-Ga.) Aug. 25, 1942–; House 1993–(1993–April 10, 1995, Democrat).

    DeFazio, Peter A. (D-Ore.) May 27, 1947–; House 1987–.

    DeGette, Diana (D-Colo.) July 29, 1957–; House 1997–.

    Delahunt, William (D-Mass.) July 18, 1941–; House 1997–.

    DeLauro, Rosa (D-Conn.) March 2, 1943–; House 1991–.

    DeLay, Tom (R-Texas) April 8, 1947–; House 1985–.

    DeMint, Jim (R-S.C.) Sept. 2, 1951–; House 1999–2005; Senate 2005–.

    Deutsch, Peter (D-Fla.) April 1, 1957–; House 1993–2005.

    DeWine, Mike (R-Ohio) Jan. 5, 1947–; House 1983–1991; Senate 1995–.

    Diaz-Balart, Lincoln (brother of Mario Diaz-Balart) (R-Fla.) Aug. 13, 1954–; House 1993–.

    Diaz-Balart, Mario (brother of Lincoln Diaz-Balart) (R-Fla.) Sept. 25, 1961–; House 2003–.

    Dicks, Norm (D-Wash.) Dec. 16, 1940–; House 1977–.

    Dingell, John D. (son of John David Dingell) (D-Mich.) July 8, 1926–; House Dec. 13, 1955–.

    Dodd, Christopher J. (son of Thomas Joseph Dodd) (D-Conn.) May 27, 1944–; House 1975–1981; Senate 1981–.

    Doggett, Lloyd (D-Texas) Oct. 6, 1946–; House 1995–.

    Dole, Elizabeth (wife of Robert J. Dole) (R-N.C.) July 29, 1936–; Senate 2003–.

    Domenici, Pete V. (R-N.M.) May 7, 1932–; Senate 1973–.

    Dooley, Cal (D-Calif.) Jan. 11, 1954–; House 1991–2005.

    Doolittle, John T. (R-Calif.) Oct. 30, 1950–; House 1991–.

    Dorgan, Byron L. (D-N.D.) May 14, 1942–; House 1981–Dec. 14, 1992; Senate Dec. 15, 1992–.

    Doyle, Mike (D-Pa.) Aug. 5, 1953–; House 1995–.

    Dreier, David (R-Calif.) July 5, 1952–; House 1981–.

    Duncan, John J. “Jimmy” Jr. (son of John J. Duncan) (R-Tenn.) July 21, 1947–; House 1988–.

    Dunn, Jennifer (R-Wash.) July 29, 1941–; House 1993–2005.

    Durbin, Richard J. (D-Ill.) Nov. 21, 1944–; House 1983–1997; Senate 1997–.

    E

    Edwards, Chet (D-Texas) Nov. 24, 1951–; House 1991–.

    Edwards, John (D-N.C.) June 10, 1953–; Senate 1999–2005.

    Ehlers, Vernon J. (R-Mich.) Feb. 6, 1934–; House Jan. 25, 1994–.

    Ehrlich, Robert Jr. (R-Md.) Nov. 25, 1957–; House 1995–2003.

    Emanuel, Rahm (D-Ill.) Nov. 29, 1959–; House 2003–.

    Emerson, Jo Ann (R-Mo.) Sept. 16, 1950–; House Nov. 5, 1996–. (Elected as an Independent in a 1996 special election following the death of her husband, Bill Emerson, because the filing date had passed but ran as a Republican in the general election and thereafter.)

    Engel, Eliot L. (D-N.Y.) Feb. 18, 1947–; House 1989–.

    English, Phil (R-Pa.) June 20, 1956–; House 1995–.

    Ensign, John (R-Nev.) March 25, 1958–; House 1995–1999; Senate 2001–.

    Enzi, Michael B. (R-Wyo.) Feb. 1, 1944–; Senate 1997–.

    Eshoo, Anna G. (D-Calif.) Dec. 13, 1942–; House 1993–.

    Etheridge, Bob (D-N.C.) Aug. 7, 1941–; House 1997–.

    Evans, Lane (D-Ill.) Aug. 4, 1951–; House 1983–.

    Everett, Terry (R-Ala.) Feb. 15, 1937–; House 1993–.

    F

    Faleomavaega, Eni F.H. (D-Am. Samoa) Aug. 15, 1943–; House (Delegate) 1989–.

    Farr, Sam (D-Calif.) July 4, 1941–; House June 16, 1993–.

    Fattah, Chaka (D-Pa.) Nov. 21, 1956–; House 1995–.

    Feeney, Tom (R-Fla.) May 21, 1958–; House 2003–.

    Feingold, Russell D. (D-Wis.) March 2, 1953–; Senate 1993–.

    Feinstein, Dianne (D-Calif.) June 22, 1933–; Senate Nov. 10, 1992–.

    Ferguson, Mike (R-N.J.) July 22, 1970–; House 2001–.

    Filner, Bob (D-Calif.) Sept. 4, 1942–; House 1993–.

    Fitzgerald, Peter G. (R-Ill.) Oct. 20, 1960–; Senate 1999–2005.

    Flake, Jeff (R-Ariz.) Dec. 31, 1962–; House 2001–.

    Fletcher, Ernest (R-Ky.) Nov. 12, 1952–; House 1999–Dec. 8, 2003. Gov. 2004–.

    Foley, Mark (R-Fla.) Sept. 8, 1954–; House 1995–.

    Forbes, J. Randy (R-Va.) Feb. 17, 1952–; House June 26, 2001–.

    Ford, Harold E. Jr. (D-Tenn.) May 11, 1970–; House 1997–

    Fossella, Vito J. (R-N.Y.) March 9, 1965–; House Nov. 5, 1997–.

    Frank, Barney (D-Mass.) March 31, 1940–; House 1981–.

    Franks, Trent (R-Ariz.) June 19, 1957–; House 2003–.

    Frelinghuysen, Rodney (son of Peter Hood Ballentine Frelinghuysen) (R-N.J.) April 29, 1946–; House 1995–.

    Frist, Bill (R-Tenn.) Feb. 22, 1952–; Senate 1995–; Senate majority leader 2003–.

    Frost, Martin (D-Texas) Jan. 1, 1942–; House 1979–2005.

    G

    Gallegly, Elton (R-Calif.) March 7, 1944–; House 1987–.

    Ganske, Greg (R-Iowa) March 31, 1949–; House 1995–2003.

    Garrett, Scott (R-N.J.) July 9, 1959–; House 2003–.

    Gekas, George W. (R-Pa.) April 14, 1930–; House 1983–2003.

    Gephardt, Richard A. (D-Mo.) Jan. 31, 1941–; House 1976–2005.

    Gerlach, Jim (R-Pa.) Feb. 25, 1955–; House 2003–.

    Gibbons, Jim (R-Nev.) Dec. 16, 1944–; House 1997–.

    Gilchrest, Wayne T. (R-Md.) April 15, 1946–; House 1991–.

    Gillmor, Paul E. (R-Ohio) Feb. 1, 1939–; House 1989–.

    Gilman, Benjamin A. (R-N.Y.) Dec. 6, 1922–; House 1973–2003.

    Gingrey, Phil (R-Ga.) July 10, 1942–; House 2003–.

    Gonzalez, Charlie (son of Henry B. Gonzalez) (D-Texas) May 5, 1945–; House 1999–.

    Goode, Virgil H. Jr. (R-Va.) (Elected 1997 as a Democrat; announced in January 2000 he would seek reelection as an Independent; changed affiliation from Independent to Republican on Aug. 1, 2002) Oct. 17, 1946–; House 1997–.

    Goodlatte, Robert W. (R-Va.) Sept. 22, 1952–; House 1993–.

    Gordon, Bart (D-Tenn.) Jan. 24, 1949–; House 1985–.

    Goss, Porter J. (R-Fla.) Nov. 26, 1938–; House 1981–1987, 1989–Sept. 23, 2004.

    Graham, Bob (D-Fla.) Nov. 9, 1936–; Senate 1987–2005.

    Graham, Lindsey (R-S.C.) July 9, 1955–; House 1995–2003; Senate 2003–.

    Gramm, Phil (R-Texas) July 8, 1942–; House 1979–Jan. 5, 1983, Feb. 22, 1983–1985 (1979–Jan. 5, 1983, Democrat); Senate 1985–2003.

    Granger, Kay (R-Texas) Jan. 18, 1943–; House 1997–.

    Grassley, Charles E. (R-Iowa) Sept. 17, 1933–; House 1975–1981; Senate 1981–.

    Graves, Sam (R-Mo.) Nov. 7, 1963–; House 2001–.

    Green, Gene (D-Texas) Oct. 17, 1947–; House 1993–.

    Green, Mark (R-Wis.) June 1, 1960–; House 1999–.

    Greenwood, James C. (R-Pa.) May 4, 1951–; House 1993–2005.

    Gregg, Judd (R-N.H.) Feb. 14, 1947–; Senate 1993–.

    Grijalva, Raül M. (D-Ariz.) Feb. 19, 1948–; House 2003–.

    Grucci, Felix J. Jr. (R-N.Y.) Nov. 25, 1951–; House 2001–2003.

    Gutierrez, Luis V. (D-Ill.) Dec. 10, 1954–; House 1993–.

    Gutknecht, Gil (R-Minn.) March 20, 1951–; House 1995–.

    H

    Hagel, Chuck (R-Neb.) Oct. 4, 1946–; Senate 1997–.

    Hall, Ralph M. (R-Texas) May 3, 1923–; House 1981–(1981–Jan. 5, 2004 Democrat).

    Hall, Tony P. (D-Ohio) Jan. 16, 1942–; House 1979–Sept. 9, 2002.

    Hansen, James V. (R-Utah) Aug. 14, 1932–; House 1981–2003.

    Harkin, Tom (D-Iowa) Nov. 19, 1939–; House 1975–1985; Senate 1985–.

    Harman, Jane (D-Calif.) June 28, 1945–; House 1993–1999; 2001–.

    Harris, Katherine (R-Fla.) April 5, 1957–; House 2003–.

    Hart, Melissa (R-Pa.) April 4, 1962–; House 2001–.

    Hastert, J. Dennis (R-Ill.) Jan. 2, 1942–; House 1987–; Speaker 1999–.

    Hastings, Alcee L. (D-Fla.) Sept. 5, 1936–; House 1993–.

    Hastings, Richard “Doc” (R-Wash.) Feb. 7, 1941–; House 1995–.

    Hatch, Orrin G. (R-Utah) March 22, 1934–; Senate 1977–.

    Hayes, Robin (R-N.C.) Aug. 14, 1945–; House 1999–.

    Hayworth, J.D. (R-Ariz.) July 12, 1958–; House 1995–

    Hefley, Joel (R-Colo.) April 18, 1935–; House 1987–.

    Helms, Jesse (R-N.C.) Oct. 18, 1921–; Senate 1973–2003.

    Hensarling, Jeb (R-Texas) May 29, 1957–; House 2003–.

    Herger, Wally (R-Calif.) May 20, 1945–; House 1987–.

    Herseth, Stephanie (D-S.D.) Dec. 3, 1970–; House June 3, 2004–.

    Hill, Baron P. (D-Ind.) June 23, 1953–; House 1999–2005.

    Hilleary, Van (R-Tenn.) June 20, 1959–; House 1995–2003.

    Hilliard, Earl F. (D-Ala.) April 9, 1942–; House 1993–2003.

    Hinchey, Maurice D. (D-N.Y.) Oct. 27, 1938–; House 1993–.

    Hinojosa, Ruben (D-Texas) Aug. 20, 1940–; House 1997–.

    Hobson, David L. (R-Ohio) Oct. 17, 1936–; House 1991–.

    Hoeffel, Joseph M. (D-PA.) Sept. 3, 1950–; House 1999–2005.

    Hoekstra, Peter (R-Mich.) Oct. 30, 1953–; House 1993–.

    Holden, Tim (D-Pa.) March 5, 1957–; House 1993–.

    Hollings, Ernest F. (D-S.C.) Jan. 21, 1922–; Nov. 9. 1966–2005; Gov. 1959–1963.

    Holt, Rush D. (D-N.J.) Oct. 15, 1948–; House 1999–.

    Honda, Mike (D-Calif.) June 27, 1941–; House 2001–.

    Hooley, Darlene (D-Ore.) April 4, 1939–; House 1997–.

    Horn, Steve (R-Calif.) May 31, 1931–; House 1993–2003.

    Hostettler, John (R-Ind.) July 19, 1961–; House 1995–.

    Houghton, Amo (grandson of Alanson Bigelow Houghton) (R-N.Y.) Aug. 7, 1926–; House 1987–2005.

    Hoyer, Steny H. (D-Md.) June 14, 1939–; House June 3, 1981–.

    Hulshof, Kenny (R-Mo.) May 22, 1958–; House 1997–.

    Hunter, Duncan L. (R-Calif.) May 31, 1948–; House 1981–.

    Hutchinson, Asa (brother of Tim Hutchinson) (R-Ark.) Dec. 3, 1950–; House 1997–Aug. 6, 2001.

    Hutchinson, Tim (brother of Asa Hutchinson) (R-Ark.) Aug. 11, 1949–; House 1993–1997; Senate 1997–2003.

    Hutchison, Kay Bailey (R-Texas) July 22, 1943–; Senate June 14, 1993–.

    Hyde, Henry J. (R-Ill.) April 18, 1924–; House 1975–.

    I

    Inhofe, James M. (R-Okla.) Nov. 17, 1934–; House 1987–Nov. 15, 1994; Senate Nov. 17, 1994–.

    Inouye, Daniel K. (D-Hawaii) Sept. 7, 1924–; House Aug. 21, 1959–1963; Senate 1963–.

    Inslee, Jay (D-Wash.) Feb. 9, 1951–; House 1993–1995; 1999–.

    Isakson, Johnny (R-Ga.) Dec. 28, 1944–; House Feb. 25, 1999–2005; Senate 2005–.

    Israel, Steven (D-N.Y.) May 30, 1958–; House 2001–.

    Issa, Darrell (R-Calif.) Nov. 1, 1953–; House 2001–.

    Istook, Ernest (R-Okla.) Feb. 11, 1950–; House 1993–.

    J

    Jackson, Jesse Jr. (D-Ill.) March 11, 1965–; House Dec. 14, 1995–.

    Jackson-Lee, Sheila (D-Texas) Jan. 12, 1950–; House 1995–.

    Janklow, William J. (R-S.D.) Sept. 13, 1939–; House 2003–Jan. 20, 2004.

    Jefferson, William J. (D-La.) March 14, 1947–; House 1991–.

    Jeffords, James M. (I-Vt.) May 11, 1934–; House 1975–1989 (Republican); Senate 1989–(1989–June 5, 2001 Republican).

    Jenkins, William L. (R-Tenn.) Nov. 29, 1936–; House 1997–.

    John, Chris (D-La.) Jan. 5, 1960–; House 1997–2005.

    Johnson, Eddie Bernice (D-Texas) Dec. 3, 1935–; House 1993–.

    Johnson, Nancy L. (R-Conn.) Jan. 5, 1935–; House 1983–.

    Johnson, Sam (R-Texas) Oct. 11, 1930–; House May 22, 1991–.

    Johnson, Tim (D-S.D.) Dec. 28, 1946–; House 1987–1997; Senate 1997–.

    Johnson, Timothy V. (R-Ill.) July 23, 1946–; House 2001–.

    Jones, Stephanie Tubbs (R-Ohio) Sept. 10, 1949–; House 1999–.

    Jones, Walter B. Jr. (son of Walter Beaman Jones) (R-N.C.) Feb. 10, 1943–; House 1995–.

    K

    Kanjorski, Paul E. (D-Pa.) April 2, 1937–; House 1985–.

    Kaptur, Marcy (D-Ohio) June 17, 1946–; House 1983–.

    Keller, Richard “Ric” (R-Fla.) Sept. 5, 1964–; House 2001–.

    Kelly, Sue W. (R-N.Y.) Sept. 26, 1936–; House 1995–.

    Kennedy, Edward M. (father of Patrick J. Ken-nedy, brother of John Fitzgerald Kennedy and Robert Francis Kennedy, grandson of John Francis Fitzgerald, uncle of Joseph P. Kennedy II) (D-Mass.) Feb. 22, 1932–; Senate Nov. 7, 1962–.

    Kennedy, Mark (R-Minn.) April 11, 1957–; House 2001–.

    Kennedy, Patrick J. (son of Edward M. Kennedy, nephew of John Fitzgerald Kennedy and Robert Francis Kennedy, cousin of Joseph P. Kennedy, great grandson of John Francis Fitzgerald) (D-R.I.) July 14, 1967–; House 1995–.

    Kerns, Brian (R-Ind.) May 22, 1957–; House 2001–2003.

    Kerry, John (D-Mass.) Dec. 11, 1943–; Senate 1985–.

    Kildee, Dale E. (D-Mich.) Sept. 16, 1929–; House 1977–.

    Kilpatrick, Carolyn Cheeks (D-Mich.) June 25, 1945–; House 1997–.

    King, Peter T. (R-N.Y.) April 5, 1944–; House 1993–.

    King, Steve (R-Iowa) May 28, 1949–; House 2003–.

    Kingston, Jack (R-Ga.) April 24, 1955–; House 1993–.

    Kirk, Mark Steven (R-Ill.) Sept. 15, 1959–; House 2001–.

    Kleczka, Gerald D. (D-Wis.) Nov. 26, 1943–; House April 10, 1984–2005.

    Kline, John (R-Minn.) Sept. 6, 1947–; House 2003–.

    Knollenberg, Joe (R-Mich.) Nov. 28, 1933–; House 1993–.

    Kohl, Herb (D-Wis.) Feb. 7, 1935–; Senate 1989–.

    Kolbe, Jim (R-Ariz.) June 28, 1942–; House 1985–.

    Kucinich, Dennis J. (D-Ohio) Oct. 8, 1946–; House 1997–.

    Kyl, Jon (son of John Henry Kyl) (R-Ariz.) April 25, 1942–; House 1987–1995; Senate 1995–.

    L

    LaFalce, John J. (D-N.Y.) Oct. 6, 1939–; House 1975–2003.

    LaHood, Ray (R-Ill.) Dec. 6, 1945–; House 1995–

    Lampson, Nick (D-Texas) Feb. 14, 1945–; House 1997–2005.

    Landrieu, Mary L. (D-La.) Nov. 23, 1955–; Senate 1997–.

    Langevin, Jim (D-R.I.) April 22, 1964–; House 2001–.

    Lantos, Tom (father-in-law of Dick Swett) (D-Calif.) Feb. 1, 1928–; House 1981–.

    Largent, Steve (R-Okla.) Sept. 28, 1955–; House Nov. 29, 1994–Feb. 15, 2002.

    Larsen, Rick (D-Wash.) June 15, 1965–; House 2001–.

    Larson, John B. (D-Conn.) July 22, 1948–; House 1999–.

    Latham, Tom (R-Iowa) July 14, 1948–; House 1995–.

    LaTourette, Steven C. (R-Ohio) July 22, 1954–; House 1995–.

    Lautenberg, Frank R. (D-N.J.) Jan. 23, 1924–; Senate Dec. 27, 1982–2001; 2003–.

    Leach, Jim (R-Iowa) Oct. 15, 1942–; House 1977–.

    Leahy, Patrick J. (D-Vt.) March 31, 1940–; Senate 1975–.

    Lee, Barbara (D-Calif.) July 16, 1946–; House April 21, 1998–.

    Levin, Carl (brother of Sander M. Levin) (D-Mich.) June 28, 1934–; Senate 1979–.

    Levin, Sander M. (brother of Carl Levin) (D-Mich.) Sept. 6, 1931–; House 1983–.

    Lewis, Jerry (R-Calif.) Oct. 21, 1934–; House 1979–.

    Lewis, John (D-Ga.) Feb. 21, 1940–; House 1987–.

    Lewis, Ron (R-Ky.) Sept. 14, 1946–; House May 26, 1994–.

    Lieberman, Joseph I. (D-Conn.) Feb. 24, 1942–; Senate 1989–.

    Lincoln, Blanche Lambert (D-Ark.) Sept. 30, 1960–; House 1993–1997; Senate 1999–.

    Linder, John (R-Ga.) Sept. 9, 1942–; House 1993–.

    Lipinski, William O. (D-Ill.) Dec. 22, 1937–; House 1983–2005.

    LoBiondo, Frank A. (R-N.J.) May 12, 1946–; House 1995–.

    Lofgren, Zoe (D-Calif.) Dec. 21, 1947–; House 1995–.

    Lott, Trent (R-Miss.) Oct. 9, 1941–; House 1973–1989; Senate 1989–; Senate majority leader June 12, 1996–2003.

    Lowey, Nita M. (D-N.Y.) July 5, 1937–; House 1989–.

    Lucas, Frank D. (R-Okla.) Jan. 6, 1960–; House May 17, 1994–.

    Lucas, Ken (D-Ky.) Aug. 22, 1933–; House 1999–2005.

    Lugar, Richard G. (R-Ind.) April 4, 1932–; Senate 1977–.

    Luther, William P. “Bill” (D-Minn.) June 27, 1945–; House 1995–2003.

    Lynch, Stephen F. (D-Mass.) March 31, 1955–; House Oct. 23, 2001–.

    M

    Majette, Denise L. (D-Ga.) May 18, 1955–; House 2003–2005.

    Maloney, Carolyn B. (D-N.Y.) Feb. 19, 1948–; House 1993–.

    Maloney, James H. (D-Conn.) Sept. 17, 1948–; House 1997–2003.

    Manzullo, Donald (R-Ill.) March 24, 1944–; House 1993–.

    Markey, Edward J. (D-Mass.) July 11, 1946–; House Nov. 2, 1976–.

    Mascara, Frank R. (D-Pa.) Jan. 19, 1930–; House 1995–2003.

    Marshall, Jim (R-Ga.) March 31, 1948–; House 2003–.

    Matheson, Jim (D-Utah) March 21, 1960–; House 2001–.

    Matsui, Robert T. (D-Calif.) Sept. 17, 1941–Jan. 1, 2005; House 1979–Jan. 1, 2005.

    McCain, John (R-Ariz.) Aug. 29, 1936–; House 1983–1987; Senate 1987–.

    McCarthy, Carolyn (D-N.Y.) Jan. 5, 1944–; House 1997–.

    McCarthy, Karen (D-Mo.) March 18, 1947–; House 1995–2005.

    McCollum, Betty (D-Minn.) July 12, 1954–; House 2001–.

    McConnell, Mitch (R-Ky.) Feb. 20, 1942–; Senate 1985–.

    McCotter, Thaddeus (R-Mich.) Aug. 22, 1965–; House 2003–.

    McCrery, Jim (R-La.) Sept. 18, 1949–; House 1988–.

    McDermott, Jim (D-Wash.) Dec. 28, 1936–; House 1989–.

    McGovern, James (D-Mass.) Nov. 20, 1959–; House 1997–.

    McHugh, John M. (R-N.Y.) Sept. 29, 1948–; House 1993–.

    McInnis, Scott (R-Colo.) May 9, 1953–; House 1993–2005.

    McIntyre, Mike (D-N.C.) Aug. 6, 1956–; House 1997–.

    McKeon, Howard P. “Buck” (R-Calif.) Sept. 9, 1939–; House 1993–.

    McKinney, Cynthia A. (D-Ga.) March 17, 1955–; House 1993–2003.

    McNulty, Michael R. (D-N.Y.) Sept. 16, 1947–; House 1989–.

    Meehan, Martin T. (D-Mass.) Dec. 30, 1956–; House 1993–.

    Meek, Carrie P. (D-Fla.) April 29, 1926–; House 1993–2003.

    Meek, Kendrick (son of Carrie P. Meek) (D-Fla.) Sept. 6, 1966–; House 2003–.

    Meeks, Gregory W. (D-N.Y.) Sept. 25, 1953–; House Feb. 5, 1998–.

    Menendez, Robert (D-N.J.) Jan. 1, 1954–; House 1993–.

    Mica, John L. (R-Fla.) Jan. 27, 1943–; House 1993–.

    Michaud, Michael H. (D-Maine) Jan. 18, 1955–; House 2003–.

    Mikulski, Barbara A. (D-Md.) July 20, 1936–; House 1977–1987; Senate 1987–.

    Millender-McDonald, Juanita (D-Calif.) Sept. 7, 1938–; House April 16, 1996–.

    Miller, Brad (D-N.C.) May 19, 1953–; House 2003–.

    Miller, Candice S. (R-Mich.) May 7, 1954–; House 2003–.

    Miller, Dan (R-Fla.) May 30, 1942–; House 1993–2003.

    Miller, Jeff (R-Fla.) June 27, 1959–; House Oct. 23, 2001–.

    Miller, Gary (R-Calif.) Oct. 16, 1948–; House 1999–.

    Miller, George (D-Calif.) May 17, 1945–; House 1975–.

    Miller, Zell (D-Ga.) Feb. 24, 1932–; Senate July 27, 2000–2005; Gov. 1991–1999.

    Mink, Patsy T. (D-Hawaii) Dec. 6, 1927–Sept. 28, 2002; House 1965–1977, Sept. 27, 1990–Sept. 28, 2002.

    Moakley, Joe (D-Mass.) April 27, 1927–May 28, 2001; House 1973–May 28, 2001 (elected as an Independent Democrat; changed affiliation to Democrat Jan. 2, 1973).

    Mollohan, Alan B. (son of Robert Homer Mollohan) (D-W.Va.) May 14, 1943–; House 1983–.

    Moore, Dennis (D-Kan.) Nov. 8, 1945–; House 1999–.

    Moran, James P. (D-Va.) May 16, 1945–; House 1991–.

    Moran, Jerry (R-Kan.) May 29, 1954–; House 1997–.

    Morella, Constance A. (R-Md.) Feb. 12, 1931–; House 1987–2003.

    Murkowski, Frank H. (father of Lisa Murkowski) (R-Alaska) March 28, 1933–; Senate 1981–Dec. 2, 2002.

    Murkowski, Lisa (daughter of Frank Murkowski who appointed her to complete his term after he won election as Alaska governor in 2002) (R-Alaska) May 22, 1957–; Senate Jan. 7, 2003–.

    Murphy, Tim (R-Pa.) Sept. 11, 1952–; House 2003–.

    Murray, Patty (D-Wash.) Oct. 11, 1950–; Senate 1993–.

    Murtha, John P. (D-Pa.) June 17, 1932–; House Feb. 5, 1974–.

    Musgrave, Marilyn (R-Colo.) Jan. 27, 1949–; House 2003–.

    Myrick, Sue (R-N.C.) Aug. 1, 1941–; House 1995–.

    N

    Nadler, Jerrold (D-N.Y.) June 13, 1947–; House Nov. 4, 1992–.

    Napolitano, Grace Flores (D-Calif.) Dec. 4, 1936–; House 1999–.

    Neal, Richard E. (D-Mass.) Feb. 14, 1949–; House 1989–.

    Nelson, Ben (D-Neb.) May 17, 1941–; Senate 2001–; Gov. 1991–1999.

    Nelson, Bill (D-Fla.) Sept. 29, 1942–; House 1979–1991; Senate 2001–.

    Nethercutt, George (R-Wash.) Oct. 7, 1944–; House 1995–2005.

    Neugebauer, Randy (R-Texas) Dec. 24, 1949–; House June 5, 2003–.

    Ney, Bob (R-Ohio) July 5, 1954–; House 1995–.

    Nickles, Don (R-Okla.) Dec. 6, 1948–; Senate 1981–2005.

    Northup, Anne E. (R-Ky.) July 22, 1948–; House 1997–.

    Norton, Eleanor Holmes (D-D.C.) June 13, 1937–; House (Delegate) 1991–.

    Norwood, Charlie (R-Ga.) July 27, 1941–; House 1995–.

    Nunes, Devin (R-Calif.) Oct. 1, 1973–; House 2003–.

    Nussle, Jim (R-Iowa) June 27, 1960–; House 1991–.

    O

    Oberstar, James L. (D-Minn.) Sept. 10, 1934–; House 1975–.

    Obey, David R. (D-Wis.) Oct. 3, 1938–; House April 1, 1969–.

    Olver, John W. (D-Mass.) Sept. 3, 1936–; House June 18, 1991–.

    Ortiz, Solomon P. (D-Texas) June 3, 1937–; House 1983–.

    Osborne, Tom (R-Neb.) Feb. 23, 1937–; House 2001–.

    Ose, Doug (R-Calif.) June 27, 1955–; House 1999–2005.

    Otter, C.L. ‘Butch’ (R-Idaho) May 3, 1942–; House 2001–.

    Owens, Major R. (D-N.Y.) June 28, 1936–; House 1983–.

    Oxley, Michael G. (R-Ohio) Feb. 11, 1944–; House June 25, 1981–.

    P

    Pallone, Frank Jr. (D-N.J.) Oct. 30, 1951–; House Nov. 8, 1988–.

    Pascrell, Bill Jr. (D-N.J.) Jan. 25, 1937–; House 1997–.

    Pastor, Ed (D-Ariz.) June 28, 1943–; House Oct. 3, 1991–.

    Paul, Ron (R-Texas) Aug. 20, 1935–; House 1976–1977; 1979–1985; 1997–.

    Payne, Donald M. (D-N.J.) July 16, 1934–; House 1989–.

    Pearce, Steve (R-N.M.) Aug. 23, 1947–; House 2003–.

    Pelosi, Nancy (daughter of Thomas D'Allesandro Jr.) (D-Calif.) March 26, 1940–; House June 9, 1987–.

    Pence, Mike (R-Ind.) June 7, 1959–; House 2001–.

    Peterson, Collin C. (D-Minn.) June 29, 1944–; House 1991–.

    Peterson, John E. (R-Pa.) Dec. 25, 1938–; House 1997–.

    Petri, Thomas E. (R-Wis.) May 28, 1940–; House April 3, 1979–.

    Phelps, David D. (D-Ill.) Oct. 26, 1947–; House 1999–2003.

    Pickering, Charles W. (R-Miss.) Aug. 10, 1963–; House 1997–.

    Pitts, Joseph R. (R-Pa.) Oct. 10, 1939–; House 1997–.

    Platts, Todd (R-Pa.) March 5, 1962–; House 2001–.

    Pombo, Richard W. (R-Calif.) Jan. 8, 1961–; House 1993–.

    Pomeroy, Earl (D-N.D.) Sept. 2, 1952–; House 1993–.

    Porter, Jon (R-Nev.) May 16, 1955–; House 2003–.

    Portman, Rob (R-Ohio) Dec. 19, 1955–; House May 5, 1993–.

    Price, David (D-N.C.) Aug. 17, 1940–; House 1987–1995, 1997–.

    Pryce, Deborah (R-Ohio) July 29, 1951–; House 1993–.

    Pryor, Mark (D-Ark.) Jan. 10, 1963–; Senate 2003–.

    Putnam, Adam (R-Fla.) July 31, 1974–; House 2001–.

    Q

    Quinn, Jack (R-N.Y.) April 13, 1951–; House 1993–2005.

    R

    Radanovich, George P. (R-Calif.) June 20, 1955–; House 1995–.

    Rahall, Nick J. II (D-W.Va.) May 20, 1949–; House 1977–.

    Ramstad, Jim (R-Minn.) May 6, 1946–; House 1991–.

    Rangel, Charles B. (D-N.Y.) June 11, 1930–; House 1971–.

    Reed, Jack (D-R.I.) Nov. 12, 1949–; House 1991–1997; Senate 1997–.

    Regula, Ralph (R-Ohio) Dec. 3, 1924–; House 1973–.

    Rehberg, Denny (R-Mont.) Oct. 5, 1955–; House 2001–.

    Reid, Harry (D-Nev.) Dec. 2, 1939–; House 1983–1987; Senate 1987–.

    Renzi, Rick (R-Ariz.) June 11, 1958–; House 2003–.

    Reyes, Silvestre (D-Texas) Nov. 10, 1944–; House 1997–.

    Reynolds, Thomas M. (R-N.Y.) Sept. 3, 1950–; House 1999–.

    Riley, Bob (R-Ala.) Oct. 3, 1944–; House 1997–2003.

    Rivers, Lynn (D-Mich.) Dec. 19, 1956–; House 1995–2003.

    Roberts, Pat (R-Kan.) April 20, 1936–; House 1981–1997; Senate 1997–.

    Rockefeller, John D. IV (nephew of Nelson Aldrich Rockefeller and great grandson of Nelson Aldrich) (D-W.Va.) June 18, 1937–; Senate Jan. 15, 1985–; Gov. 1977–1985.

    Rodriguez, Ciro D. (D-Texas) Dec. 9, 1946–; House April 17, 1997–2005.

    Roemer, Tim (son-in-law of J. Bennett Johnston) (D-Ind.) Oct. 30, 1956–; House 1991–2003.

    Rogers, Harold (R-Ky.) Dec. 31, 1937–; House 1981–.

    Rogers, Mike (R-Mich.) June 2, 1963–; House 2001–.

    Rogers, Mike D. (R-Ala.) July 16, 1958–; House 2003–.

    Rohrabacher, Dana (R-Calif.) June 21, 1947–; House 1989–.

    Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana (R-Fla.) July 15, 1952–; House 1989–.

    Ross, Mike (D-Ark.) Aug. 2, 1961–; House 2001–.

    Rothman, Steven R. (D-N.J.) Oct. 14, 1952–; House 1997–.

    Roukema, Marge (R-N.J.) Sept. 19, 1929–; House 1981–2003.

    Roybal-Allard, Lucille (D-Calif.) June 12, 1941–; House 1993–.

    Royce, Ed (R-Calif.) Oct. 12, 1951–; House 1993–.

    Ruppersberger, C.A. Dutch (D-Md.) Jan. 31, 1946–; House 2003–.

    Rush, Bobby L. (D-Ill.) Nov. 23, 1946–; House 1993–.

    Ryan, Paul D. (R-Wis.) Jan. 29, 1970–; House 1999–.

    Ryan, Tim (D-Ohio) July 16, 1973–; House 2003–.

    Ryun, Jim (R-Kan.) April 29, 1947–; House Nov. 27, 1996–.

    S

    Sabo, Martin Olav (D-Minn.) Feb. 28, 1938–; House 1979–.

    Sanchez, Linda T. (sister of Loretta Sanchez) (D-Calif.) Jan. 28, 1969–; House 2003–.

    Sanchez, Loretta (sister of Linda Sanchez) (D-Calif.) Jan. 7, 1960–; House 1997–.

    Sanders, Bernard (I-Vt.) Sept. 8, 1941–; House 1991–.

    Sandlin, Max (D-Texas) Sept. 29, 1952–; House 1997–2005.

    Santorum, Rick (R-Pa.) May 10, 1958–; House 1991–1995; Senate 1995–.

    Sarbanes, Paul S. (D-Md.) Feb. 3, 1933–; House 1971–1977; Senate 1977–.

    Sawyer, Thomas C. (D-Ohio) Aug. 15, 1945–; House 1987–2003.

    Saxton, H. James (R-N.J.) Jan. 22, 1943–; House 1984–.

    Scarborough, Joe (R-Fla.) April 9, 1963–; House 1995–Sept. 6, 2001.

    Schaffer, Bob (R-Colo.) July 24, 1962–; House 1997–2003.

    Schakowsky, Janice D. “Jan” (D-Ill.) May 26, 1944–; House 1999–.

    Schiff, Adam (D-Calif.) June 22, 1960–; House 2001–.

    Schrock, Edward L. (R-Va.) April 6, 1941–; House 2001–2005.

    Schumer, Charles E. (D-N.Y.) Nov. 23, 1950–; House 1981–1999; Senate 1999–.

    Scott, David (D-Ga.) June 27, 1946–; House 2003–.

    Scott, Robert C. (D-Va.) April 30, 1947–; House 1993–.

    Sensenbrenner, F. James Jr. (R-Wis.) June 14, 1943–; House 1979–.

    Serrano, Jose E. (D-N.Y.) Oct. 24, 1943–; House March 28, 1990–.

    Sessions, Jeff (R-Ala.) Dec. 24, 1946–; Senate 1997–.

    Sessions, Pete (R-Texas) March 22, 1955–; House 1997–.

    Shadegg, John (R-Ariz.) Oct. 22, 1949–; House 1995–.

    Shaw, E. Clay Jr. (R-Fla.) April 19, 1939–; House 1981–.

    Shays, Christopher (R-Conn.) Oct. 18, 1945–; House Sept. 9, 1987–.

    Shelby, Richard C. (R-Ala.) May 6, 1934–; House 1979–1987; Senate 1987–(1979–Nov. 19, 1994, Democrat).

    Sherman, Brad (D-Calif.) Oct. 24, 1954–; House 1997–.

    Sherwood, Donald L. (R-Pa.) March 5, 1941–; House 1999–.

    Shimkus, John M. (R-Ill.) Feb. 21, 1958–; House 1997–.

    Shows, Ronnie (D-Miss.) Jan. 26, 1947–; House 1999–2003.

    Shuster, E.G. “Bud” (R-Pa.) Jan. 23, 1932–; House 1973–Feb. 3, 2001.

    Shuster, Bill (son of E.G. “Bud” Shuster) (R-Pa.) Jan. 10, 1961–; House May 17, 2001–.

    Simmons, Rob (R-Conn.) Feb. 11, 1943–; House 2001–.

    Simpson, Mike (R-Idaho) Sept. 8, 1950–; House 1999–.

    Sisisky, Norman (D-Va.) June 9, 1927–March 29, 2001; House 1983–March 29, 2001.

    Skeen, Joseph R. (R-N.M.) June 30, 1927–Dec. 7, 2003; House 1981–2003.

    Skelton, Ike (D-Mo.) Dec. 20, 1931–; House 1977–.

    Slaughter, Louise M. (D-N.Y.) Aug. 14, 1929–; House 1987–.

    Smith, Adam (D-Wash.) June 15, 1965–; House 1997–.

    Smith, Christopher H. (R-N.J.) March 4, 1953–; House 1981–.

    Smith, Gordon H. (R-Ore.) Mary 25, 1952–; Senate 1997–.

    Smith, Lamar (R-Texas) Nov. 19, 1947–; House 1987–.

    Smith, Nick (R-Mich.) Nov. 5, 1934–; House 1993–2005.

    Smith, Robert C. (R-N.H.) March 30, 1941–; House 1985–Dec. 7, 1990; Senate Dec. 7, 1990–2003.

    Snowe, Olympia J. (wife of John R. McKernan Jr.) (R-Maine) Feb. 21, 1947–; House 1979–1995; Senate 1995–.

    Snyder, Vic (D-Ark.) Sept. 27, 1947–; House 1997–.

    Solis, Hilda (D-Calif.) Oct. 20, 1957–; House 2001–.

    Souder, Mark (R-Ind.) July 18, 1950–; House 1995–.

    Specter, Arlen (R-Pa.) Feb. 12, 1930–; Senate 1981–.

    Spence, Floyd D. (R-S.C.) April 9, 1928–Aug. 16, 2001; House 1971–Aug. 16, 2001.

    Spratt, John M. Jr. (D-S.C.) Nov. 1, 1942–; House 1983–.

    Stabenow, Debbie (D-Mich.) April 29, 1950–; House 1997–2001; Senate 2001–.

    Stark, Fortney “Pete” (D-Calif.) Nov. 11, 1931–; House 1973–.

    Stearns, Clifford B. (R-Fla.) April 16, 1941–; House 1989–.

    Stenholm, Charles W. (D-Texas) Oct. 26, 1938–; House 1979–2005.

    Stevens, Ted (R-Alaska) Nov. 18, 1923–; Senate Dec. 24, 1968–.

    Strickland, Ted (D-Ohio) Aug. 4, 1941–; House 1993–1995, 1997–.

    Stump, Bob (R-Ariz.) April 4, 1927–June 20, 2003; House 1977–June 20, 2003 (1977–June 11, 1982, Democrat).

    Stupak, Bart (D-Mich.) Feb. 29, 1952–; House 1993–.

    Sullivan, John (R-Okla.) Jan. 1, 1965–; House Feb. 27, 2002–.

    Sununu, John E. (R-N.H.) Sept. 10, 1964–; House 1997–2003; Senate 2003–.

    Sweeney, John R. (R-N.Y.) Aug. 9, 1955–; House 1999–.

    T

    Talent, James M. (R-Mo.) Oct. 18, 1956–; House 1993–2001; Senate Nov. 25, 2002–.

    Tancredo, Tom (R-Colo.) Dec. 20, 1945–; House 1999–.

    Tanner, John (D-Tenn.) Sept. 22, 1944–; House 1989–.

    Tauscher, Ellen O. (D-Calif.) Nov. 15, 1951–; House 1997–.

    Tauzin, W.J. “Billy” (R-La.) June 14, 1943–; House May 17, 1980–2005 (1980–Aug. 6, 1995, Democrat).

    Taylor, Charles H. (R-N.C.) Jan. 23, 1941–; House 1991–.

    Taylor, Gene (D-Miss.) Sept. 17, 1953–; House Oct. 24, 1989–.

    Terry, Lee (R-Neb.) Jan. 29, 1962–; House 1999–.

    Thomas, William (R-Calif.) Dec. 6, 1941–; House 1979–.

    Thomas, Craig (R-Wyo.) Feb. 17, 1933–; House May 2, 1989–1995; Senate 1995–.

    Thompson, Bennie (D-Miss.) Jan. 28, 1948–; House April 20, 1993–.

    Thompson, Fred (R-Tenn.) Aug. 19, 1942–; Senate Dec. 9, 1994–2003.

    Thompson, Mike (D-Calif.) Jan. 24, 1951–; House 1999–.

    Thornberry, William M. “Mac” (R-Texas) July 15, 1958–; House 1995–.

    Thune, John (R-S.D.) Jan. 7, 1961–; House 1997–2003.

    Thurman, Karen L. (D-Fla.) Jan. 12, 1951–; House 1993–2003.

    Thurmond, Strom (R-S.C.) Dec. 5, 1902–June 26, 2003; Senate Dec. 24, 1954–April 4, 1956, Nov. 1956–2003 (1947–Sept. 16, 1964, Democrat); pres. pro tempore 1981–1987, 1995–1997; Gov. 1947–1951.

    Tiahrt, Todd (R-Kan.) June 15, 1951–; House 1995–.

    Tiberi, Pat (R-Ohio) Oct. 21, 1962–; House 2001–.

    Tierney, John F. (D-Mass.) Sept. 18, 1951–; House 1997–.

    Toomey, Patrick J. (R-Pa.) Nov. 17, 1961–; House 1999–2005.

    Torricelli, Robert G. (D-N.J.) Aug. 26, 1951–; House 1983–1997; Senate 1997–2003.

    Towns, Edolphus (D-N.Y.) July 21, 1934–; House 1983–.

    Traficant, James A. Jr. (D-Ohio) May 8, 1941–; House 1985–July 24, 2002.

    Turner, James (D-Texas) Feb. 6, 1946–; House 1997–2005.

    Turner, Michael R. (R-Ohio) Jan. 11, 1960–; House 2003–.

    U

    Udall, Mark (son of Morris K. Udall, House 1961–1991; cousin of Tom Udall) (D-Colo.) July 18, 1950–; House 1999–.

    Udall, Tom (son of Steward Udall House 1955–1961; cousin of Mark Udall House 1999–) (D-N.M.) May 18, 1948–; House 1999–.

    Underwood, Robert A. (D-Guam) July 13, 1948–; House (Delegate) 1993–2003.

    Upton, Fred (R-Mich.) April 23, 1953–; House 1987–.

    V

    Van Hollen, Chris (D-Md.) Jan. 10, 1959–; House 2003–.

    Velázquez, Nydia M. (D-N.Y.) March 22, 1953–; House 1993–.

    Visclosky, Peter J. (D-Ind.) Aug. 13, 1949–; House 1985–.

    Vitter, David (R-La.) May 3, 1961–; House June 8, 1999–2005; Senate 2005–.

    Voinovich, George V. (R-Ohio) July 15, 1936–; Senate 1999–; Gov. 1991–1998.

    W

    Walden, Greg (R-Ore.) Jan. 10, 1957–; House 1999–.

    Walsh, James T. (R-N.Y.) June 19, 1947–; House 1989–.

    Wamp, Zach (R-Tenn.) Oct. 28, 1957–; House 1995–.

    Warner, John W. (R-Va.) Feb. 18, 1927–; Senate Jan. 2, 1979–.

    Waters, Maxine (D-Calif.) Aug. 15, 1938–; House 1991–.

    Watkins, Wes (R-Okla.) Dec. 15, 1938–; House 1997–2003 (1977–1991 Democrat).

    Watson, Diane (D-Calif.) Nov. 12, 1933–; House June 7, 2001–.

    Watt, Melvin (D-N.C.) Aug. 26, 1945–; House 1993–.

    Watts, J.C. Jr. (R-Okla.) Nov. 18, 1957–; House 1995–2003.

    Waxman, Henry A. (D-Calif.) Sept. 12, 1939–; House 1975–.

    Weiner, Anthony (D-N.Y.) Sept. 4, 1964–; House 1999–.

    Weldon, Curt (R-Pa.) July 22, 1947–; House 1987–.

    Weldon, Dave (R-Fla.) Aug. 31, 1953–; House 1995–.

    Weller, Gerald C. (R-Ill.) July 7, 1957–; House 1995–.

    Wellstone, Paul (D-Minn.) July 21, 1944–Oct. 25, 2002; Senate 1991–Oct. 25, 2002.

    Wexler, Robert (D-Fla.) Jan. 2, 1961–; House 1997–.

    Whitfield, Edward (R-Ky.) May 25, 1943–; House 1995–.

    Wicker, Roger (R-Miss.) July 5, 1951–; House 1995–.

    Wilson, Heather (R-N.M.) Dec. 30, 1960–; House June 25, 1998–.

    Wilson, Joe (R-S.C.) July 31, 1947–; House Dec. 19, 2001–.

    Wolf, Frank R. (R-Va.) Jan. 30, 1939–; House 1981–.

    Woolsey, Lynn (D-Calif.) Nov. 3, 1937–; House 1993–.

    Wu, David (R-Ore.) April 8, 1955–; House 1999–.

    Wyden, Ron (D-Ore.) May 3, 1949–; House 1981–Feb. 5, 1996; Senate Feb. 6, 1996–.

    Wynn, Albert R. (D-Md.) Sept. 10, 1951–; House 1993–.

    Y

    Young, C.W. “Bill” (R-Fla.) Dec. 16, 1930–; House 1971–.

    Young, Don (R-Alaska) June 9, 1933–; House March 6, 1973–.

    Congressional Committees, 107th and 108th Congresses

    Following is a list of congressional committees and subcommittees for the 107th and 108th Congresses. The House committee listings are as of the beginning of both congresses, in 2001 and 2003. The Senate listings for the 107th Congress are divided between the first half of 2001 and the remainder of the year and through 2002 because of a change in control of that chamber (see below).

    Committee jurisdictions, party ratios, committee chairmen and the dates of their service in that capacity, ranking minority members (in italics), and subcommittee chairmen are included. Political and joint committees also are listed.

    In both the 107th and 108th Congresses the House committees and subcommittee chairmen are Republicans and ranking minority members are Democrats. In the Senate, party control in the 107th Congress changed from Republican to Democratic in June 2001. Party ratios for House committees do not include delegates or the resident commissioner.

    Senate Committees

    The 2000 elections resulted in an even split in the Senate with fifty Democrats and fifty Republicans. Democrats held committee chairmanships for a brief period between the 107th Congress convening on Jan. 3, 2001, when Democratic Vice President Al Gore could cast a tie-breaking vote, and Jan. 20, when Republican Richard B. Cheney was sworn in and took over Gore's position. With Cheney's tie-breaking vote the Republicans became the majority party and controlled the chairmanships (although the two parties worked out a power-sharing arrangement on the committees). However, in the spring Republican senator James M. Jeffords of Vermont left the GOP to become an Independent but to caucus with the Democrats, effective June 6, 2001. When his switch occurred in June the Democrats became the majority party and took over control of the Senate, including the committee chairmanships. The information that follows shows the Republican chairmen of the Senate committees from January 20 to June followed by the Democratic chairmen from June through the remainder of the 107th Congress, which ended in January 2003.

    Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry

    Agriculture in general; animal industry and diseases; crop insurance and soil conservation; farm credit and farm security; food from fresh waters; food stamp programs; forestry in general; home economics; human nutrition; inspection of livestock, meat, and agricultural products; pests and pesticides; plant industry, soils, and agricultural engineering; rural development, rural electrification, and watersheds; school nutrition programs.

    R 10–D 10(107th Congress January–June 2001)

    Richard G. Lugar, Ind.

    Tom Harkin, Iowa

    Forestry, Conservation and Rural Revitalization—Michael D. Crapo, Idaho.

    Marketing, Inspection and Product Promotion—Peter G. Fitzgerald, Ill.

    Production and Price Competitiveness—Pat Roberts, Kan.

    Research, Nutrition and General Legislation—Mitch McConnell, Ky.

    D 11–R 10(107th Congress, June 2001–January 2003)

    Tom Harkin, Iowa

    Richard G. Lugar, Ind.

    Forestry, Conservation and Rural Revitalization—Blanche Lincoln, Ark.

    Marketing, Inspection and Product Promotion—Max Baucus, Mont.

    Production and Price Competitiveness—Kent Conrad, N.D.

    Research, Nutrition and General Legislation—Patrick J. Leahy, Vt.

    R 11–D 10(108th Congress)

    Thad Cochran, Miss.

    Tom Harkin, Iowa

    Forestry, Conservation and Rural Revitalization—Michael D. Crapo, Idaho

    Marketing, Inspection and Product Promotion—Jim Talent, Mo.

    Production and Price Competitiveness—Elizabeth Dole, N.C.

    Research, Nutrition and General Legislation—Peter G. Fitzgerald, Ill.

    Appropriations

    Appropriation of revenue; rescission of appropriations; new spending authority under the Congressional Budget Act.

    R 14–D 14(107th Congress January–June 2001)

    Ted Stevens, Alaska

    Robert C. Byrd, W.Va.

    Agriculture, Rural Development and Related Agencies—Thad Cochran, Miss.

    Commerce, Justice, State and Judiciary—Judd Gregg, N.H.

    Defense—Ted Stevens, Alaska

    District of Columbia—Mike DeWine, Ohio

    Energy and Water Development—Pete V. Domenici, N.M.

    Foreign Operations—Mitch McConnell, Ky.

    Interior—Conrad Burns, Mont.

    Labor, Health and Human Services and Education—Arlen Specter, Pa.

    Legislative Branch—Robert F. Bennett, Utah

    Military Construction—Kay Bailey Hutchison, Texas

    Transportation—Richard C. Shelby, Ala.

    Treasury and General Government—Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Colo.

    VA, HUD and Independent Agencies—Christopher S. Bond, Mo.

    D 15–R 14(107th Congress June 2001–January 2003)

    Robert C. Byrd, W.Va.

    Ted Stevens, Alaska

    Agriculture, Rural Development and Related Agencies—Herb Kohl, Wis.

    Commerce, Justice, State and Judiciary—Ernest F. Hollings, S.C.

    Defense—Daniel K. Inouye, Hawaii

    District of Columbia—Mary L. Landrieu, La.

    Energy and Water Development—Harry Reid, Nev.

    Foreign Operations—Patrick J. Leahy, Vt.

    Interior—Robert C. Byrd, W.Va.

    Labor, Health and Human Services and Education—Tom Harkin, Iowa

    Legislative Branch—Richard J. Durbin, Ill.

    Military Construction—Dianne Feinstein, Calif.

    Transportation—Patty Murray, Wash.

    Treasury and General Government—Byron L. Dorgan, N.D.

    VA, HUD and Independent Agencies—Barbara A. Mikulski, Md.

    R 15–D 14(108th Congress)

    Ted Stevens, Alaska

    Robert C. Byrd, W.Va.

    Agriculture, Rural Development and Related Agencies—Robert F. Bennett, Utah

    Commerce, Justice, State and Judiciary—Judd Gregg, N.H.

    Defense—Ted Stevens, Alaska

    District of Columbia—Mike DeWine, Ohio

    Energy and Water Development—Pete V. Domenici, N.M.

    Foreign Operations—Mitch McConnell, Ky.

    Homeland Security—Thad Cochran, Miss.

    Interior—Conrad Burns, Mont.

    Labor, Health and Human Services and Education—Arlen Specter, Pa.

    Legislative Branch—Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Colo.

    Military Construction—Kay Bailey Hutchinson, Texas

    Transportation—Richard C. Shelby, Ala.

    VA, HUD and Independent Agencies—Christopher S. Bond, Mo.

    Armed Services

    Defense and defense policy generally; aeronautical and space activities peculiar to or primarily associated with the development of weapons systems or military operations; maintenance and operation of the Panama Canal, including the Canal Zone; military research and development; national security aspects of nuclear energy; naval petroleum reserves (except Alaska); armed forces generally; Selective Service System; strategic and critical materials.

    R 12–D 12(107th Congress January–June 2001)

    John W. Warner, Va.

    Carl Levin, Mich.

    Airland Forces—Rick Santorum, Pa.

    Emerging Threats and Capabilities—Pat Roberts, Kan.

    Personnel—Tim Hutchinson, Ark.

    Readiness—James M. Inhofe, Okla.

    Seapower—Jeff Sessions, Ala.

    Strategic Forces—Wayne Allard, Colo.

    D 13–R 12(107th Congress June 2001–January 2003)

    Carl Levin, Mich.

    John W. Warner, Va.

    Airland Forces—Joseph I. Lieberman, Conn.

    Emerging Threats and Capabilities—Mary L. Landrieu, La.

    Personnel—Max Cleland, Ga.

    Readiness and Management Support—Daniel K. Akaka, Hawaii

    Seapower—Edward M. Kennedy, Mass.

    Strategic Forces—Jack Reed, R.I.

    R 13–D 12(108th Congress)

    John W. Warner, Va.

    Carl Levin, Mich.

    Airland Forces—Jeff Sessions, Ala.

    Emerging Threats and Capabilities—Pat Roberts, Kan.

    Personnel—Saxby Chambliss, Ga.

    Readiness and Management Support—John Ensign, Nev.

    Seapower—Jim Talent, Mo.

    Strategic Forces—Wayne Allard, Colo.

    Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs

    Banks, banking, and financial institutions; price controls; deposit insurance; economic stabilization and growth; defense production; export and foreign trade promotion; export controls; federal monetary policy, including Federal Reserve System; financial aid to commerce and industry; issuance and redemption of notes; money and credit, including currency and coinage; nursing home construction; public and private housing, including veterans' housing; renegotiation of government contracts; urban development and mass transit; international economic policy.

    R 10–D 10(107th Congress January–June 2001)

    Phil Gramm, Texas

    Paul S. Sarbanes, Md.

    Economic Policy—Jim Bunning, Ky.

    Financial Institutions—Robert F. Bennett, Utah

    Housing and Transportation—Wayne Allard, Colo.

    International Trade and Finance—Chuck Hagel, Neb.

    Securities and Investment—Michael B. Enzi, Wyo.

    D 11–R 10(107th Congress June 2001–January 2003)

    Paul S. Sarbanes, Md.

    Phil Gramm, Texas

    Economic Policy—Charles E. Schumer, N.Y.

    Financial Institutions—Tim Johnson, S.D.

    Housing and Transportation—Jack Reed, R.I.

    International Trade and Finance—Evan Bayh, Ind.

    Securities and Investment—Christopher J. Dodd, Conn.

    R 11–D 10(108th Congress)

    Richard C. Shelby, Ala.

    Paul S. Sarbanes, Md.

    Economic Policy—Jim Bunning, Ky.

    Financial Institutions—Robert F. Bennett, Utah

    Housing and Transportation—Wayne Allard, Colo.

    International Trade and Finance—Chuck Hagel, Neb.

    Securities and Investment—Michael B. Enzi, Wyo.

    Budget

    Federal budget generally; concurrent budget resolutions; Congressional Budget Office.

    R 11–D 11(107th Congress January–June 2001)

    Pete V. Domenici, N.M.

    Kent Conrad, N.D.

    D 12–R 11(107th Congress June 2001–January 2003)

    Kent Conrad, N.D.

    Pete V. Domenici, N.M.

    R 12–D 11(108th Congress)

    Don Nickles, Okla.

    Kent Conrad, N.D.

    No standing subcommittees.

    Commerce, Science, and Transportation

    Interstate commerce and transportation generally; Coast Guard; coastal zone management; communications; highway safety; inland waterways, except construction; marine fisheries; Merchant Marine and navigation; nonmilitary aeronautical and space sciences; oceans, weather, and atmospheric activities; interoceanic canals generally; regulation of consumer products and services; science, engineering, and technology research, development and policy; sports; standards and measurement; transportation and commerce aspects of outer continental shelf lands.

    R 11–D 11(107th Congress January–June 2001)

    John McCain, Ariz.

    Ernest F. Hollings, S.C.

    Aviation—Kay Bailey Hutchinson, Texas

    Communications—Conrad Burns, Mont.

    Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce and Tourism—Peter G. Fitzgerald, Ill.

    Manufacturing and Competitiveness—John Ensign, Nev.

    Oceans and Fisheries—Olympia J. Snowe, Maine

    Science, Technology and Space—George F. Allen, Va.

    Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine—Gordon H. Smith, Ore.

    D 12–R 11(107th Congress June 2001–January 2003)

    Ernest F. Hollings, S.C.

    John McCain, Ariz.

    Aviation—John D. Rockefeller IV, W.Va.

    Communications—Daniel K. Inouye, Hawaii

    Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce and Tourism—Byron L. Dorgan, N.D. (subcommittee was dissolved after June takeover)

    Oceans, Atmosphere, and Fisheries—John Kerry, Mass.

    Science, Technology and Space—Ron Wyden, Ore.

    Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine—John Breaux, La.

    R 12–D 11(108th Congress)

    John McCain, Ariz.

    Ernest F. Hollings, S.C.

    Aviation—Trent Lott, Miss.

    Communications—Conrad Burns, Mont.

    Competition, Foreign Commerce and Infrastructure—Gordon H. Smith, Ore.

    Consumer Affairs and Product Safety—Peter G. Fitzgerald, Ill.

    Oceans, Fisheries and Coast Guard—Olympia J. Snowe, Maine

    Science, Technology and Space—Sam Brownback, Kan.

    Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine—Kay Bailey Hutchinson, Texas

    energy and natural resources

    Energy policy, regulation, conservation, research, and development; coal; energy-related aspects of deep-water ports; hydroelectric power, irrigation, and reclamation; mines, mining, and minerals generally; national parks, recreation areas, wilderness areas, wild and scenic rivers, historic sites, military parks, and battlefields; naval petroleum reserves in Alaska; nonmilitary development of nuclear energy; oil and gas production and distribution; public lands and forests; solar energy systems; territorial possessions of the United States.

    R 11–D 11(107th Congress January–June 2001)

    Frank H. Murkowski, Alaska

    Jeff Bingaman, NW.

    Energy Research, Development, Production and Regulation—Don Nickles, Okla.

    Forests and Public Land Management—Larry E. Craig, Idaho

    National Parks, Historic Preservation and Recreation—Craig Thomas, Wyo.

    Water and Power—Gordon H. Smith, Ore.

    D 12–R 11(107th Congress June 2001–January 2003)

    Jeff Bingaman, N.M.

    Frank H. Murkowski, Alaska

    Energy—Bob Graham, Fla.

    National Parks—Daniel K. Akaka, Hawaii

    Public Lands and Forests—Ron Wyden, Ore.

    Water and Power—Bryon L. Dorgan, N.D.

    R 12–D 11(108th Congress)

    Pete V. Domenici, N.M.

    Jeff Bingaman, N.M.

    Energy—Lamar Alexander, Tenn.

    National Parks—Craig Thomas, Wyo.

    Public Lands and Forests—Larry E. Craig, Idaho

    Water and Power—Lisa Murkowski, Alaska

    environment and public works

    Environmental policy, research, and development; air, water, and noise pollution; construction and maintenance of highways; environmental aspects of outer continental shelf lands; environmental effects of toxic substances other than pesticides; fisheries and wildlife; flood control and improvements of rivers and harbors; nonmilitary environmental regulation and control of nuclear energy; ocean dumping; public buildings and grounds; public works, bridges, and dams; regional economic development; solid waste disposal and recycling; water resources.

    R 9–D 9(107th Congress January–June 2001)

    Robert C. Smith, N.H.

    Harry Reid, Nev.

    Clean Air, Wetlands, Private Property and Nuclear Safety—George V. Voinovich, Ohio

    Fisheries, Wildlife, and Water—Michael D. Crapo, Idaho

    Superfund, Waste Control, and Risk Assessment—Lincoln Chafee, R.I.

    Transportation and Infrastructure—James M. Inhofe, Okla.

    D 10–R 9(107th Congress June 2001–January 2003)

    James M. Jeffords, Vt.

    Robert C. Smith, N.H.

    Clean Air, Wetlands, and Climate Change—Joseph L. Lieberman, Conn.

    Fisheries, Wildlife, and Water—Bob Graham, Fla.

    Superfund, Toxics, Risk, and Waste Management—Barbara Boxer, Calif.

    Transportation, Infrastructure, and Nuclear Safety—Harry Reid, Nev.

    R 10–D 9(108th Congress)

    James M. Inhofe, Okla.

    James M. Jeffords, Vt.

    Clean Air, Climate Change, and Nuclear Safety—George V. Voinovich, Ohio

    Fisheries, Wildlife, and Water—Michael D. Crapo, Idaho

    Superfund and Waste Management—Lincoln Chafee, R.I.

    Transportation and Infrastructure—Christopher S. Bond, Mo.

    Finance

    Revenue measures generally; taxes; tariffs and import quotas; reciprocal trade agreements; customs; revenue sharing; federal debt limit; Social Security; health programs financed by taxes or trust funds.

    R 10–D 10(107th Congress January–June 2001)

    Charles E. Grassley, Iowa

    Max Baucus, Mont.

    Health Care—Olympia J. Snowe, Maine

    International Trade—Orrin G. Hatch, Utah

    Long-Term Growth, Debt and Deficit Reduction—Frank H. Murkowski, Alaska

    Social Security and Family Policy—Jon Kyl, Ariz.

    Taxation and IRS Oversight—Don Nickles, Okla.

    D 11–R 10(107th Congress June 2001–January 2003)

    Max Baucus, Mont.

    Charles E. Grassley, Iowa.

    Health Care—John D. Rockefeller IV, W.Va.

    International Trade—Max Baucus, Mont.

    Long-Term Growth and Debt Reduction—Bob Graham, Fla.

    Social Security and Family Policy—John B. Breaux, La.

    Taxation and IRS Oversight—Kent Conrad, N.D.

    R 11–D 10(108th Congress)

    Charles E. Grassley, Iowa

    Max Baucus, Mont.

    Health Care—Jon Kyl, Ariz.

    International Trade—Craig Thomas, Wyo.

    Long-Term Growth and Debt Reduction—Gordon H. Smith, Ore.

    Social Security and Family Policy—Rick Santorum, Pa.

    Taxation and IRS Oversight—Don Nickles, Okla.

    Foreign Relations

    Relations of the United States with foreign nations generally; treaties; foreign economic, military, technical, and humanitarian assistance; foreign loans; diplomatic service; International Red Cross; international aspects of nuclear energy; International Monetary Fund; intervention abroad and declarations of war; foreign trade; national security; oceans and international environmental and scientific affairs; protection of U.S. citizens abroad; United Nations; World Bank and other development assistance organizations.

    R 9–D 9(107th Congress January–June 2001)

    Jesse Helms, N.C.

    Joseph R. Biden Jr., Del.

    African Affairs—Bill Frist, Tenn.

    East Asian and Pacific Affairs—Craig Thomas, Wyo.

    European Affairs—Gordon H. Smith, Ore.

    International Economic Policy, Export and Trade Promotion—Chuck Hagel, Neb.

    International Operations and Terrorism—George F. Allen, Va.

    Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs—Sam Brownback, Kan.

    Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, Narcotics, and Terrorism—Lincoln Chafee, R.I.

    D 10–R 9(107th Congress June 2001–January 2003)

    Joseph R. Biden Jr., Del.

    Jesse Helms, N.C.

    African Affairs—Russell D. Feingold, Wis.

    Central Asia and the South Caucasus—Robert G. Torricelli, N.J.

    East Asian and Pacific Affairs—John F. Kerry, Mass.

    European Affairs—Joseph R. Biden Jr., Del.

    International Economic Policy, Export and Trade Promotion—Paul S. Sarbanes, Md.

    International Operations and Terrorism—Barbara Boxer, Calif.

    Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs—Paul Wellstone, Minn.

    Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, Narcotics Affairs—Christopher J. Dodd, Conn.

    R 11–D 10(108th Congress)

    Richard G. Lugar, Ind.

    Joseph R. Biden Jr., Del.

    African Affairs—Lamar Alexander, Tenn.

    East Asian and Pacific Affairs—Sam Brownback, Kan.

    European Affairs—George Allen, Va.

    International Economic Policy, Export and Trade Promotion—Chuck Hagel, Neb.

    International Operations and Terrorism—John E. Sununu, N.H.

    Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs—Lincoln Chafee, R.I.

    Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, Narcotics Affairs—Norm Coleman, Minn.

    Governmental Affairs 1

    Archives of the United States; budget and accounting measures; census and statistics; federal civil service; congressional organization; intergovernmental relations; government information; District of Columbia; organization and management of nuclear export policy; executive branch organization and reorganization; Postal Service; efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of government.

    R 8–D 8(107th Congress January–June 2001)

    Fred Thompson, Tenn.

    Joseph I. Lieberman, Conn.

    International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services—Thad Cochran, Miss.

    Investigations—Susan Collins, Maine

    Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring, and the District of Columbia—George V. Voinovich, Ohio

    D 9–R 8(107th Congress June 2001–January 2003)

    Joseph I. Lieberman, Conn.

    Fred Thompson, Tenn.

    International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services—Daniel K. Akaka, Hawaii

    Investigations—Carl Levin, Mich.

    Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring, and the District of Columbia—Richard J. Durbin, Ill.

    R 9–D 8(108th Congress)

    Susan Collins, Maine

    Joseph I. Lieberman, Conn.

    Financial Management, Budget, and International Security—Peter G. Fitzgerald, Ill.

    Government Management, Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia—George V. Voinovich, Ohio

    Investigations—Norm Coleman, Minn.

    Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions

    Education, labor, health, and public welfare in general; aging; arts and humanities; biomedical research and development; child labor; convict labor; domestic activities of the Red Cross; equal employment opportunity; handicapped people; labor standards and statistics; mediation and arbitration of labor disputes; occupational safety and health; private pensions; public health; railway labor and retirement; regulation of foreign laborers; student loans; wages and hours; agricultural colleges; Gallaudet University; Howard University; St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington, D.C.

    R 10–D 10(107th Congress January–June 2001)

    James M. Jeffords, Vt.

    Edward M. Kennedy, Mass.

    Aging—Tim Hutchinson, Ark.

    Children and Families—Judd Gregg, N.H.

    Employment, Safety and Training—Michael B. Enzi, Wyo.

    Public Health—Bill Frist, Tenn.

    D 11–R 10(107th Congress June 2001–January 2003)

    Edward M. Kennedy, Mass.

    Judd Gregg, N.H.

    Aging—Barbara Mikulski, Md.

    Children and Families—Christopher J. Dodd, Conn.

    Employment, Safety, and Training—Paul Wellstone, Minn.

    Public Health—Edward M. Kennedy, Mass.

    R 11–D 10(108th Congress)

    Judd Gregg, N.H.

    Edward M. Kennedy, Mass.

    Aging—Christopher S. Bond, Mo.

    Children and Families—Lamar Alexander, Tenn.

    Employment, Safety and Training—Michael B. Enzi, Wyo.

    Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services—Mike DeWine, Ohio

    Indian Affairs

    Problems and opportunities of Native Americans, including Native American land management and trust responsibilities, education, health, special services, loan programs, and claims against the United States.

    R 7–D 7(107th Congress January–June 2001)

    Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Colo.

    Daniel K. Inouye, Hawaii

    D 8–R 7(107th Congress June 2001–January 2003)

    Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Colo.

    Daniel K. Inouye, Hawaii

    R 8–D 7(108th Congress)

    Daniel K. Inouye, Hawaii

    Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Colo.

    No standing subcommittees.

    Judiciary

    Civil and criminal judicial proceedings in general; national penitentiaries; bankruptcy, mutiny, espionage, and counterfeiting; civil liberties; constitutional amendments; apportionment of representatives; government information; immigration and naturalization; interstate compacts in general; claims against the United States; patents, copyrights, and trademarks; monopolies and unlawful restraints of trade; holidays and celebrations; revision and codification of the statutes of the United States; state and territorial boundary lines.

    R 9–D 9(107th Congress January–June 2001)

    Orrin G. Hatch, Utah

    Patrick J. Leahy, Vt.

    Administrative Oversight and the Courts—Charles E. Grassley, Iowa

    Antitrust, Business Rights, and Competition—Mike DeWine, Ohio

    Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights—Strom Thurmond, S.C.

    Criminal Justice Oversight—Strom Thurmond, S.C.

    Immigration—Sam Brownback, Kan.

    Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information—Jon Kyl, Ariz.

    Youth Violence—Jeff Sessions, Ala.

    D 10–R 9(107th Congress June 2001–January 2003)

    Orrin G. Hatch, Utah

    Patrick J. Leahy, Vt.

    Administrative Oversight and the Courts—Charles E. Schumer, N.Y.

    Antitrust, Competition, and Business and Consumer Rights—Herb Kohl, Wis.

    The Constitution—Russell Feingold, Wis.

    Crime and Drugs—Joseph R. Biden, Del.

    Immigration—Edward. M. Kennedy, Mass.

    Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information—Dianne Feinstein, Calif.

    R 10–D 9(108th Congress)

    Orrin G. Hatch, Utah

    Patrick J. Leahy, Vt.

    Administrative Oversight and the Courts—Jeff Sessions, Ala.

    Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Consumer Rights—Mike DeWine, Ohio

    Constitution, Civil Rights, and Property Rights—John Cornyn, Texas

    Crime, Corrections, and Victims' Rights—Lindsey Graham, S.C.

    Immigration, Border Security, and Citizenship—Saxby Chambliss, Ga.

    Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security—Jon Kyl, Ariz.

    Rules and Administration

    Senate rules and regulations; Senate administration in general; corrupt practices; qualifications of senators; contested elections; federal elections in general; Government Printing Office; Congressional Record; meetings of Congress and attendance of members; presidential succession; the Capitol, congressional office buildings, the Library of Congress, the Smithsonian Institution, and the Botanic Garden; purchase of books and manuscripts and erection of monuments to the memory of individuals.

    R 9–D 9(107th Congress January–June 2001)

    Mitch McConnell, Ky.

    Christopher J. Dodd, Conn.

    D 10–R 9(107th Congress June 2001–January 2003)

    Christopher J. Dodd, Conn.

    Mitch McConnell, Ky.

    R 10–D 9(108th Congress)

    Trent Lott, Miss.

    Christopher J. Dodd, Conn.

    No standing subcommittees.

    Select Ethics

    Studies and investigates standards and conduct of Senate members and employees and may recommend remedial action.

    R 3–D 3(107th Congress January–June 2001)

    Pat Roberts, Kan.

    Harry Reid, Nev. (vice chairman)

    D 3–R 3(107th Congress June 2001–January 2003)

    Harry Reid, Nev.

    Pat Roberts, Kan. (vice chairman)

    R 3–D 3(108th Congress)

    George V. Voinovich, Ohio

    Harry Reid, Nev. (vice chairman)

    No standing subcommittees.

    Select Intelligence

    Legislative and budgetary authority over the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and intelligence activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other components of the federal intelligence community.

    R 8–D 8(107th Congress January–June 2001)

    Richard C. Shelby, Ala.

    Bob Graham, Fla.

    D 9–R 8(107th Congress June 2001–January 2003)

    Bob Graham, Fla.

    Richard C. Shelby, Ala.

    R 9–D 8(108th Congress)

    Pat Roberts, Kan.

    John D. Rockefeller IV, W.Va.

    No standing subcommittees.

    Small Business and Entrepreneurship

    Problems of small business; Small Business Administration.

    R 9–D 9(107th Congress January–June 2001)

    Christopher S. Bond, Mo.

    John Kerry, Mass.

    D 10–R 9(107th Congress June 2001–January 2003)

    John Kerry, Mass.

    Christopher S. Bond, Mo.

    R 10–D 9(108th Congress)

    Olympia J. Snowe, Maine

    John Kerry, Mass.

    No standing subcommittees.

    Special Aging

    Problems and opportunities of older people including health, income, employment, housing, and care and assistance. Reports findings and makes recommendations to the Senate but cannot report legislation.

    R 10–D 10(107th Congress January–June 2001)

    Larry E. Craig, Idaho

    John B. Breaux, La.

    D 11–R 10(107th Congress June 2001–January 2003)

    John B. Breaux, La.

    Larry E. Craig, Idaho

    R 11–D 10(108th Congress)

    Larry E. Craig, Idaho

    John B. Breaux, La.

    No standing subcommittees.

    Veterans' Affairs

    Veterans' measures in general; compensation; life insurance issued by the government on account of service in the armed forces; national cemeteries; pensions; readjustment benefits; veterans' hospitals, medical care and treatment; vocational rehabilitation and education; soldiers' and sailors' civil relief.

    R 7–D 7(107th Congress January–June 2001)

    Arlen Specter, Pa.

    John D. Rockefeller IV, W.Va.

    D 8–R 7(107th Congress June 2001–January 2003)

    John D. Rockefeller IV, W.Va.

    Arlen Specter, Pa.

    R 8–D 7(108th Congress)

    Arlen Specter, Pa.

    Bob Graham, Fla.

    Political Committees

    Democratic Policy Committee (an arm of the Democratic Caucus that advises on legislative priorities)—Byron L. Dorgan, N.D., chairman (107th and 108th Congresses)

    Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (campaign support committee for Democratic senatorial candidates)—Patty Murray, Wash., chairman (107th Congress); Jon Corzine, N.J., chairman (108th Congress)

    Democratic Steering and Coordination Committee (makes Democratic committee assignments)—John Kerry, Mass., chairman (107th Congress); Hillary Rodham Clinton, N.Y., chairman (108th Congress)

    Democratic Technology and Communications Committee (seeks to improve communications with the public about the Democratic Party and its policies)—John D. Rockefeller IV, W.Va., chairman (107th and 108th Congresses)

    National Republican Senatorial Committee (campaign support committee for Republican senatorial candidates)—Bill Frist, Tenn., chairman (107th Congress); George Allen, Va., chairman (108th Congress)

    Republican Committee on Committees (makes Republican committee assignments)—John Kyl, Ariz., chairman (107th Congress); Larry E. Craig, Idaho, chairman (108th Congress)

    Republican Policy Committee (advises on party action and policy)—Larry E. Craig, Idaho, chairman (107th Congress); Jon Kyl, Ariz., chairman (108th Congress)

    House Committees

    Agriculture

    Agriculture generally; forestry in general, and forest reserves other than those created from the public domain; adulteration of seeds, insect pests, and protection of birds and animals in forest reserves; agricultural and industrial chemistry; agricultural colleges and experiment stations; agricultural economics and research; agricultural education extension services; agricultural production and marketing and stabilization of prices of agricultural products, and commodities (not including distribution outside the United States); animal industry and diseases of animals; commodities exchanges; crop insurance and soil conservation; dairy industry; entomology and plant quarantine; extension of farm credit and farm security; inspection of livestock, poultry, meat products, seafood and seafood products; human nutrition and home economics; plant industry, soils, and agricultural engineering; rural electrification; rural development; water conservation related to activities of the Department of Agriculture.

    R 27–D 24(107th Congress)

    Larry Combest, Texas

    Charles W. Stenholm, Texas

    Conservation, Credit, Rural Development, and Research—Frank D. Lucas, Okla.

    Department Operations, Nutrition and Foreign Agriculture—Robert W. Goodlatte, Va.

    General Farm Commodities and Risk Management—Saxby Chambliss, Ga.

    Livestock and Horticulture—Richard W. Pombo, Calif.

    Specialty Crops and Foreign Agriculture Programs—Terry Everett, Ala.

    R 27–D 24(108th Congress)

    Robert W. Goodlatte, Va.

    Charles W. Stenholm, Texas

    Conservation, Credit, Rural Development, and Research—Frank D. Lucas, Okla.

    Department Operations, Oversight, Nutrition and Forestry—Gil Gutknecht, Minn.

    General Farm Commodities and Risk Management—Jerry Moran, Kan.

    Livestock and Horticulture—Robin Hayes, N.C.

    Specialty Crops and Foreign Agriculture Programs—Bill Jenkins, Tenn.

    Appropriations

    Appropriation of the revenue for the support of the government; rescissions of appropriations contained in appropriation acts; transfers of unexpended balances; new spending authority under the Congressional Budget Act.

    R 35–D 29; I 1(107th Congress)

    C.W. Bill Young, Fla.

    David R. Obey, Wis.

    Agriculture, Rural Development, FDA and Related Agencies—Henry Bonilla, Texas

    Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary—Frank R. Wolf, Va.

    Defense—Jerry Lewis, Calif.

    District of Columbia—Joe Knollenberg, Mich.

    Energy and Water Development—Sonny Callahan, Ala.

    Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Agencies—Jim Kolbe, Ariz.

    Interior—Joe Skeen, N.M.

    Labor, Health and Human Services and Education—Ralph Regula, Ohio

    Legislative—Charles H. Taylor, N.C.

    Military Construction—David L. Hobson, Ohio

    Transportation—Harold Rogers, Ky.

    Treasury, Postal Service and General Government—Ernest Istook, Okla.

    Veterans Affairs, Housing and Urban Development and Independent Agencies—James T. Walsh, N.Y.

    R 27–D 24(108th Congress)

    C.W. Bill Young, Fla.

    David R. Obey, Wis.

    Agriculture, Rural Development, FDA and Related Agencies—Henry Bonilla, Texas

    Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary—Frank R. Wolf, Va.

    Defense—Jerry Lewis, Calif.

    District of Columbia—Rodney Frelinghuysen, N.J.

    Energy and Water Development—David L. Hobson, Ohio

    Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs—Jim Kolbe, Ariz.

    Homeland Security—Harold Rogers, Ky.

    Interior—Charles H. Taylor, N.C.

    Labor, Health and Human Services and Education—Ralph Regula, Ohio

    Legislative—Jack Kingston, Ga.

    Military Construction—Joe Knollenberg, Mich.

    Transportation and Treasury—Ernest Istook, Okla.

    Veterans Affairs, Housing and Urban Development and Independent Agencies—James T. Walsh, N.Y.

    Armed Services

    Ammunition depots; forts; arsenals; Army, Navy, and Air Force reservations and establishments; common defense generally; conservation, development, and use of naval petroleum and oil shale reserves; Department of Defense generally, including the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force generally; interoceanic canals generally; including measures relating to the maintenance, operation, and administration of interoceanic canals; Merchant Marine Academy, and state maritime academies; military applications of nuclear energy; tactical intelligence and intelligence related activities of the Department of Defense; national security aspects of merchant marine, including financial assistance for the construction and operation of vessels, the maintenance of the U.S. shipbuilding and ship repair industrial base, cabotage, cargo preference, and merchant marine officers and seamen as these matters relate to the national security; pay, promotion, retirement, and other benefits and privileges of members of the armed forces; scientific research and development in support of the armed services; selective service; size and composition of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force; soldiers' and sailors' homes; strategic and critical materials necessary for the common defense.

    R 32–D 28(107th Congress)

    Bob Stump, Ariz.

    Ike Skelton, Mo.

    Military Installations and Facilities—H. James Saxton, N.J.

    Military Personnel—John M. McHugh, N.Y.

    Military Procurement—Floyd D. Spence, S.C.

    Military Readiness—Curt Weldon, Pa.

    Military