Congress and the Nation, 1989-1992, Vol. VIII: The 101st and 102nd Congresses

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    Appendix

    1989 Keys Votes

    Senate
    1. Tower Nomination

    After a lengthy and bitter battle largely along partisan lines, the Senate on March 9 rejected President Bush's nomination of former Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John Tower, R-Texas, to be secretary of defense.

    Critics of the nomination, led by the Armed Services panel's current chairman, Sam Nunn, D-Ga., insisted that their opposition was based on concerns about Tower's personal fitness. Citing hundreds of interviews conducted by the FBI, Nunn and others said Tower had a record of alcohol abuse that would make him an unreliable link in the military chain of command. Moreover, they said, Tower's service as a paid consultant to several defense contractors since his retirement from the Senate would impair his efforts to restore confidence in the scandal-plagued weapons procurement system.

    But Tower's supporters, led by Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole, R-Kan., insisted that the personal questions about Tower were merely a screen for a Democratic power grab. According to this argument, the Democrats used unsworn statements by unidentified sources in the FBI files to defeat a nominee whose political savvy and grasp of the issues would have made him too powerful an advocate of Bush's policies.

    The nomination was rejected by a vote of 47-53: R 44-1; D 3-52 (ND 1-37, SD 2-15).

    2. Contra Aid

    One of the Bush administration's first priorities was to lance the political wound called contra aid. The administration succeeded, largely because of Secretary of State James A. Baker III's negotiating skills. A “bipartisan accord” that Baker hammered out with congressional leaders in March ended a years-long debate about whether the United States should use military force to oust Nicaragua's leftist Sandinista regime. Instead, Congress and the administration agreed to rely on diplomacy as the principal means of ending conflict in Nicaragua and elsewhere in Central America.

    The accord settled on a middle course about the U.S.-backed contras. Instead of resuming military aid to the contras, as many conservatives wanted, or disbanding the guerrillas, as most liberals wanted, the political leadership in Washington decided to keep the contras intact. They did so by agreeing to continue “non-military” aid until after Nicaragua's elections, set for Feb. 25.

    Both chambers ratified that agreement by approving legislation (HR 1750) authorizing the use of unspent Pentagon funds to provide food, medicine and other supplies to the contras. The Senate approved the package April 13 on an 89-9 vote — R 39-5; D 50-4 (ND 34-4, SD 16-0) — with opponents including conservatives and liberals who refused to reconcile themselves to the compromise.

    Step 2 of the bipartisan accord came in October when the chambers approved another White House request to spend $9 million to promote free and fair elections in Nicaragua. The administration contended it wanted the money to establish a “level playing field” for the elections. But officials made no secret of the fact that the administration supported, and was hoping to provide, as much indirect aid as Congress would allow to an opposition coalition headed by newspaper publisher Violeta Chamorro. The Senate approved the election aid (HR 3385) on Oct. 17. (House key vote 1)

    3. FS-X Fighter Plane

    By a narrow margin, the Senate declined to block outright a joint U.S.-Japan project to develop a new Japanese fighter plane, designated the FS-X. But critics, determined to vent frustration over what they saw as Japan's exploitation of its commercial and military links with the United States, pushed through the Senate a modified version of the resolution (S J Res 113) hedging the deal with conditions.

    Warning that the Senate-passed conditions would kill the sale, President Bush vetoed the resolution and, with strong GOP support, the Senate sustained the veto.

    Under terms of the FS-X program, U.S. and Japanese companies would modify the U.S. Air Force's workhorse F-16 fighter plane to meet Japan's requirements.

    Critics said that this “co-development” would give Japanese companies access to the engineering and program management skills of their U.S. counterparts. The Japanese aerospace industry would use that information to compete more effectively with U.S. aircraft builders for overseas sales, the critics warned.

    Supporters of the sale insisted that the project represented an attempt by Japan to pick up more of the burden of defending allied interests in the northwest Pacific. Japan would develop its commercial aerospace business with or without U.S. cooperation, they argued.

    But the critics countered that Washington should press the Japanese harder to buy U.S.-built fighter planes off the shelf.

    A resolution to block U.S. participation in the joint program in effect was rejected on May 16 by a vote of 47-52: R 11-34; D 36-18 (ND 25-12, SD 11-6). But the Senate adopted a modified version of the resolution that would have barred the transfer to Japan of sensitive jet-engine technologies and expressed the sense of Congress that if the plane went into production, U.S. companies should be guaranteed 40 percent of the business.

    An effort to override Bush's veto of the resolution fell one vote short of the constitutionally required two-thirds majority. The vote to override was 66-34.

    4. Fiscal 1989 Supplemental

    Showing little of the appetite House Democrats had for challenging President Bush on anti-drug funding, Senate Appropriations leaders on June I easily fended off efforts to put new drug money into a $3.3 billion midyear appropriations bill (HR 2072 — PL 101-45).

    Robert c. Byrd, D-W.Va., the new chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, was able to steer the bill through the committee in quick order May 31 after insisting that any attempts to add new funding would draw a certain presidential veto. The Senate measure knocked out the most controversial House provision — $822 million in new anti-drug law enforcement spending — which Bush vehemently opposed unless it was accompanied by equivalent cutbacks in other programs.

    Byrd then prevailed on the Senate floor against several drug-related amendments that would have required waivers from budget restrictions against new spending.

    The Senate's overwhelming support for Byrd's hard-line stance against new anti-drug funding gave him considerable leverage in a subsequent conference with the House, where he refused to compromise.

    House Democrats hoped to step up the pressure on Byrd, who had stocked his version of the bill with a number of pet projects for his home state (as well as for states of other key Senate committee members). Byrd had won administration approval for the Senate bill, but he was coming under increasing pressure from his own Democratic Caucus to take political advantage of the drug issue.

    The final compromise — $75 million for anti-drug law enforcement efforts, with offsetting cuts in some pet programs — was worked out by bipartisan leaders of the House and Senate Appropriations committees, under the auspices of House Speaker Thomas S. Foley, D-Wash., and Senate Majority Leader George J. Mitchell, D-Maine. White House budget director Richard G. Darman — who repeatedly threatened to urge a presidential veto if the anti-drug money was left in the bill — participated in the negotiations and was satisfied with the outcome.

    Byrd's ability to forge a bill acceptable to the administration hinged on his ability to keep anti-drug amendments off the Senate measure. Indeed, the first such amendment reflected both the mood of some senators for confrontation with the administration over anti-drug funding, and Byrd's power to stave it: It was Pennsylvania Republican Arlen Specter's attempt for a budget waiver to shift $70 million from Pentagon funds to new prison construction. Although three more drug-related amendments would surface afterward, the votes would be similarly lopsided. Byrd turned back Specter's proposal with a motion to table (kill) the waiver request, prevailing on a vote of 77-18: R 30-11; D 47-7 (ND 31-6, SD 16-1). (House key vote 2)

    5. Child Care

    The 1989 debate over increasing federal assistance for child care saw virtually every member of Congress in agreement that some action was warranted, but there was no consensus on what that action should be. At times, it seemed the most vigorous debate was not over what should be done, but whether Democrats or Republicans would ultimately get the credit.

    The Senate spent nearly two weeks in June debating a Democratic-backed measure combining very different plans approved by the Labor and Human Resources and Finance committees. The proposals were joined in a shotgun marriage by Majority Leader George J. Mitchell, D-Maine, when it became clear that the Labor Committee's plan to authorize grants to the states for child care subsidies, the so-called ABC bill (S 5), could not pass without the addition of a tax-credit proposal.

    The inclusion in the Democratic leadership bill of tax-credit provisions favored by President Bush and most Republicans left the outnumbered Republicans in an awkward position. Bush's proposal, offered in March, had little support on Capitol Hill; most congressional Republicans instead had put forward their own plans. But faced with a relatively united Democratic front, Minority Leader Bob Dole, R-Kan., knew he had to devise an attractive alternative or face defeat in an early test of Bush's domestic agenda.

    Dole patched together elements of both the original Bush plan and a bill drafted primarily by House Republicans. His proposal featured an expanded earned-income tax credit (also part of the Democratic plan) and an increase in existing block grants to the states. He spent most of a week making changes in an attempt to lure wavering Democrats, but in the end he could garner only two — Sam Nunn, Ga., and Kent Conrad, N.D. — while losing three Republicans who were cosponsors of the ABC bill.

    Dole's substitute amendment was rejected June 22 by 44-56: R 42-3; D 2-53 (ND 1-37, SD 1-16). (House key vote 12)

    6. Prohibited Foreign Activities

    Two years after the Iran-contra hearings, Congress and the administration continued to struggle over the political lessons that were learned. The conflict in 1989 involved several pieces of legislation intended to check what many on Capitol Hill viewed as excessive administration power over foreign affairs.

    One such proposal, originally authored by Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, D-N.Y., called for the imposition of criminal penalties on any administration official found guilty of undertaking foreign policy actions that Congress had otherwise barred by law. The Moynihan proposal was aimed at preventing a repetition of the actions of former White House aide Oliver L. North, who supervised a secret supply network for the Nicaraguan contras at a time when U.S. law prohibited official aid.

    Despite objections from the White House, the Senate on July 18 approved the Moynihan language, 57-42: R 4-41; D 53-1 (ND 37-0, SD 16-1), as an amendment to the fiscal 1990 authorization bill vote for the State Department and related agencies. That amendment was watered down substantially to try to meet administration objections. Even so, Bush vetoed HR 1487 because of the Moynihan amendment. The House then passed a new version of the State Department bill (HR 3792) without the Moynihan amendment, but that bill was blocked in the Senate at the end of the session because of an unrelated committee jurisdictional dispute.

    7. Strategic Defense Initiative

    Following what had become a pattern, the Senate narrowly rejected a proposal to slice funding for the strategic defense initiative (SDI) to a level that — in light of larger cuts already made by the House — would have ensured an even larger reduction in President Bush's funding request than the $1.1 billion cut that Congress eventually made.

    But there were aspects of the 1989 SDI debate that suggested that the anti-missile defense program faced a grim political future.

    The messianic rhetoric with which President Ronald Reagan inaugurated the program in 1983 — to make nuclear missiles “impotent and obsolete” — had long since given way to a more modest goal of shoring up the U.S. nuclear deterrent by ruling out a disarming Soviet first strike.

    Moreover, led by conservative Democratic Sen. Sam Nunn of Georgia, Congress had made clear that it would block any early deployment (or realistic, space-based testing) of SDI that would violate the generally held understanding of the 1972 U.S.-Soviet treaty limiting anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems.

    Nevertheless, despite the concerns of many liberal Democrats that SDI was, at best, technically dubious and, at worst, a threat to arms control, Congress had been unwilling to challenge Reagan's commitment to the program.

    In 1989, Reagan was gone. And despite Bush's insistence that he supported SDI, there was a general sense on Capitol Hill that he had not given the project the same personal commitment. Moreover, with the Pentagon's acute money crunch, even conservatives who had backed SDI saw its relatively large budget as a potential source of funds with which to salvage other programs from the budgetary ax.

    Bush requested $4.9 billion to continue the anti-missile defense research program and the House-passed version of the defense authorization bill approved $3.1 billion.

    In its version of the authorization bill, the Senate Armed Services Committee recommended $4.5 billion — a reduction of $366 million from Bush's request — for the program that some called “star wars.”

    When the Senate took up the bill, J. Bennett Johnston, D-La., who had been at the forefront of opposition to SDI in the Senate, offered an amendment that would have sliced the program's authorization by an additional $558 million, to $4 billion. Johnston had intended to incorporate in his amendment provisions that, in effect, would have transferred the funds cut from SDI to other programs, but that was blocked by an objection on procedural grounds.

    Armed Services Committee members argued that they needed the Senate to approve a higher SDI authorization so they would have bargaining leverage with House conferees to produce a final SDI authorization of about the amount Johnston was proposing.

    Johnston's amendment was tabled (thus killed) on July 27 by a key vote of 50-47: R 37-6; D 13-41 (ND 5-32, SD 8-9).

    Before the House-Senate conferees on the defense authorization bill resolved their disagreement on SDI funding, Johnston prevailed on the Senate Appropriations Committee to cut SDI funding to $4 billion in the companion defense appropriations bill.

    But on the Senate floor, Armed Services Chairman Nunn and others argued that their bargaining position in the authorization conference would be undermined if the Senate backed a lower amount in the appropriation bill. So the Senate voted 53-47 to increase the appropriation for SDI up to the level it had authorized. (House key vote 7)

    8. Savings and Loan Restructuring

    As the Senate considered President Bush's plan to salvage the nation's savings and loan industry (HR 1278 — PL 101-73), only one issue rose to prominence — how to borrow the $50 billion needed to close insolvent thrifts.

    First in the Banking Committee and later on the Senate floor, Republicans and a few Democrats banded together to oppose a Democratic plan to borrow the money from the Treasury and count the cost as part of the federal budget. Bush's plan — favored by Republicans — was to borrow the money privately and keep it off the federal books, except for those interest costs paid by taxpayers.

    Bush argued that because the $50 billion principal would be repaid by the industry, not by taxpayers, there was no justification for counting it as part of the budget. Most Democrats, including Banking Chairman Donald W. Riegle Jr., D-Mich., countered that it was a government expense that should not be hidden, and that borrowing from the Treasury — with its lower costs — would save taxpayers as much as $4.5 billion in interest payments over 30 years.

    The central problem for those supporting the on-budget, Treasury-financed approach was that it would greatly increase the federal budget deficit during the three years when the $50 billion was borrowed. So supporters favored an exemption from the Gramm-Rudman anti-deficit law for the amount borrowed. Without such an exemption, other programs would have had to be cut or taxes increased to offset the larger deficit.

    The House, led by the Ways and Means Committee, had approved an on-budget financing scheme, and Senate conferees reluctantly accepted that position as their final big decision in conference on the bill. But when the conference report was returned to the Senate, Bush went to the mat. The chief administration argument was that a Gramm-Rudman exemption would set the wrong precedent and destabilize world financial markets.

    Bush's objection carried the day. Under Senate rules, adopting the Gramm-Rudman exemption required 60 votes. Riegle's motion to do so (by waiving a point of order that the exemption itself violated Gramm-Rudman) failed by six votes, and the Senate thereby rejected the conference report. The Aug. 3 vote was 54-46: R 1-44; D 53-2 (ND 36-2, SD 17-0).

    Conferees then reconvened, adopting a compromise that put $20 billion of the money on budget for fiscal 1989, which was nearly over and would not require a Gramm-Rudman exemption. The remaining $30 billion was put off budget for fiscal 1990 and 1991. And the bill passed. (House key vote 5)

    9. Airline Smoking Ban

    A harsh signal was sent to the tobacco lobby Sept. 14 when the Senate voted to shut off debate on a proposal to ban smoking on all airline flights within the United States. That vote paved the way for perhaps the most far-reaching anti-smoking legislation ever passed by Congress.

    Even tobacco-state members leading the filibuster conceded from the start that they were fighting a losing battle. The motion to end debate was approved by a vote of 77-21, well above the 60 votes needed. The Senate then approved the ban Sept. 27 as part of an $11.9 billion fiscal 1990 spending bill (HR 3015 — PL 101-164) for the Department of Transportation and related agencies.

    The ban was only slightly weakened in conference with the House, to exempt flights to and from Alaska and Hawaii that lasted six hours or more. That compromise was viewed as a face-saving concession to tobacco interests, which both sides preferred to a messy floor fight.

    Both the House and Senate sponsors of the smoking ban circumvented their authorizing committees and attached the legislation to the transportation spending bill. An earlier two-year ban on smoking on flights of two hours or less was to expire on April 23, 1990.

    Richard J. Durbin, D-Ill., lacking support for the ban on the House Appropriations Committee, went directly to the Rules Committee, where he persuaded members to include a permanent extension of the ban on two-hour flights in the spending bill.

    Frank R. Lautenberg, D-N.J., chairman of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Transportation, attached a stronger, permanent ban on smoking on all flights during his subcommittee's markup.

    Lautenberg had no chance of pushing the legislation through the Senate outside the appropriations process. The normal committee of jurisdiction, Commerce, Science and Transportation, included Democratic Chairman Ernest F. Hollings of South Carolina and Aviation Subcommittee Chairman Wendell H. Ford of Kentucky — both staunch tobacco-state members and leaders of the Senate filibuster.

    On Oct. 16, conferees agreed to the smoking-ban compromise, and Congress completed final action on the transportation spending bill Nov. 14.

    While tobacco interests continued to command a number of loyal allies in Congress, senators ignored the industry's heavy lobbying against the ban extension, with only 21 senators backing the filibuster attempt. Among those voting to end debate were tobacco-state Democrats Al Gore of Tennessee and Sam Nunn of Georgia. Even Republican Pete V. Domenici, a notoriously heavy smoker, supported ban sponsors even though it would prohibit smoking on cross-country flights back to his home state of New Mexico. In a roll call to invoke cloture, the Senate voted 77-21: R 33-11; D 44-10 (ND 35-2, SD 9-8).

    10. ‘Stealth’ Bomber

    Cost was the main theme of the first large-scale attack in the Senate on the B-2 “stealth” bomber. The Senate rejected an amendment to the fiscal 1990 defense appropriations bill by Patrick J. Leahy, D-Vt., that would have barred production of additional planes beyond the 13 B-2s built or under construction.

    Noting that the predicted total program cost of roughly $70 billion amounted to an average of $532 million for each of the planned 132 planes, Leahy contended that was just too much. Moreover, he argued, the plane's expensive stealth qualities, intended to help it fly through the Soviet Union's extensive anti-bomber defenses, were not necessary. The same missions could be performed more cheaply by long-range cruise missiles fired from existing bombers flying far beyond the reach of Soviet defenses, he said.

    But B-2 supporters said that Leahy's math inflated the B-2's unit cost by ignoring the many useful technological spinoffs produced by the $22.5 billion (out of the $70 billion total) already spent on B-2 research.

    Moreover, the B-2 backers contended, a manned penetrating bomber offered uniquely valuable military assets not duplicated by cruise missiles. For instance, they said, it would require the Soviets to completely revamp their anti-bomber defenses at huge cost.

    Leahy's amendment was rejected on Sept. 26 by a vote of 29-71: R 2-43; D 27-28 (ND 23-15, SD 4-13).

    When the Senate took up the conference report on the defense appropriations measure, Alan Cranston, D-Calif., offered an amendment to it that essentially duplicated Leahy's earlier effort. Cranston's amendment was rejected 29-68. (House key vote 8)

    11. NEA Funding

    North Carolina Republican Sen. Jesse Helms' amendment to bar federal funding of “obscene or indecent” artwork touched off a firestorm of debate across the country, pitting the arts community and its defenders against fundamentalist Christians and their allies in an argument that many members warned threatened the existence of federal arts agencies such as the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA).

    Helms' amendment to a fiscal 1990 spending bill (HR 2788 — PL 101-121) for the Interior Department and related agencies was prompted by revelations that NEA grants had helped fund exhibitions of controversial photographs many members found obscene or sacrilegious. During floor debate on HR 2788, Helms used copies of the photographs to persuade bill managers Robert c. Byrd, D-W.Va., and James A. McClure, R-Idaho, to accept his amendment on a voice vote. With the issue reduced by Helms to a simple question of whether tax dollars should be spent on obscene art, it was widely assumed the Senate would avoid a roll call at all costs.

    But then the Senate went to conference on the interior bill with the House, which had no similar language in its version. NEA defenders from both chambers managed to substantially water down the conference language, granting broad discretion to the NEA and the National Endowment of the Humanities to bar funding only for work that — in the opinion of the endowments — “may be considered” obscene and without “serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.”

    That struck Helms as a “loophole so wide you can drive 12 Mack trucks through it abreast,” and as the conference was winding up its work, Helms sought to block the language by forcing the Senate, during debate on a fiscal 1990 defense spending bill (HR 3072 — PL 101-165), to vote on a resolution instructing the Senate interior conferees to insist on the original Helms amendment.

    Despite some senators' public concern that anyone opposing Helms would be targeted for supporting obscenity, several senators took the floor to speak against the amendment. Tim Wirth, D-Colo., voiced the frustration of many of his colleagues with Helms' efforts to hold their feet to the fire.

    “I, for one, am really fed up with it,” Wirth said, insisting the Senate had reached the “end of the rope” on the matter, which he argued was censorship and “an egregious violation of the First Amendment.” He called on colleagues to “belly up and be serious about the defense of the Constitution of the United States.”

    In what appeared to be a turning point of the debate, John C. Danforth, R-Mo., a conservative and an ordained Episcopalian minister, took the floor to say that while he found the controversial photos to be “gross” and “totally indefensible,” he could not support the Helms amendment. Danforth argued that Helms' broad language barring denigration of any “religion or nonreligion” or any “person, group or class of citizens” could have a dangerously chilling effect on a wide variety of works. He urged colleagues not to try to define appropriate art on the Senate floor.

    The Senate agreed, voting to table the Helms amendment 62-35: R 19-25; D 43-10 (ND 33-5, SD 10-5).

    12. Catastrophic-Illness Insurance

    The congressional about-face on a program to expand Medicare to cover the costs of catastrophic illness was remarkable both for its swiftness and for its sweep. The decision to repeal the 1988 Medicare Catastrophic Coverage law came less than 17 months after the measure was enacted and marked the first time that Congress had voted to take away significant new benefits it had created.

    Members who wrote the 1988 law knew that its financing mechanism would be controversial — particularly an income-related surtax that required affluent senior citizens to pay more for their benefits than their less well-off brethren. But they badly underestimated the size of the backlash, the extent to which Medicare's 33 million beneficiaries did not understand the program and the number of outside groups that would seek to exploit the confusion.

    Sponsors of the 1988 law fought throughout the year to quell the complaints, but the Bush administration was lukewarm in its support, and by fall the battle was virtually over. On Oct. 4, the House voted 360-66 to repeal both the new benefits and the premiums to finance them.

    On Oct. 6, the Senate took up a free-standing bill (S 1726) sponsored by Arizona Republican John McCain, the principal antagonist of the surtax in that chamber. Although several amendments were debated, advocates of the 1988 program pinned their hopes for its survival on a plan crafted by Dave Durenberger, Minn., ranking Republican on the Finance Committee's Medicare subcommittee.

    Durenberger's proposal would have preserved the core catastrophic benefits — stop-loss coverage of hospital and doctor bills. But to pay for them, the plan also would have retained about one-quarter of the surtax that had touched off the political firestorm in the first place.

    The Durenberger amendment had the support of Majority Leader George J. Mitchell, D-Maine, Minority Leader Bob Dole, R-Kan., and Finance Committee Chairman Lloyd Bentsen, D-Texas. It also was endorsed by Health and Human Services Secretary Louis W. Sullivan, although the White House disavowed that statement. None of the high-level backing mattered in the end; the plan was resoundingly defeated, 37-62: R 8-37; D 29-25 (ND 21-16, SD 8-9).

    Members subsequently approved, 99-0, McCain's plan to abolish the surtax but keep the hospital coverage and some smaller benefits. In the end, however, both chambers approved a House measure (HR 3607) repealing the entire program. (House key vote 11)

    13. Deficit Reduction

    The Senate in effect put a stop to President Bush's 1989 drive for a lower capital gains tax rate, and perhaps set a precedent for more streamlined deficit-reduction bills, with its passage Oct. 13 of a $14.1 billion budget “reconciliation” bill (HR 3299). The vote, a bipartisan ending to a most divisive episode, was 87-7: R 40-2; D 47-5 (ND 34-2, SD 13-3).

    The outcome ended a week of wrangling over a Democratic offer from Senate Majority Leader George J. Mitchell, D-Maine, to strip the comprehensive budget-cutting bill of the usual array of unrelated and sometimes costly provisions that often hitch a ride on the critical legislation.

    Democrats described their strategy in “good government” rhetoric, but their purpose was to block a GOP bid to add another amendment — for the capital gains tax cut, a 1988 Bush campaign priority.

    The administration resisted Democrats' overture, demanding a vote on the tax issue, but Republican senators were losing enthusiasm for the apparently futile fight. Convinced they could not overcome a Democratic filibuster of a capital gains amendment, the Republicans finally accepted Mitchell's offer in terms that made it sound like their own.

    Republicans reserved their right to offer a capital gains amendment on other legislation, specifically a pending measure to raise the government's debt limit. But within weeks Bush would concede what had become all but certain with the reconciliation bill vote — that the tax-cut effort was dead for the year.

    After the reconciliation vote, the Senate still had a hard time in a conference committee persuading House members to go along with a stripped-down bill. House Democrats were eager to drop the capital gains amendment that had made its way into their version, but many opposed forfeiting provisions on priorities such as child care.

    They ultimately did so in late November, as part of a $14.7 billion compromise intended to meet Bush's demand for a bill providing at least $14 billion in 1990 savings, without the extraneous add-ons, thus freeing Congress to adjourn for the year before Thanksgiving.

    14. Flag Desecration Amendment

    Although President Bush insisted that a constitutional amendment was the only way to reverse a June 21 Supreme Court decision striking down laws against flag desecration, the Senate Oct. 19 rejected a proposed amendment (S J Res 180) sponsored by Minority Leader Bob Dole, R-Kan.

    The vote was 51-48: R 33-11; D 18-37 (ND 8-30, SD 10-7). That was 15 short of the required two-thirds of those present and voting.

    The outcome could not have been predicted in the immediate aftermath of the 5-4 court decision in Texas v. Johnson. That ruling, which held that flag burning and similar activities were forms of expression protected by the First Amendment, prompted an outcry by the public and politicians across the country.

    With Bush demanding a constitutional amendment to reverse the court's ruling, Democrats worried that the issue would become a test of patriotism, similar to the Pledge of Allegiance requirement that Bush had used so effectively against Democrat Michael S. Dukakis in the 1988 presidential election campaign.

    But as each month passed, passions cooled. Public interest and outrage waned, and members began to have second thoughts about amending the Bill of Rights for the first time in the nation's history. A majority of legal scholars and other experts testifying at public hearings opposed a constitutional amendment, and some of them said Congress probably could achieve the same objective with a carefully phrased statute.

    On Oct. 12 Congress cleared a bill to prohibit physical defacement of the flag. The measure became law without Bush's signature Oct. 28. Bush and a few Republicans continued urging passage of a constitutional amendment, but the White House made no effort to lobby for the proposal. The House did not vote on its version of the amendment in 1989.

    15. Capital Gains Tax Cut

    Congress managed only the second pre-Thanksgiving adjournment in a non-election year since 1965 largely because the Senate shelved the session's most contentious issue: cutting the capital gains tax.

    In a vote on Nov. 14, echoed in an identical vote the next day, supporters of President Bush's cut in the tax fell nine votes shy of the 60 needed to close debate. Thus the Democrats' threat of a filibuster successfully postponed the day of reckoning. The vote by which the motion for cloture failed was 51-47: R 45-0; D 6-47 (ND 2-34, SD 4-13).

    Despite the opposition of Democratic leaders, the House on Sept. 28 had voted to include in its budget-reconciliation bill (HR 3299 — PL 101-239) a cut in the tax on capital gains (profits from the sale of assets). The House approved the bill on Oct. 5. By then, Democratic leaders in the Senate had erected emergency barriers to passage of a similar cut in that chamber.

    In a marathon session the night of Oct. 3–4, Senate Finance Chairman Lloyd Bentsen, D-Texas, succeeded in keeping the cut out of his committee's revenue package for reconciliation.

    Sen. Bob Packwood, R-Ore., the panel's ranking GOP member, offered a plan that would have excluded from taxation 5 percent of a capital gain for each year the asset had been held. (Packwood initially capped the exclusion at 30 percent but later raised this to 35 percent.) Packwood would have paid for his plan's revenue losses with a revision of Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) designed to capture new revenue in the short run. Bentsen (who had an IRA plan of his own) beat back Packwood's amendment on a 10-10 tie vote.

    Supporters of the capital gains cut then needed a floor amendment to add it to the reconciliation bill, a move that was subject to special Senate rules requiring 60 votes. Given that procedural advantage, Majority Leader George J. Mitchell, D-Maine, forged a winning minority coalition of those who opposed the cut on substance and those who opposed waiving the usual procedures on its behalf.

    Frustrated, Senate GOP leaders on Oct. 13 gave up on the reconciliation bill and began looking for other vehicles. For a time, the cut was a pending amendment on legislation authorizing emergency aid to Poland and Hungary (S 1582). At another stage, supporters threatened to attach it to legislation raising the limit on the national debt (H J Res 280 — PL 101-140).

    As Thanksgiving neared, a compromise was reached. The House agreed to drop its capital gains provision in HR 3299, then reapproved it Nov. 9 as a free-standing bill (HR 3628). The following week, the new bill was brought to the Senate floor, where Packwood's plan was substituted for the substance of the House version. After three hours of debate, a vote was held not on the substance of Packwood's plan or on the concept of a capital gains cut but on the procedural question of closing off debate.

    The Democrats who wanted the tax cut badly enough to vote for cloture were primarily Southerners with moderate-to-conservative voting records.

    Among them was Sen. David L. Boren of Oklahoma, the only Democrat who had voted with Packwood and against Bentsen in Finance. Boren was expected to return in 1990 with a capital gains plan that more Democrats would support. (House key vote 10)

    16. Pay and Ethics Package

    The Senate broke with tradition and established a two-tier congressional salary system, when it refused to take a big salary increase the House had approved for its members. As part of a bill that revamped congressional ethics rules (HR 3660 — PL 101-194), the Senate Nov. 17 voted to take a 10 percent pay raise in 1990, while allowing House members and other federal officials increases of as much as 40 percent over 1990–91.

    The vote was a measure of lawmakers' continuing skittishness about the politically explosive job of setting their own pay — a task that blew up in their faces nine months earlier.

    In February, Congress bowed to heavy public criticism and killed a proposal to raise the salaries of lawmakers and other top federal officials by 51 percent. Despite promises that the raise's approval would be followed by action on legislation barring members from keeping honoraria and other outside income, the public was outraged by the magnitude of the proposed raise and the fact it was to take effect without Congress voting on it.

    The House revived the issue in the closing weeks of the 1989 session, exacerbating longstanding institutional tensions between the Senate and House over members' compensation. Senators had always been more satisfied with the status quo because they were, on average, wealthier and collected more in honoraria than House members. The drive to ban honoraria in exchange for the politically risky pay raise thus came primarily from the House.

    Senate leaders endorsed the House's pay plan, which included cost-of-living raises in 1990 and a 25 percent increase in 1991 in conjunction with a ban on honoraria and other tightening of ethics rules. Despite initial victories on procedural votes, the leaders could not garner a majority for the House pay plan and pulled it before bringing it to a vote. Instead, the leaders brought up an alternative providing the smaller increase for the Senate, billed as compensation for cost-of-living adjustments foregone in the previous three years. The key vote approving that alternative was 56-43: R 25-20; D 31-23 (ND 21-16 SD 10-75).

    The discrepancy between the chambers' pay and honoraria rules all but guaranteed that the compensation issue would resurface after the 1990 election year began. The only question was whether the House would buckle to pressure to roll back its pay or whether the Senate would raise its salary and drop honoraria, in line with the House. (House key vote 16)

    House
    1. Contra Aid

    Ending years of bitter political debate over whether the United States should use military force to oust the leftist government of Nicaragua, the Bush administration reached a “bipartisan accord” with Congress. Under the accord, which Secretary of State James A. Baker III hammered out with congressional leaders in March, Congress and the administration agreed to rely on diplomacy as the principal means to end conflict in Nicaragua and elsewhere in Central America.

    Congress and the administration settled on a middle course on the U.S.-backed contras. Instead of resuming military aid, as many conservatives wanted, or disbanding the guerrillas, as most liberals wanted, the political leadership in Washington decided to keep the contras intact — at least temporarily — and continue to provide “non-military” aid to the guerrillas until after Nicaragua's elections Feb. 25, 1990.

    Both chambers of Congress ratified the agreement April 13 by approving legislation (HR 1750) authorizing using unspent Pentagon funds to send the contras food, medicine and other supplies. The House approved that package 309-110 — R 157-11; D 152-99 (ND 84-87, SD 68-12) — with opponents including both conservatives and liberals who refused to reconcile themselves to the political compromise.

    A follow-up move in the bipartisan accord came in October, when the two chambers approved another Bush request for permission to spend $9 million to promote free and fair elections in Nicaragua. The administration said it wanted the money to establish a “level playing field,” but officials made no secret that the administration supported, and hoped to provide as much indirect aid as Congress would allow, to an opposition coalition headed by newspaper publisher Violeta Chamorro.

    The House approved the elections aid (HR 3385) on Oct. 4. (Senate key vote 2)

    2. Fiscal 1989 Supplemental

    House Republicans on April 26 found a way to exploit some abiding divisions among their Democratic counterparts and, as a result, help President Bush avert an early showdown with Congress on spending policy. A $4.74 billion supplemental spending bill (HR 2402 — PL 101-45) for fiscal 1989, though laced with politically popular plums such as anti-drug funding, was abruptly pulled from the House floor after members decisively rejected an effort by Democratic leaders to pay for the bill with midyear cuts in federal programs.

    The April vote was the first sign that Bush would be no pushover on fiscal policy, as liberal and conservative Democrats alike defected from the party leadership. A proposal to impose across-the-board cuts to pay for the congressional add-ons to Bush's original $2.2 billion request — though amounting to little more than half a percent from each appropriations account — would have sliced deeply into programs ranging from child nutrition and cancer research to military enlistment bonuses. House Majority Leader Thomas S. Foley, D-Wash., had offered the hurriedly prepared amendment to mend fences between the party's Appropriations and Budget committee leaders and to co-opt a similar, but even more stringent, GOP plan to impose offsetting cuts on domestic programs alone.

    Silvio O. Conte of Massachusetts, ranking Republican on the Appropriations Committee, had indicated that he would try to impose across-the-board cuts on domestic appropriations to cover increases for anti-drug initiatives and forest firefighting reimbursements opposed by the Bush administration. But even though Democratic leaders pushed through a “king of the hill” rule for floor debate — designed to make Foley's amendment pre-eminent even if the House first approved Conte's — they did not anticipate Conte's countermove (or lack of one), which exposed the flaws in Foley's scheme.

    Democrats had tried to cast Foley's amendment as a test of Bush's vows to wage a war on drugs and provide a “kinder, gentler” domestic policy. The Bush administration tried to keep the supplemental in line with a 1987 White House-congressional budget summit, which stipulated that spending cuts must offset any supplemental spending requests that did not fit the description of a “dire emergency.”

    Before the Democrats' floor-vote scenario got under way, however, Conte backed off, preferring to force an all-or-nothing vote on Foley's plan. Suddenly, Foley's plan was transformed from the less painful alternative to the sole source of widely unappealing spending cuts.

    Ninety-two Democrats crossed over to vote with Republicans against Foley's amendment. It was rejected, 172-252: R 9-160; D 163-92 (ND 129-44, SD 34-48).

    In the end, Bush's $2.2 billion request would be increased to $3.3 billion. House Appropriations leaders found a way to keep an $822 million funding proposal for anti-drug programs in the House bill, but only by avoiding a direct vote (and thus another fiscal showdown with the administration). When the Senate refused to put extra anti-drug funding in its version of the bill, the increasingly weakened negotiators for House Appropriations were forced to find a face-saving compromise, which in effect kept the supplemental appropriations bill at a funding level agreeable to Bush. (Senate key vote 4)

    3. Budget Resolution

    The House easily endorsed the first budget negotiated in the Bush years (as the Senate would the same week), but while the atmosphere was more conciliatory, the action merely continued the cease-fire in the partisan deadlock over spending and tax policy that had marked the Reagan years.

    The $1.17 trillion budget resolution for fiscal 1990 (H Con Res 106) was the product of a bipartisan budget pact that President Bush and congressional leaders sealed April 14 in a Rose Garden ceremony. But the House's lopsided approval May 4, by a vote of 263-157 — R 106-61; D 157-96 (ND 102-71, SD 55-25) — masked the widespread disgruntlement and dashed expectations in both parties over the limited terms of the deal.

    The budget resolution called for $28 billion in savings to bring the projected 1990 deficit within the $100 billion target set in the Gramm-Rudman anti-deficit law. But lawmakers knew the full amount would never be realized and that what savings were likely to be implemented in a so-called budget-reconciliation bill would be heavy on accounting gimmicks and one-time windfalls.

    The budget resolution, which is an annual outline for fiscal action in the appropriations, tax-writing and authorizing committees, proposed no major cuts in federal programs and required just $5.3 billion in new but unspecified revenues.

    That reflected the same standoff between Democrats opposed to significant cuts in social programs and Republicans opposed to higher taxes and defense cuts that had divided the government under Ronald Reagan.

    Both sides agreed that they would try, as early as fall, to improve on the modest 1990 budget by negotiating a bold deficit-cutting plan for fiscal 1991. But that promise was soon lost in acrimony, along with the spirit of good will that the leaders had cited in the spring as their chief accomplishment. Congress and the administration fought nearly to Thanksgiving just to implement the 1990 agreement and enact what turned out to be a $14.7 billion reconciliation bill.

    4. Minimum Wage Increase

    After more than two years of trying — and largely failing — to tarnish Ronald Reagan and George Bush with the minimum wage issue, labor leaders and top congressional Democrats began seeking a face-saving compromise after failing June 14 to override a veto of their bill to raise the hourly minimum wage from $3.35 to $4.55.

    Bush's whiplike veto of their bill (HR 2) — and House Democrats' inability to override it — convinced senior strategists in Congress and organized labor that pressing the point for mere political advantage would be futile.

    Restless congressional Republicans then began prodding Bush to seek a compromise with Democrats that might finally break the long partisan deadlock. White House Chief of Staff John H. Sununu and AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland, meeting Oct. 24 to discuss the imminent arrival in the United States of Polish Solidarity leader Lech Walesa, finally agreed to negotiate a solution.

    That talk broke the ground for rapid negotiations that resulted Nov. 1 in the House's approving, by a resounding vote of 382-37, legislation (HR 2710 — PL 101-157) to raise the minimum hourly wage to $4.25 over two years. It also provided, for the first time, for a subminimum “training wage,” a key request of Bush that organized labor had long opposed.

    The Senate followed suit Nov. 8, clearing the bill on an 89-8 vote. Bush signed HR 2710 into law Nov. 17.

    Bush had promised to veto the original Democratic proposal in HR 2 almost from the day he entered the White House. Indeed, his opposition to HR 2 became the cornerstone of a White House strategy to show that Bush would be willing to deal on some issues, but on others (such as the minimum wage) he would “lay down a mark” and fight to hold it, if only to show Congress that he was no pushover.

    Bush vetoed HR 2 almost before he received it June 13, issuing a statement even as the official papers were being delivered from Capitol Hill. House Democratic leaders scheduled an override the next day, hoping to capitalize on the publicity and put pressure on wavering Republicans.

    It was not enough. Proponents fell 37 votes shy of the two-thirds (284 in this case) needed to thwart Bush. The tally was 247-178: R 20-150: D 227-28 (ND 171-3, SD 56-25).

    5. Capital Standards for Thrifts

    The nation's savings and loan industry had in the past wielded considerable clout on Capitol Hill. It was, after all, the presumed source of money for the American dream of home ownership. So, as Congress began working through President Bush's request (HR 1278 — PL 101-73) for hundreds of billions of dollars from taxpayers to salvage the industry, there was sure to be a showdown.

    It came on the issue of “capital” or “net worth” requirements for surviving thrifts. Critics of the industry and its regulators had charged that the financial crisis was caused at least in part by not requiring thrift owners to put their own money into the businesses. Without a sufficient cushion of capital, thrift owners had no incentive to make careful, responsible investments. The only money at risk was that of depositors, and it was insured by the federal government.

    Congress had previously yielded to industry requests for exemptions from capital standards. And when the bailout bill reached the House Banking Committee, several members tried to continue the forbearance.

    The chief issue was “supervisory good will,” in essence an accounting gimmick to offset the difference between the value of a thrift's weak assets and its liabilities. Buyers of hundreds of failed thrifts in the mid-1980s had been allowed to carry this “phantom” capital on their books for up to 40 years.

    In April markup sessions, some members of the Banking Committee tried to allow thrifts with good will to continue to count it so they could meet the stiff capital standards being crafted, but they were rebuffed, often by close votes.

    The bill was also referred to the Judiciary Committee, where Henry J. Hyde, R-Ill., argued May 24 that preventing the future use of good will was in effect a denial of due process. Hyde offered an amendment in committee to give thrifts that would lose the ability to count good will as capital the right to administrative and judicial appeals. His amendment lost on a 17-17 tie vote.

    Hyde took his cause to the floor.

    Throughout the Banking and Judiciary committee debate, it had been mostly Democrats who argued against counting good will and Republicans who favored it. Just two days before the floor vote, it appeared that Hyde might prevail on the floor.

    But when the issue reached the floor June 15, Bush decided that it would be embarrassing if his party were soft on the thrift industry. Bush lobbied hard, threatening a veto if the capital standards were weakened. And he changed the vote of Minority Leader Robert H. Michel, R-Ill., sealing the amendment's fate.

    Hyde's amendment lost by an overwhelming vote of 94-326: R 56-114; D 38-212 (ND 30-144, SD 8-68).

    Observers saw the outcome as a clear signal of the end of the thrift industry's clout in Congress. Later votes the same day to ban “junk bond” investments by thrifts and to strike several perceived “special interest” provisions from the bill merely reinforced that view. (Senate key vote 8)

    6. Superconducting Supercollider

    The overwhelming House vote June 28 to begin building the world's largest atom smasher in Waxahachie, Texas, put to rest a simmering controversy over the wisdom of spending billions on this “big science” project, handed President Bush a significant legislative victory and charted a new direction for federal science policy.

    The House vote was the first ever on the superconducting supercollider (SSC), and the margin stunned friends and foes alike. An amendment to eliminate the $110 million in initial construction funds from a $200 million earmark for research and development was rejected. It meant that, barring an unusual retreat in 1990, the controversial project would enter the construction phase and cost as much as $900 million a year until it was finished in five to seven years.

    The House action thus embarked the federal government on a new science policy initiative that would put an increasingly heavy burden on the budget over the next decade. It also was a revealing case study in how a project of such magnitude and controversy — yet such limited geographical interest — found necessary support in Congress.

    The money was included in the fiscal 1990 energy and water development appropriations bill (HR 2696 — PL 101-101). Ultimately, in conference with the Senate, appropriators agreed to provide the SSC $225 million.

    Even that did not end the budget and technical problems that have plagued the SSC since its inception. Facing cost overruns of $2 billion, federal officials recommended scaling back the project because it was unlikely its $5.9 billion construction budget would be increased.

    Defenders argued that the SSC, one of the largest and most complicated public works projects ever undertaken, would let scientists delve further into the basic nature of matter and energy. Opponents questioned spending so much on a project with comparatively narrow scientific interest.

    Intense lobbying by the Texas congressional delegation, the Bush administration and key science budget defenders in the House helped swing the vote in favor of the SSC. The vote on an amendment by Democrat Dennis E. Eckart of Ohio to scale back the construction funds was rejected 93-330: R 28-144; D 65-186 (ND 57-112, SD 8-74).

    7. Strategic Defense Initiative

    As it has done each year since 1986, the House made a hefty slash in funding for the strategic defense initiative (SDI). By a July 25 vote of 248-175, which broke largely along party lines, the House adopted an amendment to the fiscal 1990 defense authorization bill (HR 2461) approving $3.1 billion for SDI research in fiscal 1990 instead of the $4.9 billion President Bush had requested.

    Reflecting the lowered political expectations for the anti-missile program that had been a cornerstone of President Ronald Reagan's program, the Bush administration had scaled back its request. In his revised fiscal 1990 defense budget, Bush sought $4.9 billion for SDI, $1.1 billion less than Reagan had requested before leaving office in January. Even so, the program remained a target for its longtime opponents as well as conservative supporters who saw its relatively large budget as a potential source of money with which to rescue other programs from the budget ax.

    The House Armed Services Committee cut the project to $4 billion. And when the House took up the defense authorization bill, even SDI's strongest backers hoped for nothing better than boosting the figure to $4.1 billion. That proposal was rejected 117-299. The House then rejected a second amendment that would have cut SDI funding to $1.3 billion.

    Then it approved an amendment setting SDI funding at $3.1 billion by a key vote of 248-175: R 34-137; D 214-38 (ND 163-7, SD 51-31). (Senate key vote 7)

    8. ‘Stealth’ Bomber

    Against the backdrop of acute budgetary limits and a receding Soviet military threat, the projected $70 billion cost of a planned fleet of 132 B-2 bombers fostered intense Hill skepticism toward the program in 1989.

    Built of exotic materials in the shape of a “flying wing,” the plane was intended to penetrate Soviet air defenses that would be too lethal for the newly built B-1Bs by the late 1990s. For decades, liberals have challenged the need for sophisticated bombers able to fly through Soviet defense, insisting that the same mission could be performed more cheaply by small, long-range cruise missiles, fired from planes beyond the reach of Soviet defenses.

    This year, several prominent Republicans took up that argument, insisting that the B-2 was simply too expensive in the current circumstances.

    Bush requested money to buy three of the big bombers in fiscal 1990 and components that could be used to build five more B-2s in fiscal 1991. The House Armed Services Committee, in its version of the defense authorization bill, trimmed the authorization to two planes with components for two more.

    By a key vote of 144-279 — R 28-144; D 116-135 (ND 102-68, SD 14-67) — on July 26, the House rejected an amendment to end B-2 production after completing 13 planes already flying or under construction. But it then rejected, 176-244, another amendment to reaffirm the committee position.

    The House later voted by 257-160 to adopt an amendment that reduced the committee's B-2 authorization by $470 million and provided that none of the procurement funds could be spent until Congress approved a new, less expensive long-term production plan for the plane. (Senate key vote 10)

    9. ‘Section 89’

    Sandwiched in the landmark 1986 tax-overhaul bill between hundreds of other provisions, the so-called “Section 89” rules against discrimination in employee benefit plans at first escaped the watch of many businesses and many in Congress.

    But complaints mounted as the implementation date, Jan. 1, 1989, drew near. And while large employers griped about the rules, small businesses least equipped to bear the administrative burden protested the loudest. The complaints often surprised lawmakers, few of whom had ever heard of Section 89.

    By the end of the year, sentiment against the rules had grown so intense in the House that opponents overran all efforts to find a compromise. An overwhelming House vote on Sept. 27 to repeal the tax rules forced the Senate to back off its own compromise measure. The repeal provision was finally attached to a bill (H J Res 280 — PL 101-140) raising the federal debt limit, which President Bush signed Nov. 8.

    At the start of 1989, the National Federation of Independent Business and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce made repeal or drastic overhaul of Section 89 a top priority. They got a huge boost when House Small Business Chairman John J. LaFalce, D-N.Y., agreed to sponsor a repeal bill, which attracted more than half of the House members as cosponsors.

    Meanwhile, Ways and Means Committee leaders and staff, who had drafted the Section 89 provisions, were having second thoughts of their own. Chairman Dan Rostenkowski, D-Ill., agreed to craft a compromise that would revamp the rules. That compromise was folded into the deficit-reduction reconciliation bill (HR 3299 — PL 101-239) moving through the House.

    But several of LaFalce's Republican counterparts had other ideas. They urged the House GOP to use Section 89 as a test case for a new, more aggressive legislative strategy and stake everything on repeal. Even Democrats found repeal an easy way to demonstrate that they shared business' worries about excessive government regulation.

    But when a bipartisan majority of the Appropriations Committee on July 25 narrowly approved a one-year delay in enforcing the Section 89 rules, Rostenkowski fought back. He lost a key battle in the Rules Committee, however, prompting him to seek further compromise.

    Emboldened Section 89 opponents would have none of that, however, preparing the way for a tense vote on outright repeal.

    On Sept. 27, the mutiny against Rostenkowski's authority over tax issues turned into a rout. Ways and Means Democrat Byron L. Dorgan of North Dakota offered an amendment to strike Rostenkowski's scaled-backed substitute from the reconciliation bill and repeal the Section 89 tax rules altogether. Lawmakers on both sides of the aisle rushed to support the amendment, which was approved on a vote of 390-36: R 172-2; D 218-34 (ND 140-31, SD 78-3).

    10. Capital Gains Tax Cut

    President Bush tasted perhaps the sweetest triumph of his first year in office on Sept. 28, when 239 House members voted to cut the tax on capital gains. The plan at issue that day was far from the substance of Bush's own proposal (he had called for a 15 percent top rate for gains on securities and residential real estate, instead of the existing top rate of 28 percent or 33 percent), and it was soon to come to grief in the Senate. But on the House floor, Bush won the support of 64 Democrats who defied their leadership to join Republicans in backing the central feature of the president's tax policy.

    The Ways and Means Committee had wrangled over the issue for months, delaying consideration of the fiscal 1990 budget-reconciliation bill (HR 3299 — PL 101-239). Chairman Dan Rostenkowski, D-Ill., whose leanings on capital gains had seemed uncertain through the spring, finally announced against a cut.

    Nevertheless, on Sept. 14, a bare majority of the committee supported a two-year plan that would have capped the tax rate at 19.6 percent for a wider range of capital assets, including timber. Rostenkowski, Speaker Thomas S. Foley of Washington and the rest of the Democratic leadership denounced the cut as a tax break for the wealthy and vowed to expunge it from the bill on the floor.

    As an alternative, they pushed an amendment restoring universal eligibility for individual retirement accounts (IRAs). To pay for the IRAs, the leadership amendment would have eliminated the “bubble” the 1986 tax overhaul set in the tax rates. In effect, this would have raised the marginal rate from 28 percent to 33 percent on the highest taxpayers' incomes (more than $200,120 for a family of four).

    As this amounted to a tax increase, it virtually assured a presidential veto. Moreover, it alienated some members who were otherwise ambivalent about cutting capital gains taxes. In the end, only one House Republican (Doug Bereuter of Nebraska) opposed the president, while a majority of Democrats from the South and from timber-growing districts voted for the cut. The leadership amendment was rejected 190-239: R 1-175; D 189-64 (ND 152-20, SD 37-44). (Senate key vote 15)

    11. Catastrophic-Illness Insurance

    Nothing Congress has done in the 1980s created more aggravation for members than the 1988 Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act. Hailed at enactment as a shield for senior citizens, it turned into a sword against its authors. By the August recess, Ways and Means Chairman Dan Rostenkowski, D-Ill., who helped write the law, found his car blocked by angry, sign-waving senior citizens when he was leaving a speaking engagement in Chicago.

    What happened to Rostenkowski differed only in degree from what confronted virtually every other member of Congress on trips home during the year — a continuing backlash from seniors outraged at being required to pay for the largest expansion of Medicare since it began in 1965.

    The Ways and Means Committee agreed just before the August recess to restructure the program's financing. But it was quickly apparent that its action was too little, too late. By the time the issue reached the House floor Oct. 4, members were fed up.

    The result was overwhelming approval of an amendment to the fiscal 1990 budget-reconciliation bill (HR 3299 — PL 101-239) that would repeal the program outright. The amendment, offered by one of the 1988 law's authors, Ways and Means member Brian Donnelly, D-Mass., was adopted 360-66: R 164-10; D 196-56 (ND 124-47, SD 72-9).

    Two days later, the Senate voted 99-0 to preserve the program's expanded hospital coverage and certain smaller benefits.

    But the House position eventually prevailed. Lawmakers cleared a separate repeal measure, HR 3607, only hours before Congress adjourned for the year Nov. 22. (Senate key vote 12)

    12. Child Care

    The new House Democratic leadership team, battered by losses on a capital gains tax cut and several other issues, prevailed Oct. 5 in a floor fight over child care proposals.

    Unable to force a compromise between competing plans from the Ways and Means and Education and Labor committees, the leadership reluctantly decided to let both plans stay in the fiscal 1990 budget-reconciliation bill (HR 3299) and resolve the issue in conference. But just as with the capital gains issue, the disagreement left an opening for Republicans to move in and assert themselves.

    The leadership was confident that it could turn back the official GOP plan, which would have replaced both Democratic proposals with a simple expansion of the earned-income tax credit (also part of the Ways and Means package). But Democratic leaders feared trouble over an ostensibly bipartisan plan that was cosponsored by Charles W. Stenholm, D-Texas, and E. Clay Shaw Jr., R-Fla., but was drafted by Republican Ways and Means staffers. That plan offered scaled-back elements from both the Education and Labor and Ways and Means proposals.

    The leadership pulled out all the stops to defeat Stenholm's plan, which failed Oct. 5 by 195-230: R 159-16; D 36-214 (ND 6-163, SD 30-51).

    While a temporary truce between Education and Labor and Ways and Means members to save their proposals certainly helped Democratic leaders, members on both sides said a more decisive factor was rank-and-file Democrats — particularly those who voted against their leaders on the capital gains tax — who wanted to prevent another embarrassing loss for their new top team. Indeed, only 36 Democrats defected from the party line, compared with 64 who broke ranks on the capital gains tax vote the previous week.

    The disagreements over how to produce a child care bill proved impossible to resolve in the context of the reconciliation bill, and the issue was put off until 1990. (Senate key vote 5)

    13. Abortion Funding

    The July 3 Supreme Court decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, which gave states a green light for stiff new restrictions on abortion, may have been a Pyrrhic victory for abortion opponents. The ruling galvanized abortion rights advocates, who wasted no time putting the heat on their elected representatives. Virtually overnight, abortion became the dominant political issue of the year.

    Nowhere was the shift in political momentum more obvious than in the House, where abortion rights forces had not prevailed on a single vote since 1980.

    The first sign of change came Aug. 2, when the House rejected, 206-219, an amendment offered by Robert K. Dornan, R-Calif., to the fiscal 1990 spending bill for the District of Columbia that sought to bar the city from using its own tax dollars (as well as federal funds) to pay for abortions for poor women. The year before, the House had approved a similar ban by 222-186.

    No one was quite sure how to read the D.C. vote, though; it was muddied by issues relating to the city's home rule rights and by an odd parliamentary situation that prohibited Dornan from offering language that would allow funding for abortions necessary to save the life of a woman.

    No such doubts existed Oct. 11, when the House took up the conference report for the $156.7 billion fiscal 1990 appropriation for the departments of Labor, Health and Human Services (HHS), and Education and related agencies. As had been true several times in the 1980s, the original House version barred federal funding of all abortions except in cases in which a woman's life was in danger, while the Senate version also allowed funding of abortions in cases of rape or incest “promptly reported” to public health or law enforcement authorities.

    Thirteen months earlier, in dealing with the conference report on the fiscal 1989 Labor-HHS bill, the House had voted 216-166 to insist on its position, and the Senate gave in. But this time, the outcome was different. In a stunning turnabout that saw a swing of 50 votes from the year before, the House agreed to a motion offered by Barbara Boxer, D-Calif., that the House recede from its position. The vote was 216-206: R 41-134; D 175-72 (ND 124-44, SD 51-28).

    In a second vote moments later, the House voted 212-207 to concur in the Senate's rape and incest amendment.

    President Bush vetoed the Labor-HHS bill over its abortion language, and the House on Oct. 25 fell 51 votes short in an attempt to override. Members did not try to override vetoes of two other spending bills Bush had rejected for abortion related reasons — those for D.C. and foreign operations. But, even though abortion rights advocates gave in for 1989, they vowed to continue the battle in 1990 and to make abortion a central issue in that year's elections.

    14. Aid to Poland and Hungary

    Along with everyone else, members of Congress watched with awe and wonder as one Eastern European communist regime after another fell during 1989. There was little the United States could do to encourage the process, but Washington's political leaders were determined to help ensure that the new reformist regimes, in what used to be called the Soviet bloc, would not fail.

    Poland and Hungary were the first two countries to escape Moscow's clutches, and they were the ones most in need of Western financial assistance. President Bush announced several aid packages for the two countries, each package somewhat more generous than its predecessors. Sensing political opportunity in Bush's characteristic caution, Democrats in Congress began a campaign to denounce his “timidity” and sought to prove that they were more eager to help the reform governments in Warsaw and Budapest.

    After several weeks of negotiations, House leaders of both parties settled on a proposal authorizing $837.5 million in various forms of aid to Poland and Hungary over three years — nearly twice as much as Bush had requested. Despite the administration's refusal to endorse that proposal (HR 3402), the House approved it on Oct. 19 by 345-47 — R 128-34; D 217-13 (ND 152-4, SD 65-9) — an unusually lopsided vote for a foreign aid program.

    More negotiations involving the Senate and the administration produced a three-year authorization total of $938 million, with $532.8 million appropriated in fiscal 1990. However, both totals were inflated by a $200 million trade credit program that was considered unlikely to get off the ground. Those figures also included a suggested $125 million donation of food aid for Poland in fiscal 1990 — most of which Bush had already provided.

    15. Oil-Spill Liability

    Congressional outrage over the March 24 Exxon Valdez oil spill did what 14 years of inconclusive wrangling had never achieved: It erased the key difference between the House and the Senate on oil-spill liability legislation, bringing passage of a bill nearer than it has been since Congress began debating the issue in 1975.

    The crucial roll call came Nov. 8, when the House reversed more than a decade of tradition and voted for an amendment to prohibit federal liability provisions from taking precedence over stricter state oil-spill laws.

    The House passed the bill (HR 1465) on a 375-5 vote, clearing the way for a conference with the Senate in 1990.

    The House and the Senate had long ago roughly agreed on the shape of oil-spill legislation. Bills on both sides of the Hill envisioned taxing imported and domestic oil to create a huge spill-cleanup and damage-compensation fund. A spiller's liability would be limited at a level to take care of most spills, and the fund would pay any further costs. However, if the spill was caused by gross negligence or willful misconduct, or if it involved failing to observe federal regulations, the spiller would be liable for all costs.

    But the House and the Senate diverged sharply over whether the federal liability and compensation regime should override state laws. The Senate said no, insisting that states with their own oil-spill laws and cleanup funds should be allowed to keep them, even if that meant exposing spillers to unlimited liability, as at least 17 state laws do. Proponents of the hands-off approach argued that other federal environmental laws allowed states to keep and enforce their own statutes. The Senate passed a non-pre-emption bill (S 686) by 99-0 on Aug. 4. Majority Leader George J. Mitchell, D-Maine, had threatened early in the year not to go to conference at all if the House passed a measure that pre-empted state laws, as it had done repeatedly in previous years.

    For a while, it seemed that the House would approve a pre-emption statute again. Bills reported by both the Merchant Marine and the Public Works committees carried language that pre-empted state liability laws and restricted the uses of state cleanup and compensation funds. Authors of HR 1465 argued that it made little sense to impose a national liability and compensation system that did not replace the patchwork of conflicting state laws.

    But as when the Senate passed its bill, the mood in the House when the issue came to the floor in November was decidedly pro-environmental and anti-big oil, and many members were looking for ways to strike back at spillers. Critics of pre-emption repeatedly invoked the Exxon Valdez disaster, arguing that the House should not reward big oil by setting up national liability limits and junking stricter state laws. A package of amendments offered by George Miller, D-Calif., and Gerry E. Studds, D-Mass., included provisions to strike pre-emption language, and the House agreed to do so, voting 279-143: R 75-99; D 204-44 (ND 155-14, SD 49-30).

    16. Pay and Ethics Package

    Nine months after Congress bowed to a storm of public criticism and rejected a 51 percent pay raise, House leaders transformed the dynamics of the issue and won approval of legislation (HR 3660 — PL 101-194) combining a hike of nearly 40 percent over two years with the first overhaul of House ethics rules in 12 years.

    The key vote came when House members swallowed political qualms and approved the pay and ethics package by a margin of 252-174 — R 84-89; D 168-85 (ND 121-52, SD 47-33).

    Although the Senate balked and took a smaller increase of 10 percent for itself, it let stand the larger raise for House members and other government officials.

    The raise was a coup for Thomas S. Foley of Washington, who became Speaker at midyear after Jim Wright resigned under an ethics cloud.

    In February, Congress blocked the 51 percent pay raise in the face of virulent opposition from the public, which was unappeased by promises that Congress would ban honoraria after the pay raise took effect. Although many thought the pay plan was doomed from the start, some Democrats blamed Wright for its defeat.

    Foley succeeded where Wright had failed in part because the pay raise proposal he pushed at year's end had many features to make it more palatable than the earlier proposal: It was a smaller hike, with the biggest part taking effect only after an election, and the proposal was subject to open debate and a recorded vote.

    Moreover, it was conspicuously linked to ethics rules changes a bipartisan task force had drafted. And to allay concerns about political fallout, top political operatives in both parties signed a letter pledging to oppose publicly using the pay raise vote as a campaign issue.

    In testament to widespread skepticism that the promise was the end of pay as a political issue, the rolls of those who voted against the bill were dominated by politically vulnerable junior members and House members with higher political ambitions. (Senate key vote 16)

    1. Tower Nomination

    Confirmation of President Bush's nomination of John Tower of Texas to be secretary of defense. Rejected 47-53: R 44-1; D 3-52 (ND 1-37, SD 2-15), March 9, 1989. A “yea” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    2. Contra Aid/Passage

    HR 1750 Passage of the bill to provide $49.75 million in non-military aid to the contras. The bill also includes $5 million for administration of the Agency for International Development, an unspecified amount for transportation of the aid, and $4.2 million for medical aid to victims of the war in Nicaragua. Passed 89-9: R 39-5; D 50-4 (ND 34-4, SD 16-0), April 13, 1989. A “yea” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    3. FS-X Plane Development/Disapproval

    S J Res 113 Dixon, D-Ill., amendment to the Byrd, D-W.Va., amendment to the resolution, to bar the proposed transfer to Japanese firms of design data on the F-16 fighter plane that would be used for the joint development by U.S. and Japanese firms of a modified version of a plane, designated the FS-X, for Japan's use. Rejected 47-52: R 11-34; D 36-18 (ND 25-12, SD 11-6), May 16, 1989. (In effect, the vote on this amendment was a vote on the underlying resolution to block the deal.) A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    4. Fiscal 1989 Supplemental Appropriations/Budget Act Waiver

    HR 2072 Byrd, D-W.Va., motion to table (kill) the Specter, R-Pa., motion to waive the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 to permit consideration of the Specter amendment to transfer $70 million from defense appropriations to prison construction. Motion agreed to 77-18: R 30-11; D 47-7 (ND 31-6, SD 16-1), June 1, 1989. A “yea” was a vote supporting the president's position. (The amendment subsequently fell on a point of order.)

    5. Child Care/Dole Substitute

    S 5 Dole, R-Kan., amendment to the Mitchell, D-Maine, substitute, to make the dependent-care tax credit refundable, to expand the earned-income tax credit by adjusting it for family size for children aged 4 or under, and to increase block grants to the states by $400 million to increase the availability of child care. Rejected 44-56: R 42-3; D 2-53 (ND 1-37, SD 1-16), June 22, 1989. A “yea” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    6. Fiscal 1990 State Department Authorization/Prohibited Activities

    S 1160 Moynihan, D-N.Y., amendment to prohibit the solicitation or diversion of funds to carry out activities for which U.S. foreign assistance is prohibited. Adopted 57-42: R 4-41; D 53-1 (ND 37-0, SD 16-1), July 18, 1989. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    7. Fiscal 1990–91 Defense Department Authorization/SDI Funding

    S 1352 Nunn, D-Ga., motion to table (kill) the Johnston, D-La., amendment to reduce to $3.95 billion appropriations for the strategic defense initiative (SDI) program. Motion agreed to 50-47: R 37-6; D 13-41 (ND 5-32, SD 8-9), July 27, 1989. A “yea” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    8. Savings and Loan Restructuring/Budget Act Waiver

    HR 1278 Riegle, D-Mich., motion to waive Titles III and IV (which, among other things, prohibit breaching deficit ceilings established by the current budget resolution) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 with respect to the conference report on the bill to salvage the nation's savings and loan industry and overhaul federal thrift regulation. Motion rejected 54-46: R 1-44; D 53-2 (ND 36-2, SD 17-0), Aug. 3, 1989. A three-fifths majority vote (60) of the total Senate is required to waive the Budget Act. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    1. Contra Aid/Passage

    HR 1750 Passage of the bill to provide $49.75 million in non-military aid to the Nicaraguan contras, including $5 million for administration of the Agency for International Development, an unspecified amount for aid transportation, and $4.2 million for medical aid to victims of the war. Passed 309-110: R 157-11; D 152-99 (ND 84-87, SD 68-12), April 13, 1989. A “yea” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    2. Fiscal 1989 Supplemental Appropriations/Offsetting Cuts

    HR 2072 Foley, D-Wash., amendment to offset new discretionary outlays provided in the bill with across-the-board percentage cuts in budget authority of 0.57 percent in all discretionary accounts of the government, including defense, foreign affairs and domestic programs, except those programs funded in the bill. Rejected 172-252: R 9-160; D 163-92 (ND 129-44, SD 34-48), April 26, 1989. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position. (The bill was later withdrawn from floor consideration.)

    3. Fiscal 1990 Budget Resolution/Adoption

    H Con Res 106 Adoption of the concurrent resolution to set forth the congressional budget for the U.S. government for fiscal 1990–92. It sets fiscal 1990 ceilings of $1.351 trillion in budget authority and $1.165 trillion in outlays; establishes a revenue floor of $1.066 trillion, with an expected deficit of $99.7 billion; and recommends general spending levels for the various functions of government conforming to the bipartisan budget agreement with the White House for defense and non-defense discretionary spending levels. Adopted 263-157: R 106-61; D 157-96 (ND 102-71, SD 55-25), May 4, 1989.

    4. Minimum Wage Increase/Veto Override

    HR 2 Passage, over President Bush's June 13 veto, of the bill to raise the minimum wage from $3.35 an hour to $4.55 over three years, and to provide for a 60-day training wage — equal to 85 percent of the minimum — for workers who have not worked a total of 60 days. Rejected 247-178: R 20-150; D 227-28 (ND 171-3, SD 56-25), June 14, 1989. A two-thirds majority of those present and voting (284 in this case) of both houses is required to override a veto. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    5. Savings and Loan Restructuring/Capital Standards

    HR 1278 Hyde, R-Ill., amendment to give savings and loan associations with supervisory “good will” on their books as capital the ability to seek formal hearings — subject to court review — on whether that good will was granted through an enforceable contract that should be upheld, allowing it to continue to count as capital, despite provisions in the bill to the contrary. Rejected 94-326: R 56-114; D 38-212 (ND 30-144, SD 8-68), June 15, 1989. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    6. Energy and Water Appropriations/Supercollider

    HR 2696 Eckart, D-Ohio, amendment to delete $110 million for initial construction of the superconducting supercollider, leaving $90 million for continued research on the project. Rejected 93-330: R 28-144; D 65-186 (ND 57-112, SD 8-74), June 28, 1989. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    7. Fiscal 1990–91 Defense Department Authorization/SDI Funding

    HR 2461 Bennett, D-Fla., amendment to decrease the authorization in the bill for the strategic defense initiative (SDI) to $3.1 billion for the Defense and Energy departments. Adopted 248-175: R 34-137; D 214-38 (ND 163-7, SD 51-31), July 25, 1989. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    8. Fiscal 1990–91 Defense Department Authorization/‘Stealth.’

    HR 2461 Kasich, R-Ohio, substitute for the Synar, D-Okla., amendment, to allow the Air Force to complete a fleet of 13 B-2s already built or under construction and then to put the production line on hold while those 13 are used to test the new plane's exotic design. Rejected 144-279: R 28-144; D 116-135 (ND 102-68, SD 14-67), July 26, 1989. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    9. Fiscal 1990 Budget Reconciliation/Section 89

    HR 3299 Dorgan, D-N.D., amendment to repeal Section 89 of the 1986 tax code overhaul, which requires employers to prove their health benefit plans are non-discriminatory, and to delete the provision in the reconciliation bill that would deny favorable tax treatment to certain employee health benefit plans that discriminate in favor of owners and executives. Adopted 390-36: R 172-2; D 218-34 (ND 140-31, SD 78-3), Sept. 27, 1989.

    10. Fiscal 1990 Budget Reconciliation/Alternative Revenue Package

    HR 3299 Rostenkowski, D-Ill., amendment to strike the Jenkins-Archer capital gains tax cut included in the reconciliation bill and substitute restored deductibility for individual retirement accounts, a deficit-reduction trust fund and an increase to 33 percent from 28 percent in the marginal tax rates for the highest incomes. Rejected 190-239: R 1-175; D 189-64 (ND 152-20, SD 37-44), Sept. 28, 1989. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    11. Fiscal 1990 Budget Reconciliation/Catastrophic Repeal

    HR 3299 Donnelly, D-Mass., amendment to repeal nearly all of the 1988 Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act (PL 100-360), retaining only the non-Medicare provisions — primarily selected Medicaid expansions. Adopted 360-66: R 164-10; D 196-56 (ND 124-47, SD 72-9), Oct. 4, 1989.

    12. Fiscal 1990 Budget Reconciliation/Child-Care Substitute

    HR 3299 Stenholm, D-Texas, substitute amendment to strike the child-care provisions in the bill and replace them with an expanded earned-income tax credit and increased authorizations for Head Start. Rejected 195-230: R 159-16; D 36-214 (ND 6-163, SD 30-51), Oct. 5, 1989.

    13. Fiscal 1990 Labor, HHS and Education Appropriations/Abortion Funding

    HR 2990 Boxer, D-Calif., motion that the House recede from its disagreement to the Senate amendment to permit the use of federal funds to pay for abortions in cases of “promptly reported” rape or incest. Motion agreed to 216-206: R 41-134; D 175-72 (ND 124-44, SD 51-28), Oct. 11, 1989. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    14. Aid to Poland and Hungary/Passage

    HR 3402 Passage of the bill to authorize $837.5 million in U.S. aid programs to Poland and Hungary during fiscal years 1990–92. Passed 345-47: R 128-34; D 217-13 (ND 152-4, SD 65-9), Oct. 19, 1989.

    15. Oil-Spill Liability/State Pre-emption

    HR 1465 Miller, D-Calif., en bloc amendments to prevent federal law from pre-empting state laws on oil-spill liability, compensation and cleanup. Adopted 279-143: R 75-99; D 204-44 (ND 155-14, SD 49-30), Nov. 8, 1989. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    16. Government Pay and Ethics Package/Passage

    HR 3660 Passage of the bill to phase out honoraria, revise ethics rules and raise salaries for members of the House of Representatives and high officials of the executive and judicial branches. Passed 252-174: R 84-89; D 168-85 (ND 121-52, SD 47-33), Nov. 16, 1989.

    9. Fiscal 1990 Transportation Appropriations/Cloture

    HR 3015 Mitchell, D-Maine, motion to invoke cloture (thus limiting debate) on the Lautenberg, D-N.J., amendment to permanently ban smoking on all airline flights within the United States. Motion agreed to 77-21: R 33-11; D 44-10 (ND 35-2, SD 9-8), Sept. 14, 1989.

    10. Fiscal 1990 Defense Appropriations/B-2 Funding

    HR 3072 Leahy, D-Vt., amendment to delete all funds for procurement of additional B-2 bombers. Rejected 29-71: R 2-43; D 27-28 (ND 23-15, SD 4-13), Sept. 26, 1989. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    11. Fiscal 1990 Defense Appropriations/National Endowment for the Arts Obscenity

    HR 3072 Mitchell, D-Maine, motion to table (kill) the Helms, R-N.C., amendment to instruct the Senate conferees on the fiscal 1990 Interior Department appropriations bill (HR 2788) to insist on a Senate-passed provision barring the use of federal funds for artworks deemed “obscene or indecent.” Motion agreed to 62-35: R 19-25; D 43-10 (ND 33-5, SD 10-5), Sept. 28, 1989.

    12. Catastrophic Revision/Durenberger Substitute

    S 1726 Durenberger, R-Minn., substitute amendment to preserve stop-loss coverage of hospital and doctor bills, plus most other benefits in the 1988 Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act except prescription drug coverage, and to cut the maximum surtax to $200 in fiscal 1990. Rejected 37-62: R 8-37; D 29-25 (ND 21-16, SD 8-9), Oct. 6, 1989.

    13. Fiscal 1990 Budget Reconciliation/Passage

    HR 3299 Passage of the bill to reduce the fiscal 1990 budget deficit by $13.5 billion. Passed 87-7: R 40-2; D 47-5 (ND 34-2, SD 13-3), Oct. 13, 1989.

    14. Anti-Flag Desecration/Passage

    S J Res 180 Passage of the joint resolution to propose a constitutional amendment to grant Congress and the states the power to prohibit the physical desecration of the U.S. flag. Rejected 51-48: R 33-11; D 18-37 (ND 8-30, SD 10-7), Oct. 19, 1989. A two-thirds majority of those present and voting (66 in this case) of both houses is required for passage of a constitutional amendment. A “yea” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    15. Capital Gains Tax Cut/Cloture

    HR 3628 Mitchell, D-Maine, motion to invoke cloture (thus limiting debate) on the Packwood, R-Ore., substitute amendment to exclude capital gains from taxable income in the amount of 5 percent for each full year an asset is held (to a maximum of 35 percent) and to make Individual Retirement Accounts available to all taxpayers with varying tax benefits. Motion rejected 51-47: R 45-0; D 6-47 (ND 2-34, SD 4-13), Nov. 14, 1989. A three-fifths majority vote (60) of the total Senate is required to invoke cloture. A “yea” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    16. Government Pay and Ethics Package/Pay Raise

    HR 3660 Mitchell, D-Maine, substitute amendment to give senators a cost-of-living adjustment different from House pay levels and to reduce the ceiling on honoraria senators may keep. Adopted 56-43: R 25-20; D 31-23 (ND 21-16, SD 10-7), Nov. 17, 1989.

    Appendix

    1990 Key Votes

    Senate
    1. Chinese Students Veto

    The first vote of the year was set up as a test of the strength of President Bush's veto. Bush had prevailed on all nine previous vetoes, and Democratic leaders thought they would have a breakthrough with a bill to allow Chinese students to remain in the United States instead of returning home to face possible reprisals by the repressive Chinese government. The bill (HR 2712) had cleared near the end of the first session without a dissenting vote in either chamber. When the House took up the veto override, only 25 Republicans stuck by the president.

    In the Senate, Bush marshaled a strong display of GOP solidarity. Only eight Republicans went with the Democrats, and the 62-37 vote, taken Jan. 25, fell four short of the two-thirds majority needed to override the veto: R 8-37; D 54-0 (ND 38-0, SD 16-0). The Republican senators who provided the margin of victory expressed their positions in partisan terms as support for the chief executive, not as support for Bush's China policy.

    It was a theme that played out for the rest of the year; Bush ended the Congress without having any of his vetoes overridden, and a credible veto threat was one of the few bargaining chips that the Republican minority had on numerous pieces of legislation.

    The bill would have permitted Chinese students who were in the United States at the time of the Tiananmen Square massacre in June 1989 to remain for an indeterminate period and to seek permanent resident status without returning to China. It also would have waived for four years a requirement that Chinese exchange students on “J” visas return home for at least two years before applying for permanent U.S. residency.

    Bush vetoed the legislation Nov. 30, while Congress was in recess. The action was part of the administration's effort to restore cordial relations with China despite that country's repression of pro-democracy forces. The Chinese government had threatened to permanently pull out of the Fulbright scholarship program and other education exchanges if HR 2712 became law. Bush originally said he considered his veto to be a pocket veto not subject to override by Congress, but did not press the issue when congressional leaders moved ahead with override votes; they argued that a pocket veto could occur only after the adjournment of a full Congress.

    Administration officials said they were trying privately to persuade the government in Beijing to ease oppression. Bush had taken other steps to lessen U.S.-Chinese tensions, including sending U.S. officials to Beijing — a secret delegation in July 1989 and a public visit in December 1989 by national security adviser Brent Scowcroft.

    Administration officials pointed to Beijing's lifting of martial law as a sign of human rights progress. But members of Congress were skeptical. Rep. Nancy Pelosi, D-Calif., sponsor of HR 2712, said:

    Beijing can lift martial law because it does not need martial law to crush dissent…. I am confident the Congress will see through these feeble attempts by Chinese leaders to mislead Western governments.

    Members who voted to uphold the veto denounced Chinese oppression but said they believed Bush's behind-the-scenes efforts would do more to help democracy than congressional action.

    The House vote to override, 390-25, came a day before the Senate vote.

    2. Education Programs

    Two weeks after the Senate reconvened in 1990, Jesse Helms, R-N.C., tied up President Bush's education initiative for two days with complaints about a $25 million grant tacked on to the legislation (S 695) by Democrats. Though his amendment to delete the provision was defeated on Feb. 6, 35-64: R 35-10; D 0-54 (ND 0-37, SD 0-17), the same issue came back to kill the package on the last day of the 101st Congress.

    The grant was to go to the National Board for Professional Teaching Standards, headed by former North Carolina Gov. James B. Hunt Jr., who had challenged Helms in 1984 for his Senate seat in a rancorous campaign.

    The board, which was created in 1987 with funding from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and a number of other foundations, was drawing up guidelines for voluntary certification of teachers nationwide.

    Helms charged that the board was dominated by teachers' unions, and he predicted that its voluntary certification guidelines would soon turn into mandatory licensing standards for teachers.

    “The labor unions want to control education in America. No one else need apply,” he said.

    Proponents of the plan stressed that certification was not designed to take the place of state and local standards for teachers. “All we are trying to do is to retain the good teachers, attract new ones and provide some recognition for their accomplishments in what they are doing,” said Christopher J. Dodd, D-Conn. Despite administration opposition to the grant, 10 Republicans joined Democrats to defeat the Helms amendment.

    But at the end of the session, Helms had another chance. S 695 came back to the Senate in the form of HR 5932. The new bill included the president's education proposals plus literacy and teacher training provisions, and had been worked out with the House in an informal conference.

    When Majority Leader George J. Mitchell, D-Maine, tried to call the bill up for a vote on Oct. 27, the last full day of the session, Helms and a number of other conservative Republicans objected. The group kept a rolling hold on the bill, with some objecting to a smaller, $10 million grant to the National Board, and with others objecting to different provisions.

    In the end, Helms won his battle to kill the grant as well as the entire bill. In a campaign appearance in North Carolina, Helms boasted that he had saved taxpayers $800 million — the cost of the entire education package.

    3. Clean Air

    The environment lobby had been waiting years for a vote like this one — yes or no on a get-tough amendment to the most important anti-pollution bill (S 1630) in a decade. It seemed that such a vote would separate the black hats from the white hats, prove the movement's true strength in the Senate and provide campaign fodder for years to come.

    For all the frantic lobbying beforehand, however, the outcome the week of March 19 was far from a definitive indication of the new environmental politics. Instead, it proved to be a pivotal show of strength for an unusual alliance: the Republican White House, which had introduced and backed clean air legislation for the first time in a decade, and Senate leaders of both parties, who had fashioned a compromise off the floor in the hope of winning passage for the first time since the Clean Air Act was last amended in 1977.

    At stake was an amendment by Sens. Tim Wirth, D-Colo., and Pete Wilson, R-Calif. They wanted to make the bill's auto-emissions controls and clean-fuel provisions sub-stantially tougher than the White House-leadership compromise.

    Wirth and Wilson wanted to require an automatic, second round of tailpipe emissions reductions in 2002 — not a conditional review based on how much progress had been made, as called for in the White House compromise. They also wanted to require the use of cleaner burning gasoline mixes by 1993 in all smog-heavy areas — 60 to 70 in all — not just in the nine worst cities, as the compromise stipulated.

    The Senate killed Wirth-Wilson 52-46, on a motion to table: R 25-19; D 27-27 (ND 14-23, SD 13-4), March 20.

    The result, however, appeared to be less a measure of environmentalist vs. industry muscle than of the unusual political alliances that formed around the Senate bill.

    Farm-state members liked the Wirth-Wilson amendment because they believed it favored grain-based ethanol as an alternative clean fuel. Others went for it thinking it would help small businesses by shifting more of the pain of cleaning the air to big oil companies and car manufacturers.

    Meanwhile, usually pro-environment senators voted against the amendment, fearing that it would scuttle the still-tenuous compromise with the Bush administration. Majority Leader George J. Mitchell, D-Maine, and his Republican counterpart, Bob Dole of Kansas, made the vote a test of the compromise's survival.

    Much of the debate over Wirth-Wilson focused on whether it would indeed doom the bill's chances for yet another year. The environment lobby, dominated by purists, had made it clear that it did not think much of the Mitchell-Dole-White House compromise.

    The Wirth-Wilson amendment was the group's main shot at shoring up the bill, so the lobby fought hard to counter the argument that it would harm its chances.

    But many of their traditional allies remained swayed by Mitchell and voted with him to table the amendment. Voting to table were senators who usually voted the environmentalist position, including Democrats Christopher J. Dodd of Connecticut, Paul S. Sarbanes of Maryland and Howard M. Metzenbaum of Ohio, and Republican Gordon J. Humphrey of New Hampshire.

    Then again, some usually pro-industry senators voted for the Wirth-Wilson amendment — at least one hoping that it would indeed become a “dealbuster.”

    Voting for Wirth-Wilson were Republicans who rarely toed the environment lobby's line, including Jesse Helms of North Carolina, James A. McClure and Steve Symms of Idaho, Jake Garn and Orrin G. Hatch of Utah, and Malcolm Wallop of Wyoming.

    The defeat of Wirth-Wilson was followed the next day by another close vote on an amendment by Bob Kerrey, D-Neb., to toughen the urban smog provisions of the deal. It was killed on a 53-46 tabling vote.

    After those votes, the Senate compromise was able to survive all onslaughts — including another test in the attempt by Robert c. Byrd, D-W.Va., to ensure job-loss benefits for coal miners. (House key vote 3)

    4. Job-Loss Benefits

    Ostensibly, the two-week fight over Robert c. Byrd's amendment to the Senate clean air bill (S 1630) was over job-loss benefits for coal miners. The narrow defeat of the West Virginia Democrat's proposal, however, said little about the Senate's sympathy for miners thrown out of work by the bill: The chamber later approved a less ambitious House-crafted package as part of the final bill.

    What the episode did show was the complex nature of power within the Senate. When the roll call was taken March 29, traditional liberal-conservative divisions broke down, and members were driven more by loyalty, fear and trickery.

    The debate pitted Byrd's formidable force as chairman of the Appropriations Committee against Majority Leader George J. Mitchell of Maine, who had become inextricably linked in an alliance of convenience with the White House. The fight was the climax to Byrd's long struggle against a new clean air law. As the Democrats' leader before Mitchell, Byrd for years helped block such bills, knowing well that reducing acid rain would involve weaning the nation from West Virginia's high-sulfur coal.

    Once Byrd stepped down from that post, he lost much of his power over the issue. President Bush was committed to signing a clear air bill so that he could become the “environmental president,” and Mitchell had long advocated such legislation.

    So Byrd made the best of the situation: He tried to extract a price from the bill's supporters in the form of hundreds of millions of dollars for his constituents.

    A master of debate, Byrd spent hours on the floor pleading for support. “Have we looked into the eyes of a hungry coal miner's child?” he asked at one point. For days, few would publicly oppose him; he joked that he had been forced into negotiations with himself.

    But the White House remained adamantly opposed, pointedly hinting that President Bush would veto the entire bill over Byrd's amendment. Mitchell fought it hard, but only to preserve a broad clean air deal with the White House; his sympathies clearly rested with Byrd on the need for unemployment benefits.

    Byrd took advantage of Mitchell's dilemma. During a photo session the day before the vote, Byrd put his arm around a coal miner's son and said: “Sen. Mitchell is fighting for what he believes in, and I'm fighting for what I believe in.”

    Byrd had more than symbolic strength, however. His pockets were full of IOUs from 32 years in the Senate, and as the new chairman of the Appropriations Committee, he had plenty of future chits to hand out.

    His office-to-office campaign served as a not-so-subtle reminder to his colleagues of what each had at stake in the fight. A large majority of his Democratic colleagues were too loyal or too afraid to vote against him, as were many Republicans. “Had I offered an amendment like this, I would not get five votes,” said Republican leader Bob Dole of Kansas.

    Minutes before the vote, it looked like Byrd might just win. Said Mitchell: “None of us like the choice we now face.”

    The White House, however, stole two of Byrd's votes, and thus victory, with a last-minute bit of apparent double-dealing.

    During the roll call, Bush's chief of staff, John H. Sununu, assured Joseph R. Biden Jr., D-Del., that the president would veto the bill if Byrd won. Not wanting to scuttle the bill, Biden voted no. Earlier Sununu had told Steve Symms, R-Idaho, just the opposite — that Bush would not veto the whole bill just because he opposed the Byrd amendment.

    Symms, convinced that the clean air bill was too expensive already, had been looking for a way to derail it. Assured that the Byrd amendment would not do the trick, he voted against making what he thought was a bad bill worse.

    Byrd's amendment fell short by one vote, 49-50: R 11-34; D 38-16 (ND 29-9, SD 9-7). (House key vote 2)

    5. Assault Weapons

    Senate Democrats surprised themselves May 23 by gathering enough votes to preserve in an anti-crime bill (S 1970) a ban on semiautomatic assault-style weapons. The vote temporarily snagged the bill in the Senate, and ultimately, Congress backed away from the controversial topics of gun control and the death penalty as it settled for a much less sweeping anti-crime bill than it had planned.

    The provision would have outlawed the manufacture, sale or possession of nine semiautomatic weapons, including the AK-47, used in a January 1989 schoolyard massacre in Stockton, Calif., that sparked an outcry over criminal use of semiautomatics. The gun control provision squeaked by the Senate Judiciary Committee in July 1989 on a 7-6 vote, largely because two usual opponents of gun control did not contest it.

    The crime bill made it to the floor 10 months later, with President Bush on numerous occasions criticizing Congress for inaction. Gun control opponents tried to delete the assault weapons ban, but their motion failed 48-52: R 36-9; D 12-43 (ND 5-33, SD 7-10). Two hours later, gun control advocates prevailed again as a motion to reconsider fell short, 49-50. Dennis DeConcini, D-Ariz., whose sponsorship of the gun ban had touched off a brief recall effort in Arizona, brought off the one-vote victory.

    The Senate gun vote marked that chamber's biggest defeat for the National Rifle Association (NRA), which was known for its lobbying muscle and hefty campaign contributions. The NRA had been able to dissuade both chambers from voting for restrictions on handguns. But assault weapons were a different story, since they had come to be a symbol of the drug trade.

    DeConcini was supported by a handful of Southern Democrats who had generally opposed gun control, including Lloyd Bentsen of Texas, David L. Boren of Oklahoma, Sam Nunn of Georgia and Al Gore of Tennessee. He also won the vote of Majority Leader George J. Mitchell of Maine, who came from a big sporting state and who had been quoted in the past as saying he did not believe in gun control.

    The Senate did, however, reject an amendment by Howard M. Metzenbaum, D-Ohio, that would have permanently banned 12 more types of semiautomatic rifles and pistols and limited ammunition magazines to 15 rounds.

    Gun control, opposed by most Republicans and the Bush administration, was one of the disputed items that hung up passage of a comprehensive anti-crime bill. House conferees would not give up on racial protections for death penalty defendants, which the Senate had rejected. Senate conferees would not relinquish gun control. Both subjects were stripped from the final bill, paving the way for passage.

    6. Flag Burning

    Closing out a chapter that began a year earlier, the Senate on June 26 defeated a resolution (S J Res 332) for a constitutional amendment to protect the flag. The 58-42 vote was nine short of the two-thirds needed to pass the amendment: R 38-7; D 20-35 (ND 10-28, SD 10-7).

    The resolution stated: “The Congress and the states shall have the power to prohibit the physical desecration of the flag of the United States.”

    It was a loss for President Bush, who had been pushing for an amendment to the Constitution since the Supreme Court first ruled on June 21, 1989, that a Texas law against flag burning infringed on First Amendment guarantees of free expression. A second Supreme Court ruling, on June 11, 1990, striking down a federal flag law, touched off the second round of political rhetoric on whether the flag needed special protection. But the second ruling sparked much less public outcry than the first, and that gave opponents of a constitutional amendment an edge.

    Members against the amendment asserted that it was politically inspired and too radical a solution to the few flag-burning incidents that occurred. Some members thought defeat of the amendment would be used in the fall elections, since it had been mostly Republicans championing the constitutional amendment. But hardly a peep on the flag was heard.

    The Senate had rejected a constitutional amendment to protect the Stars and Stripes a year earlier, after the first court ruling. As an alternative, Congress on Oct. 12, 1989, cleared the statute (HR 2978 — PL 101-131) to safeguard the flag from physical desecration; that was the law struck down by the high court in June.

    The Senate's June 26 vote was superfluous because a week earlier the House had failed by 34 votes to gain the necessary two-thirds to pass the amendment. Approval by both chambers was needed to send an amendment to the states for ratification. (House key vote 4)

    7. Americans with Disabilities Act

    In contrast to the high-profile debates in 1990 over flag burning, pornographic art and the budget, Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) with comparatively little fanfare. But while it was barely noticed by most of the general public, the sweeping civil rights measure would affect the lives of far more Americans than the 43 million with physical or mental disabilities.

    The ADA guaranteed to those with disabilities protections against discrimination in employment, public transit, public accommodations and telecommunications. It required employers to make “reasonable accommodations” needed by workers with disabilities, and business owners to make “readily achievable” changes to make facilities accessible to and usable by those with disabilities. It also required telecommunications companies to operate relay systems that allowed those with speech or hearing impairments to use the telephone.

    Backed by candidate George Bush on the campaign trail in 1988 and by a bipartisan corps in Congress that included leaders of both parties from both chambers, there was never much doubt that the ADA would become law during the 101st Congress. But there were some tense moments for backers of the bill when progress was stalled temporarily over two relatively minor issues: how to include Congress as a covered entity, and whether or not people with AIDS could be transferred out of food handling jobs.

    Both issues were ultimately resolved by mid-July, with the House approving a second conference report on the measure by a vote of 377-28 on July 12. A day later, after a brief but emotional debate during which Orrin G. Hatch, R-Utah, broke down as he spoke of the courage with which his late brother-in-law battled polio, the Senate overwhelmingly cleared the measure by a vote of 91-6: R 37-6; D 54-0 (ND 37-0, SD 17-0).

    President Bush signed the bill (PL 101-336) on July 26 at a huge outdoor ceremony on the White House grounds.

    8. Farm Price Supports

    In the weeks leading up to Senate floor action on the 1990 farm bill in July, there was plenty of fierce politicking on the issue of farm price supports. Much of the action centered on supports for one crop, sugar. Sugar seemed to be emerging as a sacrificial lamb, the one crop subsidy program among the multitude that Congress might dare to cut — not so much to save money as to save face: Politically the sugar program had become almost indefensible.

    The opportunity came on an amendment by Bill Bradley, D-N.J., to the farm bill (S 2830) to cut the 18-cent sugar support price by 2 cents.

    Candy makers and soda companies had directed a steady barrage of invective at the program that guaranteed prices for sugar that were far above world market levels. They charged that it was protectionist and gouged consumers at home and some of our best and poorest allies abroad. Though by law it cost taxpayers nothing, it hurt consumers by artificially bolstering the price of sugar and hurt the nation's sugar-producing allies by preventing them from selling their main product in the United States.

    The sugar industry countered that cutting the support price would be devastating, from the cane fields of Hawaii, Louisiana and Florida to the sugar beet and corn fields of the Midwest, all the way to the processing plants in New York, California and elsewhere.

    For several months, the Bush administration had been flip-flopping, caught between its support for lifting “trade-distorting” subsidies around the world and the need to bolster the fortunes of Republican Senate candidates in states where the need for a high sugar price verged on gospel.

    But before the vote on the Bradley amendment, all the signs suggested that it had a good chance of passing. Agriculture Secretary Clayton Yeutter had unequivocally endorsed it. So had Cargill, the giant Midwestern agribusiness company. That raised the possibility that farm-state lawmakers, who usually banded together to defeat assaults on individual programs, might split their votes.

    In fact, the vote proved that the farm coalition remained powerful and mostly unified. The 2-cent cut was tabled, or killed, on July 24 by a vote of 54-44: R 17-26; D 37-18 (ND 22-16, SD 15-2).

    Later that day, during debate on its version of the farm bill, the House also rebuffed a similar amendment, 150-271.

    The Senate sugar vote foreshadowed what would occur throughout floor action on the farm bill. Amendments cutting or eliminating specific crop programs were repeatedly rejected, often by wide margins. Many lawmakers said they realized that the budget would require deep cuts in farm programs, but they preferred to leave that responsibility in the hands of the budget summit negotiators.

    9. Campaign Finance

    Perhaps the most surprising thing about the Senate's July 30 vote on taxpayer financing of congressional campaigns was that it took place at all.

    It was one of 17 roll call votes on amendments that, taken together, showed how far campaign finance legislation had come since the 100th Congress, when the action never advanced beyond a Republican filibuster. But the results also showed how far there was to go before there was substantive change in the law.

    The bill put before the Senate by the Democrats (S 137) sought to impose state-by-state spending limits on Senate races and eliminate political action committees (an idea borrowed from the GOP). But because spending limits had to be voluntary, the bill called for wide-ranging use of public monies to lure participation.

    The incentives offered to participants included: discounts on campaign mail; a voucher worth 20 percent of the spending limit for the state, to be used to purchase television time in blocks of one minute or more; and contingent public financing if an opposing candidate exceeded the spending limits. The cost to the Treasury was estimated at more than $56 million a year. While proponents argued that this was a small price to pay for their vision of reform, opponents ridiculed the idea of asking taxpayers to pay for congressional elections in an era of $300 billion federal deficits.

    Republicans opposed both spending limits and public financing. Kentucky Sen. Mitch McConnell, the Republican floor manager, argued that because the U.S. election system equated spending with free speech — an opinion expressed by the Supreme Court in its 1976 Buckley v. Valeo decision — the government would in effect punish candidates who chose to exercise their First Amendment rights, by giving money to their opponents. Republicans, moreover, were convinced that rigid spending limits would deter their efforts to retake the Senate.

    McConnell moved to strip all forms of taxpayer financing from the bill. It was rejected 46-49: R 44-0; D 2-49 (ND 1-34, SD 1-15). The narrow, basically party-line defeat signaled that the Democrats would be in firm control of the debate. But that partisan cast brought a firm veto threat from President Bush, and while the House also passed a bill, the two chambers never attempted to resolve the considerable differences between Democrats at different ends of the Capitol.

    10. Abortion/Parental Notification

    For several years, the conventional wisdom about the abortion debate held that while it was difficult to tell from opinion surveys how available most Americans thought the procedure should be, two issues regularly claimed large majorities. One was the question of abortion in cases of rape and incest, which both sides conceded was supported by a substantial majority of the public. The other was whether minors should have to notify or obtain consent from their parents before an abortion could be performed. On that question, too, supporters of abortion rights as well as abortion opponents agreed that the public favored some sort of parental notification. Thus, while rape and incest came to be viewed as the weakest issue for abortion opponents, parental notification was considered the Achilles' heel for abortion rights supporters.

    Congress had voted often on providing federal funding in cases of rape and incest, and the House's shift in 1989 from a position opposing such funding to support signaled abortion rights gains in the backlash from the Supreme Court's decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. That July 1989 decision gave states broader authority to restrict abortion than at any time since the court struck down state abortion bans in the 1973 Roe v. Wade decision.

    By contrast, Congress had almost no track record on parental notification, an issue generally debated at the state level. Sen. William L. Armstrong, R-Colo., a leader of anti-abortion forces, made a first attempt to force votes on the issue Sept. 26 when he offered an amendment to a family planning reauthorization bill (S 110) that would require federally supported family planning agencies to notify a parent of a minor 48 hours before an abortion could be performed. But a roll call was muddied by the fact that it was tied to an unrelated amendment urging President Bush to tap the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. The amendment was eventually added to the bill by voice vote, but S 110 died the next day when it failed to achieve cloture to limit debate.

    But the question was more clear-cut on Oct. 12, when Armstrong sought to append a similar amendment to the fiscal 1991 appropriations bill for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services (HHS), and Education (HR 5257). In contrast to the earlier vote, this time abortion rights supporters worked to defeat the amendment, and, to their surprise, they almost succeeded. It was added to the bill only after a motion by Labor-HHS Subcommittee Chairman Tom Harkin, D-Iowa, to table it failed on a 48-48 tie: R 8-34; D 40-14 (ND 31-6, SD 9-8).

    In the end, the parental notification language and an amendment permitting abortion funding in cases of rape or incest, to which the notification amendment had been added, were both dropped to clear the bill.

    Still, abortion rights supporters were buoyed by the strength of the vote on their weakest issue. And Congress might have been influenced further by the defeat Nov. 6 of a parental notification ballot proposal in Oregon. Even abortion rights supporters, who vehemently opposed the proposal, expected it to pass.

    11. U.S. Troops in Europe

    The budget crunch and the dramatic improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations added high-octane fuel to the long-simmering congressional unhappiness over the cost of stationing U.S. forces overseas.

    Since the mid-1970s, a growing coalition in Congress has argued that high Pentagon budgets are, in effect, subsidies for the United States' strongest commercial competitors, particularly Japan and Germany. The critics argued that countries protected by the U.S. shield could spend a smaller share of their national wealth on defense programs, making available more money for productive investments. Presidents of both parties had countered that overseas deployments directly serve U.S. security interests. But they also had pressed the major allies to begin picking up a larger share of the cost of alliance defense efforts.

    In 1990, with the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact disintegrating and a treaty slashing the size of conventional forces in Europe (CFE) nearing completion, demands to bring home some of the 311,000 Army and Air Force personnel in Europe rose to a crescendo. The House and Senate each approved a provision in the fiscal 1991 defense authorization bill (HR 4739) to cut the overseas deployment by 50,000.

    By the time the Senate took up the companion defense appropriations bill (S 3189) on Oct. 15, critics had another grievance: the allies' paltry commitments to the U.S.-led deployments to the Persian Gulf to confront Iraq. An amendment to the appropriations measure by Kent Conrad, D-N.D., would have sliced U.S. manpower in Europe by 80,000 — a reduction of 30,000 more than each chamber had approved. It was only narrowly rejected, 46-50: R 8-34; D 38-16 (ND 31-6, SD 7-10).

    Days later, in negotiations over the authorization measure, the 80,000-troop-cut was accepted by the administration for fear that even deeper cuts would win out. The final version of the appropriations bill settled on a cut of 78,600 personnel.

    12. ‘Stealth’ Bomber

    The B-2 “stealth” bomber, designed to penetrate Soviet air defenses but controversial because of its cost, ran into more congressional flak in 1990 because of the declining Pentagon budget and the receding Soviet threat.

    The plane's exotic materials and complex shape were intended to prevent an enemy from locating it with sufficient precision to shoot it down. But those factors also produced a price tag that was all too visible on the political battlefield — between $450 million and $850 million per copy, according to competing estimates.

    For decades, liberals had challenged the need for bombers with sophisticated equipment designed to slip through Soviet defenses. The same missions could be performed more cheaply by small, long-range cruise missiles launched from planes flying beyond the reach of Soviet defenses, the critics argued.

    Air Force leaders and congressional backers of the program contended that the B-2's hard-to-detect design would give U.S. forces a revolutionary advantage in conventional conflicts, as well as in a nuclear war. To get control of the program's soaring cost, the Pentagon in April cut the planned B-2 fleet from 132 planes to 75. But the argument that the plane simply cost too much, particularly in light of eased U.S.-Soviet relations, made significant headway, even among Senate and House Republicans.

    In 1990, a bipartisan coalition persuaded the House to oppose building any more B-2s beyond the 15 planes funded in previous budgets. The Senate approved funds for two additional planes in fiscal 1991, and the two bodies wrestled the issue to an intentionally ambiguous draw: authorizing and appropriating more B-2 procurement money, but not specifying whether it could be used for anything more than unanticipated cost increases on the previously funded bombers. Even in the Senate, where support for the B-2 had been stronger, critics made a creditable showing, reaching their high-water mark on an amendment to the fiscal 1991 defense appropriations bill that would have halted B-2 production. The amendment, by Patrick J. Leahy, D-Vt., was rejected 44-50: R 9-32; D 35-18 (ND 30-7, SD 5-11).

    13. Tax and Spending-Cut Package

    The House vote to defeat the budget summit deal Oct. 5 deprived the Senate of a chance to weigh in on the most controversial aspect of the budget debate — not that many senators complained. Only two weeks later — after both chambers had given their committees the responsibility for ironing out the specifics of how to raise taxes and cut spending — did the Senate face a tough vote. (House key vote 11)

    The action came on a budget-reconciliation bill rolled together by the Senate Budget Committee after other committees had filled in the details of a bare-bones budget resolution. Again, the House had acted first. Armed with their 83-vote majority, House Democrats ignored GOP complaints and passed a partisan Democratic alternative reconciliation bill that skewed tax increases heavily toward the wealthiest taxpayers.

    The narrower 10-vote Democratic margin in the Senate forced party leaders to temper their reconciliation bill from the start. After lengthy negotiations with GOP leaders and White House officials over the measure's tax and entitlement program components, Democratic leaders agreed to back a more moderate reconciliation measure.

    That put Senate Majority Leader George J. Mitchell, D-Maine, and other top Democrats on the defensive during floor debate — primarily against attacks from liberals in their own party. Democratic senators made repeated attempts to amend the reconciliation bill to make it more like the one the House had passed, but Mitchell and Senate Budget Committee Chairman Jim Sasser, D-Tenn., had to fight each amendment on the grounds that it would violate their deal with Republican leaders and the White House, and thereby kill the bill. They killed proposals that appealed to Democrats, such as a proposal by Al Gore, D-Tenn., and Barbara A. Mikulski, D-Md., to raise taxes on the wealthy in order to cut back a proposed increase in the gasoline tax and eliminate proposed increases in payments by Medicare beneficiaries.

    The debate stretched over three days, Oct. 17–19. When it came time for a vote on final passage shortly after 1 a.m. on Oct. 19, liberal Democrats had been unable to change it, and conservative Republicans, who were bitterly opposed to the package's broad new taxes, had been unable to kill it. Leaders had agreed that both parties would provide a majority of their members in support of the package, and that took some doing. Some senators with tough re-election races wanted desperately to vote against the measure. The measure went over the top only when GOP leaders persuaded two Republican senators to switch their “nay” votes to “yeas”; others then followed. In the end, the Senate approved the bill 54-46: R 23-22; D 31-24 (ND 20-18, SD 11-6). The final package that President Bush signed looked more like the Senate bill than the House version. (House key vote 14)

    14. El Salvador Aid

    Few foreign policy issues had been more contentious during the 1980s than military aid for El Salvador. Conservatives had argued that the support was essential to prevent left-wing guerrillas from taking over; liberals objected to the assistance because of the poor human rights record of the government in San Salvador.

    Although the issue caused fierce ideological divisions, the Reagan and Bush administrations managed to win continued military assistance during the 1980s, thanks to backing in the Senate from Republicans and centrist Democrats. But that loose coalition eventually fell apart in 1990, primarily because of the military's alleged role in yet another atrocity.

    Senators from both parties agreed that the character of the issue changed substantially on Nov. 16, 1989, when six Jesuit priests and their two housekeepers were murdered. Eight soldiers were arrested after the execution-style slayings, and there were suspicions that high-ranking officers — including the head of military forces — had prior knowledge of the murders. A House task force concluded that the government botched its investigation of the case, and the House voted in May to cut U.S. aid by half.

    The murders and charges of a coverup resulted in a backlash against the Salvadoran military. That sentiment was bolstered by Congress' waning interest in Third World conflicts that had served as proxies for superpower rivalry during the Cold War.

    The Senate followed the House in slashing aid Oct. 19, approving an immediate 50 percent cut in the $85 million military aid package for El Salvador by a vote of 74-25: R 19-25; D 55-0 (ND 38-0, SD 17-0).

    The measure, an amendment to the foreign aid appropriations bill (HR 5114), was sponsored by Democratic Sens. Christopher J. Dodd, Conn., and Patrick J. Leahy, Vt. Support for the amendment crossed partisan and ideological lines. Dodd said senators were “fed up” with El Salvador's continuing human rights abuses.

    An administration-backed amendment aimed at weakening the Dodd-Leahy provision, offered by Bob Graham, D-Fla., was subsequently defeated, also by a wide margin (39-58). President Bush initially had vowed to veto the foreign aid bill if it included restrictions on military aid, but the threat was eventually withdrawn, and he signed the bill. (House key vote 1)

    15. Egyptian Debt

    After Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on Aug. 2, the White House assiduously cultivated Arab backing for the U.N. embargo against the regime of Saddam Hussein and for the U.S. military buildup in the Persian Gulf.

    Egypt was considered particularly crucial to the alliance. As a reward for its help and to relieve its economic burden, the White House decided to forgive $6.7 billion in military debts the Egyptian government owed.

    The action triggered far more congressional criticism than the initial dispatch of 200,000 troops to the region. Lawmakers from both parties, while recognizing the unique contributions of President Hosni Mubarak's government to the multilateral coalition against Iraq, were concerned that it could set a precedent for debt forgiveness that would lead to new problems. Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, D-Vt., said, “If we grant relief to all of the nations that request it, the total cost could be $60 billion, $61 billion.”

    But Leahy, chairman of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, eventually supported the debt relief offer. He led successful opposition to an amendment by Sen. Tom Harkin, D-Iowa, that would have stricken the debt-relief provision from the foreign aid appropriations bill (HR 5114). On Oct. 19, the Harkin amendment was defeated 42-55: R 10-34; D 32-21 (ND 20-16, SD 12-5).

    There was no up-or-down vote on the provision in the House because work on the foreign aid appropriations bill had been completed well before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. But intense opposition to the provision contributed to the narrow margin (188-162) by which the conference report on the final aid bill was passed by the House on Oct. 27.

    16. Civil Rights

    By a single vote, the Senate on Oct. 24 failed to override President Bush's veto of a sweeping civil rights bill (S 2104 — H Rept 101-856). The result was the first defeat of a major civil rights bill in the last 25 years.

    The vote was 66-34: R 11-34; D 55-0 (ND 38-0, SD 17-0). Democratic sponsors complained that the administration was not honest in its months-long negotiations on the legislation and that Bush likely never intended to sign the measure, which would have made it easier to prove job discrimination.

    The administration rejoined that the Hill sponsors wanted too much too fast and were unwilling to compromise. On the day of the override vote, black House members ringed the Senate floor, and in the gallery sat Jesse Jackson and, separately, David Duke, a failed Louisiana senatorial candidate and former Ku Klux Klan leader who had run against affirmative action.

    The bill would have countered six 1989 Supreme Court rulings that narrowed the rights and remedies of victims of job discrimination. It also would have responded to four other court decisions from the 1980s by making it easier for lawyers for prevailing plaintiffs to recover costs and fees.

    Unrelated to high court action, the bill would have amended Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to allow victims of intentional discrimination to recover compensatory damages and, in egregious cases, punitive damages. Title VII forbade racial, sex, religious and ethnic bias in the workplace. Title VII remedies were limited to back pay and benefits, attorneys' fees and court orders to correct discriminatory practices. The bill also would have allowed jury trials.

    The arguments against the bill could be stated in one word: quotas. Bush and business groups contended that the bill would cause companies to adopt hiring quotas for women and minorities so that they would not be subject to frivolous lawsuits based on the presence of a higher percentage of male or white workers.

    That argument arose primarily from the centerpiece of the legislation, intended to reverse the court's June 1989 ruling in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio. The bill would have made it more difficult for an employer to justify in court job practices that were fair in form but that had an adverse impact on minorities or women. Examples of such practices were skill tests or physical requirements. (House key vote 15)

    House
    1. El Salvador Aid

    For Rep. Joe Moakley, D-Mass., chairman of the powerful Rules Committee and head of a House task force on El Salvador, tolerance for rights abuses perpetrated by the Salvadoran military reached a breaking point in 1990. “Enough is enough,” said Moakley during the House debate on the fiscal 1990 foreign aid supplemental authorization bill (HR 4636).

    His colleagues agreed and on May 22 approved a 50 percent cut in military aid to the government in San Salvador by adopting a Moakley amendment 250-163: R 31-135; D 219-28 (ND 166-4, SD 53-24). It was the first of several defeats for the administration on the issue, culminating in Senate passage Oct. 19 of an amendment to the fiscal 1991 foreign aid appropriations bill that also required a 50 percent aid cut.

    In a pattern later repeated in the Senate, liberal House opponents of the aid to El Salvador were able to enlist more moderate members — such as John P. Murtha, D-Pa., chairman of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee — who in the past had been strong backers of the Salvadoran military. Murtha, a member of the Moakley task force, which traveled to El Salvador to investigate the 1989 murders of six Jesuit priests, cosponsored the measure to reduce the aid.

    Still, it took some time for a consistent House position on the issue to jell. On May 24, with the El Salvador aid as only one of the issues in dispute, the House voted down the foreign aid bill to which the language sponsored by Moakley and Murtha was attached. But by June, when the House considered the fiscal 1991 foreign aid appropriations bill (HR 5114), support for a 50 percent aid cut had solidified. The bill including the aid cut passed the House, and eventually the Senate, by a wide margin.

    As it turned out, David R. Obey, D-Wis., chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, was prescient in characterizing the May 22 action. “That's the position of the House,” said Obey; it was essentially the position that later became law. (Senate key vote 14)

    2. Job-Loss Benefits

    Most of the battles on the clean air package in 1990 were fought along regional rather than partisan lines. But one debate sent the parties scrambling back to their corners: Whether to provide job-loss relief for workers displaced by the new law.

    House Democrats, spurning White House veto threats, approved such a measure by a wide margin May 23. In doing so, West Virginia Democrat Bob Wise achieved what his powerful Senate counterpart, Robert c. Byrd, could not.

    Wise, along with cosponsors Tom Ridge, R-Pa., and Thomas J. Downey, D-N.Y., patterned his amendment after similar relief available to U.S. workers under the Trade Adjustment Assistance Act. The amendment offered 26 additional weeks of unemployment and retraining benefits to workers who could show that the clean air law was “an important contributing factor” to their job loss. It authorized $250 million in funding over five years.

    The Senate barely rejected a similar but more expensive program on a 49-50 vote March 29, marking a rare defeat for Appropriations Chairman Byrd, who — like Wise — was trying to help coal miners in his state.

    But part of the appeal of the Wise amendment was its application to workers in all fields and geographic regions, while Byrd's $500 million plan offered aid only to coal miners.

    House Democrats pushed the amendment through on a vote of 274-146: R 43-126; D 231-20 (ND 169-2, SD 62-18).

    Still, administration threats to veto the entire bill over the provision remained. President Bush argued that it would become an open-ended entitlement that would cost far more than $250 million. And though it was unclear whether Senate conferees would abandon their previous pact with the White House and go along with a compromise job-loss provision, Wise never took the veto threat seriously: “I can't believe the president's going to veto the environmental bill of the decade over $50 million a year.”

    Wise was right. The amendment was modified in conference — with help from the administration — to address Bush's concerns. Instead of continuing mandatory benefits, conferees agreed to a $250 million needs-based program that would be administered through the Job Training Partnership Act. Qualified displaced workers would be guaranteed cash supplemental payments after their unemployment assistance ran out as long as they remained in a job-retraining program. (Senate key vote 4)

    3. Clean Air

    For a decade, clean air bills were stalled in Congress. But when a package (HR 3030) finally made it to the House floor May 23, members approved the sweeping rewrite of the anti-pollution law by an overwhelming 401-21 vote: R 154-16; D 247-5 (ND 169-4, SD 78-1). The vote, which followed only two days of largely non-partisan debate, demonstrated what environmentalists had long maintained: They had the support they needed on the floor, if only a bill could be navigated through key committee obstructionists — in particular, auto industry ally John D. Dingell, D-Mich. As chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, Dingell for years had blocked a series of earlier bills that would have placed new controls on automobiles and smokestacks.

    This time, however, the Energy Committee had produced so many agreements on so many divisive issues that the rest of the House was given only a handful of choices to make before final passage. The long-awaited floor showdown that some lobbyists had promoted as the environmental vote of the decade looked at times like a bipartisan love-in, with members clamoring to take credit for a series of compromise amendments, most of which passed on overwhelming votes.

    In the end, the vote on final passage locked in the legislation's major components as the bill entered the next stage — grueling conference negotiations with the Senate — which ended barely in time for a bill to be sent to President Bush's desk before Congress adjourned. Dingell, Henry A. Waxman, D-Calif., the main House advocate of clean air legislation, and Norman F. Lent, N.Y., the ranking Republican on Energy and Commerce, were committed to standing by many parts of the House bill through conference with the Senate, unless all three could agree on a compromise.

    House conferees did spend much of their time renegotiating parts of their bill to make it less burdensome on businesses; although pro-environment conferees had the leverage of a strong floor vote, pro-industry conferees had the clock on their side.

    Oddly, the soundness of House floor support may have done more to bolster the position of Senate conferees, most of whom supported a stronger clean air rewrite than the bill (S 1630) that passed their chamber. Senate conferees, led by Majority Leader George J. Mitchell, D-Maine, had been forced to strike a deal with the White House, watering down the legislation to get it past strident Senate opposition.

    Once in conference, however, Senate negotiators felt free to abandon the White House deal and give in to House-passed language in important areas, opting, for example, to recede entirely to the House's tougher anti-smog provisions. (Senate key vote 3)

    4. Flag Burning

    An early-strike strategy by House opponents of a constitutional amedment to protect the U.S. flag led to a June 21 defeat of the proposed amendment (H J Res 350). The opponents had contended in this politically charged debate that the First Amendment and the Bill of Rights needed more protection than the flag.

    The 254-177 vote fell 34 short of the two-thirds necessary for passage: R 159-17; D 95-160 (ND 43-130, SD 52-30).

    The resolution stated: “The Congress and the states shall have the power to prohibit the physical desecration of the flag of the United States.”

    The amendment was proposed after the Supreme Court on June 11 struck down a federal statute that made it illegal to burn, mutilate or otherwise desecrate the flag. As the court had ruled in 1989 on a Texas flag-burning statute, the majority said protesters who burned the U.S. flag were protected by the First Amendment right to free speech.

    Supporters of an amendment to reverse the court believed that public sentiment was on their side. But they failed to organize outside interest groups, such as veterans, to write and call members of Congress. At the same time, foes of a flag amendment had spent months putting in place an opposition strategy, anticipating the court's decision to strike down the statute.

    Democrats suggested that Republicans were trying to stir up pre-election defensiveness, just as George Bush had challenged Democratic nominee Michael S. Dukakis' patriotism during the 1988 presidential campaign. They used the Bill of Rights as both a legal argument and a symbol, trying to defuse those who argued that support for the flag was a test of patriotism. House Speaker Thomas S. Foley of Washington, who had led opposition to the constitutional amendment, made a rare floor appearance to close debate. In the end, the House vote on the amendment was not close to the two-thirds necessary, and the issue was not a major factor in the fall elections. (Senate key vote 6)

    5. Family and Medical Leave

    “We shall override, someday,” vowed Patricia Schroeder, D-Colo., of legislation vetoed by President Bush that would have required employers to grant unpaid leave to workers caring for newborn children or sick relatives.

    That day was not July 25, when the House by a wide, 54-vote margin failed to revive the family and medical leave bill (HR 770). Indeed, Schroeder's wistful pledge seemed aimed not only at family leave — it also spoke of Democrats' frustration at being unable to override any of the Bush presidency's vetoes.

    The legislation would have protected jobs for workers who took up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave to care for a newborn, adopted or ill child at no cost to the employee. It also would have covered time off for personal medical emergencies, including caring for family members. The bill would have applied only to businesses with 50 or more employees.

    Sponsors argued that federal minimum requirements were needed to bring U.S. businesses in line with the changing workplace, with about 60 percent of mothers working outside the home. They also said the United States was virtually alone among industrialized nations in lacking a national family and medical leave policy, though opponents said employees were forced to pay into mandatory leave benefit plans in many other countries.

    Bush, in vetoing the bill June 29, said he supported the concept of parental and medical leave but believed such arrangements should be decided in labor-management negotiations.

    Despite heavy lobbying, Democrats found the goal of getting a two-thirds vote in the House insurmountable. In fact, sponsors lost eight votes from when the bill was passed by the chamber May 10. The override attempt was rejected 232-195: R 38-138; D 194-57 (ND 156-14, SD 38-43).

    Democrats howled that Bush was falling short on a campaign promise to support families. But with 57 Democrats sustaining the veto, Bush could not be held solely accountable. Election-year pressure by business groups opposing the bill swayed more than a few votes.

    But Bush's seeming invincibility and popularity over the summer also helped him trounce Democrats resoundingly in their own back yard.

    6. Farm Programs

    If there was an underlying theme to the 1990 farm bill, it was class warfare. Rich, successful farmers found themselves scorned as “fat cats” who were milking the taxpayer for millions of dollars. Pitted against them were the poorer farmers who produced less of the nation's food and received less of its subsidy bounty. Conflict was inevitable because the budget crisis meant that for the first time in years, farmers would be getting less, not more, government aid. The matter came to a head July 25, when the House debated an amendment to the farm bill (HR 3950) that would have denied crop subsidies to farmers with gross adjusted incomes of more than $100,000 a year. The four-hour debate on the amendment cut to the philosophical underpinnings of farm programs.

    The amendment was the handiwork of Charles E. Schumer, D-N.Y., and Dick Armey, R-Texas, the leaders of a coalition of urban liberals who disliked farm subsidies going to a few farmers while programs for the poor had been under pressure, and of Republican conservatives, who clung to a hope of a free market farm sector.

    Farm-state lawmakers saw the amendment as a strike at the heart of the program. Having wealthy farmers with large operations in the program was desirable, they argued, because it gave the government more control over those who produced most of the nation's food, and thus over prices and supply. Kick out those affluent farmers, they argued, and the government would have a tougher time keeping food prices stable.

    Critics had long contended that the farm program was inequitable, but they had little success in changing it. With the budget crisis, however, 1990 seemed different. Armey and Schumer argued that, in addition to correcting the inequities of the farm program, their amendment would save the government money. In effect, their proposal would convert farm subsidies into a more explicit welfare program for needy farmers.

    However, farm-state lawmakers had an alternative: Instead of soaking the rich, they proposed reducing every farmer's subsidy check. In the end, the alternative proved more acceptable. The amendment was defeated 159-263: R 66-109; D 93-154 (ND 85-82, SD 8-72).

    7. Ethics Reprimand

    Buffeted by a yearlong string of scandals, the House navigated unusually partisan, emotional waters when it debated how harshly to punish Barney Frank, D-Mass., for improperly using his office to help a male prostitute.

    The debate came at a time when many politicians were evincing election-year jitters about Congress' scandal-scarred image. The drama of floor debate centered on whether nervous incumbents would go along with the recommendation of the House ethics committee to reprimand Frank or impose the stiffer sanction of censuring him.

    The key vote came when the House on July 26 rejected a Republican motion to censure Frank 141-287: R 129-46; D 12-241 (ND 1-171, SD 11-70); clearing the way for overwhelming approval of a reprimand.

    Frank's case was the most publicized of several congressional sex scandals of 1990. After investigating allegations that first surfaced in the Washington Times in August 1989, the ethics committee concluded that Frank “reflected discredit upon the House” by writing a misleading memorandum in behalf of Steve Gobie, a male prostitute with whom Frank associated in 1985–87, and by improperly using his status as a member of Congress to fix 33 parking tickets. However, the committee found no conclusive evidence to back up allegations that Frank knew Gobie was running a prostitution service out of Frank's apartment.

    Frank did not contest the committee's recommendation that he be reprimanded. The motion to increase the punishment to censure was offered by House GOP Whip Newt Gingrich of Georgia, who had instigated the 1989 ethics inquiry that led to the resignation of House Speaker Jim Wright of Texas.

    The voting breakdown on the censure motion showed how partisan the ethics issue had become, especially in Frank's case. Disciplinary votes usually did not break down along party lines. But the ethics committee itself, before deciding to recommend a reprimand, had been riven by unusually deep partisan divisions over how far to go. Although the committee's recommendation had been approved unanimously, three Republican committee members voted for censure on the floor.

    Solid Democratic opposition to the censure motion was, in part, a measure of Democrats' deep hostility toward Gingrich. Many resented his role in the Wright affair and were irritated that he was criticizing the same ethics committee that he had praised earlier in the year for clearing his own name.

    In the end, ethics committee Chairman Julian C. Dixon, D-Calif., depicted the censure vote as a referendum on the ethics panel itself. He portrayed it as a choice between a unanimous, bipartisan committee that had studied the case for almost a year and GOP demagogues who would throw their colleagues to the wolves. Said Dixon, “This case boils down to, really, who do you trust?”

    8. Strategic Defense Initiative

    Congress continued its persistent effort to reorient and reduce long-term funding for the strategic defense initiative (SDI), the anti-missile defense program launched in 1983 by President Ronald Reagan.

    The sweeping rhetoric Reagan used in promoting the program — offering the potential to make nuclear missiles “impotent and obsolete” — had long since been supplanted by the more modest goal of deploying by the end of the 1990s a network of space-based missiles that could protect the U.S. nuclear deterrent against a Soviet first strike.

    But in 1990, both the revised goal and President Bush's $4.7 billion SDI funding request for fiscal 1991 were wanting in congressional support.

    Following the Senate's lead, the final defense authorization bill included provisions intended to reduce funding for the planned network of space-based missiles while increasing funding for two other kinds of missile defenses: ground-based anti-missile interceptors that could head off a small attack or a few accidentally launched missiles; and lasers and other futuristic weapons that might in the 21st century begin to realize Reagan's grander vision.

    Congress also slashed the SDI funding request to $2.89 billion — a compromise between the $3.57 billion authorized by the Senate and the $2.3 billion authorized by the House. The House accepted that figure in an amendment sponsored by Charles E. Bennett, D-Fla., and Tom Ridge, R-Pa., which was adopted by 225-189: R 20-150; D 205-39 (ND 157-7, SD 48-32).

    9. Abortion at Military Facilities

    The Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, which gave states new latitude to restrict access to abortion, galvanized abortion rights forces in the country and on Capitol Hill. But abortion rights supporters, while enjoying considerable success in Congress that year on abortion-related issues, were unable to alter policy because they could not muster majorities large enough to override four Bush vetoes.

    By 1990, abortion rights backers were looking for new issues on which they might be able to roll back some of the myriad federal restrictions that had cropped up in the years since abortion was legalized nationwide by the Supreme Court's 1973 Roe v. Wade decision.

    The one they ultimately set out to overturn was a 1988 Defense Department directive forbidding abortions in overseas military facilities, even if the woman paid for the procedure herself.

    The first test came in the Senate on Aug. 3, where Tim Wirth, D-Colo., tried to add the amendment overturning the ban to the defense authorization bill (S 2884). Sponsors mustered a majority but fell two votes short of the 60 needed to stop a filibuster.

    By the time the issue got to the House, debate had sharpened.

    Supporters painted the issue as a vote on simply ensuring access to abortion services for members of the military and their dependents. But opponents portrayed it as a vote for “abortion on demand,” which they said would lead to abortions of fetuses potentially able to live outside the womb or for sex selection.

    That argument carried the day; an amendment similar to the Senate proposal, offered by Vic Fazio, D-Calif., could not even muster a majority, failing Sept. 18 by 200-216: R 35-139; D 165-77 (ND 113-50, SD 52-27).

    10. Immigration

    The House on Oct. 3 voted to increase immigration by more than 60 percent and offer amnesty, under certain conditions, to thousands of people living in the United States illegally.

    The generous House bill (HR 4300) set the stage for negotiations with the Senate, which had passed a less-sweeping bill (S 358) in July 1989. The compromise that was cleared for the president did not open the door as wide as the House bill would have. But the House's position forced the Senate to broaden its approach toward the numbers and types of immigrants allowed in.

    The House legislation passed 231-192: R 45-127; D 186-65 (ND 159-13, SD 27-52). The administration had opposed the measure largely because of its country-specific amnesty and huge increases in visa levels.

    The broad purpose of the legislation — and that of the bill that cleared — was to bring in more specially trained workers and increase immigration from countries adversely affected under the existing visa allotment system that favored Latin Americans and Asians. The House bill differed from the Senate legislation beyond sheer numbers. It would have allowed a stay of deportation for illegal immigrants from El Salvador, Lebanon, Liberia and Kuwait. It would have granted more visas to spouses and unmarried minor children of lawful permanent residents under the terms similar to those for immediate relatives of U.S. citizens.

    It also would have been more generous in barring deportation of children and spouses of foreigners who were legalized under the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act. The children and spouses did not have visas.

    During House floor debate, members beat back several attempts to decrease the number of new visas in the bill. The issue divided members who argued that a generous immigration policy was a good thing for reuniting families, adding diversity to the population and building the talent pool, and those who said the government should discourage foreigners and concentrate its money on essential services for U.S.-born.

    John Bryant, D-Texas, protested, “We have a shortage of jobs and training, not a shortage of people.”

    His point of view did not prevail on the House floor or in conference. Under the measure cleared Oct. 27, legal immigration was raised from about 500,000 annually to about 700,000 during each of the first three years of the act. After that, a permanent level of 675,000 would be set. The only country-specific amnesty that remained in the bill was an 18-month stay of deportation for people from El Salvador living in the United States illegally.

    11. Budget Summit Agreement

    In one of 1990's most dramatic congressional votes, House leaders unsure of their vote counts rolled the dice at 1 a.m. Oct. 5 in a last-ditch attempt to save a budget deal produced by nearly five months of increasingly desperate negotiations between Congress and the Bush administration. When White House and congressional leaders announced the package Sept. 30, they hoped that the pressure of automatic budget cuts threatened by the Gramm-Rudman deficit-reduction law would bring members into line. But five days later, with the House in open rebellion and support for the budget package fading by the minute, leaders felt they had little choice but to gamble. They lost. In a stunning rebuke of President Bush and House leaders of both parties, the House refused to adopt the conference report on the budget resolution 179-254: R 71-105; D 108-149 (ND 63-111, SD 45-38).

    The defeat of the budget deal meant that Congress was held hostage in Washington for another three weeks of negotiations — the longest election-year session since World War II — before Congress adopted a final budget-reconciliation package Oct. 27.

    By the time of the Oct. 5 vote, many House members felt they had already been prisoners of the budget wars since the talks began in mid-May. Some blamed the defeat on the package's most politically odious components: new taxes and cuts in safety net programs such as Medicare. But others said it was at least in part an angry backlash by members frustrated at having been left out as an elite corps of congressional and White House officials negotiated behind closed doors, only to hand the rank and file a tough, take-it-or-leave-it package just weeks before the fall elections.

    The process began in early May when President Bush, driven by fear that the economy would collapse on his watch, agreed to convene a no-preconditions budget summit with congressional leaders. When the talks threatened to stall in June, he abandoned his “no new taxes” pledge to get the negotiations started again.

    That shifted the terms of the debate from whether to tax to whom to tax, and how much. Democrats who had been on the defensive over taxes for the decade since Ronald Reagan became president suddenly found themselves making political headway with the “fairness” issue. When Republicans demanded a cut in the capital gains tax to stimulate a dangerously weakening economy, Democrats countered that the cut would be a sop to rich taxpayers that would have little or no effect on the nation's economic health. Instead, they insisted on a hike in the top tax rate for the wealthiest taxpayers.

    When it became clear that the budget summit deal would include substantial new taxes, negotiator and House Minority Whip Newt Gingrich of Georgia jumped ship and declared war on the process. When the deal itself was announced Sept. 30, Gingrich refused to attend the Rose Garden ceremony where Bush and congressional leaders said they would support it despite disliking it. Gingrich's defection was an omen.

    Backers of the budget deal spent the week furiously lobbying Congress. Early indications were that the Senate would go along but that the package was in trouble in the House. Bush himself went on television to ask for national support, but that only appeared to generate more phone calls to congressional offices against the package. With a stopgap spending bill set to run out at midnight Oct. 5, the House had to vote on the deal less than a week after it was unveiled.

    There had long been an understanding that both parties would have to produce a majority of their members to support the package on the floor, but a significant bloc of conservative Republicans had solidified around Gingrich in opposition, and when it became clear that the GOP would not produce its votes, Democrats deserted in droves as well. Ultimately, the deal was done in by a rare alliance between conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats. The Republicans hated the taxes, and the Democrats hated the cuts in Medicare and other programs.

    After three more weeks of negotiations, the final budget deal still had both taxes and safety-net cuts, but each in either smaller quantities or more politically palatable forms.

    12. Textile Quotas

    It had become routine for Congress to send bills to the president mandating stiff new quotas on textile, apparel and shoe imports in an effort to shore up domestic producers. It was just as routine for him to veto those bills and for the House to fail to override the veto by a narrow margin.

    It happened in 1986, in 1988 and again in 1990. The show of support for the nation's textile industry had barely wavered on Capitol Hill. But that fact, quota supporters said, was important for the long-term survival of the domestic industry.

    Textile quota bills also had been altered somewhat over time in an effort to pick up votes; the 1990 version would have allowed textile and apparel imports to grow by 1 percent annually, and shoe imports would have been frozen permanently at 1989 levels. It also would have given incentives to countries that purchased U.S. farm goods.

    Critics said stiff quotas were needed to preserve a shrinking domestic manufacturing base, while opponents argued that a constricted supply would drive up prices for consumers. Besides, they said, the domestic textile industry had never been healthier. Apparel makers, but not their unions, opposed the quota measure.

    Although the House had come up a few votes short of overriding the president's veto each time, 1990 was the first time either chamber summoned more than a two-thirds majority for a textile quota bill. In July, the Senate had passed the measure (HR 4328) by 68-32, and opponents feared for the first time that there might be enough congressional support for the measure to ram it through.

    But Oct. 10, when the vetoed bill was returned to the House floor for an override attempt, history repeated itself. Supporters could not quite muster the required two-thirds majority — falling 10 votes short — and the override effort failed 275-152: R 70-103; D 205-49 (ND 131-41, SD 74-8).

    Quota supporter Ed Jenkins, D-Ga., said he was not surprised at the outcome. But neither was he completely disheartened. He and others said it was important that congressional support for quotas remained strong because international trade negotiators meeting in Geneva and Brussels, Belgium, were hoping to make major changes in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade before the end of 1990. A central element of those talks was the proposal to phase out an existing scheme of negotiated bilateral textile and apparel quotas. Third World suppliers of textiles in particular wanted an end to restrictions on textile trade.

    Any such trade agreement would have to be submitted to Congress for approval before it could take effect. And Jenkins said after the override attempt failed that if a new trade agreement was reached that would put an end to the existing quota regime, it was clear that Congress would refuse to support it.

    13. Obscenity Debate

    A year after Congress restricted the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) from funding works that could be considered obscene, sadomasochistic or homoerotic, lawmakers pulled back. The House on Oct. 11 chose to drop the restrictions in favor of a substitute by Pat Williams, D-Mont., and E. Thomas Coleman, R-Mo., by a vote of 382-42: R 142-31; D 240-11 (ND 160-11, SD 80-0).

    The House's lopsided vote marked a turning of the tide in favor of artistic freedom over the concerns of the religious right.

    Approval of the Williams-Coleman language, as an amendment to a bill to reauthorize the NEA (HR 4825), followed months of stalemate among arts advocates who wanted to preserve the endowment without any restrictions, moderate Republicans who wanted to include language opposing obscenity and conservatives who wanted to abolish the agency.

    The impetus for the compromise between Williams and Coleman was a 15-1 vote in the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee to reauthorize the arts endowment while leaving the courts to decide what was obscene. Similar to the Senate language, the Williams-Coleman substitute dropped the existing restrictions and placed the onus on courts to determine questions of obscenity.

    If an artist was convicted of violating obscenity standards, the NEA could order him or her to return the federal money. In a nod to the right, the substitute included language drafted by Paul B. Henry, R-Mich., stating that although artistic excellence was the standard by which grant applications were judged, “general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public” should be taken into account.

    The only serious opposition to the amendment came from Dana Rohrabacher, R-Calif., and a few other conservatives. Rohrabacher offered an amendment containing a series of restrictions aimed at curbing obscenity, blasphemy, flag desecration and racism in NEA-funded projects.

    But Amo Houghton, R-N.Y., called Rohrabacher's effort to further restrict the NEA “a ruse” designed to gut federal arts spending. The House agreed, rejecting Rohrabacher's amendment, 175-249, before approving the Williams-Coleman language.

    Ultimately, the House plan was adopted in conference on the fiscal 1991 Interior appropriations bill (HR 5769 — PL 101-512), which funded the NEA.

    14. Tax and Spending-Cut Package

    For much of the year, Democratic congressional leaders worked with their Republican counterparts and White House officials to craft a budget deal that could win majority support from both sides of the aisle. But after the House on Oct. 5 overwhelmingly rejected the best compromise leaders could strike, Democrats decided it was time to take a more partisan tack.

    Bowing to pressure from rank-and-file members — most of whom had been shut out of the high-level budget deliberations — House leaders agreed to allow a largely political Democratic alternative to be offered as a floor amendment to the fiscal 1991 reconciliation bill (HR 5835). The alternative did what many Democrats had clamored for throughout the year but which leaders had discouraged because of the ongoing negotiations with the White House.

    The package, drafted by Ways and Means Committee Democrats, shifted a much larger share of the tax burden onto the wealthy and made smaller spending cuts in Medicare and other social programs. In short, it did everything President Bush opposed in the budget talks. It raised the top rate for the wealthiest taxpayers from 28 percent to 33 percent and imposed a 10 percent surtax on millionaires. It called for a capital gains tax break but only for the middle class, and it reduced proposed Medicare savings from $60 billion to $43 billion.

    As expected, support for the Democratic alternative split along party lines. The amendment was adopted Oct. 16 by a vote of 238-192: R 10-164; D 228-28 (ND 157-16, SD 71-12). The package helped refocus the tax debate from one concerning how much revenue should be raised to one concerning who should pay, and its passage in the House forced conferees to shape a final reconciliation bill much more to Democrats' liking. (Senate key vote 13)

    15. Civil Rights

    The House voted Oct. 16 to accept the final version of a comprehensive civil rights measure, but the vote was 12 short of what would have been needed to override a veto. And, ultimately, it was a veto by President Bush that killed the bill aimed at making it easier for workers to sue and win awards for discrimination.

    The House adopted the conference report (S 2104 — H Rept 101-755) by a vote of 273-154: R 34-139; D 239-15 (ND 169-3, SD 70-12). The veto override attempt failed in the Senate by a single vote, so it never came back to the House.

    The bill would have countered six 1989 Supreme Court rulings that narrowed the rights and remedies of victims of job discrimination. In response to four other court decisions from the 1980s, it would have given lawyers a greater chance to obtain costs and fees.

    The legislation also would have amended Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to allow victims of intentional discrimination to recover compensatory damages and, in egregious cases, punitive damages. Under existing law, Title VII remedies were limited to back pay and benefits, attorneys' fees and court orders to stop discriminatory practices. The bill also would have allowed jury trials for discrimination victims.

    Civil rights advocates and labor groups said the legislation was needed to protect workers from bias. The administration and business argued, however, that its pro-employee slant would have opened the door for frivolous lawsuits and led to quota hiring by employers trying to protect themselves. (Senate key vote 16)

    16. Aid to Angolan Rebels

    President Ronald Reagan had terrific problems persuading Congress to view the Nicaraguan contras as “freedom fighters,” but he had a far easier time obtaining support for covert assistance to anti-government rebels in Angola.

    For years, a broad coalition of lawmakers, including a substantial number of Democrats, backed secret military assistance for the rebels, who were led by the public-relations savvy Jonas Savimbi.

    But the argument in favor of such programs was far more convincing for many lawmakers when the Soviet Union was aggressively funding communist regimes in the Third World. With the Cold War ending and the Soviets less interested in fueling regional conflicts, support for anti-communist movements such as Savimbi's waned.

    In October, the House approved tough new restrictions on aid for the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebels as part of its fiscal 1991 intelligence authorization bill (HR 5422). While the complicated conditions ultimately were eased somewhat by a House-Senate conference committee, the House vote demonstrated growing congressional skepticism toward large-scale secret programs.

    The Angola restrictions, sponsored by Stephen J. Solarz, D-N.Y., a member of the Intelligence Committee, passed Oct. 17 by one vote: Speaker Thomas S. Foley, D-Wash., was called on to cast the deciding vote to approve the Solarz amendment 207-206: R 12-156; D 195-50 (ND 158-10, SD 37-40). Given the razor-thin margin of passage, the administration was confident that the provision would be dropped in conference.

    The Senate, in its consideration of the intelligence bill, attached only minor conditions on aid for UNITA. But the conference committee approved language by Solarz with-holding half of the military aid for UNITA until congressional intelligence committees approved its release. Solarz termed that a “remarkable victory.” The rebels reportedly received about $60 million a year from the United States, about half in military aid.

    1. Chinese Students/Veto Override

    HR 2712 Passage, over President Bush's Nov. 30 veto, of the bill to defer indefinitely the deportation of Chinese students whose visas expire and waive a requirement that students on “J” visas return to their home country for two years before applying for permanent residence in the United States. Rejected 62-37: R 8-37; D 54-0 (ND 38-0, SD 16-0), Jan. 25, 1990. A two-thirds majority of those present and voting (66 in this case) of both houses is required to override a veto. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    2. Education Programs/National Standards

    S 695 Helms, R-N.C., amendment to delete $25 million in federal matching funds for the National Board for Professional Teaching Standards, which is developing guidelines for voluntary certification of teachers. Rejected 35-64: R 35-10; D 0-54 (ND 0-37, SD 0-17), Feb. 6, 1990. A “yea” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    3. Clean Air Act Reauthorization/Motor Vehicles

    S 1630 Mitchell, D-Maine, motion to table (kill) the Wirth, D-Colo., amendment to provide for a second round of tailpipe emissions reductions in the year 2003; to require cleaner-burning reformulated gasoline in all ozone non-attainment areas; to require light-duty vehicles to meet new-car emission standards for 100,000 miles; and to provide for use of clean fuels and clean-fuel vehicles in the nation's smoggiest cities. Motion agreed to 52-46: R 25-19; D 27-27 (ND 14-23, SD 13-4), March 20, 1990. A “yea” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    4. Clean Air Act Reauthorization/Coal Miner Benefits

    S 1630 Byrd, D-W.Va., amendment to provide severance pay and retraining benefits to coal miners who lose their jobs as a result of provisions to control acid rain. Rejected 49-50: R 11-34; D 38-16 (ND 29-9, SD 9-7), March 29, 1990. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    5. Omnibus Crime Package/Assault-Style Weapons

    S 1970 Hatch, R-Utah, amendment to strike provisions that would prohibit for three years making, selling and possessing nine types of semiautomatic assault-style weapons. Rejected 48-52: R 36-9; D 12-43 (ND 5-33, SD 7-10), May 23, 1990. A “yea” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    6. Constitutional Amendment on the Flag/Passage

    S J Res 332 Passage of the joint resolution to propose an amendment to the Constitution to prohibit the physical desecration of the U.S. flag. Rejected 58-42: R 38-7; D 20-35 (ND 10-28, SD 10-7), June 26, 1990. A two-thirds majority of those present and voting (67 in this case) of both houses is required for passage of a joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution. A “yea” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    7. Americans with Disabilities Act/Conference Report

    S 933 Adoption of the conference report on the bill to prohibit discrimination against the disabled in public facilities and employment and guarantee access to mass transit and telecommunications services. Adopted 91-6: R 37-6; D 54-0 (ND 37-0, SD 17-0), July 13, 1990. A “yea” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    8. Farm Programs Reauthorization/Sugar Price Supports

    S 2830 Akaka, D-Hawaii, motion to table (kill) the Bradley, D-N.J., amendment to extend the current sugar program for five years and lower the sugar price-support program loan rate from 18 cents per pound to 16 cents per pound. Motion agreed to 54-44: R 17-26; D 37-18 (ND 22-16, SD 15-2), July 24, 1990.

    9. Campaign Finance Overhaul/Taxpayer Funding

    S 137 McConnell, R-Ky., amendment to the Boren, D-Okla., substitute amendment to eliminate all taxpayer funding of Senate campaigns. Rejected 46-49: R 44-0; D 2-49 (ND 1-34, SD 1-15), July 30, 1990.

    10. Fiscal 1991 Labor, HHS and Education Appropriations/Abortion

    HR 5257 Harkin, D-Iowa, motion to table (kill) the Armstrong, R-Colo., amendment to the committee amendment to permit federal funding of abortion in cases of rape or incest. The Armstrong amendment would require organizations receiving funds to notify a parent or legal guardian 48 hours before performing an abortion for a minor, unless there is a medical emergency. Motion rejected 48-48: R 8-34; D 40-14 (ND 31-6, SD 9-8), Oct. 12, 1990. (Subsequently, the Armstrong amendment was adopted by voice vote.)

    11. Fiscal 1991 Defense Appropriations/Troop Cuts

    S 3189 Conrad, D-N.D., amendment to reduce U.S. forces in NATO by 30,000 troops below the Senate-passed authorization level and reduce the Department of Defense military personnel level by a corresponding 30,000 below the authorized level. Rejected 46-50: R 8-34; D 38-16 (ND 31-6, SD 7-10), Oct. 15, 1990. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    12. Fiscal 1991 Defense Appropriations/B-2 Bomber

    S 3189 Leahy, D-Vt., amendment to cut funds for the two additional B-2 bombers in the bill, thereby terminating the expansion of the program with the 15 bombers being produced and tested. Rejected 44-50: R 9-32; D 35-18 (ND 30-7, SD 5-11), Oct. 15, 1990. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    13. Fiscal 1991 Budget Reconciliation Act/Passage

    HR 5835 Passage of the bill to cut spending and raise revenues as required by the reconciliation instructions in the budget resolution and make changes in the budget process. Passed 54-46: R 23-22; D 31-24 (ND 20-18, SD 11-6), in the session that began, and the Congressional Record dated, Oct. 18, 1990.

    14. Fiscal 1991 Foreign Operations Appropriations/El Salvador

    HR 5114 Leahy, D-Vt., amendment to the committee amendment, to reduce military aid to the government of El Salvador by 50 percent and link future military aid to improvements in human rights and progress toward a negotiated peace settlement. Adopted 74-25: R 19-25; D 55-0 (ND 38-0, SD 17-0), Oct. 19, 1990. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    15. Fiscal 1991 Foreign Operations Appropriations/Egyptian Debt

    HR 5114 Harkin, D-Iowa, amendment to the committee amendment, to strike provisions canceling Egypt's debt to the United States and to require the president to develop in cooperation with Congress a proposal to restructure that debt and convene an international conference to develop a comprehensive and multilateral solution to Egypt's international debt problem. Rejected 42-55: R 10-34; D 32-21 (ND 20-16, SD 12-5), Oct. 19, 1990. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    16. Civil Rights Act of 1990/Veto Override

    S 2104 Passage, over President Bush's Oct. 22 veto, of the bill to reverse or modify six recent Supreme Court decisions that narrowed the reach and remedies of job discrimination law and to authorize monetary damages under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Rejected 66-34: R 11-34; D 55-0 (ND 38-0, SD 17-0), Oct. 24, 1990. A two-thirds majority of those present and voting (67 in this case) of both houses is required to override a veto. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    1. Fiscal 1990 Foreign Aid Supplemental Authorizations/Military Aid

    HR 4636 Moakley, D-Mass., amendment to suspend 50 percent of El Salvador's military aid planned for fiscal years 1990 and 1991, depending on actions by the Salvadoran government or by the leftist guerrillas. Adopted 250-163: R 31-135; D 219-28 (ND 166-4, SD 53-24), May 22, 1990. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    2. Clean Air Act Reauthorization/Transition Aid

    HR 3030 Wise, D-W.Va., amendment to authorize $250 million over a five-year period for a Clean Air Employment Transition Assistance program to provide workers who lose their jobs or have their wages reduced as a result of the bill with retraining assistance and up to six months of additional unemployment benefits. Adopted 274-146: R 43-126; D 231-20 (ND 169-2, SD 62-18), May 23, 1990. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    3. Clean Air Act Reauthorization/Passage

    HR 3030 Passage of the bill (thus clearing for the president) to amend the Clean Air Act to attain and maintain national ambient air quality standards, require reductions of emissions in motor vehicles, control toxic air pollutants, reduce acid rain, establish a system of federal permits and enforcement, and otherwise improve the quality of the nation's air. Passed 401-21: R 154-16; D 247-5 (ND 169-4, SD 78-1), May 23, 1990.

    4. Constitutional Amendment on the Flag/Passage

    H J Res 350 Brooks, D-Texas, motion to suspend the rules and pass the joint resolution to propose an amendment to the Constitution to prohibit the physical desecration of the U.S. flag. Rejected 254-177: R 159-17; D 95-160 (ND 43-130, SD 52-30), June 21, 1990. A two-thirds majority of those present and voting (288 in this case) of both houses is required for passage of a joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution. A “yea” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    5. Family and Medical Leave Act/Veto Override

    HR 770 Passage, over President Bush's June 29 veto, of the bill to require public and private employers to give unpaid leave to care for a newborn child or a seriously ill child, parent or spouse, or to use as medical leave due to a serious health condition. Rejected 232-195: R 38-138; D 194-57 (ND 156-14, SD 38-43), July 25, 1990. A two-thirds majority or those present and voting (285 in this case) of both houses is required to override a veto. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    6. Farm Programs Reauthorization/High-Income Farmers

    HR 3950 Schumer, D-N.Y., amendment to prohibit all payments, purchases and loans under the wheat, feed grains, cotton, honey, rice, oil seeds, and wool and mohair programs for any person with an adjusted gross income of $100,000 or more. Rejected 159-263: R 66-109; D 93-154 (ND 85-82, SD 8-72), July 25, 1990.

    7. Frank Reprimand/Censure

    H Res 440 Gingrich, R-Ga., motion to recommit the resolution reprimanding Barney Frank, D-Mass., to the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct with instructions to report back a recommendation of censure instead of reprimand. Motion rejected 141-287: R 129-46; D 12-241 (ND 1-171, SD 11-70), July 26, 1990.

    8. Fiscal 1991 Defense Authorization/SDI Funding

    HR 4739 Bennett, D-Fla., amendment to reduce spending for the strategic defense initiative by $600 million to a new level of $2.3 billion. Adopted 225-189: R 20-150; D 205-39 (ND 157-7, SD 48-32), Sept. 18, 1990. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    9. Fiscal 1991 Defense Authorization/Abortion Services

    HR 4739 Fazio, D-Calif., amendment to provide military personnel and their dependents stationed overseas with reproductive health services, including privately paid abortions, at military hospitals. Rejected 200-216: R 35-139; D 165-77 (ND 113-50, SD 52-27), Sept. 18, 1990. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    10. Legal Immigration Revision/Passage

    HR 4300 Passage of the bill to increase the number of visas for relatives and people coming to the United States to work; suspend deportation for the spouses and children of newly legalized aliens; establish diversity visas for immigrants from countries that currently account for a low number of immigrants to the United States; and reform and revise other immigration procedures. Passed 231-192: R 45-127; D 186-65 (ND 159-13, SD 27-52), Oct. 3, 1990. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    11. Fiscal 1991 Budget Resolution/Conference Report

    H Con Res 310 Adoption of the conference report to set binding budget levels for fiscal 1991: budget authority, $1.49 trillion; outlays, $1.24 trillion; revenues, $1.173 trillion; deficit, $64 billion, by incorporating the spending and revenue targets announced Sept. 30 at the budget summit. The agreement contains reconciliation instructions providing cost-saving changes in entitlement programs, increases in various user fees and taxes, and caps on annual appropriations for defense, international affairs and domestic programs to reduce the deficit by $40.1 billion in fiscal 1991 and $500 billion in fiscal 1991 through 1995. Rejected 179-254: R 71-105; D 108-149 (ND 63-111, SD 45-38), in the session that began, and the Congressional Record dated, Oct. 4, 1990. A “yea” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    12. Textile Trade Act/Veto Override

    HR 4328 Passage, over President Bush's Oct. 5 veto, of the bill to limit the growth of imports of textiles and apparel to 1 percent annually, establish permanent quotas for most non-rubber footwear imports at 1989 levels, authorize the special allocation of textile quotas for countries increasing their purchases of U.S. agricultural goods, and for other purposes. Rejected 275-152: R 70-103; D 205-49 (ND 131-41, SD 74-8), Oct. 10, 1990. A two-thirds majority of those present and voting (285 in this case) of both chambers is required to override a veto. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    13. Fiscal 1991–95 NEA Authorization/NEA Funding Standards

    HR 4825 Williams, D-Mont., substitute amendment to require the chairman of the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) in funding projects to take into account not only artistic excellence and merit but general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of Americans. The amendment also gives states a larger share of NEA funds and leaves the courts to decide what constitutes obscenity; requires artists convicted of obscenity to repay their grants; and makes changes in the grant application process. Adopted 382-42: R 142-31; D 240-11 (ND 160-11, SD 80-0), Oct. 11, 1990.

    14. Fiscal 1991 Omnibus Reconciliation Act/Democratic Alternative

    HR 5835 Rostenkowski, D-Ill., en bloc amendment to provide smaller increases in the Medicare premium and deductible; delete revenue provisions, including the gas tax, the petroleum fuels tax, the extension of the Medicare tax to additional state and local employees, and the limit on itemized deductions; eliminate the “bubble” and lift the top marginal tax rate to 33 percent; create a 10 percent surtax on income above $1 million; increase the minimum tax rate; delay indexing for one year; provide a limited tax break for capital gains; and for other purposes. Adopted 238-192: R 10-164; D 228-28 (ND 157-16, SD 71-12), Oct. 16, 1990. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    15. Civil Rights Act of 1990/Conference Report

    S 2104 Adoption of the conference report on the bill to reverse or modify six recent Supreme Court decisions that narrowed the reach and remedies of job-discrimination laws and to authorize monetary damages under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Adopted 273-154: R 34-139; D 239-15 (ND 169-3, SD 70-12), Oct. 17, 1990. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    16. Fiscal 1991 Intelligence Appropriations/Aid to UNITA

    HR 5422 Separate vote at the request of Hyde, R-Ill., on the Solarz, D-N.Y., amendment to suspend military aid to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) — a rebel group fighting the Angolan government — if the government of Angola agrees to accept a cease-fire and a political settlement for the conflict in Angola; receives no military aid from the Soviet Union; and offers free and fair multi-party elections in which UNITA is free to participate. Adopted 207-206: R 12-156; D 195-50 (ND 158-10, SD 37-40), Oct. 17, 1990. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    Appendix

    1991 Key Votes

    Senate
    1. Persian Gulf War

    It was one of the rare instances when the mood of the Senate was as grave as the momentous matter being considered.

    One by one, senators rose from their chairs to vote on S J Res 2, authorizing the president to use “all necessary means” to reverse Iraq's occupation of Kuwait. When the “yeas” and “nays” were called on Saturday afternoon Jan. 12, the resolution was approved 52-47: R 42-2; D 10-45 (ND 3-35, SD 7-10).

    President Bush, after refusing for months to acknowledge that Congress had a formal role in the ultimate decision of whether to go to war, on Jan. 8 finally requested a congressional resolution authorizing force.

    It marked the first such request by a president since the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin resolution, which had authorized U.S. military action during the Vietnam War.

    But the administration was forced to scramble for votes even after the president made his request. An early projection by Minority Leader Bob Dole, R-Kan., that the resolution would receive 60 votes proved optimistic. By Jan. 10, Sen. Charles S. Robb, Va., a Democratic supporter of the measure, said the resolution stood only a “50-50 chance” of passing the Senate.

    The issue was so much in doubt that the administration's allies delayed the introduction of the war resolution until Jan. 11 — the second day of the Senate debate on the issue.

    The opposition was led by Senate Majority Leader George J. Mitchell, D-Maine. In opening the debate on the measure, Mitchell had pleaded with his colleagues to allow economic sanctions — imposed on Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait — more time to work.

    Mitchell noted that hundreds of thousands of Americans were then preparing for battle in the gulf. “And the truly haunting question,” he said, “which no one will ever be able to answer, will be: Did they die unnecessarily? For if we go to war now, no one will ever know if sanctions would have worked if given a full and fair chance.”

    Proponents of continued reliance on sanctions received important backing from Sam Nunn, D-Ga., the conservative chairman of the Armed Services Committee. Nunn's panel had held a series of hearings on the gulf that had featured the testimony of former generals and admirals, most of whom cautioned against a precipitous rush to war.

    But in the end, a slim majority of senators agreed that the authorization of war represented, in the words of the president, “the last best chance for peace.” Joseph I. Lieberman of Connecticut, who emerged as the leading Senate Democrat in support of the president's position, quoted the Greek historian Herodotus: “To have peace, you must prepare for war.”

    After the vote and the war's successful conclusion, Mitchell and other Democratic opponents of the resolution tried to minimize their differences with the administration. They emphasized that they would have been willing to ultimately support the use of force, provided that economic sanctions had been given more of a chance first.

    But Sen. Phil Gramm, Texas, the combative chairman of the National Republican Senatorial Committee, predicted that voters would recall Democratic opposition to the war in 1992. “They are going to pay for that vote,” Gramm said. (House key vote 1)

    2. Highway Funding

    To Trent Lott, R-Miss., the amendment was simple: Keep the federal government's share for Interstate maintenance and bridge projects at 90 percent and 80 percent, respectively. That way, states would continue to have funds and incentives to repair those roads.

    But to New York Democrat Daniel Patrick Moynihan, principal author of the then-$124 billion surface transportation authorization (S 1204), the Lott amendment meant a relapse of a “public sector disease” — an ailment that caused public funds to be wasted when awarded with too few strings attached.

    Despite intense lobbying pressure from state highway officials, the Senate on June 19 narrowly agreed, 53-44, to a Moynihan motion to table the Lott amendment: R 20-23; D 33-21 (ND 30-9, SD 3-12).

    The vote on the amendment marked the end of the Interstate highway era, which was launched in 1956 based on a federal promise to pay 90 percent of all road-building costs. By rejecting it, senators showed they were prepared to abandon a 35-year-old policy of channeling highway funds to states at little or no cost. It also set the stage for Congress to clear for the president the sweeping final highway and transit bill on Nov. 26.

    Along with lower federal shares, the legislation would force states and urban areas to compete for funds by tying the money to metropolitan planning requirements, giving urban areas more power and giving states flexibility to spend money on roads or transit.

    Competition and productivity were central tenets of Moynihan's bill. He viewed his measure as his only chance to make good on a 31-year mission to stop states from blindly pouring concrete and ruining urban neighborhoods.

    “The demand for 90-10 highway funds is so great that there is almost nothing, however sensible, that local governments would not do to get their share,” Moynihan wrote in a 1960 essay.

    Under the new bill, the federal government was to pay 80 percent for most road and mass transit projects. The government would shoulder 75 percent of the cost of building roads and bridges that added lanes for single-occupancy vehicles. The Bush administration wanted a 60-percent federal share for most road programs, but Moynihan refused to go that far because of the fiscal constraints facing states.

    Lott had argued that current federal shares should be continued because states could not afford to pay more for road and bridge projects. “It is very important that we not shift more of the burden for these Interstate highways back to the states,” Lott said.

    After the vote, Moynihan said at least 15 senators told him that state transportation officials had urged them to vote for the crippling amendment. “Of course they did…. How can you say no to free money?” Moynihan asked. “Has no one heard anything we've said?”

    3. Gun Control

    After weeks of negotiations among Senate leaders, a compromise on the Brady bill was offered late June 28 and won a decisive 67-32 vote. It was the first time the Senate had approved a provision for a waiting period for handgun purchases, and adoption of it into an omnibus crime bill (S 1241) came amid constituent fears of escalating street violence.

    Phil Gramm, R-Texas, one of the strongest opponents of the provision, said at the time, “Our bleeding nation cries out for us to do something about crime.” The provision required a five-business-day waiting period for handgun purchases and a plan for an immediate national background check of buyers that would take effect in two-and-a-half years. It superseded a House-passed measure (HR 7) for a seven-day wait with no timetable for an instantaneous check.

    The proposal was named for former presidential press secretary James S. Brady, who was wounded in a 1981 assassination attempt on Ronald Reagan. Like many other elements of the Senate crime bill, it was folded into a conference committee crime bill (HR 3371) in November. That legislation stalled at the end of the first session of the 102nd Congress because of partisan differences largely unrelated to gun control.

    Senate adoption of the gun control measure came after opponents of the waiting period backed away from filibuster threats. Recognition that they could not gather the votes to defeat the bill came early June 28, when senators defeated, 44-54, an attempt to strip the Brady provision from the crime bill.

    In addition to local crime concerns, the insertion of a timetable for an instantaneous check appeared to be a key factor in winning strong support for the compromise measure. Although the 67-32 vote was bipartisan, it was mostly Republicans who were fighting the Brady bill: R 19-24; D 48-8 (ND 37-3, SD 11-5).

    Existing law made it illegal for felons and people who have been adjudged mentally ill to buy guns. But there was no nationwide system in place to ensure that people who completed firearm purchase forms were not lying. For four years, a handful of lawmakers had been pushing for a waiting period.

    They gained momentum in May when the House approved a related bill (HR 7) by a resounding 53 votes. (House key vote 3)

    That put the spotlight on the Senate, and Majority Leader George J. Mitchell, D-Maine, played a major role in the drive for a Senate version that shortened the waiting period from seven days to five business days and required a police background check.

    Having the credibility that comes from representing a big sporting state, Mitchell worked on fellow Democrats to support the Brady bill. At the same time, Brady and his wife, Sarah, kept up their emotional pressure on wavering members.

    Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole, R-Kan., helped craft the final compromise to help speed action on the crime bill, as did Howard M. Metzenbaum, D-Ohio, who had proposed the original seven-day waiting period in the Senate.

    4. Superconducting Supercollider

    For the first time, the Senate went on record in support of the superconducting supercollider — the giant atom smasher under construction in Waxahachie, Texas, and a symbol of government investment in “big science” projects.

    Senate supporters July 10 handily rallied to back the project, which could take until the end of the 20th century and cost at least $8 billion to complete. But it was clear that the 1991 battle, sparked by an effort to kill the smasher, would be the first of many such attempts to derail it.

    The Senate vote came during debate on the fiscal 1992 energy and water development appropriations bill (PL 102-104). J. Bennett Johnston, D-La., a strong collider supporter, moved to kill on a tabling motion an amendment offered by Dale Bumpers, D-Ark., that would have eliminated $509 million in funding for the atom smasher. Bumpers' attempt failed July 10 when the motion carried, 62-37: R 33-10; D 29-27 (ND 19-21, SD 10-6).

    The vote was critical not only because it put the Senate on record for the first time in support of the project but also because it set the stage for what was likely to become an annual debate about the project's cost and scope. The vote also cleared the way to begin construction on the project.

    The supercollider was to use powerful magnets to hurl protons — particles of matter smaller than atoms — through a 54-mile underground tunnel. Scientists planned to use powerful computers to analyze the debris in an effort to unlock the secrets of the building blocks of matter.

    Bumpers argued that the scientific knowledge likely to be yielded by the project was too uncertain given the nation's tight economic times. In addition, he said, supporters had overstated the potential commercial spinoffs to flow from research on the atom smasher. “It would be nice to know the origin of matter,” said Bumpers. “It would also be nice to have a balanced budget.”

    Johnston, who wielded considerable political clout because of his chairmanship of the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Subcommittee, jumped to the project's defense along with both Texas senators. They argued that the project would provide a crucial step in the nation's search for knowledge and would augment U.S. competitiveness.

    Perhaps as important to the success of those who quashed the Bumpers amendment was the promise of lucrative research projects linked to the atom smasher and expected to be spread over 43 states. Supporters asserted that a total of 60,000 jobs nationwide were on the line. The White House also lobbied hard for the project.

    Though unsuccessful, the attack on the project's funding signaled an end to an era of uncritical support for big science projects. Opponents several weeks later launched a similar attack on funding for the space station Freedom. In the end, the Senate backed the space station by a two-thirds margin, but the vote was the first time the Senate had questioned space station funding.

    Although just 37 senators voted against Johnston's motion regarding the supercollider, the group included some prominent Republicans, suggesting that the procollider lobbying effort launched by the White House lacked full Republican support. Among Republicans voting against Johnston's motion were Republican Whip Alan K. Simpson of Wyoming and Richard G. Lugar of Indiana. Among Democrats, support for Bumpers' effort to eliminate funding came largely from states in the northern Midwest, Great Plains and East, where the project was not expected to generate contract dollars. (House key vote 6)

    5. Honoraria Ban

    Historians will mark July 17, 1991, as the day the Senate finally outlawed what critics called a legally sanctioned form of bribery: the acceptance by lawmakers of whopping fees for throw-away speeches from favor-seeking interest groups. “There is nothing honorable about honoraria,” said Robert c. Byrd, D-W.Va., the Senate patriarch and a converted one-time defender of the system.

    Senators had twice previously approved the outright ban on all honoraria, but only on purely symbolic votes void of effect. To make it stick required an incentive, a quid pro quo, in fact — a $23,200 pay raise to compensate members for the forgone honoraria income.

    The Senate was the last institution in the federal government that continued to allow officials to accept the speaking fees. For years, ethics purists had been complaining about the practice, which defenders argued had ancient traditions. The critics made some headway in the 1970s, persuading Congress to limit the size of the fees and the total amount that could be pocketed each year. But tales of $2,000 breakfast appearances kept the issue alive for years.

    After vacillating on the matter for more than a decade, Congress in 1989 barred every employee but those in the Senate from accepting the fees as of Jan. 1, 1991. The Senate balked because leaders could not persuade a majority to accept a House-passed, 40 percent pay raise. Instead, senators took a much smaller pay raise and voted to phase out honoraria slowly as their government salaries grew with future automatic annual increases.

    That decision created the pressure that eventually killed the practice. Senators resented being paid less than House members; as of Jan. 1, their annual salary was $101,900, compared with $125,100 for House members. The vagaries of the rules under which congressional aides were paid provided an additional slap: Some top House staffers were being paid more than senators.

    As the annual legislative branch spending bill (HR 2506) began making its way toward the floor, Sen. Christopher J. Dodd, D-Conn., and Patrick J. Leahy, D-Vt., publicly mulled offering the honoraria ban amendment to that must-pass measure. That prompted Byrd to act.

    Byrd had laid the groundwork earlier — though he denied a connection — by inserting a provision in the bill to bar Senate staff from accepting honoraria and to allow top aides to earn more than their bosses. The effect was more than symbolic: Senators would be almost totally isolated as virtually the only 100 employees among millions in the federal government still allowed to accept speaking fees.

    The former majority leader methodically gathered votes in favor of an honoraria ban/pay raise amendment. He gave members up for re-election in 1992 a pass, and in the end, only seven of those 33 voted for the amendment. To compensate, Byrd pressed the chamber's richest members the hardest, persuading a few to reverse their long-standing opposition to pay raises.

    Floor consideration of the spending bill was delayed until Byrd had a majority of both parties ready to vote yea. As dusk approached July 17, he confirmed he had the votes by double-checking each at an invitation-only kaffee-klatsch in his office.

    A pending bill was abruptly pulled from the floor at 7 p.m., and the legislative branch spending bill was brought up without notice to the press or the public. Debate was perfunctory on Byrd's amendment.

    The amendment passed, 53-45: R 25-18; D 28-27 (ND 22-18, SD 6-9). The House later accepted the provision but not before insisting that the Senate tighten its definition on what constituted honoraria and agreed to loosen congressional gift-acceptance rules.

    6. China MFN

    Majority Leader George J. Mitchell, D-Maine, won Senate approval for a bill requiring China's communist regime to make deep reforms in order to qualify for a renewal of its low-tariff, most-favored-nation (MFN) trade status in 1992.

    But while a majority of senators favored the bill, the July 23 vote fell short of the two-thirds necessary to overcome a promised veto, signaling the failure of Mitchell's effort to retaliate for the Chinese government's brutal attack on pro-democracy protesters in Tiananmen Square two years before.

    President Bush had made it clear that he would reject any interference from Congress in his handling of Beijing and its octogenarian communist leaders.

    Two weeks earlier, the House had voted by a wide margin to set stiff conditions on an MFN renewal. But there was never any question about the bill's fate in the House, which had shown strong support for conditions in 1990. As a result, the White House largely ignored the House and concentrated its efforts on the Senate. Since there was no chance of the bill being defeated in that chamber, the administration opted from the beginning for a veto strategy — getting enough votes to prevent the president from being overridden and holding on to them at all costs.

    Mitchell's bill would have required China to account for and release demonstrators arrested during the Tiananmen Square protests as well as to make progress toward lowering its trade deficit with the United States, improving the treatment of dissidents and religious groups and ending exports of missiles and other weapons. The bill contained a variety of other conditions as well.

    Before and during floor consideration, Mitchell accepted numerous modifications in an effort to get enough votes to override a veto. By the end, the bill had become a lengthy laundry list, tying MFN renewal to, among other things, China ending assistance for the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, providing better protection for U.S. patents, reducing assistance to Cuba and ending forced abortions.

    Despite the amendment fest, Mitchell could not overcome two factors: First, Bush, a former U.S. envoy to Beijing, enjoyed a deep well of loyalty among Republicans, who were inclined to give his China policy the benefit of the doubt. Second, farm-state Democrats feared that withdrawing China's MFN status would mean the loss of the lucrative Chinese market, which accounted for more than $500 million in U.S. wheat sales in 1990.

    Imitating a strategy that had been successful during the fight over U.S.-Mexico free trade negotiations, the White House pledged to take a series of steps to bring pressure on China — and thus lessen the pressure on Congress to act.

    It worked better than the White House might have expected.

    After the Senate acted in July, the bill languished until November, when a House-Senate conference was convened to negotiate a final version of the bill.

    Only the House voted on the conference report. With no hope of overriding a veto, the Senate did not act on the bill.

    In the July vote, a bloc of six conservative Republicans joined 49 Democrats in voting for Mitchell's bill. The vote was 55-44: R 6-37; D 49-7 (ND 36-4, SD 13-3).

    7. Women in Combat

    Inspired by the prominent role women played in the armed services during the Persian Gulf War, critics of the law that barred assignment of women to certain combat roles began to chip away at that barrier. The law prohibited the assignment of women to Navy warships or to combat aircraft in the Navy, Marine Corps or Air Force. No law prohibited the assignment of Army women to combat jobs, but such assignments were ruled out as a matter of policy.

    Female officers long had argued that their career prospects were limited by their inability to serve in combat units that were at the core of their services' missions. Their cause gained clout from the generally glowing reviews of the job performance of women deployed to the gulf region — including women who flew airplanes and helicopters behind enemy lines on ostensibly non-combat missions.

    By highlighting the threat posed by ballistic missiles and chemical weapons to warriors far behind the traditional “front lines,” the gulf war also called into question the assumption that women assigned to traditionally non-combatant military jobs would be safe.

    When the House Armed Services Committee marked up the fiscal 1992 defense authorization bill in May, critics of the combat exclusion law proposed a repeal of the ban on assigning women to combat aircraft. Since all military aviators were volunteers, proposing the change for that group finessed the argument that dropping the law might have forced women into combat against their will.

    The committee accepted the provision, and no effort was made on the House floor to delete it before the authorization bill was passed.

    But a majority of the Senate Armed Services Committee, led by John Glenn, D-Ohio, and John McCain, R-Ariz., opposed immediate repeal of the combat exclusion law for pilots. As an alternative, the panel included in its version of the authorization bill a provision establishing a blue-ribbon presidential commission to study issues that would be raised by assigning women to combat roles.

    When the Senate took up the bill, Glenn and McCain sweetened their alternative by offering an amendment allowing the Pentagon to waive the combat exclusion laws on a trial basis so women would be assigned to any kind of combat unit to provide data for the commission's study. But after accepting that amendment 96-3, the Senate on July 31 also adopted an amendment by Edward M. Kennedy, D-Mass., and William V. Roth Jr., R-Del., waiving the combat exclusion law for women on aircrews in the Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force. A motion to table (kill) the Kennedy-Roth amendment was rejected 30-69: R 14-29; D 16-40 (ND 6-34, SD 10-6).

    Although President Bush signed into law the defense authorization measure (HR 2100 — PL 102-190), a Pentagon spokesman said the Defense Department was not likely to make any move to revise its policies banning women from combat until the commission created by the bill completed its work late in 1992.

    8. Strategic Defense Initiative

    Even before President Reagan launched the strategic defense initiative (SDI) in 1983, Sen. Malcolm Wallop, R-Wyo., and other proponents contended that missile defense would be a winning political issue if it ever got onto the national agenda.

    The congressional debate on SDI did not get under way in earnest until 1986. Despite critics who ridiculed the idea as a costly and dangerous “Star Wars” fantasy, Wallop's judgment appeared vindicated by Congress' repeated votes to fund the program. Although Congress annually sliced by one-third or more the amounts requested by Reagan and Bush for anti-missile research, lawmakers repeatedly rejected proposals to make more far-reaching cuts that would have restricted SDI to laboratory-based research.

    Reagan presented SDI as a revolutionary improvement in national security that would supplant the balance of nuclear terror as the central influence in the U.S.-Soviet military rivalry. SDI officials and conservative missile defense advocates such as Wallop envisioned a network of space-based weapons intended to intercept Soviet missiles in the first few minutes of flight, before they dispensed multiple warheads and swarms of decoys.

    But that approach alienated a cadre of key Democrats, including Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn, Ga., and his House counterpart, Les Aspin, Wis. These centrist critics deemed Reagan's vision of SDI technically infeasible. Moreover, they warned that a U.S. effort to defend against all-out Soviet attack would foster a more vigorous Soviet effort to develop new strategic weapons intended to circumvent SDI.

    As an alternative, Nunn and Aspin promoted a more modest anti-missile program: Designed to avoid the appearance of threatening Moscow's retaliatory capacity, this defense would be intended to protect U.S. territory, overseas forces and allies against “limited” attacks, which might be launched by a Third World country or by a renegade military unit. In 1991, the war with Iraq underscored the potential threat of radical Third World regimes armed with ballistic missiles and nuclear or chemical warheads. And the political disintegration of the Soviet Union highlighted the possibility that Moscow's tight rein on its nuclear weapons might slacken.

    President Bush's fiscal 1992 budget request recast SDI toward that kind of mission. But he retained the controversial space-based weapons as a key part of the program.

    In shaping the annual defense authorization bill (HR 2100 — PL 102-190), Senate Armed Services Republicans led by John W. Warner, Va., hammered out a compromise SDI package with conservative and centrist Democrats: The new approach put aside plans to deploy space-based weapons while providing funds to continue research on them. It directed the president to deploy by 1996 a ground-based anti-missile system at a single site that would comply with the 1972 treaty limiting anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs). And it called on the president to negotiate with the Soviet Union changes in the ABM Treaty that would allow more extensive ABM testing and deployment.

    The compromise provision contained a strong implication that the United States should abrogate the ABM Treaty if the Soviet Union did not agree to amend the pact. On the Senate floor, Jeff Bingaman, D-N.M., offered an amendment intended to dilute that threat by declaring that the maintenance of strategic stability between the U.S. and Soviet arsenals was the overriding goal and by deleting references to the deployment of ground-based weapons at a single site as an “initial” deployment. But Bingaman's amendment was rejected July 31 by a vote of 43-56: R 2-41; D 41-15 (ND 33-7, SD 8-8). (House key vote 4)

    9. Domestic Spending

    When Congress returned from its August recess, the world had been transformed. Plotters in the Soviet Union had tried to mount a coup and failed; the collapse of the Soviet empire appeared assured. The Soviet military threat that the United States had been girding to fight for 50 years had evaporated, and if ever there were a time to cut back on defense spending, this seemed to be it.

    It certainly looked that way to Sen. Tom Harkin, D-Iowa, who had started before the recess to push an amendment to the fiscal 1992 Labor-HHS appropriations bill taking $3.15 billion out of defense to beef up spending for 10 domestic programs that he insisted had been underfunded.

    As chairman of the Senate Labor-HHS Appropriations Subcommittee, Harkin said an inadequate allocation at the beginning of the year had forced him to give short shrift to such line items as the National Cancer Institute, child immunization programs, Pell student aid grants and Head Start, the widely acclaimed program for low-income preschool children.

    Now was the time to right that wrong, Harkin argued. He proposed to rescind sufficient 1992 defense outlays and prior-year unobligated defense balances to pay for the domestic spending increases. “Do we start investing in solutions to our nation's critical problems?” Harkin asked. “Or, in the aftermath of the events of the past month, do we continue to pour billions of dollars into the subsidy of Europe's defense against a now-nonexistent Soviet Union?”

    Harkin had a problem, however. Under the terms of the 1990 budget summit agreement, any reduction in defense spending could be used only for deficit reduction — it could not be used to increase spending for domestic programs, as he was proposing. So, before he could get a straight, up-or-down vote on his amendment, he first had to convince three-fifths of the Senate — 60 senators — to agree to waive the Budget Act.

    That brought defenders of the budget agreement to the floor, warning that while they might agree with Harkin's desire to increase spending for important programs, it would be far too dangerous to break the budget deal.

    “I have a great deal of sympathy” for the amendment, said Budget Committee Chairman Jim Sasser, D-Tenn. But

    if we can breach the budget summit agreement for this particular appropriations bill, then clearly we can breach it for a whole host of appropriations bills to follow. [That] is a short-term ticket for fiscal chaos in this body.

    Harkin received an even more direct rebuke from Appropriations Committee Chairman Robert c. Byrd, D-W.Va., who spent the better part of an hour warning that the amendment could put all domestic appropriations spending at risk of an across-the-board spending cut. “The amendment would destroy the budget agreement,” Byrd said. “I ask all senators not to go down this road of chaos.”

    In the end, the politically attractive trade-off in Harkin's package could not overcome the Senate's reluctance to break the budget deal they had agreed to less than two years before. The motion was rejected, 28-69: R 3-39; D 25-30 (ND 24-14, SD 1-16), Sept. 10.

    The budget agreement's defenders had mounted a major effort to convincingly defeat Harkin so that others with similar ideas would think twice. This turned out to be the clearest test of the strength of the budget deal, which remained intact through the end of 1991.

    10. Unemployment Benefits

    Throughout the long debate over providing extra weeks of unemployment benefits to the long-term jobless, the Senate took a more conservative approach than the House. Congress first passed an unemployment bill in August but was blocked by President Bush. During Congress' second attempt to enact a bill, the House wanted to require Bush to pay for the measure through deficit spending. Simply signing the bill would have been the equivalent of declaring a budget emergency, and the money would have flowed to the long-term unemployed.

    The Senate, on the other hand, said Bush should decide whether there was an emergency and whether the money should be spent. Senators voted 69-30 on Sept. 24 in favor of that approach.

    But Congress had already tried that in August. Bush had refused to declare an emergency, and most unemployed workers were receiving no more than 26 weeks of state benefits. Few federal benefits were finding their way into the hands of the unemployed through the standard extended benefits program.

    In a House-Senate conference, House Democrats insisted on forcing Bush to sign or veto the measure without any wiggle room. That way, at least, Congress would have a chance to override a veto. The conference report was sent back to the Senate, where many Republicans were angry with the change from the bill they had just passed. Congress' ability to override an expected veto rested with 13 Republican senators who had initially supported the measure. If just four Republicans changed their votes, the Senate would not have the 67 votes needed to override, and Bush's veto would prevail.

    The $6.4 billion bill that came back from conference would have given an additional seven weeks of unemployment benefits to workers in 30 states and the District of Columbia, an additional 13 weeks to workers in 14 states and an additional 20 weeks to workers in six states where unemployment exceeded 8 percent.

    The vote was a test of loyalty to the president, but the White House was confident of GOP senators' support and barely lifted a finger to lobby them. Rather, the Senate minority leader, Bob Dole of Kansas, worked the issue extensively. Ultimately, the House language on emergency spending was the reason that five Republicans who had voted for the earlier Democratic bill changed their votes on the conference report. They were: John C. Danforth and Christopher S. Bond of Missouri; John Seymour of California; Conrad Burns of Montana; and David Durenberger of Minnesota. The conference report was adopted 65-35 on Oct. 1, two votes short of the number needed to override a veto: R 8-35; D 57-0 (ND 40-0, SD 17-0).

    It was a key vote because it finally convinced Senate Democrats that it was time to negotiate with the administration — particularly over finding a way to pay for the measure.

    By Nov. 15, Congress sent Bush a $5.4 billion bill to extend unemployment benefits for nearly 3 million people. Bush signed the bill the same day he received it. (House key vote 11)

    11. Family and Medical Leave

    It was the second go-round for legislation to require businesses to allow their workers to take unpaid leave for the birth or adoption of a child or for their own serious illness or that of an immediate family member. Democrats had promoted the issue as their own kinder, gentler vision for the country's middle class. But businesses had responded with stiff opposition to being told what to do.

    The legislation had already failed to be enacted in 1990; senators had never gone on record voting for or against the measure; and House and Senate leaders knew they did not have the votes in 1991 to override a promised veto. Enter Christopher S. Bond, R-Mo., and bill sponsor Christopher J. Dodd, D-Conn. The pair forged a slightly modified compromise to attract the votes needed for a two-thirds majority — 67 votes.

    The Bond-Dodd compromise raised the number of hours an employee had to work from 1,000 hours to 1,250 hours per year in order to qualify for the unpaid leave. It also allowed employers to deny leave to “key employees,” defined as those who were the highest paid 10 percent of the company's work force. That provision was included in the House bill (HR 2) but not in the Senate version.

    The bill itself would mandate that businesses with more than 50 workers give workers up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave for the birth or adoption of a child or for the serious illness of the worker or an immediate family member.

    The compromise came before the Senate Oct. 2 amid intensive lobbying — by women's groups and unions for the measure and by business organizations against it. In 1990, the Senate approved a family and medical leave bill by voice vote. When Bush vetoed the bill, the House sustained him, and senators were never subject to a recorded vote. In 1991, members voted 65-32 for the compromise language: R 15-28; D 50-4 (ND 38-0, SD 12-4). It was two short of the 67 needed for the two-thirds majority that could override a veto. But both supporters and opponents assumed that all three absent Democrats — David Pryor, Ark., and presidential candidates Tom Harkin, Iowa, and Bob Kerrey, Neb. — would have voted for the substitute.

    Despite the big vote, senators were not sanguine that they could force the bill into law over Bush's objections. The House had not been able to attract as much support for the compromise language, and many Republicans who had voted for the measure might have buckled on an override vote. “People understand the loyalty factor” and do not punish those who switch votes to support their party's president, said Orrin G. Hatch, R-Utah. In 1992, the House and Senate were to reconcile their two bills and send them back to their chambers for approval before shipping the final version to the president.

    12. Thomas Confirmation

    Politics and increasing conflicts between the Court and Congress converged to give Clarence Thomas, President Bush's second high court nominee, the closest Supreme Court confirmation vote in more than a century.

    After two sets of divisive hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee, the full Senate voted on Oct. 15 to confirm Thomas, 52-48: R 41-2; D 11-46 (ND 3-37, SD 8-9).

    While Thomas, 43, became only the second black justice on the Court, his confirmation was likely to be remembered more for the upheaval over sexual harassment allegations. Senators were to vote on Thomas' nomination Oct. 8. But two days before that scheduled vote, University of Oklahoma law professor Anita F. Hill went public with allegations that Thomas had sexually harassed her when she worked for him at the Department of Education and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).

    The Senate Judiciary Committee reconvened to produce three days of nationally televised hearings that, because of their explicit subject matter and window into Senate discord, became the talk of the country.

    Both sides estimated that Thomas lost about 10 votes that he might have had before the Hill allegations emerged — narrowing an outcome that still would have been one of the closest in history. But only three senators publicly shifted positions. Democrats Richard H. Bryan, Nev., Joseph I. Lieberman, Conn., and Harry Reid, Nev., withdrew their support. They said they were influenced by Hill's testimony.

    The vote ended up being largely partisan, although 11 Democrats, mostly Southerners, made up the margin of difference needed to seat Thomas, a federal appeals court judge who had worked in the Bush and Ronald Reagan administrations for eight years.

    Most opponents said Thomas was too conservative and lacked the qualifications for the high court. They also accused Bush of nominating Thomas more for his color than for his credentials. As a black conservative, Thomas' nomination effectively split the minority community and made it difficult for the liberal groups that traditionally opposed conservative nominees to drum up support.

    Sen. John C. Danforth, R-Mo., for whom Thomas had twice worked, was credited with keeping the nomination on track.

    In many ways, the Court's conservative tilt raised the stakes on the nomination and led to the storm over Thomas. Before Thomas was nominated to fill the seat of retiring Justice Thurgood Marshall, Bush and Reagan had named a total of six conservative jurists, including the 1986 elevation of William H. Rehnquist to chief justice. A majority on the high court was lining up with the administration in favor of law enforcement over defendants' rights and on many questions involving whether state authority should supersede individual protections, such as on free speech and abortion.

    The Democratic majority in Congress was increasingly finding itself on the other side of battles against the administration and the Court, and Senate Democrats said they were not inclined to give another conservative nominee the benefit of the doubt.

    13. Civil Rights

    The Senate's overwhelming vote on a compromise job-rights bill was not as dramatic as what had come before: a week of sudden and intense negotiations between the White House and senators to produce a compromise on the hard-fought legislation. The bill was approved by the Senate Oct. 30 by a vote of 93-5: R 38-5; D 55-0 (ND 38-0, SD 17-0).

    The deal ended a two-year struggle to reinstate protections for victims of job bias that had been narrowed by the Supreme Court. It also closed a chapter of racial politicking in Congress and the White House that earlier in the year had seemed so divisive as to preclude agreement on a bill. President Bush had vetoed a related bill in 1990.

    What changed was the political dynamic. The issue of sexual harassment had been elevated on the national agenda by the Clarence Thomas-Anita F. Hill hearings. The Republican White House also was concerned about fallout from the primary success of Louisiana gubernatorial candidate David Duke, a Republican and former Ku Klux Klansman. (Duke eventually lost but declared his candidacy for president.)

    The confluence of those October events intensified gender and racial politics and shifted the atmosphere. Sensing that Bush could no longer count enough GOP senators to sustain another veto, the White House cut a deal with Senate proponents the week of Oct. 21.

    The final pact involved the liberal Democrats who began the push for the legislation in 1989 (led by Edward M. Kennedy, D-Mass.) and key moderate Republicans who kept negotiations going with the White House while warnings of quota hiring swirled (led by John C. Danforth, R-Mo.). Bush had charged that earlier versions of the bill would have forced businesses to hire set numbers of minorities and women to avoid lawsuits.

    Both Democrats and Republicans tried to claim that they had won the better deal. Indeed, each side made concessions. But the bottom line was that overall, most of the original plan to reverse the Court and to give victims of harassment and other intentional discrimination money damages prevailed.

    Although workers were likely to be better off under the bill, to what degree was still uncertain because the final agreement left some of the toughest issues to be resolved in the federal courts. The new law, signed by Bush on Nov. 21, countered the effects of nine Supreme Court decisions and made it easier for victims of bias to bring lawsuits to enforce protections already on the books. A key to the compromise was an open-ended provision on how businesses might justify the discriminatory effects of seemingly fair hiring practices, such as tests and academic requirements. Those practices would have to be job-related and necessary to a business' operation. It would be up to the courts to interpret the new standard.

    The law also allowed, for the first time, limited money damages for victims of harassment and other intentional discrimination based on sex, religion or disability. Racial minorities already could win money damages under a Reconstruction-era law.

    The compromise set caps on damages for intentional bias, ranging from $50,000 for companies with 100 or fewer workers to $300,000 for employers with more than 500 workers.

    Democrats in both chambers said that in 1992 they would push legislation to lift such limits. (House key vote 7)

    14. Energy Policy

    The oil concerns of the Persian Gulf War created a legislative push for new energy policy early in 1991. But a massive Senate energy bill was eventually slowed by controversy and, when it finally went to the floor late in the year, lawmakers voted to kill the measure — at least temporarily.

    The energy bill (S 1220) was crafted by Louisiana Democrat J. Bennett Johnston, and it sped through the Energy and Natural Resources Committee he chaired. The bill would have touched almost every sector of energy policy. But it became best known for proposing to open Alaska's Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to drilling and for failing to mandate specific increases in federal gas mileage standards. Other provisions would have streamlined the licensing of nuclear power plants, eased federal regulation of the electric industry and mandated certain conservation measures and the use of non-gasoline transportation fuels.

    Johnston and other advocates said the bill was politically balanced and would have made a critical move toward reducing U.S. dependence on oil imports. But environmental groups and their congressional allies put the bill at the top of their hit list, saying it would have encouraged environmentally damaging production measures and done little to promote energy efficiency and conservation. Many Democrats in particular were cool to the bill, which they saw as kin to a controversial Bush administration policy unveiled early in 1991.

    Johnston fought hard to get the bill to the floor, despite a filibuster led by a group of junior Democrats opposed to the Alaska drilling provision. On Nov. 1, the Senate voted 50-44 to shut off debate, 10 votes short of the 60 needed to invoke cloture: R 32-9; D 18-35 (ND 9-28, SD 9-7).

    The vote was a powerful setback in the push to enact new energy legislation. It also represented a stunning defeat for Johnston and the administration, which had endorsed the measure. While acknowledging that the bill included many controversial provisions, Johnston had repeatedly insisted he had enough votes to bring it up for debate. Even opponents had not expected to win by such a large margin.

    Environmental groups seized upon the outcome as a mandate for a new approach to energy legislation that would stress efficiency, conservation and environmental protection. Opposition to Alaska drilling did provide the fervor behind the filibuster effort and many of the votes against cloture. Opponents promised to return with a new, more progressive energy bill.

    However, the message behind the final tally was considerably more muddled. The filibuster also won support from utilities opposed to the bill's electric industry restructuring and from some auto interests who feared it would become a vehicle for boosting federal fuel-efficiency mandates. Johnston had ignited some turf battles by refusing to refer the bill to several committees that shared jurisdiction on certain energy issues, and nine committee chairmen were among those voting against cloture.

    Some of the bill's proponents criticized the vote as proof that Congress, absent an imminent oil crisis, did not have the courage to enact energy policy. However, both Johnston and some of his critics said they would try to move some energy bill early in 1992.

    15. Gates Confirmation

    When Robert M. Gates was nominated in May to be director of central intelligence, administration officials bargained that lawmakers would be so weary of investigating the involvement of Gates and others in the Iran-contra affair that he would quickly be confirmed.

    They might have been right, had a former CIA official not pleaded guilty on July 9 to unlawfully withholding from Congress information about the agency's role in the 1986 scandal. That plea rekindled a question that had forced Gates to withdraw his name from consideration for the No. 1 job in 1987: As the No. 2 man at the CIA, just how much had he known about the illegal diversion of funds from Iranian arms sales to help the contra rebels in Nicaragua?

    The Senate Intelligence Committee delayed Gates' confirmation hearings, initially set to begin July 15, for two months to try to determine what role the CIA had played in the diversion. When the hearings opened, the panel had compiled an exhaustive record revealing numerous inconsistencies between Gates' account of events and the accounts of others.

    But it quickly became clear from Gates' testimony and that of other witnesses that it would come down to a question of his word against theirs. The same was true of allegations from former and current subordinates of Gates at the CIA that he had forced agency analysts to slant their reports to bolster administration policy objectives.

    In the end, the nominee had a lot going for him. He had solid support from Republicans who vowed to stick with the president's nominee unless convinced otherwise. He also had the strong backing of Chairman David L. Boren, D-Okla., who had worked closely with Gates and had found him extremely candid with Congress.

    Gates promised that as the nation's chief intelligence official he would work closely with Congress in its oversight role as he put in place massive changes in the way the intelligence community conducted business in the post-Cold War era. Gates' supporters argued that while he may have made some past errors in judgment, he was the best man for the job because of his intellect, lengthy government service and close ties with President Bush.

    Some Democrats, led by New Jersey's Bill Bradley, tried to attack Gates' credibility and questioned how the agency could attain an image of openness and honesty with a leader whose record was tainted. But the arguments fell on deaf ears.

    A crucial factor was the timing of the Gates vote, just three weeks after the tumultuous debate over Bush's nomination of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court. Few members had any desire to take on another key nomination so soon, especially when there was no clear-cut proof that Gates had behaved illegally or unethically. Gates was confirmed on Nov. 5 by a vote of 64-31: R 42-0; D 22-31 (ND 11-25, SD 11-6).

    16. Soviet Aid

    In a remarkable reversal, Congress agreed in the last hours of its session to give the president the authority to spend up to $500 million in defense funds to help the transformation of the former Soviet Union.

    The action was remarkable because just two weeks earlier the chairmen of the Armed Services committees — Rep. Les Aspin, D-Wis., and Sen. Sam Nunn, D-Ga. — had to withdraw a $1 billion aid proposal because of lawmakers' reluctance to spend money on a former enemy when so many domestic needs were not being met. And President Bush, under attack from Democrats for devoting too much attention to foreign policy, refused to endorse the proposal.

    But only days before adjournment, a bipartisan group of senior senators decided to give it one last try. These senators — led by Nunn and Richard G. Lugar, R-Ind. — crafted a scaled-back proposal that targeted the funds toward helping the Soviets and the republics dismantle some of the 27,000 nuclear weapons inside their territories. The group argued that the assistance was not “foreign aid” but a defensive move to reduce the nuclear threat against the United States. The senators cited a Harvard study that detailed the potential disaster that could result if the weapons fell into the wrong hands.

    Repeated attempts by the senators to elicit White House support for the plan failed, although sponsors said they had been encouraged privately by administration officials. On the Senate floor, however, the proposal received an unusually warm welcome, a tribute to the high regard in which Nunn, Lugar and other sponsors were held by their colleagues, not to mention to their success in repackaging what had been an unpopular proposal. The proposal was adopted on Nov. 25 by a vote of 86-8: R 34-8; D 52-0 (ND 36-0, SD 16-0).

    A subsequent amendment to allow another $200 million in aid to help the Soviets transport food and medical supplies to survive the winter was also approved, 87-7.

    With the overwhelming backing of the Senate, the proposal had little trouble in the House. The proposal, modified to provide a total of $500 million for both the demilitarization and humanitarian aid, was approved by voice vote in the early morning hours of Nov. 27.

    The Senate cleared the legislation later that day by voice vote.

    Eleven days later the administration endorsed it.

    House
    1. Persian Gulf War

    After one of its longest and most moving debates in recent memory, Congress on Jan. 12 approved a resolution (H J Res 77) authorizing President Bush to use military force to reverse Iraq's occupation of Kuwait. Four days later, Bush did just that, ordering the aerial bombardment of Iraq.

    On Feb. 27, following six weeks of devastating air strikes and a brief but bloody ground campaign, Bush announced: “Our military objectives are met.” Kuwait was liberated and Iraq had been defeated, Bush said.

    In the House, opponents of the war resolution, led by Speaker Thomas S. Foley, D-Wash., knew going into the debate that they were facing an uphill struggle.

    For several months, Foley and other Democratic leaders had urged the president to stay the course with economic sanctions that had been imposed on Iraq after it invaded Kuwait on Aug. 2, 1990. But in the weeks leading up to the climactic vote, some key members of the party expressed skepticism that sanctions alone would ever force Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein to withdraw his forces from the tiny, oil-rich emirate.

    Armed Services Committee Chairman Les Aspin, D-Wis., had predicted that the United States and it allies could achieve victory over Iraq without sustaining heavy casualties. Stephen J. Solarz, D-N.Y., typified a small group of Northern liberals — most of whom were strong supporters of Israel — who also supported an early resort to force against Saddam.

    But the likelihood that the resolution would be approved did little to diminish the tension and emotion that permeated the three-day debate on the issue.

    In a rare speech from the well, Foley told his colleagues, “In 26 years in the House of Representatives, I have never seen this House more serious nor determined to speak its heart and mind on a question than they are at this time on this day.”

    The Senate voted first to approve its war resolution. Minutes later, the House voted 250-183 for H J Res 77, an identical resolution that authorized the president to use military force pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 678. The U.N. resolution, approved in November 1990, had authorized member states “to use all necessary means” to force Iraq out of Kuwait by Jan. 15. (Senate key vote 1)

    While congressional leaders had urged members to vote their consciences, the vote was split largely along partisan lines: R 164-3; D 86-179 (ND 33-147, SD 53-32); I 0-1.

    Pro-defense Democrats from the South joined with Republicans and a handful of liberals to provide the margin of victory. Key committee chairmen — such as Aspin, John D. Dingell, D-Mich., of Energy and Commerce, and Dan Rostenkowski, D-Ill., of Ways and Means — supported H J Res 77.

    After the vote, most House members put aside partisan differences and closed ranks in support of the president and hundreds of thousands of U.S. military personnel who were poised for battle in the Persian Gulf.

    During the dramatic debate on the measure, Majority Leader Richard A. Gephardt, D-Mo., had said, “Whatever our decision, we will leave this room one again and whole again.”

    2. Thrift Bailout

    Paying for past mistakes is never fun, and the savings and loan debacle was about the biggest mess in Congress' back yard. So it was not surprising that when it came time to ante up the taxpayers' money to cover insured deposits in failed thrifts, members did so reluctantly.

    That was never demonstrated more aptly than in March, when the House defeated a succession of plans to give money to the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), the thrift bailout agency created in August 1989.

    The March votes were required because a bill to give the RTC additional money had failed in the final hours of the 101st Congress. The agency had gotten $50 billion when it was created, a sum that the Bush administration persisted in claiming would be enough. By the summer of 1990, however, administration officials said the cost would range from $89 billion to $132 billion.

    So, at the beginning of the 102nd Congress, the House and Senate Banking committees began work on bills to give the RTC another $30 billion — enough, it was plain by then, to last only through 1991, not to finish the job.

    In February, the House Banking Committee marked up a bill and then could not summon up the votes to send the measure to the floor. On March 7, it voted to send not one but two bills to the floor.

    Eventually, the House voted four times on the two committee options — and variations on their themes — rejecting all four. The final vote, on March 12, was on a “clean” bill (HR 1315) sponsored by ranking committee Republican Chalmers P. Wylie of Ohio, which did little more than provide the needed $30 billion. But even that measure failed on a vote of 201-220: R 120-42; D 81-177 (ND 44-132, SD 37-45); I 0-1.

    The clean bill did get more votes than any of the three alternatives, which contained a variety of low-income housing, management reform and so-called pay-as-you-go provisions. These bells and whistles were intended to pick up the votes of disaffected members, but they also generated opposition.

    The day after Wylie's bill was rejected, House Democratic and Republican leaders cut a deal with Treasury Secretary Nicholas F. Brady to call up a Senate-passed bill (S 419) that was similarly devoid of controversial amendments and add a few low-income housing provisions to it. The compromise managed to hold the line on Republican support and picked up enough Democratic votes to pass. A conference committee reconciled the two similarly stripped-down versions in about 15 minutes, and both chambers adopted the conference agreement without difficulty.

    That did not mean the story was over, however. By the summer of 1991, the administration was asking for $80 billion more. And in the final hours of the 1991 session, almost as its last act, Congress cleared a bill (HR 3435) providing another $25 billion for the RTC and restructuring the agency. It was not at all certain until the end that the second thrift bailout bill of the year would pass either chamber. And with the limited amount of money it contained, Congress set itself up for yet another showdown on the issue in 1992.

    3. Gun Control

    A May vote on the Brady bill revealed a significant shift in attitudes on gun control in the House and handed the National Rifle Association a rare defeat. Legislation for a waiting period on handgun purchases (HR 7) passed the House on May 8 by a surprising 53-vote margin, 239-186: R 60-102; D 179-83 (ND 138-41, SD 41-42); I 0-1.

    Although Democrats were more inclined to back the legislation, the vote was bipartisan. Three years earlier, the powerful gun lobby had blocked a similar measure by 46 votes.

    The handgun proposal, which also passed the Senate in 1991, was on hold at the end of the session after having been modified and rolled into an omnibus crime bill (HR 3371), which was held up over partisan differences. Nonetheless, because of the strong votes for the Brady bill in both chambers, many members expected the provision to become law in 1992.

    HR 7 would have required a seven-day waiting period on the purchase of handguns for a background check. The compromise version that became part of the crime bill was for a five-business-day wait.

    Its supporters chalked up the win in the House to constituent pressure on members in the face of increasing violent crime. Polls had been showing resounding support for firearms restrictions, and swing voters said they were persuaded to back down on their no-gun-control positions by local police and worried constituents.

    The waiting period language was named for former presidential press secretary James S. Brady, who was wounded in a 1981 assassination attempt on Ronald Reagan.

    Brady made several appearances on Capitol Hill in his wheelchair, with his determined wife, Sarah. They were ubiquitous at the Capitol in the days leading up to the vote and had a strong influence on the legislation.

    The Bradys became a poignant contrast to the powerful NRA, which boasted among its members several House leaders, including Speaker Thomas S. Foley, D-Wash.

    Under existing law, a gun buyer had to sign a statement that he was not a felon, fugitive, drug addict or mentally ill. But because the form never left the dealer's shop, buyers acted on their honor. Under the Brady bill, gun dealers would have to send that form to the police, who would check the buyer's background to make sure the purchase was legal. HR 7 did not require the police to make the background check, but the new version in the crime bill did.

    Before the House passed the Brady bill, it rejected an alternative offered by Harley O. Staggers Jr., D-W.Va., that would have ordered states to set up an instant check system within six months, under which a gun dealer could find out by telephone whether a would-be buyer had a criminal record. The amendment was devised largely to block the Brady bill. Opponents of the Staggers plan pointed to studies showing that because state criminal justice records are not fully computerized, it would take years to put the telephone-check system in place. The House defeated the Staggers substitute, also on May 8, by a strong 193-234.

    Overwhelming passage of HR 7, which was offered by Edward F. Feighan, D-Ohio, put pressure on the Senate to develop a similar measure.

    The bipartisan compromise was endorsed by the Bradys and adopted in that chamber June 28 by a secure, 67-32 vote as part of a Senate crime bill (S 1241). (Senate key vote 3)

    4. Strategic Defense Initiative

    Since 1985, Congress had routinely slashed the annual funding request for the anti-missile research program called the strategic defense initiative (SDI). And since 1987, it had consistently opposed deployment of space-based anti-missile weapons that would violate the 1972 U.S.-Soviet treaty limiting anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems.

    Despite those hotly contested annual fights over funding and treaty compliance, however, Congress had approved spending at least a few billion dollars annually on a program of anti-missile defense research that was strongly oriented toward eventual deployment of ABM weapons.

    President Ronald Reagan launched SDI in 1983, arguing that an array of anti-missile devices could render nuclear weapons obsolete and end the superpower arms race. But many leading arms control advocates had opposed the program on the grounds that missile defenses could stimulate escalating deployments of offensive weapons intended to nullify such defenses.

    In past years, some liberals, led by Ronald V. Dellums, D-Calif., had proposed deep reductions in SDI funds that essentially would have limited the program to laboratory research. But most arms control activists had thrown more of their energy into a pragmatic effort to win more modest cuts in SDI. On the other side, conservatives had pushed for rapid deployment of a nationwide anti-missile defense regardless of the 1972 ABM Treaty.

    In 1991, the House Armed Services Committee sliced Bush's $5.2 billion request for anti-missile work to $3.5 billion in its version of the fiscal 1992 defense authorization bill. When the House took up the measure in May, no middle-ground amendment was offered to make a relatively moderate additional SDI reduction. However, Dellums offered an amendment that would have sliced the total to $1.1 billion while disbanding the SDI program office and limiting the project to laboratory work.

    Dellums' amendment was an effort to draw the line against the kind of ground-based defense against limited missile attacks that had been endorsed by prominent Democratic centrists, including House Armed Services Committee Chairman Les Aspin, Wis. Demonstrating the weakness of the outright opponents of SDI, the amendment was rejected 118-266: R 2-149; D 115-117 (ND 104-55, SD 11-62); I 1-0, on May 20.

    By final passage of the defense authorization bill (HR 2100 — PL 102-190) in November, the House acquiesced in a Senate-forged deal that gave a congressional endorsement to a limited SDI deployment. It provided for rapid deployment of a ground-based anti-missile defense at one site and for negotiations with leaders of the former Soviet Union to revise the ABM Treaty in order to permit a more extensive SDI system. (Senate key vote 8)

    5. Fast-Track Trade Procedures

    Democrats in Congress complained regularly that President Bush's trade policy was ineffective and unsound, but they passed up a rare chance to do more of the job themselves. Influential Democrats decided it was wiser to remain in the back seat shouting directions than to take the wheel.

    In what had become a referendum on Bush's controversial decision to begin negotiations with Mexico to create a North American free-trade zone, the House agreed May 23 to continue so-called fast-track procedures that bar lawmakers from amending trade pacts submitted for congressional approval. The Senate followed suit a day later.

    During weeks of intensive lobbying, the Bush administration had argued that the two-year extension was imperative not only to begin the U.S.-Mexico talks but also to revive negotiations on strengthening the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the multilateral accord governing most world trade. No country would negotiate with the United States, officials said, if Congress reserved the right to alter the resulting accord.

    The vote was a bitter disappointment to organized labor. The AFL-CIO had campaigned hard to convince members that removing trade and investment barriers with Mexico would cause U.S. workers to lose their jobs as companies headed south to take advantage of cheaper labor and lax environmental laws. Defeat of the extension was the organization's top legislative priority, and it was counting on its close ties with Democrats to produce the votes.

    In the end, a majority of House Democrats voted against the extension. Midwestern lawmakers were strongly opposed, arguing that a U.S.-Mexico pact would hurt industries such as automobiles, electronics and glassware. Also voting against the extension were members from states with industries such as agriculture and textiles, which feared that a GATT accord would eliminate U.S. laws that had long shielded them from foreign competition.

    But key party members — including Majority Leader Richard A. Gephardt, D-Mo., to whom opponents had looked for leadership, and Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dan Rostenkowski, D-Ill. — voted with the president. They did so after the White House issued an “action plan” promising to uphold U.S. environmental laws, phase in changes affecting farmers and industries worried about being swamped by Mexican imports, and assist workers who lost their jobs as a result of the pact.

    Gephardt, the Democrats' leading trade warrior, defended his vote, saying he reserved the right to oppose the final agreement with Mexico if it was not protective enough of U.S. workers and industries. Even with the fast track, Gephardt insisted, lawmakers could amend the terms of any trade deal Bush sent them if they wanted.

    The defeat of a resolution that would have terminated the fast track was a victory for Bush, who won endorsement from the Democratic controlled Congress for his free-trade agenda in the middle of a recession.

    Equally important, Bush persuaded Congress to leave the negotiating to him, knowing that, if he succeeded, he also would get the credit.

    The House defeated the resolution 192-231: R 21-140; D 170-91 (ND 128-50, SD 42-41); I 1-0, on May 23.

    6. Superconducting Supercollider

    Despite increased opposition and resistance from respected members of the Science and Budget committees, the $8 billion atom smasher being built in Waxahachie, Texas, continued to attract substantial House support.

    Enthusiasm for the project was evident May 29 when supporters soundly defeated an attempt to drop federal funding for the project. The vote came during debate on the fiscal 1992 energy and water appropriations bill when the House rejected, 165-251, an amendment by Jim Slattery, D-Kan., that would have eliminated funding for the project: R 58-101; D 106-150 (ND 86-87, SD 20-63); I 1-0.

    Still, the vote revealed that the project's popularity had eroded considerably since 1989 — when there were 93 votes to cut funding for the collider — and it suggested that in future years opponents might be able to muster the votes necessary to kill it.

    The House version called for allotting $434 million for the atom smasher in fiscal 1992, about $100 million less than the Bush administration's budget request. The supercollider was designed to hurl subatomic particles through a 54-mile underground tunnel; scientists hoped that studying particle collisions would help them trace the origins of matter and yield scientific discoveries.

    Opposition to the collider was growing in the House among science supporters who feared that its high price tag could cannibalize other science projects and among Budget Committee members who considered it too costly. Joining Slattery's attack were Howard Wolpe, D-Mich., who headed the Science Investigation and Oversight Subcommittee, and Sherwood Boehlert, R-N.Y., ranking member on the subcommittee. Boehlert called the collider a “Texas gila monster” and said support for it came from “Texas and Texas and Texas and Texas.”

    Boehlert might have added to his short list another 42 states and 1600 Pennsylvania Ave. President Bush had long been an advocate for the project and met personally last year with Tom Bevill, D-Ala., who headed the Appropriations panel with jurisdiction over the project. Bevill, originally a skeptic, had become a strong supporter. Since that meeting with Bush, the White House had been less inclined to oppose additional water projects in the appropriations bill Bevill shepherded through the House. Additional political ballast for the project came from about 8,500 contracts worth hundreds of millions of dollars that had been doled out to 43 states. The contracts had sparked support for the atom smasher from members who otherwise would have had little interest in the project.

    In the 1991 debate, supporters of the project were led by the good-natured Joe L. Barton, R-Texas, whose home is just a couple of miles from the collider site. They argued that the atom smasher was likely to produce many lucrative spinoffs and that it was already too far along to stop. The latter was an argument often used by supporters of big, multi-year weapons or science projects.

    The 1991 vote was significant because it marked the resurrection of opposition to the project, which had dissipated in 1990. In the tight budget climate that was likely to dominate the decade, high-cost projects had become the target of budget cutters. Supporters also said the vote was key because it provided funds meant to begin construction of the project's tunnel. (Senate key vote 4)

    7. Civil Rights

    An initial blow to civil rights legislation came in late spring when the House failed to gather a two-thirds majority for a bill President Bush was threatening to veto. Bush, who asserted that HR 1 would lead to quota hiring of minorities and women, had vetoed a similar bill in 1990.

    The June 5 House vote was the first test of a reconstituted anti-discrimination bill. The vote was largely partisan: 273-158: R 22-143; D 250-15 (ND 177-4, SD 73-11); I 1-0. The 273 votes were 15 short of the two-thirds needed to override a veto; the 1990 House tally on the job rights conference report was 12 short.

    The failure to reach two-thirds effectively stalled HR 1 but paved the way for more intense negotiations among Senate moderates on a separate bill. In the end, a compromise was brokered in the wake of the Senate's Supreme Court nomination hearings involving Clarence Thomas and Anita F. Hill. Workplace protections, similar to those proposed in HR 1, had since become law.

    The bill was intended to offer workers more protection against bias, largely by reversing a series of Supreme Court decisions that narrowed the reach of anti-bias laws. It would have for the first time allowed limited money damages for victims of harassment and other intentional discrimination based on sex, religion or disability. Minorities already could win unlimited money damages for racial discrimination under a separate post-Civil War law. HR 1 would have reversed more court cases and been more generous to workers than the legislation eventually enacted.

    The House vote came at a time when the political and substantive problems with the job rights bill were near their height. Republicans had been pounding away on the message that the measure would force employers to use quotas to avoid costly lawsuits. They struck a nerve with white constituents worried about holding onto their jobs in a frail economy.

    Democrats, meanwhile, struggled with how to convey the importance of workplace protections. They had tried to appeal to women by adding a study of pay equity and other items designed to appeal to working women. They also tried to defuse the quota issue by inserting language for an outright ban on quotas. Because the Supreme Court had ruled that hiring by the numbers is illegal, the move appeared to be motivated by attempts to give political cover to members who wanted to vote for the bill but faced constituent complaints about “reverse discrimination.”

    Before the vote on HR 1, the House rejected two other civil rights proposals — a White House plan and a hard-line effort from liberal Democrats that included unlimited money damages in intentional bias suits.

    Only one House member who voted against the 1990 bill switched to support the 1991 version. He was Democrat Bill Sarpalius of Texas.

    Sarpalius' switch was more than offset by the one Democrat (Jimmy Hayes of Louisiana) and nine Republicans who voted for the 1990 rights bill but opposed HR 1. (Senate key vote 13)

    8. Space Station

    Bob Traxler, D-Mich., knew he was going out on a limb when he persuaded the House Appropriations Committee to eliminate fiscal 1992 funding for NASA's premier space enterprise, the orbiting space station Freedom. He was afraid the massive construction project would take too big a bite out of the $64 billion in discretionary spending allocated to the Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs (VA), Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and Independent Agencies, which oversaw the space agency's funding. At risk were other, smaller space and science projects as well as the many low-income housing, veterans' medical care and environmental programs under the panel's jurisdiction.

    Meeting privately, the subcommittee on May 15 informally voted 6-3 against President Bush's $2.03 billion request for the space station in the fiscal 1992 spending bill (HR 2519). The full committee, at Traxler's request, deferred debate until the House floor, where Traxler believed all members should be put to the test. “We simply can no longer afford huge new projects with huge price tags while trying to maintain services that the American people expect to be provided,” he said.

    The subcommittee action touched off a lobbying firestorm. Low-income housing groups and environmentalists, in particular, began urging representatives to ratify the subcommittee's bill. They feared that if money was put back in, it would come out of their appropriations.

    Also lobbying members were NASA officials, aerospace contractors and members of the House Science Committee. The agency passed out maps showing each House member how many jobs and how many dollars flowed into the districts from space station contracts and subcontracts. Freedom's proponents, including Bush, also painted the project as having the potential for scientific breakthroughs with research in space. “It clearly caught the imagination of our colleagues,” said Bill Lowery, R-Calif.

    But others viewed the space station, estimated to cost a total of $40 billion, as a boondoggle. “If we fund this, it's clearly not for scientific reasons, it's for the contractors who work on the project,” said Richard J. Durbin, D-Ill.

    The key vote came June 6 on an amendment to restore nearly $2 billion in space station funding. The amendment was drafted by the White House Office of Management and Budget and offered by Jim Chapman, D-Texas, and Lowery, two VA-HUD subcommittee members.

    In order to avoid the appearance that the space station would be taking money away from the poor, the amendment primarily cannibalized every other NASA program, including the environmental satellite project, Mission to Planet Earth. But it also proposed cutting $217 million, or nearly 10 percent, of the funds used to maintain public housing.

    The House agreed to restore the space station's funding nearly to the level Bush requested by a vote of 240-173: R 133-27; D 107-145 (ND 55-114, SD 52-31); I 0-1.

    Sending the bill on to the Senate, Freedom proponents knew their project would be protected by Barbara A. Mikulski, D-Md., chairman of the Senate VA-HUD Subcommittee.

    Yet in a roundabout way the vote was a victory for Traxler, who may have succeeded in isolating NASA's budget from non-space programs. Space station proponents were so frightened of being cast as foes of the poor that they primarily took from other NASA programs to pay for Freedom's appropriation.

    9. Grazing Fees

    If any issue encapsulated the growing conflict among users of the country's vast public lands, it was grazing fees, a subject that produced much heated debate on public lands policy in 1991.

    By almost any measure, the fees ranchers paid to graze their cattle on public land were lower than those paid by ranchers who grazed their cattle on private pastures. The inevitable result, argued some lawmakers and environmentalists, was overgrazing of arid Western rangeland and millions of dollars in lost revenue yearly.

    But Western lawmakers had turned the issue into a symbolic lightning rod, imbuing it with images of another kind of endangered species: struggling ranchers, said to be the backbone of the old West. And they noted that the Bureau of Land Management in its 1990 “State of the Public Rangelands” report said the nation's rangelands were in better shape than at any time in the 20th century.

    The rhetoric and lobbying by environmentalists reached a new emotional pitch on June 25 when Mike Synar, D-Okla., proposed an amendment to raise grazing fees from $1.97 to $8.70 per animal unit month by 1995. (Studies from the General Accounting Office had determined that the average private market rate for Western rangeland is $9.22.) The House voted 232-192 to add the amendment to the fiscal 1992 Interior appropriations bill: R 47-114; D 184-78 (ND 140-38, SD 44-40); I 1-0.

    Synar's amendment actually passed by a smaller margin than had a similar Synar amendment a year before. On Oct. 15, 1990, the House voted 251-155 to increase grazing fees.

    What made the 1991 vote key was that it emboldened Senate supporters of a fee hike, who for the first time since 1978 pushed for a vote in their chamber. The Senate effort, led by James M. Jeffords, R-Vt., ultimately failed, showing that there is a solid phalanx of Western conservatives determined to block a hike in grazing fees. And when the matter reached conference, it became clear that even the House was not willing to place a high enough priority on higher fees to make them stick.

    The Senate voted on Sept. 17, 60-38, to table (kill) the Jeffords amendment, which would have raised grazing fees to $5.13 by 1996.

    And in conference the House amendment capsized under a deal that became known as “corn for porn.” It preserved low grazing fees in exchange for no new restrictions on federal arts funding.

    10. Defense Budget Cuts

    The 1990 deficit-reduction act proved a formidable obstacle to those members — mostly liberal Democrats — who wanted to cut President Bush's $291 billion defense budget request. The law limited the allowable deficit each year through fiscal 1995. And it limited through fiscal 1993 annual discretionary spending for defense, international affairs and domestic programs. Funds cut from defense could not be transferred to popular domestic programs without violating the cap on domestic spending.

    When the House returned from its August recess, some Pentagon critics, led by Barney Frank, D-Mass., calculated that events might have shifted the political equation in their favor. The unsuccessful mid-August coup attempt in Moscow by hard-line communists had been followed by a total collapse of communist power in the Soviet Union and a powerful surge of separatist sentiment in most of the republics that made up the U.S.S.R. The communist superpower's military might had been the motivating threat behind U.S. defense plans for more than 40 years. Therefore, Frank and his allies contended, the passing of that threat called for a fundamental revision of the budget deal.

    But Defense Secretary Dick Cheney warned that the defense establishment would suffer far-reaching damage if Congress forced a more rapid cutback than his program to reduce the force by roughly 25 percent by fiscal 1995.

    And many House Democratic leaders were aligned with Cheney in opposing any effort to depart significantly from the existing budget deal, although some were willing to renegotiate the budget deal in 1992. House Budget Committee Chairman Leon E. Panetta, D-Calif., and others expressed fear that the political pressures for an array of domestic programs were so powerful that any effort to tamper with the existing arrangement would risk a bidding war that would torpedo the budget deal, endanger the economy and subject the Democrats to taunts that they were addicted to big spending.

    When the House appointed conferees on the defense authorization bill (HR 2100 — PL 102-190) Sept. 16, Frank intended to propose a motion instructing them to back the lower of the amounts authorized by the two chambers for any conventional weapons program, “consistent with emerging national security needs.” But he was blocked from offering that defense-cutting motion by a procedural vote, which he lost 220-145: R 136-4; D 84-140 (ND 30-124, SD 54-16); I 0-1.

    11. Unemployment Benefits

    For the first part of 1991, congressional Democrats and President Bush sparred over whether the country needed a bill to provide extended unemployment benefits for the long-term jobless. But as the economy worsened and unemployment hovered near 6.8 percent during the summer and fall, Bush stopped talking about whether a bill would be prudent. Instead, he criticized Congress for trying to pay for a multibillion-dollar bill through deficit spending. Congress, Bush maintained, wanted to “bust the budget agreement.”

    Bush had already blocked one bill in August that would have declared unemployment an emergency and therefore not subject to the budget agreement's pay-as-you-go rules. Bush signed that legislation but not an accompanying emergency designation that would have released the funds.

    Democrats vowed to try again. They pointed to the $8 billion surplus in revenues from unemployment taxes paid by employers, which they maintained was being used to help mask the overall federal deficit.

    They insisted that the budget agreement allowed Congress to spend money without offsetting tax increases or spending cuts if both Congress and the president declared an emergency. So Democrats pushed through a second bill (HR 3040), which would have automatically triggered spending of $6.3 billion in extended benefits if Bush had signed it into law.

    The second time, on Sept. 17, the House voted 283-125: R 48-107; D 234-18 (ND 172-2, SD 62-16); I 1-0. The vote gave Democrats 11 more ayes than necessary to exceed the two-thirds margin needed to override Bush. Despite Bush's opposition, 48 Republicans supported the bill, eight more than Democrats had predicted.

    The vote was a key one because it signaled to the administration that Democrats had momentum on their side. More and more members were complaining about the economy — Republicans as well as Democrats. With the override strength apparent, the administration began to accept that negotiations would be necessary in order to reach a compromise and get the unemployment issue off the domestic agenda.

    Ultimately, after a four-month political standoff, Congress sent Bush a $5.3 billion bill to extend unemployment benefits for nearly 3 million people. Bush signed the measure the same day he received it, Nov. 15. The bill was paid for by tightening a loophole on those paying quarterly taxes; extending a law allowing Internal Revenue Service collection of debts owed the federal government; extending the federal unemployment tax at 0.08 percent; and garnisheeing the wages of those who defaulted on student loans. (Senate key vote 10)

    12. Surface Transportation

    Congress' biggest legislative achievement of the session, a six-year, $151 billion highway and mass transit bill, began the year mired in controversy. But when the final bill came to the House floor on Oct. 23, it passed swiftly after only a single day of debate.

    The smooth sailing was aided by the tight rein the Democrat-dominated Rules Committee kept on items open to floor consideration. Despite Republican protests, the committee limited debate to only a dozen amendments and squelched 41 others. On the floor, Republicans forced three procedural roll call votes in protest. In the end, the House adopted the rule, 323-102, with significant help from Republicans: R 66-97; D 257-4 (ND 174-4, SD 83-0); I 0-1.

    Votes on rules typically are procedural matters. But this vote was significant because Democrats succeeded in crafting a “stealth” bill that evaded all controversial issues. Despite the small group of dissenting Republicans, most lawmakers went along because the bill included authority for hundreds of local projects.

    The roads and transit measure first faced trouble when House sponsors proposed hiking gasoline taxes by a nickel. The plan met with staunch opposition from both parties, and an early version of the bill was pulled from the floor calendar in August. Leaders of the Public Works and Transportation Committee dropped the nickel increase, opting instead to extend 2.5 cents of a 1990 nickel increase that was set to expire after fiscal 1995.

    With that issue out of the way, other potential floor fights loomed: Some lawmakers, particularly from states that paid more in gas taxes than they received in highway funds, were upset that much of the $5.4 billion for 489 special road projects ended up in the states and districts of bill sponsors. Others objected to the new gas-tax plan.

    But the Public Works panel, with help from the Rules Committee, managed to keep every controversial issue from coming to a floor vote. Almost every amendment blocked by the Rules panel dealt with potentially explosive issues that had tied up highway bills in the past, including a limit on billboard construction, a repeal of the national speed limit, a weakening of motorcycle helmet laws and a strengthening of drunken driving laws.

    Republicans, including Rules Committee member Bob McEwen of Ohio, Robert S. Walker of Pennsylvania and Dan Burton of Indiana, opened their assault on the bill by attacking the rule. The Rules Committee had denied Burton's attempts to cut seven special road projects expected to cost $67.1 million.

    But the Republican effort to overturn the rule failed in large part because lawmakers feared retaliation from bill sponsors, and they were not eager to lose funding for their hometown road projects.

    The Public Works and Transportation Committee's hold over the bill's amendments continued as the bill went to conference with the Senate. The only amendment to pass was one by Anthony C. Beilenson, D-Calif., that would have allowed states to include a warranty clause in highway contracts. Despite the overwhelming approval of the amendment, 400-26, Public Works leaders opposed it, and it was dropped in conference.

    13. Foreign Aid

    When House members rejected the foreign aid bill on Oct. 30, they were signaling their clear displeasure with helping other nations during a period of economic crisis in the United States.

    The key vote came when the House defeated the conference report on the bill (HR 2508 — H Rept 102-225), 159-262: R 28-134; D 131-127 (ND 105-73, SD 26-54); I 0-1.

    It was a dramatic mood change from June, when the House had approved the original foreign aid authorization bill by 136 votes (274-138).

    President Bush had vowed to veto the bill on several grounds. He objected that the measure would have repealed abortion-related restrictions on aid to international family planning organizations and would have included a “cargo preference” provision requiring that a certain percentage of exports be transported on U.S.-flagged vessels.

    But those red flag provisions had also been part of the original bill that won House approval.

    House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Dante B. Fascell, D-Fla., the manager of the bill, described what had changed since the June vote: “The big difference is the change in attitude toward domestic issues.”

    Moreover, there was virtually no downside for members who wanted to cast an anti-foreign aid vote. Foreign aid funding for the first six months had been ensured with the passage of a continuing resolution Oct. 24.

    Democrats had political incentives to oppose the bill. Party leaders had been hammering away at Bush as being more concerned with foreign policy than the domestic economy. With an eye on the 1992 campaign, Democrats did not want to muddle that message with strong backing for a foreign aid bill.

    In an unlikely combination, socialist Bernard Sanders, I-Vt., and bedrock conservative Gerald B. H. Solomon, R-N.Y., attacked a provision — supported by the administration — that would have increased the U.S. contribution in the International Monetary Fund by $12.2 billion.

    The failure to enact an authorization bill was hardly unprecedented; no such measure had become law since 1985. But several lawmakers said the vote could be a harbinger of congressional opposition to more significant legislation.

    One of the first items on the agenda for 1992 would be the fiscal 1992 foreign aid appropriations bill, which was delayed over the controversy surrounding Israel's request for $10 billion in loan guarantees.

    14. Banking Overhaul

    On Nov. 4, the House overwhelmingly rejected a comprehensive banking bill that had been debated, amended and negotiated for nine months. The vote marked the beginning of the end for the Bush administration's hopes to overhaul the banking industry in 1991.

    The bill (HR 6) had survived hundreds of amendments and two extensive markup sessions in the House Banking Committee, yet emerged much as the administration had wanted. It had been attacked in the Energy and Commerce Committee because of provisions involving the ownership of banks and bank affiliations with securities firms. So those major controversial elements were dropped or revised in post-markup negotiations between Banking Chairman Henry B. Gonzalez, D-Texas, and Energy and Commerce Chairman John D. Dingell, D-Mich.

    On the floor a third controversial element — allowing banks to move freely across state lines — was curtailed by giving states power to limit interstate branching.

    Yet, in the end, after all the changes and negotiations, members were still far from satisfied. Some regarded the measure as too restrictive; others thought it still too expansive. The bill was rejected by a vote of 89-324: R 6-153; D 83-170 (ND 69-105, SD 14-65); I 0-1.

    The bill was nearly sidetracked when the rule permitting floor debate was adopted on a 210-208 vote. The rule came close to defeat, but the vote was turned around by the personal lobbying of Speaker Thomas S. Foley, D-Wash., who had promised Treasury Secretary Nicholas F. Brady that he would keep the bill on track. However, after it became clear that the bill would not be changed on the floor to its liking, the administration joined big banks in working to kill the measure outright.

    It took two more tries on the floor before the House finally approved a banking bill.

    The second failed attempt was on a bill (HR 2094) that began as a stripped-down measure to replenish the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's Bank Insurance Fund and overhaul the deposit insurance system. But at the administration's insistence, provisions allowing interstate branching were added back on the floor. Beyond providing the nearly insolvent insurance fund with a line of credit at the Treasury so it could stay in business closing failed banks, the administration's top priority was to improve bank profitability. Allowing nationwide interstate branching was seen as the best way to improve bank efficiency, spead risk and increase profits.

    The third bill (HR 3768), which finally passed the House, was limited to refinancing and overhauling the deposit insurance system.

    The Senate went through much the same torment, though mostly in behind-the-scenes negotiations. As the progression of House bills got narrower, so did a parallel Senate measure (S 543), which in a series of floor amendments was pared of its language permitting bank affiliations with securities firms and other contentious provisions. The Senate did manage to pass a bill that would have permitted interstate branching. But in conference, the House's overwhelming rejection of anything but the narrowest bill that focused on the deposit insurance system remained the controlling factor.

    House and Senate conferees produced a compromise version of S 543 on the final day of the session, Nov. 27, that was essentially the same as HR 3768.

    The conference agreement was adopted easily and sent to the president.

    15. Abortion ‘Gag Rule’

    Abortion rights advocates thought the Supreme Court's May 23 ruling in Rust v. Sullivan could be a blessing in disguise. Although they strenuously disagreed with the Court's ruling — that controversial regulations issued in 1988 banning abortion counseling in federally funded family planning clinics did not violate the Constitution — they thought they finally had an issue that could transcend the traditional pro-choice and anti-abortion debates. Indeed, shortly after the Court ruling, many abortion opponents in Congress declared that what opponents dubbed the “gag rule” in their view violated free speech rights by limiting discussion between patients and doctors and other health care providers.

    Opponents of the rules adopted a two-track strategy. One track consisted of legislation that would permanently overturn the rules and write into law the counseling and referral guidelines in effect between 1981 and 1988. The Senate in July passed a free-standing bill (S 323) to do just that, while the House Energy and Commerce Committee in August approved legislation to reauthorize the family planning program (HR 3090) that included provisions to overturn the rules.

    Proponents knew their best chance of success lay in the other half of the strategy: inserting language to block enforcement of the rules for one year into the popular spending bill (HR 2707) for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education. Procedural rules governing appropriations measures prevented inclusion of language to overturn the regulations outright.

    But while abortion rights advocates were telling colleagues that the issue was not abortion but free speech, abortion opponents were stressing exactly the opposite. Together many of the groups formed the “Abortion is Not Family Planning Coalition,” which bought newspaper ads to, in their words, clear up misconceptions about the rules and the effect they would have on federally funded family planning clinics.

    The preliminary test on the issue came when the House Nov. 9 approved the conference report on the bill by a vote of 272-156, well short of the two-thirds needed to override Bush's promised veto. But the matter was complicated by a budget issue. Several Republicans who had already come out against the counseling ban said they could not vote for the bill because it pushed more than $4 billion worth of spending into fiscal 1993, thus threatening the viability of the 1990 budget agreement between the White House and Congress.

    In his Nov. 19 veto message, Bush mentioned the budget issue but made it clear that the veto was primarily if not exclusively because of the abortion language.

    The House Democratic leadership, including anti-abortion Majority Whip David E. Bonior, Mich., worked the issue hard, and a day before the vote Speaker Thomas S. Foley, Wash., predicted that the veto would be overridden. But the votes that were picked up with the elimination of the budget issue did not offset votes lost by abortion opponents, particularly 43 anti-abortion Democrats.

    Members ultimately fell 12 votes short of the 288 they would have needed to override in the 276-156 tally: R 53-113; D 222-43 (ND 155-26, SD 67-17); I 1-0.

    16. Campaign Finance

    For the second straight year, House Democratic leaders pushed for legislation to limit campaign spending. But the 1991 version (HR 3750 — H Rept 102-340) contained something the 1990 bill avoided: direct public subsidies of campaigns.

    The bill would set a $600,000 optional spending limit for House races in primary and general elections. Candidates who agreed to obey the limit would get benefits, including cut-rate postage and up to $200,000 in public financing doled out to match the first $200 of each individual contribution. The measure would also place a $200,000 aggregate cap on how much a candidate could accept from political action committees and a $200,000 aggregate cap on individual contributions of more than $200.

    Given the partisan nature of the issue, the Democratic leadership did not want to risk bringing the measure to the floor without enough Democratic votes to assure its passage. So when conservative Democrats began raising objections to the public financing provisions, Sam Gejdenson, D-Conn., the chairman of a special task force on campaign finance, began giving ground.

    Public financing had become the touchstone of opposition to the Senate bill earlier in the year when Republicans ridiculed a Democratic measure (S 3) as “food stamps for politicians.” Democrats in both chambers countered that public financing was a small price to pay to control campaign costs and diminish the clout of special interests. But Southern Democrats in the House feared that they could not justify launching a new spending program for campaigns at an estimated cost of $75 million every two years.

    Gejdenson sought to meet the objections even before introducing the measure Nov. 12. He rewrote draft language to keep the mechanism for raising the revenue vague, leaving that detail to a future tax bill. Instead, the bill as introduced said the money should be raised by limiting the tax deductions that organizations take for lobbying, an effort to make special interests bear the costs.

    That still went too far for some, as it designated tax revenues for campaigns. So Gejdenson bent again. Before floor consideration, the bill was stripped of any meaningful way to pay for public financing of campaigns.

    The change ensured widespread Democratic backing for the bill, and on Nov. 26 it easily passed, 273-156: R 21-144; D 251-12 (ND 176-4, SD 75-8); I 1-0.

    1. Use of Force Against Iraq/Passage

    S J Res 2 Passage of the joint resolution to authorize military force if Iraq has not withdrawn from Kuwait and complied with U.N. Security Council resolutions by Jan. 15. The resolution authorizes using force and expending funds under the War Powers Act. Passed 52-47: R 42-2; D 10-45 (ND 3-35, SD 7-10), Jan. 12, 1991. A “yea” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    2. Surface Transportation Reauthorization/Interstate Maintenance

    S 1204 Moynihan, D-N.Y., motion to table (kill) the Lott, R-Miss., amendment to retain the current 90 percent federal share for Interstate maintenance and 80 percent for bridge projects. Motion agreed to 53-44: R 20-23; D 33-21 (ND 30-9, SD 3-12), June 19, 1991.

    3. Crime Bill/Handgun Waiting Period

    S 1241 Dole, R-Kan., amendment to require a waiting period of five business days before handgun purchases, during which time a mandatory background check of the prospective handgun buyers would be conducted, and to require the attorney general within six months of enactment to select a system and computer software for a National Instant Check system that within five years would be able to provide a record of criminal activity. Adopted 67-32: R 19-24; D 48-8 (ND 37-3, SD 11-5), June 28, 1991.

    4. Fiscal 1992 Energy and Water Appropriations/Superconducting Supercollider

    HR 2427 Johnston, D-La., motion to table (kill) the Bumpers, D-Ark., amendment to eliminate all funding for the superconducting supercollider by reducing the bill's funding level for the General Science and Research Activities account by $508,700,000. Motion agreed to 62-37: R 33-10; D 29-27 (ND 19-21, SD 10-6), July 10, 1991. A “yea” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    5. Fiscal 1992 Legislative Branch Appropriations/Pay Raise

    HR 2506 Byrd, D-W.Va., amendment to raise senators' pay from $101,900 to $125,100, ban senators' honoraria and limit outside earned income to 15 percent of a senator's base pay. Adopted 53-45: R 25-18; D 28-27 (ND 22-18, SD 6-9), July 17, 1991.

    6. Conditional MFN for China in 1992/Passage

    HR 2212 Passage of the bill to prohibit the president from granting China most-favored-nation status for the 12-month period beginning July 3, 1992, unless he reports that China has accounted for and released all political prisoners and made progress in human rights, among other conditions. Passed 55-44: R 6-37; D 49-7 (ND 36-4, SD 13-3), July 23, 1991. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    7. Fiscal 1992–93 Defense Authorization/Women in Combat Pilot Positions

    S 1507 Glenn, D-Ohio, motion to table (kill) the Roth, R-Del., amendment to repeal the 1948 law that prohibits women from flying in combat pilot positions. Motion rejected 30-69: R 14-29; D 16-40 (ND 6-34, SD 10-6), July 31, 1991. (The Roth amendment was subsequently adopted by voice vote.)

    8. Fiscal 1992–93 Defense Authorization/Strategic Stability

    S 1507 Bingaman, D-N.M., amendment to state that it is the United States' goal to maintain strategic stability with the Soviet Union while deploying an anti-ballistic missile system with one or more ground-based sites and space-based sensors. The amendment would clarify that current actions undertaken by the United States are treaty compliant. Rejected 43-56: R 2-41; D 41-15 (ND 33-7, SD 8-8), July 31, 1991. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    9. Fiscal 1992 Labor, HHS, and Education Appropriations/Budget Waiver

    HR 2707 Harkin, D-Iowa, motion to waive the Budget Act with respect to the Harkin amendment to the committee amendment, to rescind $3.148 billion in budget authority from unobligated balances in Defense Department accounts from fiscal 1988–91, and transfer the $3.148 billion in budget authority to domestic programs. Motion rejected 28-69: R 3-39; D 25-30 (ND 24-14, SD 1-16), Sept. 10, 1991. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    10. Unemployment Benefits Extension/Conference Report

    S 1722 Adoption of the conference report to provide an estimated $6.4 billion for up to 20 additional weeks of unemployment benefits based on a state's unemployment rate. The conference report designates the spending as an emergency and would not require a presidential declaration to be exempt from budget agreement limits. Adopted 65-35: R 8-35; 57-0 (ND 40-0, SD 17-0), Oct. 1, 1991. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    11. Family and Medical Leave Act/Substitute

    S 5 Bond, R-Mo., substitute amendment to raise the number of hours an employee must work in order to be eligible for up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave for the birth or adoption of a child or for the serious illness of the worker or an immediate family member. Adopted 65-32: R 15-28; D 50-4 (ND 38-0, SD 12-4), Oct. 2, 1991. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    12. Thomas Nomination/Confirmation

    Confirmation of President Bush's nomination of Clarence Thomas of Georgia to be an associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. Confirmed 52-48: R 41-2; D 11-46 (ND 3-37, SD 8-9), Oct. 15, 1991. A “yea” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    13. Civil Rights Act of 1991/Passage

    S 1745 Passage of the bill to make it easier to sue for employment discrimination and permit women, religious minorities and the disabled to win compensatory and punitive damages for intentional discrimination, mainly by reversing several recent Supreme Court decisions and by expanding Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Passed 93-5: R 38-5; D 55-0 (ND 38-0, SD 17-0), Oct. 30, 1991. A “yea” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    14. National Energy Policy/Cloture

    S 1220 Mitchell, D-Maine, motion to invoke cloture (thus limiting debate) on the Johnston, D-La., motion to proceed to the bill to allow drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, mandate that federal and private vehicle fleets use alternative fuels and direct the secretary of Transportation to adopt new corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards, and enact other programs related to energy production and consumption. Motion rejected 50-44: R 32-9; D 18-35 (ND 9-28, SD 9-7), Nov. 1, 1991. A three-fifths majority (60) of the total Senate is required to invoke cloture.

    15. Gates Nomination/Confirmation

    Confirmation of President Bush's nomination of Robert M. Gates of Virginia to be director of central intelligence. Confirmed 64-31: R 42-0; D 22-31 (ND 11-25, SD 11-6), Nov. 5, 1991. A “yea” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    16. CFE Treaty Implementation/Dismantlement of Soviet Weapons

    HR 3807 Nunn, D-Ga., amendment to authorize $500 million in defense funds to assist the Soviet Union and its republics with the dismantlement of Soviet nuclear, chemical and other weapons. Adopted 86-8: R 34-8; D 52-0 (ND 36-0, SD 16-0), Nov. 25, 1991.

    1. Use of Force Against Iraq/Passage

    H J Res 77 Passage of the joint resolution to authorize the use of military force if Iraq has not withdrawn from Kuwait and complied with U.N. Security Council resolutions by Jan. 15. The resolution authorizes the use of force and expenditure of funds under the War Powers Act. Passed 250-183: R 164-3; D 86-179 (ND 33-147, SD 53-32); I 0-1, Jan. 12, 1991. A “yea” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    2. RTC Financing/Passage

    HR 1315 Passage of the bill to provide $30 billion to the Resolution Trust Corporation to cover fiscal 1991 losses of failed thrifts; also requires that requests for more money for the RTC be accompanied by a spending plan. Rejected 201-220: R 120-42; D 81-177 (ND 44-132, SD 37-45); I 0-1, March 12, 1991. A “yea” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    3. Handgun Waiting Period/Passage

    HR 7 Passage of the bill to require a seven-day waiting period for handgun purchases, allowing local law enforcement authorities to check whether prospective buyers have a criminal record. The waiting period requirement would end when a national computer system for instant checks became operational. Passed 239-186: R 60-102; D 179-83 (ND 138-41, SD 41-42); I 0-1, May 8, 1991.

    4. Fiscal 1992 Defense Authorization/SDI

    HR 2100 Dellums, D-Calif., amendment to terminate the strategic defense initiative program and permit only a basic SDI research program funded at $1.1 billion. Rejected 118-266: R 2-149; D 115-117 (ND 104-55, SD 11-62); I 1-0, May 20, 1991. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    5. Disapproval of Fast-Track Procedures/Adoption

    H Res 101 Adoption of the resolution to disapprove the president's request to extend for two more years fast-track procedures that would require legislation implementing trade agreements to be considered within 60 days of introduction under limited debate and with no amendments permitted. Rejected 192-231: R 21-140; D 170-91 (ND 128-50, SD 42-41); I 1-0, May 23, 1991. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    6. Fiscal 1992 Energy and Water Appropriations/Superconducting Supercollider

    HR 2427 Slattery, D-Kan., amendment to eliminate all funding for the superconducting super collider, $434 million, primarily by reducing the bill's funding level for general science and research activities. Rejected 165-251: R 58-101; D 106-150 (ND 86-87, SD 20-63); I 1-0, May 29, 1991. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    7. Civil Rights Act of 1991/Passage

    HR 1 Passage of the bill to reverse or modify a series of Supreme Court rulings that narrowed the reach and remedies of job discrimination laws and to authorize compensatory and punitive damages for victims of discrimination based on sex, religion or disability. Passed 273-158: R 22-143; D 250-15 (ND 177-4, SD 73-11); I 1-0, June 5, 1991. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    8. Fiscal 1992 VA and HUD Appropriations/Restore Space Station Funding

    HR 2519 Chapman, D-Texas, en bloc amendments to provide $1.9 billion for the space station Freedom, restoring its funding to the fiscal 1991 level, and to offset the increase by holding all NASA programs to fiscal 1991 levels — a decrease of $1.7 billion — and by cutting $217 million from public housing operating subsidies. Adopted 240-173: R 133-27; D 107-145 (ND 55-114, SD 52-31); I 0-1, June 6, 1991. A “yea” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    9. Fiscal 1992 Interior Appropriations/Grazing Fees

    HR 2686 Synar, D-Okla., amendment to increase over four years the domestic livestock grazing fee on public lands administered by the Bureau of Land Management from $1.97 to $8.70 per animal unit month or to fair market value, whichever is higher. Adopted 232-192: R 47-114; D 184-78 (ND 140-38, SD 44-40); I 1-0, June 25, 1991. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    10. Fiscal 1992 Defense Authorization

    HR 2100 Dickinson, R-Ala., motion to order the previous question (thus ending debate and amendment) on the Dickinson motion to instruct the House conferees on the fiscal 1992 defense authorization bill to insist on the House position to make permanent certain changes in benefits for military personnel from Operation Desert Shield/Storm. Motion agreed to 220-145: R 136-4; D 84-140 (ND 30-124, SD 54-16); I 0-1, Sept. 16, 1991.

    11. Unemployment Benefits Extension/Passage

    HR 3040 Passage of the bill to permanently extend unemployment benefits to long-term unemployed workers for up to 20 additional weeks, at an estimated cost of $6.3 billion through fiscal 1996. The bill automatically declares the benefits to be emergency spending and would not require a presidential declaration to be exempt from the spending requirements of 1990's budget agreement. Passed 283-125: R 48-107; D 234-18 (ND 172-2, SD 62-16); I 1-0, Sept. 17, 1991. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    12. Surface Transportation Reauthorization/Rule

    HR 3566 Adoption of the rule (H Res 252) to provide for House floor consideration of the bill to authorize $151 billion for highway and mass transit programs in fiscal 1992–97 and extend through fiscal 1999 half of the nickel added to the federal gasoline tax in 1990. Adopted 323-102: R 66-97; D 257-4 (ND 174-4, SD 83-0); I 0-1, Oct. 23, 1991.

    13. Fiscal 1992–93 Foreign Aid Authorization/Conference Report

    HR 2508 Adoption of the conference report to authorize $25 billion in fiscal 1992–93 for foreign economic and military assistance. Rejected 159-262: R 28-134; D 131-127 (ND 105-73, SD 26-54); I 0-1, Oct. 30, 1991. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    14. Banking Reform/Passage

    HR 6 Passage of the bill to restructure the banking industry, overhaul the federal bank deposit insurance system and allow the FDIC to borrow $30 billion to cover losses in failed banks. Rejected 89-324: R 6-153; D 83-170 (ND 69-105, SD 14-65); I 0-1, Nov. 4, 1991. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    15. Fiscal 1992 Labor, HHS, and Education Appropriations/Passage

    HR 2707 Passage, over President Bush's Nov. 19 veto, of the appropriations bill for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education. The measure would block enforcement of the administration rule, known as the “gag rule,” barring abortion counseling in federally funded family planning clinics. Rejected 276-156: R 53-113; D 222-43 (ND 155-26, SD 67-17); I 1-0, Nov. 19, 1991. A two-thirds majority of those present and voting (288 in this case) of both chambers is required to override a veto. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    16. Campaign Finance/Passage

    HR 3750 Passage of the bill to provide lower mail costs and up to $200,000 in public matching funds for the first $200 of individual contributions for House candidates who have raised more than $60,000 in individual contributions of less than $200 and agreed to a voluntary spending limit of $600,000. All House candidates would be limited to $200,000 in contributions from political action committees. Passed 273-156: R 21-144; D 251-12 (ND 176-4, SD 75-8); I 1-0, Nov. 25, 1991. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    Appendix

    1992 Key Votes

    Senate
    1. School Choice

    Despite talk of improving public schools with national goals, standards and testing, along with new “break the mold” schools, the 1992 debate over elementary and secondary education hinged on one inflammatory issue: school choice. It would have sent public funds to some private schools.

    Although Congress traditionally worked on a bipartisan basis to pass education legislation, the Democratic school improvement bill (S 2) became a political battleground in election year 1992, with President Bush trying to assert his “education president” label and Democrats striving to prove otherwise. The school choice issue was the main point of friction.

    Bush and Education Secretary Lamar Alexander argued that all children should be able to vote with their feet, leaving bad schools for better schools, which would in turn spur schools to improve through the competition for students. But opponents said that using federal funds for private schools would undermine public schools and the students left in them.

    Choice opponents won a decisive victory Jan. 23 when the Senate declined to support even the smallest demonstration program of private school choice.

    After a generally partisan debate over the basic philosophy of public education, the Senate rejected a sharply scaled-back amendment to set up six demonstration projects in which federal school aid could be used to allow low-income students to attend the schools of their parents' choice. Despite the administration's backing, the amendment failed, 36-57: R 33-6; D 3-51 (ND 2-35, SD 1-16).

    Offered by Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, R-Utah, the amendment proposed spending $30 million on the program, far less than the nationwide choice plan outlined in Bush's America 2000 program for elementary and secondary education. Hatch and other choice proponents had hoped that by limiting the amendment to a small demonstration program, Democratic senators might be willing to try it.

    But Senate Democrats said from the outset that they would not allow the administration to get a foot in the “choice” door. Only three Democrats voted for Hatch's amendment: Bill Bradley, N.J., John B. Breaux, La., and Joseph I. Lieberman, Conn. Six of the Senate's 43 Republicans voted against it.

    The Senate vote had larger consequences for school choice advocates. The lack of support for even the scaled-back Hatch proposal prompted House Education and Labor Chairman William D. Ford, D-Mich., to dump unilaterally a compromise school choice provision that he had previously agreed to in committee. Ford said that if the Senate bill did not have public money for private school choice, then the House would not either.

    A House-Senate conference report on S 2 — minus any school choice language — eventually died in the Senate in the face of a Republican filibuster threat.

    2. Nuclear Energy

    Congress administered a political booster shot to the beleaguered nuclear power industry in 1992 by approving a streamlined federal licensing process that could make it easier to build new nuclear power plants.

    The Senate was the first chamber to approve the new licensing rules, adopting them by voice vote after rejecting an alternative by Sen. Bob Graham, D-Fla., that was opposed by the industry.

    The once-thriving U.S. nuclear industry saw its fortunes wane in recent years. Highly publicized accidents at Three Mile Island, near Harrisburg, Pa., and at the former Soviet Union's Chernobyl nuclear plant shook public confidence in the safety of nuclear power. Nuclear power sometimes proved costlier than anticipated, and experts struggled to determine the best way to dispose of radioactive nuclear waste.

    But substantial congressional support for nuclear power still existed, especially in light of the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act, which set new limits on air pollution from other power sources such as coal-fired plants.

    Nuclear power advocates sought regulatory changes they said would advance the industry. Among them was licensing reform.

    In the past, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) used a two-step process that required applicants first to win a construction license, then an operation license.

    But industry officials complained this system was abused by nuclear critics to delay plant operations and drive up costs. Industry officials sought a combined construction and operation license that would force regulators to rule on controversial issues up front — and presumably protect investment in a plant from eleventh-hour opposition.

    The NRC in 1989 issued a rule to create such a combined license, but it was challenged in court. While that case advanced, the administration and congressional supporters sought legislation to authorize the new one-step licensing process.

    Senate Energy Committee Chairman J. Bennett Johnston, D-La., included the proposal in his committee's omnibus energy bill (S 2166), over the strong opposition of environmental groups. The new process generally would cut out a second full public hearing that was required before a plant was allowed to operate. Environmentalists and other critics argued that the change could increase the possibility of approving unsafe nuclear plants and undermine public confidence in the licensing system.

    During floor debate on the energy bill in February, Graham challenged the licensing proposal and offered an alternative. His proposal also would have created a one-step licensing process, but with greater guarantees for a second public hearing if critics raised valid safety concerns or new information.

    But Johnston undercut support for Graham's proposal by slightly modifying his original bill to include some additional guarantees of public participation. In the key vote, Johnston moved to table (and thus kill) Graham's proposal. He prevailed 52-43: R 31-11; D 21-32 (ND 9-27, SD 12-5), on Feb. 6.

    Senators then adopted the revised Johnston language by voice vote.

    The Senate vote paved the way for similar action in the House, where the nuclear industry traditionally has enjoyed solid support. The House passed identical licensing language, virtually ensuring victory for the proposal if the energy bill passed. The energy bill, with the new one-step licensing provisions, cleared Congress and was signed into law in October.

    The licensing change had little practical effect, as no new plants were on order. But the change stood to increase investor confidence in nuclear plants and provide an important symbolic win for industry.

    3. Budget ‘Walls’

    Senate Democratic leaders were confident early in 1992 that they would mount an effective election-year challenge to President Bush by passing economic measures with a Democratic stamp and forcing Bush to veto them.

    A key to that strategy was a bill to knock down the budget “walls” between defense and domestic appropriations, allowing a shift of defense savings into cash-short domestic programs. They calculated that while a Bush veto of such a bill was virtually certain, it would sharpen the differences between what they saw as their invest-in-America policy and Bush's outmoded Cold War priorities.

    But like their House counterparts, Senate leaders failed to reckon on trouble in their ranks. Before they could confront Bush, they had to unite Senate Democrats to overcome strong GOP opposition, and in the end they could not do it.

    When Senate leaders tried to stop a filibuster against the measure March 26, they were defeated by virtually unanimous Republican opposition combined with the same Democratic coalition that would undo House Democratic leaders' plans to pass a walls bill five days later — conservative defense and deficit hawks joined with moderate and liberal Democrats worried about losing hometown defense jobs.

    The bill (S 2399), drawn up by Budget Committee Chairman Jim Sasser, D-Tenn., would have changed the terms of the 1990 budget agreement to allow defense savings to be used for purposes other than deficit reduction. Senate appropriators, limited by increasingly tight spending caps, wanted the extra money to help keep domestic programs even with inflation or give them a boost.

    Proponents argued that the Soviet threat that had justified the level of defense spending agreed to in the 1990 budget deal no longer existed. The money, they said, should go to other needs. “Are we going to move decisively to invest a portion of our peace dividend?” asked Sasser. “Or are we going to maintain Cold War policy and Cold War sacrifices after the Cold War is over?”

    “What peace dividend?” retorted John C. Danforth, R-Mo., who noted that the fiscal 1992 deficit was estimated to be as high as $400 billion or more. “How can we talk about an election-year gift to the American people when we're broke?”

    Sasser argued that the bill would simply authorize a shift of money that could have been spent anyway from one spending category to another, with no net impact on the deficit.

    But even fellow Democrats disputed him. “There's only one guaranteed result to a change in the budget deal, and that's to increase the deficit,” said Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn, D-Ga. “If we pass this amendment … the defense budget will become the equivalent of the House bank.”

    In the end, Senate Majority Leader George J. Mitchell, D-Maine, was unable to shut down a filibuster against the measure. Mitchell and Sasser came up 10 votes short of the 60 they needed to move the bill forward. The motion to invoke cloture (and thereby end the filibuster) was rejected, 50-48: R 3-40; D 47-8 (ND 35-3, SD 12-5). (House key vote 3)

    4. Fetal Tissue Research

    Of all the abortion-related issues the 102nd Congress grappled with, none hit as close to home as whether to lift the Bush administration's ban on research using tissue from aborted fetuses.

    Abortion opponents, including Bush, supported the ban because they feared the research, if successful, could encourage women to have abortions. But that was by no means a universal view among those who opposed abortion. Even some of the Congress's strongest abortion foes — such as Sens. Strom Thurmond, R-S.C., and Mark O. Hatfield, R-Ore. — opposed the ban. They argued that it was wrong to refuse to fund research that scientists said had the potential to provide treatments or even cures for such ailments as diabetes, Parkinson's disease and Alzheimer's disease. And they hammered their message home by citing the plights of friends and relatives who were waiting for a miracle; people such as Thurmond's daughter, Julie, who suffered from diabetes, and former Rep. Morris K. Udall, D-Ariz., who was forced to retire due to Parkinson's disease.

    By early 1992, it became clear to abortion foes who supported the ban that they needed to provide an alternative if they were to avert legislative defeat. That alternative, provided during Senate floor consideration in late March of legislation to reauthorize the National Institutes of Health (which contained language to overturn the ban), came in the form of an amendment offered by Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, R-Utah. Hatch's amendment would have allowed the research to go forward, but instead of using remains from elective abortions, it would have created a series of “banks” to collect tissue from miscarriages and tubal pregnancies. Hatch was backed by experts who said such remains could provide enough tissue to allow the research effort to proceed.

    Advocates of unfettered fetal tissue research produced experts of their own who said that tissue from miscarriages and tubal pregnancies is often diseased and unusable for research, and that it was not possible to harvest tissue fast enough from such unplanned events as miscarriages. Their argument prevailed overwhelmingly in the Senate, which rejected Hatch's amendment March 31 on a vote of 23-77: R 20-23; D 3-54 (ND 1-39, SD 2-15).

    But while opponents of the ban won the battle, the staunch abortion foes temporarily won the war. Bush created the tissue banks by executive order in May and vetoed the NIH bill (HR 2507) in June, and the House failed to override. The Senate in October tried to take up yet another NIH bill that would have required researchers first to seek samples from the tissue banks but, if tissue was not readily available, would then allow them to use samples from abortions. That bill died in an end-of-session filibuster. However, upon assuming office, Bill Clinton on Jan. 22, 1993, by executive order, overturned the ‘gag rule.’

    5. Campaign Finance

    Passing a campaign finance bill was nothing new for the Senate; it had done so in each of the previous two Congresses. But sending a bill to the White House, as the Senate did April 30, was a new experience for many. Only 10 of the senators who voted for the bill (S 3) had been in the chamber in 1974, when the last campaign finance overhaul was enacted.

    The 1992 experience, however, was academic. A veto had been guaranteed since Day One.

    The Senate had passed S 3 in May 1991. The only question in 1992 was whether House and Senate conferees would try to somehow bridge the chasms that separated the chambers' bills and the gulf separating the parties to produce a bill that the president might sign. In the end, they did not. Instead, Democrats in both chambers found common ground by letting each chamber write its own rules. But that plan left out Republican views, and President Bush vetoed the bill May 9.

    The Democrats believed the way to reform the congressional system was to limit campaign spending. To accomplish this within the framework of the 1976 Supreme Court decision in Buckley v. Valeo, the bill would have provided federal funds to candidates who agreed to comply with the spending limits and other restrictions.

    The bill would have established a complex formula for determining spending ceilings depending on state population. The highest would have been $8.9 million for a candidate from a large state with a contested primary and general election; the low, $636,500, for a candidate from a small state with a primary but no general election opponent.

    Candidates who agreed to obey the limit would get benefits, including cut-rate postage and up to 20 percent of the spending cap in broadcast vouchers.

    Most Republicans opposed the tenets of the bill. They believed spending limits would put challengers at a disadvantage, and they strongly objected to public funding.

    One key Senate provision that changed significantly between 1991 and 1992 concerned contributions from political action committees (PACs).

    The 1991 version of S 3 contained a prohibition on PAC participation in Senate campaigns. It was one provision that appealed to Republicans, who had grown tired of watching PAC contributions flow to the party that controlled Congress. Democrats went along with the proposal; it was accepted without a vote or even much debate.

    But in 1992, when it was evident that the bill would clear Congress, Senate Democrats looked to their conferees to quietly dilute the ban. While not as dependent on PAC money as their House counterparts, Democratic senators who felt they could do without the politically risky special interest money had already kicked the habit. The others apparently felt they could not do without it.

    So, without fuss, the conference changed the Senate provision to allow some contributions, limiting them to $2,500 per PAC per election (half the existing cap). PAC contributions could not total more than 20 percent of the limit for a particular state.

    The Senate approved the conference report April 30 on a 58-42 vote, with two Republicans switching their votes from 1991 to oppose the bill because of the PAC provision. Three Democrats changed their positions to support the measure.

    When the bill came back with a veto message, only one senator switched his vote: John McCain, R-Ariz., had voted for the conference report but supported the veto. The override on May 13 was 57-42: R 3-40; D 54-2 (ND 39-0, SD 15-2).

    That was nine votes short of overriding the veto. “We'll be back again and again until we get it passed into law,” vowed David L. Boren, D-Okla., chief Senate sponsor of the measure. (House key vote 5)

    6. Ex-Soviet Aid

    While support for U.S. aid to the former Soviet republics was stronger in the Senate than in the House, there was still a great deal of reluctance among Senators to help the former superpower. A number of Senators felt strongly that the United States should use the opportunity to impose stringent conditions on any such assistance. They argued that U.S. taxpayers should not be asked to send their money to nations that still posed a military threat or acted in other ways contrary to U.S. interests.

    But the administration and other proponents of the legislation countered that any conditions would slow the distribution of the urgently needed assistance and possibly undermine the reform governments that it was intended to help. These fledgling regimes, while not perfect, were described as far friendlier to the United States than any replacement regime would be if they failed.

    Perhaps the biggest obstacle to Senate approval of aid was the continued presence of about 100,000 former Soviet troops in the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. While Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin said it was the intention of the Commonwealth of Independent States to remove the troops eventually, the gradual withdrawal was not fast enough for Baltic supporters in Congress. They argued that these countries had never been part of the Soviet Union and that the troops represented an occupation force. The Russians countered that they could not withdraw the troops more quickly because they lacked housing and jobs for the soldiers and because the country needed first to get its economy in order.

    When the ex-Soviet aid package came to the Senate floor July 1, Dennis DeConcini, D-Ariz., and Larry Pressler, R-S.D., offered an amendment to prohibit the United States from giving economic aid to Russia until the president certified that Moscow was making “significant progress” in withdrawing forces from the Baltics.

    Backers of the bill said the amendment, if approved, would nullify the commitment of aid to Russia because the president would not be able to make such a certification. Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Claiborne Pell, D-R.I., tried to modify the amendment by proposing a one-year delay in the certification requirement.

    Pressler then made a motion to table (or kill) Pell's amendment for a grace period on the aid restriction. On this key vote, the motion was rejected 35-60: R 11-30; D 24-30 (ND 14-24, SD 10-6). Pell's amendment was then adopted by voice vote.

    It was a turning point toward passage of aid with few strings attached. Most subsequent attempts to place conditions on the aid were blocked, and the bill (S 2532) was subsequently passed by a vote of 76-20. (House key vote 14)

    7. Unemployment Compensation

    For months, the House and the Senate had tried to persuade President Bush to extend emergency unemployment benefits for the long-term jobless. Existing authorization of extended benefits was due to expire July 4, 1992, and people exhausting state benefits after that date would not be eligible for federal benefits.

    President Bush repeatedly complained about the price of continuing the emergency program, which had cost $2.7 billion. But when the national unemployment rate leaped three-tenths of a percent in June — to 7.8 percent, the highest rate in eight years — Bush softened his opposition considerably. Congress promptly moved on a $5.5 billion bill (HR 5260 — PL 102-318) extending benefits for the long-term jobless.

    It may have been the final unemployment bill Congress would have to consider: Besides the emergency benefits, HR 5260 included a permanent change in the compensation system that was expected to make further extension bills unnecessary.

    Because the usual mechanism releasing extended unemployment compensation was relatively restrictive, Congress had stepped in twice during the past year to override the regular extension system with emergency benefits. Under the regular system, jobless workers became eligible for state-federal extended benefits after they used up 26 weeks of state benefits, but only when statewide unemployment rates reached a certain trigger level. The bill changed the state-federal trigger, allowing the extended benefits to flow more quickly without intervention by Congress.

    When the June unemployment rate was announced July 2, Bush's first reaction was that it was “not good news,” but that he might still veto an unemployment bill if it cost too much. By the end of the day, however, Bush referred to HR 5260 as “an important safeguard for workers who still can't find jobs as the economy continues to grow.”

    The House-Senate conference report to HR 5260 had been written largely by Senate Finance Chairman Lloyd Bentsen, D-Texas, and represented a compromise between Bush and the original $5.8 billion House version.

    Bentsen's bill also contained fewer permanent changes to the unemployment system. Bentsen's version provided unemployed workers in 15 states with 26 extra weeks of benefits and workers in all other states and the District of Columbia with 20 extra weeks until March 6, 1993. Those benefits went into effect when workers exhausted their state compensation without finding a job.

    The change in the trigger for non-emergency extended benefits also went into effect: It would kick in March 7, 1993, the day after the emergency program expired.

    The permanent change in the unemployment system was something Bush had vowed that he would not accept, but the higher unemployment numbers forced him to cave. The Senate on July 2 promptly cleared the conference report, 93-3: R 37-3; D 56-0 (ND 40-0, SD 16-0). Bush signed the bill the next day.

    8. Strategic Defense Initiative

    The Senate ratified the basic stand it had taken in 1991, funding a version of the strategic defense initiative (SDI) that was aimed at deploying a ground-based, anti-missile defense system. However, with the budget tight and the Soviet threat defunct, a majority of senators voted to rein in SDI spending.

    On Aug. 7, the Senate in effect supported an amendment that would have sliced $1 billion in SDI funding from the defense authorization bill (S 3114). The key vote was on a motion to table (and thus kill) the amendment. The motion failed 43-49: R 34-5; D 9-44 (ND 4-33, SD 5-11).

    The strong show of sentiment to reduce SDI funding even below the $4.3 billion proposed by the Armed Services Committee blocked action on the overall defense bill for more than a month. SDI opponents refused to back down; SDI supporters, backed by a veto threat from President Bush, refused to permit the Senate to proceed to the next procedural step — a vote on the amendment to cut the funding.

    Senate leaders warned that the stalemate could kill the entire defense measure, leaving the Pentagon to rely on a stopgap appropriations bill. On Sept. 17, the Senate backed away from the SDI confrontation, settling on a $3.8 billion SDI research compromise engineered by Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn, D-Ga. The final version of the bill (HR 5006 — PL 102-484), as crafted by a House-Senate conference committee, included $4.05 billion for SDI. The compromise defense appropriations bill (HR 5504) incorporated the $3.8 billion compromise on SDI funding.

    The Aug. 7 vote to slash SDI may have marked the start of a third phase in SDI's contentious political history in the Senate.

    President Ronald Reagan launched the program in 1983, offering it as a revolutionary program to liberate the nation from the Soviet nuclear missile threat. In the first phase of the SDI debate, through 1986, Congress routinely reduced the SDI budget from Reagan's request but rejected proposals for deeper cuts that would have restricted the program to laboratory research.

    In the second phase, between 1987 and 1992, the SDI debate turned on the role of space-based weapons. Republican conservatives, led by Sen. Malcolm Wallop, R-Wyo., sought an extensive system of space-based interceptors that could destroy Soviet missiles in the first few minutes of flight, before they could swamp the defense with multiple warheads and swarms of decoys. But that goal was challenged as provocative and technically questionable by centrist Democrats, including Nunn and House Armed Services Committee Chairman Les Aspin, Wis.

    Nunn and Aspin instead promoted a more modest anti-missile defense intended to protect U.S. territory, overseas forces and allies against “limited” attacks by a Third World country or by a renegade military unit.

    In a series of votes between 1987 and 1991, Congress essentially endorsed the Nunn-Aspin approach: It repeatedly forced unwilling Republican administrations to respect the prohibition on space-based weapons tests included in the 1972 U.S.-Soviet treaty limiting anti-ballistic missile defenses. And in 1991, the Senate recast Bush's SDI program to focus on near-term, ground-based defenses and to defer the space-based weapons.

    In 1992, liberal Democrats still opposed to such a limited defense conceded that they had lost that fight. So when the Senate took up the Armed Services Committee's $4.3 billion recommendation for SDI — compared with the the $5.4 billion requested by Bush — Jim Sasser, D-Tenn., and Dale Bumpers, D-Ark., proposed the $1 billion cut to $3.3 billion. (House key vote 8)

    9. Nuclear Test Ban

    Symbolically closing the books on the Cold War, the Senate voted to end nuclear weapons testing. The more significant of two votes on the subject came Sept. 18, when the Senate approved, 55-40, an amendment to the fiscal 1993 defense authorization bill (S 3114) that would have imposed a nine-month halt to nuclear testing, to be followed by a permanent test ban after the end of fiscal 1996.

    For four decades, a test ban was largely a distant dream of liberal activists. Every president from Dwight D. Eisenhower to Ronald Reagan proclaimed an eventual end to testing as a national goal, but only Jimmy Carter accorded the goal more than lip service.

    In fiscal 1986 through 1988, the House annually had approved an amendment to the defense authorization bill that would have barred tests of nuclear weapons with an explosive punch greater than 1,000 tons of TNT. But those votes were largely symbolic, taken on the assumption the Senate would reject any significant nuclear test limitations.

    And, indeed, so long as the Soviet nuclear threat was intact, a majority of senators seemed to accept the contention of Pentagon and Energy Department nuclear weapons specialists: that continuous testing was required to check on the safety and reliability of weapons already in the U.S. stockpile.

    But with the disintegration of the Soviet Union — and with Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin observing a self-imposed nuclear test moratorium — test ban proponents in 1992 stepped up their efforts to terminate the U.S. testing program.

    For the first time, they were supported by Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn, D-Ga., who echoed what had long been one of the liberals' arguments: That a halt to testing might give Washington more diplomatic leverage to dissuade other countries from trying to develop nuclear weapons.

    On Aug. 3, the Senate approved 68-26 an amendment by Mark O. Hatfield, R-Ore., to the fiscal 1993 energy and water appropriations bill (HR 5373) to impose a nine-month testing halt followed in 1996 by a permanent ban. But that vote overstated Senate support for the proposal because several opponents voted for the amendment for tactical reasons.

    On Sept. 18, Hatfield offered a similar amendment to the defense authorization bill. It was approved 55-40: R 13-29; D 42-11 (ND 35-3, SD 7-8).

    In the end, a halt to nuclear testing was enacted as part of the energy and water spending bill, and the sensitive provision then was dropped from the defense bill.

    Despite the administration's vocal opposition to the test ban, President Bush signed the energy and water measure (PL 102-377), which also included funds for the politically appealing superconducting supercollider, an atom smasher being built in Texas that was eagerly sought by the administration.

    10. Family and Medical Leave

    With two votes more than necessary, the Senate on Sept. 24 overrode President Bush's veto of the Family and Medical Leave Act (S 5), a bill to require large companies to grant unpaid leave to employees for family and medical emergencies. It was the first time in four years the Senate had mustered a two-thirds override majority.

    Although the House later sustained the family leave veto, the Senate vote presaged the decline of Bush's power in Congress. And it showed the bipartisan political appeal of an issue that directly targeted middle-age, middle-class families. The measure would have granted unpaid leave of up to 12 weeks to workers for the birth or adoption of a child or the illness of a close family member. Democrats and a number of Republicans generally supported it because of this “pro-family” bent.

    And while most Republicans opposed the legislation because of its mandates on business, the override vote demonstrated the frustration of many within GOP ranks over Bush's refusal to negotiate a compromise with Democrats.

    Just one year earlier, the Senate had approved with 65 votes — two short of what it took to override a veto — a compromise bill worked out by Democrat Christopher J. Dodd of Connecticut and Republican Christopher S. Bond of Missouri. At that time, two Democratic senators were off campaigning for president, and one was out sick. They all said they supported the bill, however, so it appeared that they would prevail if the president maintained his veto stance.

    For the next year, Dodd and Bond tried to pull the administration on board. Seeking to take business interests into account, they agreed to exempt the highest-paid 10 percent of an employer's work force and to restrict eligibility for leave to employees who had worked at least 25 hours a week for the previous 12 months.

    As it was, the bill would apply only to those businesses with more than 50 workers, exempting more than 95 percent of all employers (the largest 5 percent of businesses employ 60 percent of all workers).

    But White House officials refused to budge. “They were not willing to deal,” Bond complained. As the election neared, and as Democratic nominee Bill Clinton stepped up his campaign references to the family leave bill, Senate Democrats decided to make their push on the eve of the Republican convention in August. But GOP leaders threatened to block Dodd's effort to force a roll-call vote. Instead, senators adopted the House-Senate conference report by voice vote, delaying the showdown until after the promised veto.

    And as expected, Bush vetoed the bill Sept. 22, sending it back to Capitol Hill. Although Dodd and Bond appeared to have the votes, they worried about Bush peeling away important conservatives, such as Daniel R. Coats, R-Ind., who had come on board in support of a “family values” bill.

    But unlike nine previous Senate override votes, Bush could not sway the one or two votes he needed. With 99 senators voting on Sept. 24, the family leave sponsors prevailed on a vote of 68-31: R 14-28; D 54-3 (ND 40-0, SD 14-3).

    As expected, three senators who were absent for the 1991 vote voted to override: Tom Harkin, D-Iowa, Bob Kerrey, D-Neb., and David Pryor, D-Ark. The lone Republican to switch over to the president's side — Ted Stevens of Alaska — was offset by a Democratic switch, David L. Boren of Oklahoma.

    The House on Sept. 30 voted to sustain the veto, 258-169, killing the bill for the year. In that chamber, Republican opponents were able to convince conservative Democrats that the measure would burden businesses with unnecessary mandates.

    In 1993, however, the bill became law. Upholding his promise to sign a family leave bill during his first 100 days in office, President Bill Clinton on Jan. 25 signed the legislation (HR 1 — PL 103-3). The bill was nearly identical to the one vetoed by Bush in 1992.

    11. Taxes/Urban Aid

    It was the second tax bill of the year — and the second one that appeared predestined for a veto. In came Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole, R-Kan., late on Sept. 25 with an amendment to shed several tax increases in the $32 billion bill (HR 11) in hopes of pleasing President Bush and maybe saving the measure.

    But Dole's amendment failed 34-59: R 31-8; D 3-51 (ND 1-38, SD 2-13). If it was not clear before, it was clear then that the bill was doomed.

    The demise of the Dole amendment offered a micro-cosmic glimpse into why Congress and Bush — despite mutual agreement about the need to stimulate the economy and to give tax incentives to blighted inner cities — could not overcome deep divisions that killed this bill and stunted tax policy making throughout much of the Bush administration.

    Dole's amendment would have eliminated two tax raising provisions — a limit on itemized deductions and a phaseout of the personal exemption for upper-income taxpayers — that the White House had said it opposed.

    To offset the $7.7 billion revenue loss caused by removing the provisions, the amendment also would have scaled back assistance for inner cities, removed a tax break for contributions to individual retirement accounts (IRAs) and shortened to 12 months from 15 months the extension provided for a dozen expiring tax provisions.

    The basic problem that Dole was trying to address was one that lay below the surface as the bill progressed through Congress throughout the late summer and early fall.

    After trying to tag Bill Clinton as a tax-and-spender because of his support for a slew of mostly minor revenue provisions during his tenure as Arkansas governor, Bush was refusing to open himself to the same charge by supporting anything resembling a tax increase. So Dole was trying to get the two most obvious tax increases out of the bill. “The president of the United States is not going to sign a tax increase 30 days before the election,” he told the Senate.

    But in cutting the tax increases, Dole also had to cut back on the tax breaks in the bill. And Senate Finance Committee Chairman Lloyd Bentsen, D-Texas, the architect of the IRA provisions, did not appreciate that — Bentsen's opinion carried a lot of weight among fellow Democrats. The vote against Dole's amendment went largely along party lines.

    Dole's amendment had an additional problem. It would have lowered from 125 to 30 the number of enterprise zones created by the bill, severely cutting back on the tax assistance for inner cities that had been the original justification for doing the bill.

    In short, the Senate discovered that it was impossible to do all it wanted in the bill without tax increases. But it also proved impossible to win Bush's support for a bill with new taxes, regardless of what else it contained. With the failure of the Dole amendment, it became clear there was no overcoming that basic impediment.

    12. Abortion Counseling

    By the time the Senate finally took its first roll-call vote on a bill to overturn the “gag rule” prohibiting abortion counseling in federally funded family planning clinics, the ultimate fate of the bill was no longer in doubt. Repeated votes in the House had made clear that, while a majority of members opposed the counseling ban, a two-thirds supermajority was not attainable to override a certain Bush veto.

    Still, there was more than the usual amount of interest when the Senate on Oct. 1 cast its override vote on a bill (S 323) to overturn the ban and reauthorize the federal family planning program. It was the first time the Senate had taken a roll-call vote on the measure.

    Both the original bill, approved in July 1991, and the conference report on the measure, approved Sept. 14, had passed on voice votes. Congress watchers also were interested in whether the Senate would, for only the second time in the Bush presidency, muster the two-thirds override margin. (The first time came only a week earlier, when the chamber voted to override Bush's veto of a bill to require employers to provide unpaid family and medical leave.)

    It appeared that the Senate would have little difficulty attaining the two-thirds majority to override. Ever since abortion became a major congressional issue in the 1970s, the Senate had traditionally been more sympathetic to abortion rights forces, while the House had generally leaned toward abortion foes. But the Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, which gave states some leeway in restricting abortions, rejuvenated abortion rights forces in both chambers. As a result, the House shifted to a more abortion rights stance and the Senate moved even further into that camp.

    But supporters of the bill to overturn the gag rule remained worried. Bush aides had been amazingly successful over the previous four years in getting Senate Republicans to stand by the president even when they did not agree with his veto. And it was not entirely clear how many Democrats with mixed abortion voting records would go for the override.

    But the Senate vote on Oct. 1 left few doubts about where senators stood. The vote was 73-26: R 20-23; D 53-3 (ND 40-0, SD 13-3) — seven more than needed to override. A day later, however, the House surprised no one when members voted to sustain Bush's veto. (House key vote 6)

    13. Foreign Aid

    After President Bush and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin agreed in August on a package of loan guarantees for Jerusalem, Senate approval of the fiscal 1993 foreign aid appropriations bill (HR 5368 — PL 102-391) was virtually assured.

    The Senate has long been a wellspring of support for Israel, and the authorization of the five-year program of loan guarantees — on top of the $3 billion usually provided Israel in the foreign aid bill — made the measure palatable for senators even during an election year focused on domestic concerns.

    In the key vote Oct. 1, the Senate passed the $26.4 billion foreign aid appropriations bill, 87-12: R 35-8; D 52-4 (ND 39-1, SD 13-3).

    It marked the first time in two years that the Senate had approved an aid bill. The fiscal 1992 measure became embroiled in a bitter battle between the Bush administration and Israeli government over loan guarantees.

    Despite the chronic unpopularity of foreign aid, there were only a few attempts to cut the funding. Sen. Jesse Helms, R-N.C., failed in a bid to cut funding by 10 percent.

    Nor was there opposition to the loan guarantees or to the bill's other major initiative, $12.3 billion in new financing for the International Monetary Fund.

    But the measure addressed a host of issues arising from the breakup of the former Soviet Union and the bitter ethnic conflicts exploding in many parts of the world.

    The legislation put the Senate squarely on the side of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Yugoslav civil war by authorizing the president to provide up to $50 million in U.S. defense equipment for the country. Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr., D-Del., who sponsored the amendment, said that 100,000 Bosnians might be “frozen while under Serbian seige” during the coming winter if Western nations ignored their plight. “Are we truly to adjourn, having done nothing?” he asked his colleagues.

    The measure did not require the president to take action, and the United Nations would have to lift its arms embargo on former Yugoslavia for any arms to be provided. Still, Bush administration officials expressed concern that the introduction of more weapons into the region would only fuel the Yugoslav conflict, although they did not actively oppose Biden's amendment.

    The legislation also earmarked $55 million in refugee aid and other assistance for victims of the fighting in former Yugoslavia.

    Although the Senate fully funded the Bush administration request for $417 million in aid for the former Soviet Union, it imposed restrictions on the assistance program. The measure stipulated that no U.S. aid could be provided to Russia — except for humanitarian assistance — unless Moscow either removed its troops from the three Baltic States or negotiated an agreement for withdrawing its forces.

    The bill also barred most assistance to Russia unless the president certified that Moscow had ceased military exports to Iran. The amendment, offered by Helms, came in response to reports that Russia had sold Iran submarines over the objections of the United States. The restrictions were relaxed significantly by House-Senate conferees in the final version of the bill. (House key vote 15)

    14. Cable Reregulation

    Never had the Bush administration worked so hard to whip up support to sustain a veto — only to get whipped so badly.

    When the Senate on Oct. 5 voted to override President Bush's veto of a bill to reregulate the cable television industry, followed by similar House action hours later, the president lost his first veto confrontation with Congress. The Senate vote was 74-25: R 24-18; D 50-7 (ND 36-4, SD 14-3), more than the two-thirds majority needed to override the veto.

    By casting the showdown as a critical test of presidential loyalty, White House advisers misjudged more than Bush's slumping popularity. They also misread members' awareness of the American public's desire for inexpensive television viewing.

    Bush viewed the legislation as an unfair encroachment on the business prerogatives of a successful private industry. He also agreed with cable industry arguments that the bill had become laden with special interest provisions to help broadcasters and the home satellite dish industry, and that those provisions would make cable rates rise, not fall.

    But lawmakers from both parties saw cable television as an unregulated monopoly, and their votes responded to heavy lobbying by broadcasters and consumer groups who complained of a 61 percent average increase in cable rates since the industry was deregulated in 1987.

    The legislation (S 12 — PL 102-385) required the Federal Communications Commission to regulate rates for the lowest-priced package of programming subscribed to by the nation's 56 million cable viewers. It also took steps to help competitors such as home satellite dish programmers compete with the $20 billion cable industry.

    Bush, his Chief of Staff James A. Baker III and Senate Republican leader Bob Dole of Kansas worked hard to persuade enough senators to abandon their support for the legislation. The Senate had adopted the conference report Sept. 22 on a 74-25 vote.

    In fact, the administration came close to winning the 34 senators needed to sustain the veto, falling just one or two votes short at one point. When it became apparent that the votes could not be mustered, senators who agreed to switch were released from their commitments. As a result, the override vote was unchanged from the Sept. 22 vote on the conference report.

    That the Democratic-controlled Congress denied Bush a perfect veto record — a rarity in modern times — took on heightened importance at a time when the president was struggling to gain ground against Democratic presidential challenger Bill Clinton.

    “On this particular bill, [Bush] had very little to trade with, other than loyalty to the party and loyalty to him. And he didn't get it,” said James A. Thurber, director of the Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies at American University. (House key vote 12)

    15. Western Water Bill

    The usually solid wall of unanimity among Western senators cracked a bit in the 102nd Congress under the powerful force of water.

    In the waning days of the session, Congress approved, and President Bush signed, a huge omnibus water bill (HR 429 — PL 102-575) that had provisions affecting every Western state. The 40-title bill garnered interest from every Western quarter but, in the end, the battle came down to one title.

    Title 34, long pushed by Sen. Bill Bradley, D-N.J., sought to revamp the operations of the Central Valley Project (CVP) in California, the federal government's largest irrigation and power project. Environmentalists and urban interests maintained that some way had to be found to reallocate the CVP's water, 85 percent of which was being sold at heavily discounted rates to 23,000 farming operations.

    The CVP had always been blamed for environmental problems: changed stream flows, declining salmon populations and diminishing wildfowl habitat. Then a six-year drought in California started to pinch urban families and businesses that complained of being subject to rationing and high rates while nearby farmers got water for much less.

    Along with George Miller, D-Calif., chairman of the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, and J. Bennett Johnston, D-La., chairman of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, Bradley fashioned a CVP title that would transfer more water to fish and wildlife purposes; allow urban users to buy project water from willing sellers; and shorten long-term water contracts to enhance flexibility in water distribution.

    But Bradley had an implacable opponent on the measure: California Republican John Seymour, who argued that Bradley's proposal would hurt his supporters among the state's powerful farming interests.

    In most situations, Seymour could have counted on aid from his fellow Western conservatives, but this time he received scant help. For example, Jake Garn, the retiring Republican from Utah, was consumed with getting the long-sought authorization to complete the massive Central Utah Irrigation Project, a measure also in the bill. Garn was not about to let a lone senator kill off the entire bill, and he said so on a number of occasions.

    Seymour's main ally was Republican Gov. Pete Wilson, who once held Seymour's seat and who as governor had appointed Seymour as his replacement in the Senate.

    When the conference report came to the Senate floor Oct. 8, Seymour fought with all the dilatory weapons afforded him by the Senate.

    He helped Alfonse M. D'Amato, R-N.Y., who mounted an all-night filibuster on another, unrelated bill. And he insisted that the clerk read the entire 396-page bill, a procedure that took hours of precious Senate time in the closing days of the session.

    But again Seymour got little support from his Western brethren. Even as the bill was making its way to the floor, word got out that Garn and other senators had met with White House Chief of Staff James A. Baker III to lobby against a veto.

    When it became clear that he did not have the votes to prevent Senate leaders from invoking cloture, Seymour caved. He agreed to a deal in which the Senate would approve a symbolic bill that incorporated the California farm community's wish list. But because that bill moved on the next-to-last day of the session, it died when the House failed to act.

    The Senate, meanwhile, finally adopted the conference report on HR 429 on Oct. 8. The vote was 83-8: R 30-8; D 53-0 (ND 38-0, SD 15-0). Only two other Westerners joined Seymour in opposing the bill: Republicans Hank Brown of Colorado and Larry E. Craig of Idaho.

    President Bush signed the measure Oct. 30 in the midst of his unsuccessful campaign for re-election. The move was widely seen as an attempt to win favor in Utah and other Western states, even at the sacrifice of California. (House key vote 16)

    House
    1. Taxes

    When the House passed the first tax bill of the year (HR 4210) on Feb. 27, it was more of an election-year manifesto for the Democratic Party than serious legislation. Even so, party leaders clearly underestimated the difficulty they would have persuading their own rank and file to go along with a measure that promised higher taxes on the rich to finance a tax cut for the middle class.

    Finding themselves short of a majority hours before the scheduled vote, House Democratic leaders resorted to a hard-nosed appeal, arguing that their party had made tax cuts for the middle class its rallying cry and could not turn back.

    It worked — but just barely. A Democratic substitute amendment by Ways and Means Chairman Dan Rostenkowski, Ill., carried 221-210: R 1-164; D 219-46 (ND 156-27, SD 63-19); I 1-0. The bill (HR 4210) subsequently passed 221-209.

    Many members said the bill was inadequate, either because the tax cut was too meager, or because it was the wrong policy in an era of massive deficits. Another contingent of Democrats feared voting for the higher taxes on upper-income earners that their leaders contended would bring greater fairness to the tax code, but which would have kicked in for individuals with taxable incomes as low as $85,000.

    Democrats were divided from the start about whether the central feature of their bill should have been middle-class tax relief or help for the economy. Trying to accomplish both, Rostenkowski included provisions to help the real estate industry and other sectors of the economy.

    But Democratic leaders, in particular Majority Leader Richard A. Gephardt, Mo., saw the vote and the bill as an opportunity to put President Bush in a political bind: They hoped he would have to choose between opposing the middle-class tax cut or raising taxes — something he vowed never to repeat after signing a tax increase in 1990.

    In a heated speech during floor debate on the bill, Gephardt said, “The question in this bill is: Where does the money go? Who do you stand for? Who do you fight for?”

    Before the vote, the White House and House Republicans did their best to parry any political advantage for the Democrats, arguing that the bill was a straightforward tax increase that would do little to help the economy and would probably even hurt it. In solidarity with Bush, every House Republican but one voted against the Democratic package.

    The Democrat's slim victory underscored the feeling that the bill was doomed to result in an election-year stand-off with Bush, who was promising to veto any bill raising taxes. A month later, presented with the final version of the tax bill, Bush did just as he promised. And the Democrats' manifesto, endorsing higher taxes on the rich to pay for lower taxes on the middle class, was done for the year.

    2. House Bank Overdrafts

    On the surface, the House was in unanimous agreement. In the early morning hours of March 13 it voted 426-0 — R 165-0; D 260-0 (ND 178-0, SD 82-0); I 1-0 — to reveal the names of all who overdrew their House bank accounts.

    In fact, members could not have been more divided over an issue that paralyzed the House for weeks, embarrassed hundreds of members and several Cabinet members, increased public disdain for Congress, gave the executive branch unprecedented access to intimate details of members' personal finances, prompted the House to reform its internal operations and eventually helped end the careers of many members from both parties.

    The issue was divisive from its inception on Sept. 18, 1991, when the General Accounting Office revealed that despite past reform attempts, the members-only House bank allowed members to routinely overdraw their checking accounts.

    Activist Republicans, especially a group of freshmen known as the Gang of Seven, drove the process from the beginning. Both parties' leaders tried to end the matter by scolding members for continuing to overdraw their accounts. But the activists said that was not enough, and in October successfully pushed for the bank to be closed and for the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct to open an ethics inquiry.

    After a five-month investigation, the ethics committee on March 5 proposed revealing the names of only the 24 worst offenders — those the panel decided had “abused their banking privileges” by routinely overdrawing their accounts by significant amounts during 3¼ years studied by the panel.

    Again the Republicans, who with fewer members in office had less to lose, balked. Under the committee's proposal, more than 300 members who overdrew their accounts, including some with hundreds of overdrafts, could have remained anonymous. Although a bipartisan subcommittee of the ethics panel had approved the proposal unanimously, four GOP members of the full committee dissented, calling the proposal a whitewash.

    Democratic leaders tried to rally their members behind the committee's proposal as the week of March 9 opened. They received no help from Republican Leader Robert H. Michel, Ill., who after a GOP leadership meeting March 10 broke his silence to endorse “full disclosure” — publicizing the names and overdraft totals of each current and former member who overdrew. President Bush backed full disclosure March 11.

    Rank-and-file Democrats quickly began distancing themselves from the ethics committee's proposal. At a whip organization meeting March 12, Speaker Thomas S. Foley, D-Wash., was pummeled by members who either favored full disclosure or saw the fight as a sure loser. The leadership relented.

    Closed-door meetings to work out the details and explain the ramifications of full disclosure to members went into the evening. The final debate did not begin until 8:25 p.m., when Sergeant-at-Arms Jack Russ, who ran the House bank and cashed some of his own bad checks there, resigned.

    There was no longer any question what would happen, although members made speeches into the night about what they were doing. The ethics committee proposal to name the abusers (H Res 393) was taken up first, and it was approved 391-36 at 11 p.m., assuring those with fewer overdrafts that the most serious cases would be spot-lighted. The full disclosure resolution (H Res 396) was not approved until 1:15 a.m. the next day.

    Throughout the night, the mood was somber. “As of today,” ethics member Fred Grandy, R-Iowa, told his colleagues, “your talk show hosts have a topic; as of today, your opponent has an issue and your constituents have a reason to support term limitations.” Members opposed to full disclosure voiced doubts, but voted “yea” anyway.

    I hope it will be clear to the country that we are not hiding any information, embarrassing as it may be, misleading as it may be, in many cases unjust to members as it may be; we are going to release it,
    Foley said.

    After an arduous appeals process, the committee on April 1 cited 17 current and five former members for abusing their banking privileges and on April 16 revealed the names of 252 current members and 51 former members who overdrew their accounts. A week after all the names came out, the Justice Department's special counsel investigating the scandal for criminal wrongdoing, Malcolm R. Wilkey, subpoenaed the bank's records, prompting another weeklong fight over how much to disclose. Again, the Republicans won under the aegis of full disclosure, 347-64, on April 29.

    In September, Wilkey resuscitated the issue for fall campaigns when he began sending members letters telling them their records were no longer under scrutiny. Controversy over checks helped account for perhaps a third of the 96 members who retired or were denied re-election in 1992.

    On. Dec. 16, Wilkey issued a report calling for a criminal investigation of a few unspecified members and former members, and the Justice Department announced that it had opened such an inquiry.

    3. Budget ‘Walls’

    After President Bush challenged Congress to pass his economic agenda in a combative State of the Union address Jan. 28, House Democratic leaders decided to try to retake the political momentum by confronting him over a series of economic issues. In addition to a tax bill and a budget resolution that would spell out their — not his — priorities, leaders planned to move quickly to knock down the budget “walls” that prohibited shifting defense money to domestic spending programs.

    The 1990 budget summit agreement walled off defense, domestic and international appropriations into separate, inviolable categories. While nothing barred Congress from further reducing defense, the savings could only be used for deficit reduction, a psychological barrier that White House negotiators hoped would safeguard defense funds from a Congress that might want to raid defense for domestic projects.

    But the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the once-potent Soviet military strengthened a conviction among Democratic leaders that the priorities set by the 1990 summit were obsolete. Democratic strategists believed that shifting defense funds to cash-short domestic programs would draw a clear distinction between Democrats and Republicans during the presidential election year — demonstrating that Democrats were committed to investing in critical home-front programs, while the Bush White House and congressional Republicans were still locked in outmoded Cold War thinking. Bush had threatened to veto any bill to knock down the walls, but Democratic leaders figured a veto would draw the political distinctions that much more sharply.

    But the leadership failed to reckon on dissension in the ranks. Trouble surfaced early when conservative Democrats on the House Budget Committee forced the panel to produce two budgets: a walls-down, leadership budget that devoted most defense savings to domestic programs; and a walls-up, conservative budget that would use any defense cuts for deficit reduction. The leadership budget would prevail only if the House passed a separate bill to knock down the walls.

    Worried about support among their rank and file, Democratic leaders repeatedly postponed a scheduled vote on a bill (HR 3732), drawn up by Government Operations Committee Chairman John Conyers Jr., D-Mich., to eliminate the budget walls. When they finally brought the bill to a vote March 31, members rejected it overwhelmingly, 187-238: R 0-162; D 186-76 (ND 151-28, SD 35-48); I 1-0.

    The anatomy of the Democratic coalition against the walls bill was a study in strange bedfellows. On one side were mostly conservative deficit hawks worried about budget discipline and defense hawks concerned about opening the floodgates between defense and domestic spending categories. On the other were members, including moderates and liberals, who worried that a cut in defense funds would mean a loss of hometown defense jobs.

    The vote was one of several occasions during the year when House Democratic leaders miscalculated the strength of conservative “boll weevil” Democrats, led by Charles W. Stenholm of Texas. On this and other key issues, conservative Democrats were able to briefly form a working majority with unified House Republicans to push the House in a more fiscally conservative direction than Democratic leaders wanted it to go. (Senate key vote 3)

    4. RTC Financing

    Three years into the government's cleanup of hundreds of failed savings and loan institutions, Congress allowed the salvage operation to grind to a halt in April 1992.

    Leary of angry voters and worried about the ever-rising cost, the House overwhelmingly refused to pump any more taxpayer money into the effort — though it was obvious to all that the refusal was nothing more than a costly postponement.

    Multiple factors contributed to the House decision — including partisanship, gamesmanship and outright fear. From the beginnings of the thrift bailout in 1989 through the fall of 1991, Congress had pumped $80 billion into the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC). More than half of that sum had come from taxpayers; a bit over $30 billion was ponied up by the thrift industry itself.

    In November 1991, the first $80 billion was gone and hundreds of dead and dying thrifts remained to be shut down. So Congress reluctantly voted to give the RTC an additional $25 billion, with the stipulation that any amount that remained unspent on April 1, 1992, would revert to the Treasury. When April came, about $18 billion was returned, and the RTC's ability to close institutions and pay off depositors (or pay other banks or thrifts to take over failed thrifts) effectively came to an end.

    Many members had hoped that agreement could be reached on a package of management and policy reforms for the RTC — a huge agency that created controversy with nearly every decision it made. Some critics thought it moved too slowly to reduce its huge inventory of loans and securities taken from failed thrifts; others accused it of dumping real estate on an already weakened market, or of cutting special deals with a privileged few investors.

    Still others complained that other government policies — not decisions by the RTC — were causing some weak thrifts to be needlessly closed. House Republicans, led by Bill McCollum of Florida, rallied to that cause, refusing to support additional money for the RTC unless banking laws were changed to allow some weakened thrifts to be kept open.

    Most Democrats saw the GOP plan as yet another instance of forbearance — the sort of policy that contributed to the crisis in the first place — and refused. (House Republican Whip Newt Gingrich of Georgia had his own gambit: He wanted to use the RTC bill to force a vote on a GOP economic stimulus package.) The result was a stalemate in the House.

    On March 26, the Senate voted 52-42 in favor of a bill (S 2482) that incorporated a Bush administration request for $25 billion more for the RTC, plus restoration of the unused appropriation from the previous November. That amount would be enough, administration officials assured Congress, to conclude the cleanup. Two weeks earlier, the House Banking Committee approved a similar measure (HR 4241), but it proved impossible to line up enough votes for it to pass on the floor.

    House leaders then decided to bring up a very narrow bill (HR 4704) that merely would have restored the unused $18 billion. McCollum was not allowed to offer an amendment, and Republicans decided to abandon the bill — despite administration pleas for support. With little GOP backing for spending taxpayer money on such an unpopular cause, Democrats also voted “nay.” The bill went down overwhelmingly on April 1, 125-298: R 45-117; D 80-180 (ND 47-130, SD 33-50); I 0-1.

    The stalemate continued for the balance of the year. The House did not try to bring the bill up again, and the administration did not press the matter with any noticeable vigor.

    5. Campaign Finance

    Context was everything for the 1992 campaign finance bill. For House Democrats, under siege all spring for a series of scandals, the bill became a centerpiece of their efforts to claim the mantle of reform. On April 9, the chamber resuscitated a bill to overhaul campaign law for the first time in 18 years. Just hours later, the House voted to turn the chamber's internal operations over to a professional administrator and voted three times on resolutions to keep the heat on an internal investigation of problems at the House Post Office.

    The broader context, however, was decades of wrangling between Democrats and Republicans over which party would be advantaged by a new system. Here Republicans had the last say, because President Bush made good on his oft-repeated veto threats in May, and the bill died.

    At the beginning of the year, it was not clear that there would be any campaign finance bill for the House to vote on. In the first session, both chambers had passed legislation to change the financing practices for congressional campaigns. But the Senate and House bills were incompatible — the Senate provided publicly funded broadcast vouchers to candidates, while the House proposed matching funds for its candidates — and Democrats in the two chambers had wide differences in sensitive areas such as political action committee (PAC) contributions. Both bills were veto bait for Bush.

    In that environment, there was little incentive to make the tough choices required to reach a conference accord and send it to the House floor. But with the House bank scandal generating headlines and public esteem for the House falling precipitously, the climate changed and Democrats rushed to the conference table.

    House negotiators gave up any hope that the House and Senate would agree on one public funding formula, which made drafting a conference report a simple task of essentially stapling the two bills together.

    The final bill would have set a $600,000 optional spending limit for House races in primary and general elections. Candidates who agreed to obey the limit would get benefits, including cut-rate postage and up to $200,000 in public funds doled out to match the first $200 of each individual contribution.

    Republicans dubbed the measure another congressional perk. They said a spending limit would benefit incumbents, most of whom were Democrats, at the expense of challengers who have to compete against the taxpayer-financed communications network that House members enjoy. Republicans also objected to the public funding, which Minority Whip Newt Gingrich, R-Ga., called “a new House bank with a new line of credit.”

    Republicans and outside reform advocates found common ground on the PAC issue. For different reasons, both would have preferred that PACs, which traditionally favored incumbents, be locked out of participation in congressional campaigns. Democrats wanted no part of that. For House campaigns, the bill left intact the existing $5,000 limit on individual PAC campaign donations, although it would have placed a $200,000 aggregate cap on how much a candidate could accept from PACs.

    When the conference report made it to the House floor on April 9, party positions were already staked out. The bill's promise that public financing provisions would have to be worked out later gave Southern Democrats the cover they needed, and few members crossed party lines. The House adopted the conference report 259-165: R 19-145; D 239-20 (ND 171-6, SD 68-14); I 1-0.

    Subsequent action was equally predictable: the Senate passed the bill April 30 and the president vetoed the bill May 9. The Senate override attempt failed. (Senate key vote 5)

    6. Abortion Counseling

    Though ultimately unsuccessful, congressional efforts in 1992 to overturn the “gag rule” prohibiting abortion counseling in federally funded family planning clinics aptly illustrated both how far abortion rights supporters had come and how far they still had to go.

    For more than a decade, the House was a stronghold for abortion opponents. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, House members took the lead in imposing a series of restrictions on the procedure, mostly on funding matters.

    But the Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services changed all that. Just as 1973's Roe v. Wade, which created a nationwide right to abortion, galvanized forces opposed to the procedure, so Webster, which gave states more latitude to restrict abortion access, helped rejuvenate abortion rights activists. Since the decision, however, House abortion rights forces could manage to muster only a majority to overturn a variety of abortion-related restrictions, never the two-thirds needed to override repeated vetoes by anti-abortion stalwart President Bush.

    The key abortion counseling vote of the year came April 30 on final passage of legislation to reauthorize the federal family planning program, Title X of the Public Health Service Act. It showed the progress abortion rights backers had made. Approval of the measure (HR 3090) marked the first time since 1984 that the chamber had voted to reauthorize the program. The last time sponsors tried to do so, in 1985, the bill received only 214 votes, less than a majority and far less than the two-thirds needed for passage under the fast-track procedure sponsors used at the time. This time the vote for passage was a strong 268-150: R 55-105; D 212-45 (ND 146-28, SD 66-17); I 1-0.

    But the vote also signaled that, while abortion rights forces might have turned things around in the House, even on their strongest issues they remained unable to overturn any of the federal government's existing anti-abortion policies — as long as Bush stood by his veto promise. Many abortion foes in both parties opposed the abortion counseling rules, upheld by the Supreme Court in 1991, on the grounds that they violated free speech guarantees and medical ethics. But even with those added votes, the total was 11 short of the number needed to override Bush's promised veto.

    And, in fact, the House on Oct. 2 subsequently sustained Bush's veto on a 266-148 vote. (Senate key vote 12)

    7. National Energy Strategy

    There was little drama about the outcome of the May 27 House vote on a massive energy bill even before members passed the legislation 381-37: R 135-23; D 245-14 (ND 173-2, SD 72-12); I 1-0.

    But the vote on the House bill (HR 776) was among the most important of 1992, virtually ensuring that Congress would make its first major attempt in more than a decade to curb U.S. dependence on foreign oil.

    The 102nd Congress convened in the midst of the Persian Gulf crisis, which highlighted the economic and human cost of the nation's enormous thirst for oil. Not surprisingly, energy policy quickly shot to the top of the political agenda with scores of politicians clamoring for new measures to reduce oil imports.

    The Bush administration outlined its policy prescriptions in a massive “National Energy Strategy” almost two years in the making. Many lawmakers peddled their own proposals, attacking the Bush plan as overly generous to oil and gas producers and the nuclear industry while slighting conservation and renewable energy.

    Sen. J. Bennett Johnston, D-La., who chaired the Senate Energy Committee, quickly moved a sweeping energy bill through his committee. Environmentalists and other critics blocked it from coming to the floor late in 1991, but Johnston returned early in 1992 with a revised version. That bill, which did not include controversial proposals to allow drilling in Alaska's Arctic National Wildlife Refuge or mandate greater automobile fuel economy, easily passed the Senate in February. The legislation included measures to promote conservation and renewable energy, spur competition in the electricity industry, make it easier to build natural gas pipelines and nuclear power plants, and promote cars that run on non-gasoline fuels.

    House leaders then stepped up efforts to deliver a parallel energy bill. Although Rep. Philip R. Sharp, D-Ind., already had steered such a bill through the Energy and Commerce subcommittee he chairs, it was no simple matter to get the bill to the floor.

    After the full Energy and Commerce Committee approved the legislation, it was referred to eight additional House panels. Critics complained that delays would kill the bill or that the result would be an incoherent or politically doomed patchwork, particularly as committees such as Interior and Merchant Marine and Fisheries added large and controversial restrictions on production sought by environmentalists. The Ways and Means Committee added a package of energy-related tax measures that included tax breaks for independent oil and gas drillers as well as renewable energy and some non-gasoline fuels.

    But House Speaker Thomas S. Foley, D-Wash., set a deadline for the panels, and the Rules Committee subsequently trimmed some of the controversial additions. Other conflicts were resolved after key floor votes, and the finished product, while more pleasing to environmentalists, was very similar to the Senate bill.

    Once the House acted, the political pressure for the Democratic-led Congress to send a finished product to the White House helped propel the massive bills through a difficult conference committee.

    Lopsided votes in both chambers for energy legislation reflect policy weaknesses as well as strengths: The final version was expected to cap instead of decrease the country's growing oil imports, and many lawmakers say it did not go far enough either in aiding domestic production or, alternately, in curbing consumption. However, the legislation was considered a balanced effort bound to reverse the laissez-faire attitude on energy policy that dominated the 1980s and set the groundwork for additional efforts to cut oil imports.

    8. Strategic Defense Initiative

    In its first clear test of sentiment on the issue, the House on June 5 in effect backed deployment of a ground-based anti-missile defense.

    The key vote came when the House rejected an amendment to the fiscal 1993 defense authorization bill (HR 5006 — PL 102-484) that would have reduced funding for the strategic defense initiative (SDI) by almost $1 billion, to $3.3 billion. The vote was 161-211: R 11-134; D 149-77 (ND 125-31, SD 24-46); I 1-0.

    Through 1991, the annual House action on SDI basically consisted of members staking out the lowest possible funding figure, anticipating that the Senate would approve a larger budget for the program and that a compromise sum would be hammered out in conference.

    Liberal arms control activists, led by California Democrats Ronald V. Dellums and Barbara Boxer, repeatedly had proposed substantial cuts in SDI spending that were designed to limit the program to laboratory research. But the House routinely had rejected their initiatives by substantial margins. Instead, the House annually approved more modest reductions in SDI spending that would not have fundamentally reshaped the program.

    In 1991, the Senate recast SDI to focus on the relatively early deployment of a ground-based anti-missile defense, consistent with the 1972 U.S.-Soviet treaty limiting anti-ballistic missile systems. The Senate action was essentially incorporated into the conference report on the fiscal 1992 defense authorization bill. SDI critics objected that the procedure had deprived House members of any opportunity to debate the revamped SDI mission.

    In 1992, the House Armed Services Committee brought to the House floor a fiscal 1993 authorization bill that backed $4.3 billion for the revised version of SDI, compared with the $5.4 billion requested. Illinois Democrat Richard J. Durbin offered the amendment to trim $938 million from the committee's recommendation. But members rejected this first opportunity to dissent from the SDI compromise favored by Armed Services Chairman Les Aspin, D-Wis.

    During House debate July 2 on the companion defense appropriations bill (HR 5504), a Durbin amendment that would have cut $700 million from SDI was rejected by a much closer vote of 201-217. In the interval between the two votes, the House had narrowly voted to reject a constitutional amendment to require a balanced federal budget. That contentious debate had boosted the pressure on members to demonstrate their willingness to cut spending, a factor that may have motivated some of the 26 members who voted against Durbin's SDI amendment on June 5 but then supported him on July 2. (Senate key vote 8)

    9. Balanced Budget Amendment

    For a decade, advocates of a constitutional amendment requiring a balanced budget had failed to convince their colleagues that such a move was just the sort of strong medicine Congress and the White House needed to bring the federal deficit under control. The high-water mark for advocates had come in 1982, when the Senate passed an amendment by slightly more than the two-thirds majority needed for passage. The House tried in 1982 and again in 1986 but defeated the measure both times.

    In May 1992, however, amendment supporters seemed to be gaining converts. Despite the budget agreement hammered out in 1990, deficits had continued to grow; the White House budget office was estimating a fiscal 1992 deficit of roughly $400 billion. Meanwhile, public regard for Congress and its ability to handle the nation's finances was sinking during a critical election year. Democrats who had long opposed the idea were changing their minds out of sheer desperation, and longtime deficit hawk Charles W. Stenholm, D-Texas, had no trouble collecting the 218 signatures he needed on a petititon that allowed the amendment (H J Res 290) to bypass the committee bottleneck that had often stopped it from coming to the House floor.

    But just when it looked like backers were sure to rally the support they needed in the House and the Senate, opponents began to fight back.

    A psychological turning point came when Senate Appropriations Chairman Robert c. Byrd, D-W.Va., announced his adamant opposition and his intent to filibuster the measure in the Senate. Byrd argued that the amendment would shift fiscal power from Congress to the White House and to the federal courts, which could wind up ordering Congress to make specific spending cuts or tax increases. Byrd's stature and success record in the Senate were such that his announcement alone seemed to turn the tide. Opponents in the House then set about to sow doubt and fear among backers who might not have thought through all the implications of the amendment.

    House Budget Chairman Leon E. Panetta, D-Calif., unveiled detailed spending-cut and tax-increase scenarios designed to show just how painful it would be to implement a balanced budget amendment by 1997, when most thought an amendment would take effect. House Democratic leaders took a different tack, offering a substitute amendment that would require a balanced budget but exempt Social Security. Organized labor launched a nationwide campaign, warning that the “balanced-budget hoax would hurt all of us” by raising taxes and cutting government benefits.

    Still, passage seemed likely barely a week before the June 11 House vote. In the end, though, the lobbying by Democratic leaders and outside interest groups, plus a creeping uneasiness about tinkering with the Constitution, gave opponents a nine-vote victory margin. The amendment was rejected, 280-153: R 164-2; D 116-150 (ND 52-130, SD 64-20); I 0-1.

    10. Superconducting Supercollider

    Growing opposition to the costly superconducting supercollider reached a critical mass in June, when the House voted to kill the massive science project that was expected to cost at least $8.3 billion. The June 17 vote was 232-181: R 79-79; D 152-102 (ND 126-49, SD 26-53); I 1-0.

    Although the House eventually reversed the decision and agreed to continue funding the project in fiscal 1993, the vote was a shocking blow to project supporters and left the endeavor on precarious political ground.

    The supercollider was a giant atom smasher being built underground in Waxahachie, Texas, by the Energy Department. It was designed to produce high-speed particle collisions that scientists said could unlock the fundamental secrets of matter, as well as provide valuable technological spinoffs.

    But some critics were skeptical of these claims, while others said the project was simply too expensive at a time when lawmakers were struggling to find money to pay for human services and other pressing needs, including smaller science projects.

    Before the June vote, Congress had already appropriated roughly $1 billion for the project.

    Opponents had been gaining ground in the House and had predicted a particularly close vote on the project in 1992, when House appropriators earmarked $484 million to keep building the collider. But even sponsors of the amendment to kill the project did not expect their June 17 victory.

    Timing played an important role. It was the first key spending vote after the House narrowly defeated a proposed constitutional amendment to require a balanced budget, and many lawmakers found it hard to justify approving hundreds of millions for the supercollider so soon after speechifying against the deficit. The project also drew the ire of urban liberals, who had lost an earlier fight to transfer defense dollars to domestic needs and urban aid.

    The atom smasher became a particularly tempting target because some of the Texas lawmakers arguing for the costly project had also been prominent advocates of balanced budget proposals, and the delegation had mostly opposed increased spending for urban aid.

    That mood faded, accounting for part of the reason the House later reversed itself, agreeing to provide an additional $517 million for the collider, after the Senate restored funding in its version of the energy and water spending bill. That was less than the $650 million President Bush had requested for fiscal 1993, but more than the $484 million initially approved by House appropriators.

    While Texas received the most direct benefits from the supercollider, managers had broadened support for the project by spreading research and procurement contracts across a wide array of states. Moreover, President-elect Bill Clinton had said he supported the project.

    Nevertheless, the House vote continued to cast a shadow on the supercollider's prospects. The flip-flop hurt the Energy Department's chances of attracting Japanese or other foreign support for the project, which in turn could erode congressional support. And even some supporters warned that they might not be able to continue backing the project in light of budget constraints.

    11. Urban Aid

    Congress' first concrete response to the devastating April riots in Los Angeles came when the House passed a $494.7 million supplemental appropriations bill May 14. The measure was designed to direct small business loans and emergency grants to L.A. and to Chicago, where the collapse of a tunnel beneath the Chicago River had flooded the city's downtown.

    The House bill turned out to be just the opening bid, however. One week later, the Senate quadrupled the size of the measure to nearly $2 billion by adding money for a nationwide program of urban aid. The extra money was to go for summer youth jobs, a Head Start summer program for preschool children, a summer school program for disadvantaged neighborhoods and the administration-backed “Weed and Seed” program, which aimed to “weed” drug dealers and and other criminals out of inner-city neighborhoods and “seed” the areas with social programs.

    Senate backers, including some Republicans, fought off attempts to strip out the nearly $1.5 billion they added to the House bill and defeated a move to force Congress to cut other spending to pay for the programs. Virtually all of the money was to be provided on an “emergency” basis, exempt from spending caps set in the 1990 budget agreement.

    Despite a White House veto threat over the size of the bill, House-Senate conferees June 5 decided to keep all the Senate add-ons and leave the bill's price tag at $2 billion. Participants in negotiations between the White House and key members of Congress said last-minute insistence on the full amount by Senate Majority Leader George J. Mitchell, D-Maine, blocked a compromise on a smaller amount, but Mitchell flatly denied the account.

    In the end, it was not the veto threat from President Bush that forced the bill to slim down, it was strong GOP opposition and intransigence among rank-and-file Democrats in the House. Some Democratic leaders wanted to send Bush the $2 billion conference report and force him to issue what they assumed would be a politically embarrassing veto. But when House vote-counters ran a whip check, they found that many members objected to the size of the bill, either because it would have added $2 billion to the deficit or because rural and suburban members thought it sent too much to the inner cities.

    Bowing to reality, leaders accepted a White House compromise that cut the bill to $1.1 billion. The conference report was adopted by the House on June 18, seven weeks after the riots, by a vote of 249-168: R 43-117; D 205-51 (ND 158-17, SD 47-34); I 1-0. The Senate cleared the measure by voice vote later the same day.

    While the supplemental was intended as part of a broader urban aid initiative, in the end it contained the only money that Congress would provide to inner cities in 1992 as a response to the L.A. riots. The other big urban aid proposal that grew out of the riots — a plan to set up dozens of “enterprise zones” where investors and businesses would get special tax breaks and other federal assistance — was finally incorporated in the tax bill (HR 11) Congress cleared just before adjournment. Bush vetoed that bill on Nov. 4.

    12. Cable Reregulation

    The House and Senate votes to override a bill (S 12) to reregulate cable television prices and services represented a stunning defeat for the cable industry and the Bush administration. But the first confirmation that Bush was on the losing side of the issue — and headed toward his first override — came July 23 on a crucial amendment by Rep. W.J. “Billy” Tauzin, D-La.

    To Tauzin, along with cable bill sponsor Edward J. Markey, D-Mass., the amendment was the difference between making a serious attempt to improve cable industry competition and passing a halfhearted rate regulation bill.

    Would-be competitors to the $20 billion cable industry, such as the home satellite and “wireless” cable systems, had long complained of being effectively locked out of access to cable programs through high prices and exclusive deals. Tauzin's amendment to the House bill (HR 4850) sought to ban cable programmers from discriminating against cable competitors in the price, terms and conditions of sales of their product. It also barred most exclusive contracts between cable operators and vendors.

    The House approved the Tauzin amendment, 338-68: R 116-45; D 221-23 (ND 152-18, SD 69-5); I 1-0. The bill as amended by Tauzin subsequently passed the House, 340-73.

    Most remarkable about the overwhelming House approval for the amendment was the political clout of the opposition. Urging defeat of the amendment was the Bush administration, the cable lobby, Energy and Commerce Chairman John D. Dingell, D-Mich., and various members of the House leadership.

    Dingell supported the cable industry position that Tauzin would unfairly encroach on private business decisions, and during full committee markup of the bill he had the wording struck from the version approved by Markey's subcommittee. Dingell also argued that the provision would cause the bill to be referred to the Judiciary Committee, thus slowing down and possibly killing the entire measure.

    The floor vote to replace the Tauzin language took place in the early evening hours of July 23. With little else to do but hear the discussion on the two amendments, members packed the House chamber for the debate between Tauzin and his opponent, Thomas J. Manton, D-N.Y.

    Manton had offered a weaker substitute to the Tauzin amendment that was favored by the cable industry. He called Tauzin's amendment “far-reaching and radical” because it would set a government-mandated price for programming and cause program creators to lose control over their product.

    Apart from the formidable opposition from Manton, Dingell and House leaders, Tauzin was saddled with the task of selling distinctions between his and Manton's amendments that were complex and difficult to discern.

    Tauzin instead launched into an impassioned speech about the future of television, arguing that competition to cable would never arrive unless some controls were put on cable's program pricing policies and increasing market power.

    Just as the cable television industry relied on free network broadcasts when it was in its infancy, Tauzin said, cable's competitors now need government help to purchase cable programs at fairer prices.

    The House rejected Manton's substitute, 162-247, and subsequently voted to adopt the Tauzin amendment. The surprisingly large margin for Tauzin's amendment made it clear that the cable industry was heading for a big defeat — and that Bush's perfect veto record was in peril. (Senate key vote 14)

    13. Space Station Freedom

    In what may have been its last major vote on whether to keep the NASA space station Freedom, the House on July 29 turned back an attempt by a key Appropriations subcommittee chairman to abandon the manned-exploration venture.

    The House had voted three times in 13 months to preserve the controversial space station, expected to cost from $30 billion to $40 billion by the year 2000. The latest vote came July 29 on the fiscal 1993 appropriations bill (HR 5679) for the departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development and independent agencies (VA-HUD). The $86.8 billion bill, as reported out of the Appropriations Committee, provided $1.73 billion for the space station, $305 million less than its fiscal 1992 appropriation. President Bush, a strong and vocal supporter of the project, had sought $2.25 billion for fiscal 1993.

    But Congress had been struggling in the past two years to control high-cost science projects, pare the federal budget deficit and keep its spending bills within limits set by the 1990 budget agreement with the White House. Those budget problems only heightened lawmakers' awareness of big-ticket science projects — the space station and the superconducting supercollider being the biggest — whose missions and eventual paybacks were not easy to justify.

    Cost concerns forced NASA to scale back the space station in 1991, and it came under fire from many scientists who felt it was poorly designed and incapable of serious scientific research.

    According to NASA officials, the Freedom project would allow scientists to study how humans react to long periods in the weightless environment of outer space, thus providing the United States with a steppingstone for planetary exploration.

    But members of Congress supported the project largely because of the jobs it generated across the country and in their districts. Before the House vote, NASA officials played that angle hard, passing out maps of the country that showed exactly where the space station contract money and jobs would go.

    Bob Traxler, D-Mich., chairman of the VA-HUD Appropriations Subcommittee that oversaw NASA funding, tried to kill the space station in 1991 by leaving it out of the committee recommendation. But at the urging of Bush, NASA officials and space industry lobbyists, the full House subsequently voted 240-173 to restore the money.

    In 1992, Traxler waited until the bill went to the floor to make his move to cut Freedom's congressional lifeline. He fared no better. Again, under intense lobbying from the White House, industry officials and NASA Director Daniel Goldin, the House rejected Traxler's motion to strike, 181-237: R 38-127; D 142-110 (ND 115-59, SD 27-51); I 1-0.

    Space station advocates said they doubted that the project would be subjected in the future to such a thorough going over.

    If the budget “walls” separating domestic and defense spending come down in 1993, as scheduled, there could be less of a pinch on space and science funding from other domestic programs. And the two leading House critics of space station funding, Traxler and New York's Bill Green, the ranking Republican on the VA-HUD panel, were not returning to Congress.

    Traxler's successor as VA-HUD chairman was Louis Stokes, D-Ohio, whose state benefited greatly from the space station, receiving $101 million in contracts and 253 jobs. Although Stokes supported Traxler's amendment to kill Freedom, his opposition appeared to be far less entrenched.

    14. Ex-Soviet Aid

    In an election year when foreign policy was shunned by both parties, one piece of international legislation stood out. After months of wrangling, Congress approved a massive package authorizing technical, financial and other assistance to the former republics of the Soviet Union.

    What made the measure remarkable was that passage came against the backdrop of an extremely partisan session in which the recession-plagued U.S. economy was the main focus. Both Democrats and Republicans were reluctant to devote too much attention to foreign issues when constituents were hurting back home. This was especially true in the House, where most of the 435 members were running for re-election.

    In addition, Democrats were eager to blame Republican economic policies of the previous 12 years for many of the nation's domestic troubles. They argued that President Bush's proclivity toward foreign affairs was further evidence of his detachment from the problems of average Americans.

    Given these conditions, it was no surprise that Bush's plan to join several other western industrial nations to aid the former republics, in the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse, was not warmly embraced even though some congressional leaders had previously urged him to take such action.

    House Democrats, led by Majority Whip David E. Bonior, D-Mich., insisted that agreement be reached on a number of domestic fronts — including extension of jobless benefits, increased urban aid and job-creation legislation — before they would vote on the ex-Soviet aid package. That package, which Bush called his No. 1 foreign policy initiative, called for a $12.3 billion increase in the U.S. commitment to the International Monetary Fund, $410 million in bilateral humanitarian, economic and other assistance, and about $800 million to help dismantle the former Soviet nuclear arsenal.

    Squabbling over domestic issues delayed House consideration of the aid bill long past the mid-June deadline for passage that Bush had requested. The president had hoped to get the aid in place before a visit by Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin to Washington on June 16–17.

    It was not until early August that House leaders finally agreed to bring to the floor the legislation (HR 4547) that had been marked up by the Foreign Affairs Committee two months earlier. Paving the way for consideration was an extension of jobless benefits, as well as a tentative administration agreement with Bonior to speed up public works spending and to support loan guarantees for urban areas.

    While these assurances were enough to win leadership backing, there was still great reluctance among rank-and-file members to vote for such a large foreign aid package before the election. In an unusually united effort, Democratic and Republican House leaders took to the floor to persuade members that the United States would be the long-term beneficiary of secure successor states to the former Soviet Union. They argued that a collapse of reform efforts in the republics could mean a return to totalitarianism and perhaps greater threats to U.S. security and a greater need for more defense spending. Conversely, sponsors argued, successful new free-market economies would mean more business opportunities for U.S. companies.

    Leaders drew on a formidable group of aid proponents — including former presidents Ronald Reagan, Jimmy Carter, Gerald R. Ford and Richard Nixon, as well as a coalition of business, farm and disarmament groups — to help win passage of the bill. The legislation passed Aug. 6 by a vote of 255-164: R 94-68; D 161-95 (ND 115-63, SD 46-32); I 0-1. (Senate key vote 6)

    15. Foreign Aid

    A year after the House appeared to sour on foreign assistance, it voted to send President Bush a $26.3 billion foreign aid appropriations bill for fiscal 1993. In addition to continuing funding for foreign aid programs, the measure included $12.3 billion in new financing for the International Monetary Fund and guarantees for $10 billion in commercial loans for Israel (HR 5368 — PL 102-391).

    In the key vote Oct. 5, the House voted overwhelmingly to adopt the conference report (H Rept 102-585) for the $26.3 billion spending bill, 312-105: R 104-58; D 208-46 (ND 152-20, SD 56-26); I 0-1.

    In October 1991, with lawmakers caught up in an “America first” mood, the House had overwhelmingly rejected a two-year foreign aid authorization bill. With the domestic economy slumping and congressional elections on the horizon, the Bush administration feared that foreign aid would become an even harder sell in 1992.

    Congress also failed to complete action on a companion foreign aid appropriations measure in 1991, forcing lawmakers to approve continuing resolutions to fund the program. The fiscal 1992 bill had become tangled in a dispute between the White House and the government of Israel over Jerusalem's request for loan guarantees.

    The turnabout came in part because the fiscal 1993 bill slashed actual foreign aid spending, even though it included new programs for Israel and the IMF. The bill cut $1.1 billion from the administration request, largely by eliminating military assistance grants for Turkey, Greece and Portugal and replacing them with low-interest loans.

    The conference report also afforded House members their first opportunity to vote for loan guarantees for Israel, a popular program with members of both parties.

    The five-year program for Israel provided U.S. guarantees — not loans or direct aid — intended to help Jerusalem secure favorable rates on commercial loans. U.S. taxpayers would not be asked to provide any funding for the program unless Israel defaulted on the loans. Similarly, the $12.3 billion in new financing for the IMF entailed no budgetary outlays.

    Rep. David R. Obey, D-Wis., chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, said that any foreign aid bill not viewed as fiscally prudent would have drawn intense opposition from anxious lawmakers.

    “It's a very tight bill and we gave people some arguments to take home and defend,” Obey said after the House vote. In June, the House had voted 297-124 for the underlying appropriations bill. That measure, which did not include the loan guarantees, had reduced the administration request by $1.3 billion.

    The legislation continued a long-term downward spiral in foreign aid funding. Excluding the one-time appropriation for the International Monetary Fund, the final version provided $1.4 billion less than the fiscal 1991 bill — the last one to clear Congress. (Senate key vote 13)

    16. Western Water Bill

    Nowhere were the conflicts in the way the West used its water more starkly illustrated than in the House's battle over a single key provision of the 1992 omnibus Western water projects bill (HR 429 — PL 102-575). As crafted by Interior Committee Chairman George Miller, D-Calif., the proposal was an attempt to redirect the purpose of the Central Valley Project (CVP) in California to reflect urban and environmental values.

    The CVP is the largest irrigation project run by the Interior Department's Bureau of Reclamation. It controlled one-fifth of the state's usable water supply.

    Criticism of the half-century-old project had been building for years and was exacerbated by the ongoing California drought. The CVP historically supplied its water mainly to some 23,000 Central Valley farming operations, which used the water to grow much of California's fabled produce in otherwise arid land. Farmers got the water at rates far below those paid by the other 85 percent of the state's economy — because of subsidies from federal taxpayers.

    The result, environmentalists charged, was wasteful farming practices that led to polluted runoff and water diverted from other valuable uses, such as the state's now-decimated salmon fishery.

    Miller, from urbanized Contra Costa County just north of the valley, used the omnibus Western water bill to transform the Central Valley Project. His proposal sought to make the CVP protect fish and wildlife and make more water available to outside users. Contracts to farmers would remain short term until the ecological health of the region improved.

    The valley's farmers cried foul. They said disrupting their decades-old system of cheap water would cost jobs, make their farms more risky investments and hurt consumers with higher food prices.

    They were supported by Republican California Gov. Pete Wilson and by rural lawmakers such as Republican Bill Thomas, who represented the southern tip of the valley, and Democrat Calvin Dooley, whose family had been farming in the valley for four generations.

    But a phalanx of other state interests lined up behind Miller: most of the state's urban county governments, the big metropolitan water district of Los Angeles, corporate business groups and environmentalists.

    Thomas, Dooley and others complained that the Miller provisions would have had no chance of approval if they were not tied to the 40-title omnibus measure, a must-pass bill for other Western states. But Miller said that was the point: The huge package had widespread support, containing as it did grandiose water projects such as the Central Utah Project and smaller but locally popular provisions dishing out largess to every Western state. Few wanted to see the whole thing sink on the opposition of a handful of California Farm Belt lawmakers.

    The showdown came in the early morning hours of Oct. 6, when the House-Senate conference report came before the House. Thomas offered a motion to kick the bill back to committee and strip out all the Central Valley provisions. “If you vote yes … the hostages will be set free,” Thomas said, referring to the other titles of the bill.

    But the House was unmoved, rejecting Thomas' motion to recommit the bill to committee, 159-244: R 117-41; D 42-202 (ND 15-152, SD 27-50); I 0-1. Members then adopted the conference report by voice vote. (Senate key vote 15)

    1. Elementary and Secondary Education/School Choice

    S 2 Hatch, R-Utah, amendment to authorize $30 million for six demonstration projects to give low-income parents money to pay for enrolling a child at the public or private school of their choice, including religiously affiliated schools. Rejected 36-57: R 33-6; D 3-51 (ND 2-35, SD 1-16), Jan. 23, 1992. A “yea” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    2. National Energy Policy/NRC Hearings

    S 2166 Johnston, D-La., motion to table (kill) the Graham, D-Fla., amendment to the Johnston amendment, to require the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to conduct full adjudicatory hearings on serious new safety issues or major construction deficiencies before operation of new power reactors. Motion agreed to 52-43: R 31-11;D 21-32 (ND 9-27,SD 12-5), Feb. 6, 1992.

    3. Eliminate Budget Walls/Cloture

    S 2399 Mitchell, D-Maine, motion to invoke cloture (thus limiting debate) on the motion to proceed to the bill to modify the 1990 Budget Enforcement Act to knock down the walls that prohibit shifting funds between defense and domestic appropriations. Motion rejected 50-48: R 3-40; D 47-8 (ND 35-3, SD 12-5), March 26, 1992. A three-fifths majority vote (60) of the total Senate is required to invoke cloture. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    4. National Institutes of Health Reauthorization/Fetal Tissue Research

    HR 2507 Hatch, R-Utah, amendment to replace provisions that lift the ban on fetal tissue transplant research, including tissue from induced abortions, with provisions to establish a registry for a non-profit bank of tissue from spontaneous abortions and ectopic pregnancies. Rejected 23-77: R 20-23; D 3-54 (ND 1-39, SD 2-15), March 31, 1992. A “yea” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    5. Campaign Finance/Veto Override

    S 3 Passage, over President Bush's May 9 veto, of the bill to limit spending in congressional campaigns by providing incentives to candidates to agree to voluntary spending limits, restricting money from political action committees (PACs) and restricting “soft money” raised by state parties in federal elections. Rejected 57-42: R 3-40; D 54-2 (ND 39-0, SD 15-2), May 13, 1992. A two-thirds majority of those present and voting (66 in this case) is required to override a veto. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    6. Aid for Former Soviet Republics/Russian Troops in Baltic States

    S 2532 Pressler, R-S.D., motion to table (kill) the Pell, D-R.I., amendment to the DeConcini, D-Ariz., amendment to give a one-year grace period before imposing DeConcini provisions to suspend aid until the president certifies that Russia has significantly withdrawn armed forces from the Baltic States. Motion rejected 35-60: R 11-30; D 24-30 (ND 14-24, SD 10-6), July 1, 1992. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position. (The Pell amendment subsequently was adopted by voice vote.)

    7. Extended Unemployment Benefits/Conference Report

    HR 5260 Adoption of the conference report to provide 20 or 26 weeks of extended unemployment benefits between July 4, 1992, and March 6, 1993, if the national unemployment rate stays above 7 percent. After March 6, 1993, states could use a new 6.5 percent unemployment rate to trigger 13 weeks of extended benefits. Passed 93-3: R 37-3; D 56-0 (ND 40-0, SD 16-0), July 2, 1992. A “yea” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    8. Fiscal 1993 Defense Authorization/Strategic Defense Initiative

    S 3114 Warner, R-Va., motion to table (kill) the Sasser, D-Tenn., amendment to cut the strategic defense initiative by $1 billion from the committee level of $4.3 billion. Motion rejected 43-49: R 34-5; D 9-44 (ND 4-33, SD 5-11), Aug. 7, 1992. A “yea” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    1. 1992 Tax Bill/Democratic Substitute

    HR 4210 Rostenkowski, D-Ill., substitute to give workers a temporary tax credit worth up to $400 for couples and $200 for individuals a year to be paid for with a 10 percent surtax on millionaires and a new top income tax rate of 35 percent for individuals with taxable income higher than $85,000 and couples with more than $145,000. The package includes indexing of capital gains and other provisions designed to spur economic growth. Adopted 221-210: R 1-164; D 219-46 (ND 156-27, SD 63-19); I 1-0, Feb. 27, 1992. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    2. Further Disclosure of House Bank Abuses/Adoption

    H Res 396 Adoption of the resolution to disclose the name of any member or former member who wrote a check that exceeded his balance at the House bank and the number of insufficient funds checks written by each from July 1, 1988, to Oct. 3, 1991. Adopted 426-0: R 165-0; D 260-0 (ND 178-0, SD 82-0); I 1-0, in the session that began, and the Congressional Record dated, March 12, 1992.

    3. Eliminate Budget Walls/Passage

    HR 3732 Passage of the bill to modify the 1990 Budget Enforcement Act to knock down the walls that prohibit shifting funds between defense, international and domestic appropriations. Rejected 187-238: R 0-162; D 186-76 (ND 151-28, SD 35-48); I 1-0, March 31, 1992. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    4. RTC Financing/Passage

    HR 4704 Passage of the bill to provide the Resolution Trust Corporation with about $17 billion to resolve failed savings and loan institutions by eliminating the April 1, 1992, expiration date on $25 billion provided in November 1991. Rejected 125-298: R 45-117; D 80-180 (ND 47-130, SD 33-50); I 0-1, April 1, 1992. A “yea” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    5. Campaign Finance Reform/Conference Report

    S 3 Adoption of the conference report to limit spending in congressional campaigns by providing incentives to candidates to agree to voluntary spending limits, restricting contributions from political action committees (PACs) and restricting “soft money” raised and spent by state parties in federal elections. The bill would create a separate system for House and Senate campaigns. Adopted 259-165: R 19-145; D 239-20 (ND 171-6, SD 68-14); I 1-0, April 9, 1992. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    6. Family Planning Reauthorization/Passage

    HR 3090 Passage of the bill to reauthorize Title X of the Public Health Service Act for five years through fiscal 1997. The bill would overturn the administration's ban on abortion counseling at federally funded family planning clinics. Passed 268-150: R 55-105; D 212-45 (ND 146-28, SD 66-17);I 1-0, April 30, 1992. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position. (The text of HR 3090 was subsequently inserted into a Senate bill, S 323.)

    7. National Energy Policy/Passage

    HR 776 Passage of the bill to promote increased domestic energy production and conservation; promote the wider use of alternative motor fuels; streamline the nuclear plant licensing process; restrict state powers to regulate gas production; ban certain new offshore oil and gas drilling; overhaul federal laws governing electric utilities; and provide tax incentives for renewable energy. Passed 381-37: R 135-23; D 245-14 (ND 173-2, SD 72-12); I 1-0, May 27, 1992.

    8. Fiscal 1993 Defense Authorization/Strategic Defense Initiative

    HR 5006 Durbin, D-Ill., amendment to reduce funding for the strategic defense initiative by $937.5 million — from the $4.3 billion in the bill to $3.3 billion. Rejected 161-211: R 11-134; D 149-77 (ND 125-31, SD 24-46); I 1-0, June 5, 1992. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    9. Balanced Budget Constitutional Amendment/Passage

    H J Res 290 Passage of the joint resolution to propose a constitutional amendment that would prohibit deficit spending unless a three-fifths majority of both chambers of Congress approved a specific deficit amount or there was a declaration of war (or national military emergency) enacted into law; require the president to submit a balanced budget each fiscal year; and require a three-fifths majority of both chambers of Congress to increase the public debt. The amendment would take effect in fiscal 1998 or the second year after ratification, whichever is later. Rejected 280-153: R 164-2; D 116-150 (ND 52-130, SD 64-20); I 0-1, June 11, 1992. A two-thirds majority of those present and voting of both chambers (289 in this case) is required to propose an amendment to the Constitution. A “yea” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    10. Fiscal 1993 Energy and Water Appropriations/Superconducting Supercollider

    HR 5373 Eckart, D-Ohio, amendment to cut $450 million of the $483.7 million provided for the superconducting supercollider, leaving approximately $34 million to shut down the project. Adopted 232-181: R 79-79; D 152-102 (ND 126-49, SD 26-53); I 1-0, June 17, 1992. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    11. Fiscal 1992 Disaster Relief Supplemental Appropriations/Conference Report

    HR 5132 Adoption of the conference report to provide $1,075,510,000 in new budget authority in fiscal 1992 for disaster assistance and loans to respond to the Los Angeles riots and Chicago flooding, with $500 million allocated for Summer Youth Employment. The funds are designated as emergency spending, thus exempt from the spending caps of the 1990 Budget Enforcement Act. Adopted 249-168: R 43-117; D 205-51 (ND 158-17, SD 47-34); I 1-0, June 18, 1992. A “yea” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    12. Cable Television Reregulation/Program Access

    HR 4850 Tauzin, D-La., amendment to give satellite distributors and other potential cable competitors lower-priced access to cable programming. Adopted 338-68: R 116-45; D 221-23 (ND 152-18, SD 69-5); I 1-0, July 23, 1992.

    13. Fiscal 1993 VA, Housing and Urban Development, Independent Agencies Appropriations/Space Station Cuts

    HR 5679 Traxler, D-Mich., amendment to cut $1.2 billion of the $1.73 billion in the bill for NASA's space station Freedom, leaving $525 million to close down the program. Rejected 181-237: R 38-127; D 142-110 (ND 115-59, SD 27-51); I 1-0, July 29, 1992. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    14. Russian Aid/Passage

    HR 4547 Passage of the bill to provide aid to the former republics of the Soviet Union. The bill also increases the U.S. contribution to the International Monetary Fund by $12.3 billion and includes numerous other measures to boost aid to the former republics. Passed 255-164: R 94-68; D 161-95 (ND 115-63, SD 46-32); I 0-1, Aug. 6, 1992. A “yea” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    15. Fiscal 1993 Foreign Operations Appropriations/Conference Report

    HR 5368 Adoption of the conference report to provide $26.26 billion for foreign aid in fiscal 1993. The administration requested $27.43 billion. The bill would provide $10 billion in loan guarantees for Israel and increase the U.S. contribution to International Monetary Fund by $12.3 billion. Adopted 312-105: R 104-58; D 208-46 (ND 152-20, SD 56-26); I 0-1, Oct. 5, 1992.

    16. Western Water Bill/Central Valley Project

    HR 429 Thomas, R-Calif., motion to recommit to conference the conference report with instructions to report it back after deleting the reform of the Central Valley Project in California. Motion rejected 159-244: R 117-41; D 42-202 (ND 15-152, SD 27-50); I 0-1, in the session that began, and the Congressional Record dated, Oct. 5, 1992. (The conference report subsequently was adopted by voice vote.)

    9. Fiscal 1993 Defense Authorization/Nuclear Testing Moratorium

    S 3114 Hatfield, R-Ore., amendment to the Cohen, R-Maine, amendment, to impose a nine-month moratorium on nuclear testing until July 1, 1993; allow limited testing between July 1, 1993, and Jan. 1, 1997; require reports to Congress on the remaining weapons in the U.S. stockpile, proposed safety improvements and tests, and plans for a comprehensive test ban by Sept. 30, 1996; and, contingent on certain factors, prohibit nuclear tests after Sept. 30, 1996, unless a foreign state conducts a test. The Cohen amendment would impose a three-month testing moratorium, allow limited testing until 1998, and impose a test ban in 1998; the president could waive that ban for one year to negotiate a comprehensive test ban. Adopted 55-40: R 13-29; D 42-11 (ND 35-3, SD 7-8), Sept. 18, 1992. The Cohen amendment, as amended by the Hatfield amendment, subsequently was adopted by voice vote. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    10. Family and Medical Leave/Veto Override

    S 5 Passage, over President Bush's Sept. 22 veto, of the bill to require companies with more than 50 employees to provide workers with up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave for family emergencies. Passed (thus cleared for House action) 68-31: R 14-28; D 54-3 (ND 40-0, SD 14-3), Sept. 24, 1992. A two-thirds majority of those present and voting (66 in this case) is required to override a veto. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    11. Tax Bill/Enterprise Zones

    HR 11 Dole, R-Kan., amendment to eliminate provisions making permanent the existing cap on itemized deductions and the phaseout of the personal exemption for upper-income taxpayers; to cut the number of tax enterprise zones from 125 to 30; and to limit the individual retirement account deduction. Rejected 34-59: R 31-8; D 3-51 (ND 1-38, SD 2-13), Sept. 25, 1992. A “yea” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    12. Family Planning Amendments/Veto Override

    S 323 Passage, over President Bush's Sept. 25 veto, of the bill to reauthorize Title X of the Public Health Service Act for five years through fiscal 1997. The bill would overturn the administration's ban on abortion counseling at federally funded family planning clinics. Passed (thus cleared for House action) 73-26: R 20-23; D 53-3 (ND 40-0, SD 13-3), Oct. 1, 1992. A two-thirds majority of those present and voting (66 in this case) is required to override a veto. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    13. Fiscal 1993 Foreign Operations Appropriations/Passage

    HR 5368 Passage of the bill to provide $26.4 billion in new budget authority for foreign assistance and related programs in fiscal 1993. The administration requested $27.3 billion. Passed 87-12: R 35-8; D 52-4 (ND 39-1, SD 13-3), Oct. 1, 1992.

    14. Cable Television Reregulation/Veto Override

    S 12 Passage, over President Bush's Oct. 3 veto, of the bill to improve competition in the cable industry by giving the Federal Communications Commission authority over basic rates and giving broadcasters the right to charge cable operators for the use of over-the-air signals. Passed (thus cleared for House action) 74-25: R 24-18; D 50-7 (ND 36-4, SD 14-3), Oct. 5, 1992. A two-thirds majority of those present and voting (67 in this case) is required to override a veto. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president's position.

    15. Western Water Bill/Conference Report

    HR 429 Adoption of the conference report to reauthorize Bureau of Reclamation construction programs, including authorization for completing the Central Utah Project and reforms for the Central Valley Project in California. Adopted (thus clearing the bill for the president) 83-8: R 30-8; D 53-0 (ND 38-0, SD 15-0), Oct. 8, 1992.

    Appendix

    Congress and Its Members

    Senate Membership in the 101st Congress
    Lineup as of Jan. 3, 1989: Democrats 55, Republicans 45

    ALABAMA
    • Howell Heflin (D)
    • Richard C. Shelby (D)
    ALASKA
    • Frank H. Murkowski (R)
    • Ted Stevens (R)
    ARIZONA
    • Dennis DeConcini (D)
    • John McCain (R)
    ARKANSAS
    • Dale Bumpers (D)
    • David Pryor (D)
    CALIFORNIA
    • Alan Cranston (D)
    • Pete Wilson (R)
    COLORADO
    • Tim Wirth (D)
    • William L. Armstrong (R)
    CONNECTICUT
    • Christopher J. Dodd (D)
    • Joseph I. Lieberman (D)
    DELAWARE
    • Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D)
    • William V. Roth Jr. (R)
    FLORIDA
    • Bob Graham (D)
    • Connie Mack (R)
    GEORGIA
    • Wyche Fowler Jr. (D)
    • Sam Nunn (D)
    HAWAII
    • Daniel K. Inouye (D)
    • Spark M. Matsunaga (D) (died April 15, 1990)
    • Daniel K. Akaka (D)1(sworn in May 16, 1990)
    IDAHO
    • James A. McClure (R)
    • Steve Symms (R)
    ILLINOIS
    • Alan J. Dixon (D)
    • Paul Simon (D)
    INDIANA
    • Daniel R. Coats (R)
    • Richard G. Lugar (R)
    IOWA
    • Tom Harkin (D)
    • Charles E. Grassley (R)
    KANSAS
    • Bob Dole (R)
    • Nancy Landon Kassebaum (R)
    KENTUCKY
    • Wendell H. Ford (D)
    • Mitch McConnell (R)
    LOUISIANA
    • John B. Breaux (D)
    • J. Bennett Johnston (D)
    MAINE
    • George J. Mitchell (D)
    • William S. Cohen (R)
    MARYLAND
    • Barbara A. Mikulski (D)
    • Paul S. Sarbanes (D)
    MASSACHUSETTS
    • Edward M. Kennedy (D)
    • John Kerry (D)
    MICHIGAN
    • Carl Levin (D)
    • Donald W. Riegle Jr. (D)
    MINNESOTA
    • Rudy Boschwitz (R)
    • Dave Durenberger (R)
    MISSISSIPPI
    • Thad Cochran (R)
    • Trent Lott (R)
    MISSOURI
    • Christopher S. Bond (R)
    • John C. Danforth (R)
    MONTANA
    • Max Baucus (D)
    • Conrad Burns (R)
    NEBRASKA
    • Jim Exon (D)
    • Bob Kerrey (D)
    NEVADA
    • Richard H. Bryan (D)
    • Harry Reid (D)
    NEW HAMPSHIRE
    • Warren B. Rudman (R)
    • Gordon J. Humphrey (R) (resigned Dec. 4, 1990)
    • Robert C. Smith (R) 1(sworn in Dec. 7, 1990)
    NEW JERSEY
    • Bill Bradley (D)
    • Frank R. Lautenberg (D)
    NEW MEXICO
    • Jeff Bingaman (D)
    • Pete V. Domenici (R)
    NEW YORK
    • Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D)
    • Alfonse M. D'Amato (R)
    NORTH CAROLINA
    • Terry Sanford (D)
    • Jesse Helms (R)
    NORTH DAKOTA
    • Quentin N. Burdick (D)
    • Kent Conrad (D)
    OHIO
    • John Glenn (D)
    • Howard M. Metzenbaum (D)
    OKLAHOMA
    • David L. Boren (D)
    • Don Nickles (R)
    OREGON
    • Mark O. Hatfield (R)
    • Bob Packwood (R)
    PENNSYLVANIA
    • John Heinz (R)
    • Arlen Specter (R)
    RHODE ISLAND
    • Claiborne Pell (D)
    • John H. Chafee (R)
    SOUTH CAROLINA
    • Ernest F. Hollings (D)
    • Strom Thurmond (R)
    SOUTH DAKOTA
    • Tom Daschle (D)
    • Larry Pressler (R)
    TENNESSEE
    • Al Gore (D)
    • Jim Sasser (D)
    TEXAS
    • Lloyd Bentsen (D)
    • Phil Gramm (R)
    UTAH
    • Jake Garn (R)
    • Orrin G. Hatch (R)
    VERMONT
    • Patrick J. Leahy (D)
    • James M. Jeffords (R)
    VIRGINIA
    • Charles S. Robb (D)
    • John W. Warner (R)
    WASHINGTON
    • Brock Adams (D)
    • Slade Gorton (R)
    WEST VIRGINIA
    • Robert C. Byrd (D)
    • John D. Rockefeller IV (D)
    WISCONSIN
    • Herb Kohl (D)
    • Bob Kasten (R)
    WYOMING
    • Alan K. Simpson (R)
    • Malcolm Wallop (R)

    Appointed April 28, 1990, and then elected to complete the remaining four years of Matsunaga's term in a special election Nov. 6, 1990.Smith, who was elected to a six-year term in the Senate Nov. 6, 1990, resigned from the House Dec. 7 to be appointed for the remainder of Humphrey's term, which expired Jan. 3, 1991.

    House Membership in the 101st Congress
    Lineup as of Jan. 3, 1989: Democrats 259, Republicans 174, Vacancies 2

    ALABAMA
    • 1. Sonny Callahan (R)
    • 2. Bill L. Dickinson (R)
    • 3. Glen Browder (D) 1(sworn in April 18, 1989)
    • 4. Tom Bevill (D)
    • 5. Ronnie G. Flippo (D)
    • 6. Ben Erdreich (D)
    • 7. Claude Harris (D)
    ALASKA
    • AL Don Young (R)
    ARIZONA
    • 1. John J. Rhodes III (R)
    • 2. Morris K. Udall (D)
    • 3. Bob Stump (R)
    • 4. Jon Kyl (R)
    • 5. Jim Kolbe (R)
    ARKANSAS
    • 1. Bill Alexander (D)
    • 2. Tommy F. Robinson (D) 1
    • 3. John Paul Hammerschmidt (R)
    • 4. Beryl Anthony Jr. (D)
    CALIFORNIA
    • 1. Douglas H. Bosco (D)
    • 2. Wally Herger (R)
    • 3. Robert T. Matsui (D)
    • 4. Vic Fazio (D)
    • 5. Nancy Pelosi (D)
    • 6. Barbara Boxer (D)
    • 7. George Miller (D)
    • 8. Ronald V. Dellums (D)
    • 9. Pete Stark (D)
    • 10. Don Edwards (D)
    • 11. Tom Lantos (D)
    • 12. Tom Campbell (R)
    • 13. Norman Y. Mineta (D)
    • 14. Norman D. Shumway (R)
    • 15. Tony Coelho (D) (resigned June 15, 1989)
    • Gary Condit (D) (sworn in Sept. 20, 1989)
    • 16. Leon E. Panetta (D)
    • 17. Charles
      Chip
      Pashayan Jr. (R)
    • 18. Richard H. Lehman (D)
    • 19. Robert J. Lagomarsino (R)
    • 20. Bill Thomas (R)
    • 21. Elton Gallegly (R)
    • 22. Carlos J. Moorhead (R)
    • 23. Anthony C. Beilenson (D)
    • 24. Henry A. Waxman (D)
    • 25. Edward R. Roybal (D)
    • 26. Howard L. Berman (D)
    • 27. Mel Levine (D)
    • 28. Julian C. Dixon (D)
    • 29. Augustus F. Hawkins (D)
    • 30. Matthew G. Martinez (D)
    • 31. Mervyn M. Dymally (D)
    • 32. Glenn M. Anderson (D)
    • 33. David Dreier (R)
    • 34. Esteban E. Torres (D)
    • 35. Jerry Lewis (R)
    • 36. George E. Brown Jr. (D)
    • 37. Al McCandless (R)
    • 38. Robert K. Dornan (R)
    • 39. William E. Dannemeyer (R)
    • 40. C. Christopher Cox (R)
    • 41. Bill Lowery (R)
    • 42. Dana Rohrabacher (R)
    • 43. Ron Packard (R)
    • 44. Jim Bates (D)
    • 45. Duncan Hunter (R)
    COLORADO
    • 1. Patricia Schroeder (D)
    • 2. David E. Skaggs (D)
    • 3. Ben Nighthorse Campbell (D)
    • 4. Hank Brown (R)
    • 5. Joel Hefley (R)
    • 6. Dan Schaefer (R)
    CONNECTICUT
    • 1. Barbara B. Kennelly (D)
    • 2. Sam Gejdenson (D)
    • 3. Bruce A. Morrison (D)
    • 4. Christopher Shays (R)
    • 5. John G. Rowland (R)
    • 6. Nancy L. Johnson (R)
    DELAWARE
    • AL Thomas R. Carper (D)
    FLORIDA
    • 1. Earl Hutto (D)
    • 2. Bill Grant (D) 1
    • 3. Charles E. Bennett (D)
    • 4. Craig T. James (R)
    • 5. Bill McCollum (R)
    • 6. Cliff Stearns (R)
    • 7. Sam M. Gibbons (D)
    • 8. C. W. Bill Young (R)
    • 9. Michael Bilirakis (R)
    • 10. Andy Ireland (R)
    • 11. Bill Nelson (D)
    • 12. Tom Lewis (R)
    • 13. Porter J. Goss (R)
    • 14. Harry A. Johnston (D)
    • 15. E. Clay Shaw Jr. (R)
    • 16. Lawrence J. Smith (D)
    • 17. William Lehman (D)
    • 18. Claude Pepper (D) (died May 30, 1989)
    • Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R) (sworn in Sept. 6, 1989)
    • 19. Dante B. Fascell (D)
    GEORGIA
    • 1. Lindsay Thomas (D)
    • 2. Charles Hatcher (D)
    • 3. Richard Ray (D)
    • 4. Ben Jones (D)
    • 5. John Lewis (D)
    • 6. Newt Gingrich (R)
    • 7. George
      Buddy
      Darden (D)
    • 8. J. Roy Rowland (D)
    • 9. Ed Jenkins (D)
    • 10. Doug Barnard Jr. (D)
    HAWAII
    • 1. Patricia Saiki (R)
    • 2. Daniel K. Akaka (D) (resigned May 16, 1990)
    • Patsy T. Mink (D) (sworn in Sept. 27, 1990)
    IDAHO
    • 1. Larry E. Craig (R)
    • 2. Richard Stallings (D)
    ILLINOIS
    • 1. Charles A. Hayes (D)
    • 2. Gus Savage (D)
    • 3. Marty Russo (D)
    • 4. George E. Sangmeister (D)
    • 5. William O. Lipinski (D)
    • 6. Henry J. Hyde (R)
    • 7. Cardiss Collins (D)
    • 8. Dan Rostenkowski (D)
    • 9. Sidney R. Yates (D)
    • 10. John Porter (R)
    • 11. Frank Annunzio (D)
    • 12. Philip M. Crane (R)
    • 13. Harris W. Fawell (R)
    • 14. Dennis Hastert (R)
    • 15. Edward R. Madigan (R)
    • 16. Lynn Martin (R)
    • 17. Lane Evans (D)
    • 18. Robert H. Michel (R)
    • 19. Terry L. Bruce (D)
    • 20. Richard J. Durbin (D)
    • 21. Jerry F. Costello (D)
    • 22. Glenn Poshard (D)
    INDIANA
    • 1. Peter J. Visclosky (D)
    • 2. Philip R. Sharp (D)
    • 3. John Hiler (R)
    • 4. Jill L. Long (D) 1(sworn in April 5, 1989)
    • 5. Jim Jontz (D)
    • 6. Dan Burton (R)
    • 7. John T. Myers (R)
    • 8. Frank McCloskey (D)
    • 9. Lee H. Hamilton (D)
    • 10. Andrew Jacobs Jr. (D)
    IOWA
    • 1. Jim Leach (R)
    • 2. Tom Tauke (R)
    • 3. Dave Nagle (D)
    • 4. Neal Smith (D)
    • 5. Jim Ross Lightfoot (R)
    • 6. Fred Grandy (R)
    KANSAS
    • 1. Pat Roberts (R)
    • 2. Jim Slattery (D)
    • 3. Jan Meyers (R)
    • 4. Dan Glickman (D)
    • 5. Bob Whittaker (R)
    KENTUCKY
    • 1. Carroll Hubbard Jr. (D)
    • 2. William H. Natcher (D)
    • 3. Romano L. Mazzoli (D)
    • 4. Jim Bunning (R)
    • 5. Harold Rogers (R)
    • 6. Larry J. Hopkins (R)
    • 7. Carl L. Perkins (D)
    LOUISIANA
    • 1. Robert L. Livingston (R)
    • 2. Lindy (Mrs. Hale) Boggs (D)
    • 3. W. J.
      Billy
      Tauzin (D)
    • 4. Jim McCrery (R)
    • 5. Jerry Huckaby (D)
    • 6. Richard H. Baker (R)
    • 7. Jimmy Hayes (D)
    • 8. Clyde C. Holloway (R)
    MAINE
    • 1. Joseph E. Brennan (D)
    • 2. Olympia J. Snowe (R)
    MARYLAND
    • 1. Roy Dyson (D)
    • 2. Helen Delich Bentley (R)
    • 3. Benjamin L. Cardin (D)
    • 4. Tom McMillen (D)
    • 5. Steny H. Hoyer (D)
    • 6. Beverly B. Byron (D)
    • 7. Kweisi Mfume (D)
    • 8. Constance A. Morella (R)
    MASSACHUSETTS
    • 1. Silvio O. Conte (R)
    • 2. Richard E. Neal (D)
    • 3. Joseph D. Early (D)
    • 4. Barney Frank (D)
    • 5. Chester G. Atkins (D)
    • 6. Nicholas Mavroules (D)
    • 7. Edward J. Markey (D)
    • 8. Joseph P. Kennedy II (D)
    • 9. Joe Moakley (D)
    • 10. Gerry E. Studds (D)
    • 11. Brian Donnelly (D)
    MICHIGAN
    • 1. John Conyers Jr. (D)
    • 2. Carl D. Pursell (R)
    • 3. Howard Wolpe (D)
    • 4. Fred Upton (R)
    • 5. Paul B. Henry (R)
    • 6. Bob Carr (D)
    • 7. Dale E. Kildee (D)
    • 8. Bob Traxler (D)
    • 9. Guy Vander Jagt (R)
    • 10. Bill Schuette (R)
    • 11. Robert W. Davis (R)
    • 12. David E. Bonior (D)
    • 13. George W. Crockett Jr. (D)
    • 14. Dennis M. Hertel (D)
    • 15. William D. Ford (D)
    • 16. John D. Dingell (D)
    • 17. Sander M. Levin (D)
    • 18. William S. Broomfield (R)
    MINNESOTA
    • 1. Timothy J. Penny (D)
    • 2. Vin Weber (R)
    • 3. Bill Frenzel (R)
    • 4. Bruce F. Vento (D)
    • 5. Martin Olav Sabo (D)
    • 6. Gerry Sikorski (D)
    • 7. Arlan Stangeland (R)
    • 8. James L. Oberstar (D)
    MISSISSIPPI
    • 1. Jamie L. Whitten (D)
    • 2. Mike Espy (D)
    • 3. G. V.
      Sonny
      Montgomery (D)
    • 4. Mike Parker (D)
    • 5. Larkin Smith (R) (died Aug. 13, 1989)
    • Gene Taylor (D) (sworn in Oct. 24, 1989)
    MISSOURI
    • 1. William L. Clay (D)
    • 2. Jack Buechner (R)
    • 3. Richard A. Gephardt (D)
    • 4. Ike Skelton (D)
    • 5. Alan Wheat (D)
    • 6. E. Thomas Coleman (R)
    • 7. Mel Hancock (R)
    • 8. Bill Emerson (R)
    • 9. Harold L. Volkmer (D)
    MONTANA
    • 1. Pat Williams (D)
    • 2. Ron Marlenee (R)
    NEBRASKA
    • 1. Doug Bereuter (R)
    • 2. Peter Hoagland (D)
    • 3. Virginia Smith (R)
    NEVADA
    • 1. James Bilbray (D)
    • 2. Barbara F. Vucanovich (R)
    NEW HAMPSHIRE
    • 1. Robert C. Smith (R) (resigned Dec. 7, 1990)
    • 2. Chuck Douglas (R)
    NEW JERSEY
    • 1. James J. Florio (D) (resigned Jan. 16, 1990)
    • Robert E. Andrews (D) (sworn in Jan. 3, 1991)
    • 2. William J. Hughes (D)
    • 3. Frank Pallone Jr. (D)
    • 4. Christopher H. Smith (R)
    • 5. Marge Roukema (R)
    • 6. Bernard J. Dwyer (D)
    • 7. Matthew J. Rinaldo (R)
    • 8. Robert A. Roe (D)
    • 9. Robert G. Torricelli (D)
    • 10. Donald M. Payne (D)
    • 11. Dean A. Gallo (R)
    • 12. Jim Courter (R)
    • 13. H. James Saxton (R)
    • 14. Frank J. Guarini (D)
    NEW MEXICO
    • 1. Steven H. Schiff (R)
    • 2. Joe Skeen (R)
    • 3. Bill Richardson (D)
    NEW YORK
    • 1. George J. Hochbrueckner (D)
    • 2. Thomas J. Downey (D)
    • 3. Robert J. Mrazek (D)
    • 4. Norman F. Lent (R)
    • 5. Raymond J. McGrath (R)
    • 6. Floyd H. Flake (D)
    • 7. Gary L. Ackerman (D)
    • 8. James H. Scheuer (D)
    • 9. Thomas J. Manton (D)
    • 10. Charles E. Schumer (D)
    • 11. Edolphus Towns (D)
    • 12. Major R. Owens (D)
    • 13. Stephen J. Solarz (D)
    • 14. Guy V. Molinari (R) (resigned Jan. 1, 1990)
    • Susan Molinari (R) (sworn in March 27, 1990)
    • 15. Bill Green (R)
    • 16. Charles B. Rangel (D)
    • 17. Ted Weiss (D)
    • 18. Robert Garcia (D) (resigned Jan. 7, 1990)
    • Jose E. Serrano (D) (sworn in March 28, 1990)
    • 19. Eliot L. Engel (D)
    • 20. Nita M. Lowey (D)
    • 21. Hamilton Fish Jr. (R)
    • 22. Benjamin A. Gilman (R)
    • 23. Michael R. McNulty (D)
    • 24. Gerald B. H. Solomon (R)
    • 25. Sherwood Boehlert (R)
    • 26. David O'B. Martin (R)
    • 27. James T. Walsh (R)
    • 28. Matthew F. McHugh (D)
    • 29. Frank Horton (R)
    • 30. Louise M. Slaughter (D)
    • 31. Bill Paxon (R)
    • 32. John J. LaFalce (D)
    • 33. Henry J. Nowak (D)
    • 34. Amo Houghton (R)
    NORTH CAROLINA
    • 1. Walter B. Jones (D)
    • 2. Tim Valentine (D)
    • 3. H. Martin Lancaster (D)
    • 4. David E. Price (D)
    • 5. Stephen L. Neal (D)
    • 6. Howard Coble (R)
    • 7. Charlie Rose (D)
    • 8. W. G.
      Bill
      Hefner (D)
    • 9. Alex McMillan (R)
    • 10. Cass Ballenger (R)
    • 11. James McClure Clarke (D)
    NORTH DAKOTA
    • AL Byron L. Dorgan (D)
    OHIO
    • 1. Thomas A. Luken (D)
    • 2. Bill Gradison (R)
    • 3. Tony P. Hall (D)
    • 4. Michael G. Oxley (R)
    • 5. Paul E. Gillmor (R)
    • 6. Bob McEwen (R)
    • 7. Mike DeWine (R)
    • 8. Donald E.
      Buz
      Lukens (R) (resigned Oct. 24, 1990)
    • 9. Marcy Kaptur (D)
    • 10. Clarence E. Miller (R)
    • 11. Dennis E. Eckart (D)
    • 12. John R. Kasich (R)
    • 13. Don J. Pease (D)
    • 14. Thomas C. Sawyer (D)
    • 15. Chalmers P. Wylie (R)
    • 16. Ralph Regula (R)
    • 17. James A. Traficant Jr. (D)
    • 18. Douglas Applegate (D)
    • 19. Edward F. Feighan (D)
    • 20. Mary Rose Oakar (D)
    • 21. Louis Stokes (D)
    OKLAHOMA
    • 1. James M. Inhofe (R)
    • 2. Mike Synar (D)
    • 3. Wes Watkins (D)
    • 4. Dave McCurdy (D)
    • 5. Mickey Edwards (R)
    • 6. Glenn English (D)
    OREGON
    • 1. Les AuCoin (D)
    • 2. Bob Smith (R)
    • 3. Ron Wyden (D)
    • 4. Peter A. DeFazio (D)
    • 5. Denny Smith (R)
    PENNSYLVANIA
    • 1. Thomas M. Foglietta (D)
    • 2. William H. Gray III (D)
    • 3. Robert A. Borski (D)
    • 4. Joe Kolter (D)
    • 5. Richard T. Schulze (R)
    • 6. Gus Yatron (D)
    • 7. Curt Weldon (R)
    • 8. Peter H. Kostmayer (D)
    • 9. Bud Shuster (R)
    • 10. Joseph M. McDade (R)
    • 11. Paul E. Kanjorski (D)
    • 12. John P. Murtha (D)
    • 13. Lawrence Coughlin (R)
    • 14. William J. Coyne (D)
    • 15. Don Ritter (R)
    • 16. Robert S. Walker (R)
    • 17. George W. Gekas (R)
    • 18. Doug Walgren (D)
    • 19. Bill Goodling (R)
    • 20. Joseph M. Gaydos (D)
    • 21. Tom Ridge (R)
    • 22. Austin J. Murphy (D)
    • 23. William F. Clinger Jr. (R)
    RHODE ISLAND
    • 1. Ronald K. Machtley (R)
    • 2. Claudine Schneider (R)
    SOUTH CAROLINA
    • 1. Arthur Ravenel Jr. (R)
    • 2. Floyd D. Spence (R)
    • 3. Butler Derrick (D)
    • 4. Liz J. Patterson (D)
    • 5. John M. Spratt Jr. (D)
    • 6. Robin Tallon (D)
    SOUTH DAKOTA
    • AL Tim Johnson (D)
    TENNESSEE
    • 1. James H. Quillen (R)
    • 2. John J.
      Jimmy
      Duncan Jr. (R)
    • 3. Marilyn Lloyd (D)
    • 4. Jim Cooper (D)
    • 5. Bob Clement (D)
    • 6. Bart Gordon (D)
    • 7. Don Sundquist (R)
    • 8. John Tanner (D)
    • 9. Harold E. Ford (D)
    TEXAS
    • 1. Jim Chapman (D)
    • 2. Charles Wilson (D)
    • 3. Steve Bartlett (R)
    • 4. Ralph M. Hall (D)
    • 5. John Bryant (D)
    • 6. Joe L. Barton (R)
    • 7. Bill Archer (R)
    • 8. Jack Fields (R)
    • 9. Jack Brooks (D)
    • 10. J. J. Pickle (D)
    • 11. Marvin Leath (D)
    • 12. Jim Wright (D) (resigned June 30, 1989)
    • Pete Geren (D) (sworn in Sept. 20, 1989)
    • 13. Bill Sarpalius (D)
    • 14. Greg Laughlin (D)
    • 15. E.
      Kika
      de la Garza (D)
    • 16. Ronald D. Coleman (D)
    • 17. Charles W. Stenholm (D)
    • 18. Mickey Leland (D) (died Aug. 7, 1989)
    • Craig Washington (D) (sworn in Jan. 23, 1990)
    • 19. Larry Combest (R)
    • 20. Henry B. Gonzalez (D)
    • 21. Lamar Smith (R)
    • 22. Tom DeLay (R)
    • 23. Albert G. Bustamante (D)
    • 24. Martin Frost (D)
    • 25. Michael A. Andrews (D)
    • 26. Dick Armey (R)
    • 27. Solomon P. Ortiz (D)
    UTAH
    • 1. James V. Hansen (R)
    • 2. Wayne Owens (D)
    • 3. Howard C. Nielson (R)
    VERMONT
    • AL Peter Smith (R)
    VIRGINIA
    • 1. Herbert H. Bateman (R)
    • 2. Owen B. Pickett (D)
    • 3. Thomas J. Bliley Jr. (R)
    • 4. Norman Sisisky (D)
    • 5. Lewis F. Payne Jr. (D)
    • 6. Jim Olin (D)
    • 7. D. French Slaughter Jr. (R)
    • 8. Stan Parris (R)
    • 9. Rick Boucher (D)
    • 10. Frank R. Wolf (R)
    WASHINGTON
    • 1. John Miller (R)
    • 2. Al Swift (D)
    • 3. Jolene Unsoeld (D)
    • 4. Sid Morrison (R)
    • 5. Thomas S. Foley (D)
    • 6. Norm Dicks (D)
    • 7. Jim McDermott (D)
    • 8. Rod Chandler (R)
    WEST VIRGINIA
    • 1. Alan B. Mollohan (D)
    • 2. Harley O. Staggers Jr. (D)
    • 3. Bob Wise (D)
    • 4. Nick J. Rahall II (D)
    WISCONSIN
    • 1. Les Aspin (D)
    • 2. Robert W. Kastenmeier (D)
    • 3. Steve Gunderson (R)
    • 4. Gerald D. Kleczka (D)
    • 5. Jim Moody (D)
    • 6. Thomas E. Petri (R)
    • 7. David R. Obey (D)
    • 8. Toby Roth (R)
    • 9. F. James Sensenbrenner Jr. (R)
    WYOMING
    • AL Dick Cheney (R) (resigned March 17, 1989)
    • Craig Thomas (R) (sworn in May 2, 1989)
    Note

    Members of the 101st Congress also included delegates Ben Blaz, R-Guam; Ron de Lugo, D-Virgin Islands; Eni F. H. Faleomavaega, D-Am. Samoa; Walter E. Fauntroy, D-D.C.; and resident commissioner Jaime B. Fuster, Pop. Dem.-Puerto Rico.

    Bill Nichols, D, was re-elected Nov. 8, 1988, but died Dec. 13, 1988, before the start of the 101st Congress and was not sworn in. Glen Browder was elected to fill the vacant seat in a special election held April 4, 1989.Tommy Robinson switched to the Republican Party on July 28, 1989.Bill Grant switched to the Republican Party on Feb. 21, 1989.Daniel R. Coats, R, was re-elected Nov. 8, 1988. However, he resigned Jan. 1, 1989, to assume the Senate seat vacated by Dan Quayle, R, who was elected vice president. Jill L. Long was elected to fill the vacant seat in a special election held March 28, 1989.

    Membership Changes, 101st and 102nd Congresses
    101st Congress

    Senate

    House

    102nd Congress

    Senate

    House

    Elected to complete the remaining four years of Matsunaga's term in a special election Nov. 6, 1990.Smith, who was elected to a six-year Senate term on Nov. 6, 1990, resigned from the House on Dec. 7 to serve the remainder of Humphrey's term, which expired Jan 3, 1991.Elected to complete the remainder of Florio's term and to the 102nd Congress on Nov. 6, 1990.Elected to complete the remaining three years of Heinz's term in a special election Nov. 5, 1991.Elected Nov. 3, 1992, to complete the remaining two years of Wilson's term, succeeding Seymour, an interim appointment.Elected Nov. 3, 1992, to the 103rd Congress, to the Senate seat Kent Conrad had planned to vacate at the end of the 102nd Congress. Upon Conrad's Dec. 14 resignation, Dorgan was appointed to fill Conrad's remaining term in the 102nd Congress.On this date, Conrad won a special election to serve the remaining two years of Quentin N. Burdick's term.Elected to complete the remainder of Weiss' term and to the 103rd Congress on Nov. 3, 1992.Elected to complete the remainder of Jones' term and to the 103rd Congress on Nov. 3, 1992.

    Senate Membership in the 102nd Congress
    Lineup as of Jan. 3, 1991: Democrats 56, Republicans 44

    ALABAMA
    • Howell Heflin (D)
    • Richard C. Shelby (D)
    ALASKA
    • Frank H. Murkowski (R)
    • Ted Stevens (R)
    ARIZONA
    • Dennis DeConcini (D)
    • John McCain (R)
    ARKANSAS
    • Dale Bumpers (D)
    • David Pryor (D)
    CALIFORNIA
    • Alan Cranston (D)
    • Pete Wilson (R) (resigned Jan. 7, 1991)
    • John Seymour (R) (sworn in Jan. 10, 1991; resigned Nov. 3, 1992)
    • Dianne Feinstein (D)1(sworn in Nov. 10, 1992)
    COLORADO
    • Tim Wirth (D)
    • Hank Brown (R)
    CONNECTICUT
    • Christopher J. Dodd (D)
    • Joseph I. Lieberman (D)
    DELAWARE
    • Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D)
    • William V. Roth Jr. (R)
    FLORIDA
    • Bob Graham (D)
    • Connie Mack (R)
    GEORGIA
    • Wyche Fowler Jr. (D)
    • Sam Nunn (D)
    HAWAII
    • Daniel K. Akaka (D)
    • Daniel K. Inouye (D)
    IDAHO
    • Larry E. Craig (R)
    • Steve Symms (R)
    ILLINOIS
    • Alan J. Dixon (D)
    • Paul Simon (D)
    INDIANA
    • Daniel R. Coats (R)
    • Richard G. Lugar (R)
    IOWA
    • Tom Harkin (D)
    • Charles E. Grassley (R)
    KANSAS
    • Bob Dole (R)
    • Nancy Landon Kassebaum (R)
    KENTUCKY
    • Wendell H. Ford (D)
    • Mitch McConnell (R)
    LOUISIANA
    • John B. Breaux (D)
    • J. Bennett Johnston (D)
    MAINE
    • George J. Mitchell (D)
    • William S. Cohen (R)
    MARYLAND
    • Barbara A. Mikulski (D)
    • Paul S. Sarbanes (D)
    MASSACHUSETTS
    • Edward M. Kennedy (D)
    • John Kerry (D)
    MICHIGAN
    • Carl Levin (D)
    • Donald W. Riegle Jr. (D)
    MINNESOTA
    • Paul Wellstone (D)
    • Dave Durenberger (R)
    MISSISSIPPI
    • Thad Cochran (R)
    • Trent Lott (R)
    MISSOURI
    • Christopher S. Bond (R)
    • John C. Danforth (R)
    MONTANA
    • Max Baucus (D)
    • Conrad Burns (R)
    NEBRASKA
    • Jim Exon (D)
    • Bob Kerrey (D)
    NEVADA
    • Richard H. Bryan (D)
    • Harry Reid (D)
    NEW HAMPSHIRE
    • Warren B. Rudman (R)
    • Robert C. Smith (R)
    NEW JERSEY
    • Bill Bradley (D)
    • Frank R. Lautenberg (D)
    NEW MEXICO
    • Jeff Bingaman (D)
    • Pete V. Domenici (R)
    NEW YORK
    • Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D)
    • Alfonse M. D'Amato (R)
    NORTH CAROLINA
    • Terry Sanford (D)
    • Jesse Helms (R)
    NORTH DAKOTA
    • Quentin N. Burdick (D) (died Sept. 8, 1992)
    • Jocelyn Birch Burdick (D) (sworn in Sept. 16, 1992; resigned Dec. 14, 1992)
    • Kent Conrad (D)1
    • Byron L. Dorgan (D) (sworn in Dec. 15, 1992)
    OHIO
    • John Glenn (D)
    • Howard M. Metzenbaum (D)
    OKLAHOMA
    • David L. Boren (D)
    • Don Nickles (R)
    OREGON
    • Mark O. Hatfield (R)
    • Bob Packwood (R)
    PENNSYLVANIA
    • John Heinz (R) (died April 4, 1991)
    • Harris Wofford (D)1(sworn in May 9, 1991)
    • Arlen Specter (R)
    RHODE ISLAND
    • Claiborne Pell (D)
    • John H. Chafee (R)
    SOUTH CAROLINA
    • Ernest F. Hollings (D)
    • Strom Thurmond (R)
    SOUTH DAKOTA
    • Tom Daschle (D)
    • Larry Pressler (R)
    TENNESSEE
    • Al Gore (D) (resigned Jan. 2, 1993)
    • Jim Sasser (D)
    TEXAS
    • Lloyd Bentsen (D)
    • Phil Gramm (R)
    UTAH
    • Jake Garn (R)
    • Orrin G. Hatch (R)
    VERMONT
    • Patrick J. Leahy (D)
    • James M. Jeffords (R)
    VIRGINIA
    • Charles S. Robb (D)
    • John W. Warner (R)
    WASHINGTON
    • Brock Adams (D)
    • Slade Gorton (R)
    WEST VIRGINIA
    • Robert C. Byrd (D)
    • John D. Rockefeller IV (D)
    WISCONSIN
    • Herb Kohl (D)
    • Bob Kasten (R)
    WYOMING
    • Alan K. Simpson (R)
    • Malcolm Wallop (R)

    Elected Nov. 3, 1992, to complete the remaining two years of Wilson's term, replacing Seymour, an interim appointment.Conrad did not run for re-election in November 1992 to the 103rd Congress. His seat was won by Byron L. Dorgan, D. Upon the death of Quentin N. Burdick, D, Conrad decided to run in a special election to fill Burdick's remaining term. Conrad won the election Dec. 4, 1992, resigned his own seat Dec. 14 and assumed Burdick's seat the same day. Dorgan was appointed to fill Conrad's remaining term in the 102nd Congress.Appointed May 8, 1991, and then elected to complete the remaining three years of Heinz's term in a special election Nov. 5, 1991.

    House Membership in the 102nd Congress
    Lineup as of Jan. 3, 1991: Democrats 267, Republicans 167, Independent 1

    ALABAMA
    • 1. Sonny Callahan (R)
    • 2. Bill Dickinson (R)
    • 3. Glen Browder (D)
    • 4. Tom Bevill (D)
    • 5. Bud Cramer (D)
    • 6. Ben Erdreich (D)
    • 7. Claude Harris (D)
    ALASKA
    • AL Don Young (R)
    ARIZONA
    • 1. John J. Rhodes III (R)
    • 2. Morris K. Udall (D) (resigned May 4, 1991)
    • Ed Pastor (D) (sworn in Oct. 3, 1991)
    • 3. Bob Stump (R)
    • 4. Jon Kyl (R)
    • 5. Jim Kolbe (R)
    ARKANSAS
    • 1. Bill Alexander (D)
    • 2. Ray Thornton (D)
    • 3. John Paul Hammerschmidt (R)
    • 4. Beryl Anthony Jr. (D)
    CALIFORNIA
    • 1. Frank Riggs (R).
    • 2. Wally Herger (R)
    • 3. Robert T. Matsui (D)
    • 4. Vic Fazio (D)
    • 5. Nancy Pelosi (D)
    • 6. Barbara Boxer (D)
    • 7. George Miller (D)
    • 8. Ronald V. Dellums (D)
    • 9. Pete Stark (D)
    • 10. Don Edwards (D)
    • 11. Tom Lantos (D)
    • 12. Tom Campbell (R)
    • 13. Norman Y. Mineta (D)
    • 14. John T. Doolittle (R)
    • 15. Gary Condit (D)
    • 16. Leon E. Panetta (D)
    • 17. Calvin Dooley (D)
    • 18. Richard H. Lehman (D)
    • 19. Robert J. Lagomarsino (R)
    • 20. Bill Thomas (R)
    • 21. Elton Gallegly (R)
    • 22. Carlos J. Moorhead (R)
    • 23. Anthony C. Beilenson (D)
    • 24. Henry A. Waxman (D)
    • 25. Edward R. Roybal (D)
    • 26. Howard L. Berman (D)
    • 27. Mel Levine (D)
    • 28. Julian C. Dixon (D)
    • 29. Maxine Waters (D)
    • 30. Matthew G. Martinez (D)
    • 31. Mervyn M. Dymally (D)
    • 32. Glenn M. Anderson (D)
    • 33. David Dreier (R)
    • 34. Esteban E. Torres (D)
    • 35. Jerry Lewis (R)
    • 36. George E. Brown Jr. (D)
    • 37. Al McCandless (R)
    • 38. Robert K. Dornan (R)
    • 39. William E. Dannemeyer (R)
    • 40. C. Christopher Cox (R)
    • 41. Bill Lowery (R)
    • 42. Dana Rohrabacher (R)
    • 43. Ron Packard (R)
    • 44. Randy
      Duke
      Cunningham (R)
    • 45. Duncan Hunter (R)
    COLORADO
    • 1. Patricia Schroeder (D)
    • 2. David E. Skaggs (D)
    • 3. Ben Nighthorse Campbell (D)
    • 4. Wayne Allard (R)
    • 5. Joel Hefley (R)
    • 6. Dan Schaefer (R)
    CONNECTICUT
    • 1. Barbara B. Kennelly (D)
    • 2. Sam Gejdenson (D)
    • 3. Rosa DeLauro (D)
    • 4. Christopher Shays (R)
    • 5. Gary Franks (R)
    • 6. Nancy L. Johnson (R)
    DELAWARE
    • AL Thomas R. Carper (D)
    FLORIDA
    • 1. Earl Hutto (D)
    • 2. Pete Peterson (D)
    • 3. Charles E. Bennett (D)
    • 4. Craig T. James (R)
    • 5. Bill McCollum (R)
    • 6. Cliff Stearns (R)
    • 7. Sam M. Gibbons (D)
    • 8. C.W. Bill Young (R)
    • 9. Michael Bilirakis (R)
    • 10. Andy Ireland (R)
    • 11. Jim Bacchus (D)
    • 12. Tom Lewis (R)
    • 13. Porter J. Goss (R)
    • 14. Harry A. Johnston (D)
    • 15. E. Clay Shaw Jr. (R)
    • 16. Lawrence J. Smith (D)
    • 17. William Lehman (D)
    • 18. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R)
    • 19. Dante B. Fascell (D)
    GEORGIA
    • 1. Lindsay Thomas (D)
    • 2. Charles Hatcher (D)
    • 3. Richard Ray (D)
    • 4. Ben Jones (D)
    • 5. John Lewis (D)
    • 6. Newt Gingrich (R)
    • 7. George
      Buddy
      Darden (D)
    • 8. J. Roy Rowland (D)
    • 9. Ed Jenkins (D)
    • 10. Doug Barnard Jr. (D)
    HAWAII
    • 1. Neil Abercrombie (D)
    • 2. Patsy T. Mink (D)
    IDAHO
    • 1. Larry LaRocco (D)
    • 2. Richard Stallings (D)
    ILLINOIS
    • 1. Charles A. Hayes (D)
    • 2. Gus Savage (D)
    • 3. Marty Russo (D)
    • 4. George E. Sangmeister (D)
    • 5. William O. Lipinski (D)
    • 6. Henry J. Hyde (R)
    • 7. Cardiss Collins (D)
    • 8. Dan Rostenkowski (D)
    • 9. Sidney R. Yates (D)
    • 10. John Porter (R)
    • 11. Frank Annunzio (D)
    • 12. Philip M. Crane (R)
    • 13. Harris W. Fawell (R)
    • 14. Dennis Hastert (R)
    • 15. Edward R. Madigan (R) (resigned March 8, 1991)
    • Thomas W. Ewing (R) (sworn in July 10, 1991)
    • 16. John W. Cox Jr. (D)
    • 17. Lane Evans (D)
    • 18. Robert H. Michel (R)
    • 19. Terry L. Bruce (D)
    • 20. Richard J. Durbin (D)
    • 21. Jerry F. Costello (D)
    • 22. Glenn Poshard (D)
    INDIANA
    • 1. Peter J. Visclosky (D)
    • 2. Philip R. Sharp (D)
    • 3. Tim Roemer (D)
    • 4. Jill L. Long (D)
    • 5. Jim Jontz (D)
    • 6. Dan Burton (R)
    • 7. John T. Myers (R)
    • 8. Frank McCloskey (D)
    • 9. Lee H. Hamilton (D)
    • 10. Andrew Jacobs Jr. (D)
    IOWA
    • 1. Jim Leach (R)
    • 2. Jim Nussle (R)
    • 3. Dave Nagle (D)
    • 4. Neal Smith (D)
    • 5. Jim Ross Lightfoot (R)
    • 6. Fred Grandy (R)
    KANSAS
    • 1. Pat Roberts (R)
    • 2. Jim Slattery (D)
    • 3. Jan Meyers (R)
    • 4. Dan Glickman (D)
    • 5. Dick Nichols (R)
    KENTUCKY
    • 1. Carroll Hubbard Jr. (D)
    • 2. William H. Natcher (D)
    • 3. Romano L. Mazzoli (D)
    • 4. Jim Bunning (R)
    • 5. Harold Rogers (R)
    • 6. Larry J. Hopkins (R)
    • 7. Carl C. Perkins (D)
    LOUISIANA
    • 1. Robert L. Livingston (R)
    • 2. William J. Jefferson (D)
    • 3. W.J.
      Billy
      Tauzin (D)
    • 4. Jim McCrery (R)
    • 5. Jerry Huckaby (D)
    • 6. Richard H. Baker (R)
    • 7. Jimmy Hayes (D)
    • 8. Clyde C. Holloway (R)
    MAINE
    • 1. Thomas H. Andrews (D)
    • 2. Olympia J. Snowe (R)
    MARYLAND
    • 1. Wayne T. Gilchrest (R)
    • 2. Helen Delich Bentley (R)
    • 3. Benjamin L. Cardin (D)
    • 4. Tom McMillen (D)
    • 5. Steny H. Hoyer (D)
    • 6. Beverly B. Byron (D)
    • 7. Kweisi Mfume (D)
    • 8. Constance A. Morella (R)
    MASSACHUSETTS
    • 1. Silvio O. Conte (R) (died Feb. 8, 1991)
    • John Olver (D) (sworn in June 18, 1991)
    • 2. Richard E. Neal (D)
    • 3. Joseph D. Early (D)
    • 4. Barney Frank (D)
    • 5. Chester G. Atkins (D)
    • 6. Nicholas Mavroules (D)
    • 7. Edward J. Markey (D)
    • 8. Joseph P. Kennedy II (D)
    • 9. Joe Moakley (D)
    • 10. Gerry E. Studds (D)
    • 11. Brian Donnelly (D)
    MICHIGAN
    • 1. John Conyers Jr. (D)
    • 2. Carl D. Pursell (R)
    • 3. Howard Wolpe (D)
    • 4. Fred Upton (R)
    • 5. Paul B. Henry (R)
    • 6. Bob Carr (D)
    • 7. Dale E. Kildee (D)
    • 8. Bob Traxler (D)
    • 9. Guy Vander Jagt (R)
    • 10. Dave Camp (R)
    • 11. Robert W. Davis (R)
    • 12. David E. Bonior (D)
    • 13. Barbara-Rose Collins (D)
    • 14. Dennis M. Hertel (D)
    • 15. William D. Ford (D)
    • 16. John D. Dingell (D)
    • 17. Sander M. Levin (D)
    • 18. William S. Broomfield (R)
    MINNESOTA
    • 1. Timothy J. Penny (D)
    • 2. Vin Weber (R)
    • 3. Jim Ramstad (R)
    • 4. Bruce F. Vento (D)
    • 5. Martin Olav Sabo (D)
    • 6. Gerry Sikorski (D)
    • 7. Collin C. Peterson (D)
    • 8. James L. Oberstar (D)
    MISSISSIPPI
    • 1. Jamie L. Whitten (D)
    • 2. Mike Espy (D)
    • 3. G.V.
      Sonny
      Montgomery (D)
    • 4. Mike Parker (D)
    • 5. Gene Taylor (D)
    MISSOURI
    • 1. William L. Clay (D)
    • 2. Joan Kelly Horn (D)
    • 3. Richard A. Gephardt (D)
    • 4. Ike Skelton (D)
    • 5. Alan Wheat (D)
    • 6. E. Thomas Coleman (R)
    • 7. Mel Hancock (R)
    • 8. Bill Emerson (R)
    • 9. Harold L. Volkmer (D)
    MONTANA
    • 1. Pat Williams (D)
    • 2. Ron Marlenee (R)
    NEBRASKA
    • 1. Doug Bereuter (R)
    • 2. Peter Hoagland (D)
    • 3. Bill Barrett (R)
    NEVADA
    • 1. James Bilbray (D)
    • 2. Barbara F. Vucanovich (R)
    NEW HAMPSHIRE
    • 1. Bill Zeliff (R)
    • 2. Dick Swett (D)
    NEW JERSEY
    • 1. Robert E. Andrews (D)
    • 2. William J. Hughes (D)
    • 3. Frank Pallone Jr. (D)
    • 4. Christopher H. Smith (R)
    • 5. Marge Roukema (R)
    • 6. Bernard J. Dwyer (D)
    • 7. Matthew J. Rinaldo (R)
    • 8. Robert A. Roe (D)
    • 9. Robert G. Torricelli (D)
    • 10. Donald M. Payne (D)
    • 11. Dean A. Gallo (R)
    • 12. Dick Zimmer (R)
    • 13. H. James Saxton (R)
    • 14. Frank J. Guarini (D)
    NEW MEXICO
    • 1. Steven H. Schiff (R)
    • 2. Joe Skeen (R)
    • 3. Bill Richardson (D)
    NEW YORK
    • 1. George J. Hochbrueckner (D)
    • 2. Thomas J. Downey (D)
    • 3. Robert J. Mrazek (D)
    • 4. Norman F. Lent (R)
    • 5. Raymond J. McGrath (R)
    • 6. Floyd H. Flake (D)
    • 7. Gary L. Ackerman (D)
    • 8. James H. Scheuer (D)
    • 9. Thomas J. Manton (D)
    • 10. Charles E. Schumer (D)
    • 11. Edolphus Towns (D)
    • 12. Major R. Owens (D)
    • 13. Stephen J. Solarz (D)
    • 14. Susan Molinari (R)
    • 15. Bill Green (R)
    • 16. Charles B. Rangel (D)
    • 17. Ted Weiss (D) (died Sept. 14, 1992)
    • 18. Jose E. Serrano (D)
    • 19. Eliot L. Engel (D)
    • 20. Nita M. Lowey (D)
    • 21. Hamilton Fish Jr. (R)
    • 22. Benjamin A. Gilman (R)
    • 23. Michael R. McNulty (D)
    • 24. Gerald B. H. Solomon (R)
    • 25. Sherwood Boehlert (R)
    • 26. David O'B. Martin (R)
    • 27. James T. Walsh (R)
    • 28. Matthew F. McHugh (D)
    • 29. Frank Horton (R)
    • 30. Louise M. Slaughter (D)
    • 31. Bill Paxon (R)
    • 32. John J. LaFalce (D)
    • 33. Henry J. Nowak (D)
    • 34. Amo Houghton (R)
    NORTH CAROLINA
    • 1. Walter B. Jones (D) (died Sept. 15, 1992)
    • 2. Tim Valentine (D)
    • 3. H. Martin Lancaster (D)
    • 4. David E. Price (D)
    • 5. Stephen L. Neal (D)
    • 6. Howard Coble (R)
    • 7. Charlie Rose (D)
    • 8. W. G.
      Bill
      Hefner (D)
    • 9. Alex McMillan (R)
    • 10. Cass Ballenger (R)
    • 11. Charles H. Taylor (R)
    NORTH DAKOTA
    • AL Byron L. Dorgan (D)
    OHIO
    • 1. Charles Luken (D)
    • 2. Bill Gradison (R)
    • 3. Tony P. Hall (D)
    • 4. Michael G. Oxley (R)
    • 5. Paul E. Gillmor (R)
    • 6. Bob McEwen (R)
    • 7. David L. Hobson (R)
    • 8. John A. Boehner (R)
    • 9. Marcy Kaptur (D)
    • 10. Clarence E. Miller (R)
    • 11. Dennis E. Eckart (D)
    • 12. John R. Kasich (R)
    • 13. Don J. Pease (D)
    • 14. Thomas C. Sawyer (D)
    • 15. Chalmers P. Wylie (R)
    • 16. Ralph Regula (R)
    • 17. James A. Traficant Jr. (D)
    • 18. Douglas Applegate (D)
    • 19. Edward F. Feighan (D)
    • 20. Mary Rose Oakar (D)
    • 21. Louis Stokes (D)
    OKLAHOMA
    • 1. James M. Inhofe (R)
    • 2. Mike Synar (D)
    • 3. Bill Brewster (D)
    • 4. Dave McCurdy (D)
    • 5. Mickey Edwards (R)
    • 6. Glenn English (D)
    OREGON
    • 1. Les AuCoin (D)
    • 2. Bob Smith (R)
    • 3. Ron Wyden (D)
    • 4. Peter A. DeFazio (D)
    • 5. Mike Kopetski (D)
    PENNSYLVANIA
    • 1. Thomas M. Foglietta (D)
    • 2. William H. Gray III (D) (resigned Sept. 11, 1991)
    • Lucien E. Blackwell (D) (sworn in Nov. 13, 1991)
    • 3. Robert A. Borski (D)
    • 4. Joe Kolter (D)
    • 5. Richard T. Schulze (R)
    • 6. Gus Yatron (D)
    • 7. Curt Weldon (R)
    • 8. Peter H. Kostmayer (D)
    • 9. Bud Shuster (R)
    • 10. Joseph M. McDade (R)
    • 11. Paul E. Kanjorski (D)
    • 12. John P. Murtha (D)
    • 13. Lawrence Coughlin (R)
    • 14. William J. Coyne (D)
    • 15. Don Ritter (R)
    • 16. Robert S. Walker (R)
    • 17. George W. Gekas (R)
    • 18. Rick Santorum (R)
    • 19. Bill Goodling (R)
    • 20. Joseph M. Gaydos (D)
    • 21. Tom Ridge (R)
    • 22. Austin J. Murphy (D)
    • 23. William F. Clinger Jr. (R)
    RHODE ISLAND
    • 1. Ronald K. Machtley (R)
    • 2. John F. Reed (D)
    SOUTH CAROLINA
    • 1. Arthur Ravenel Jr. (R)
    • 2. Floyd D. Spence (R)
    • 3. Butler Derrick (D)
    • 4. Liz J. Patterson (D)
    • 5. John M. Spratt Jr. (D)
    • 6. Robin Tallon (D)
    SOUTH DAKOTA
    • AL Tim Johnson (D)
    TENNESSEE
    • 1. James H. Quillen (R)
    • 2. John J.
      Jimmy
      Duncan Jr. (R)
    • 3. Marilyn Lloyd (D)
    • 4. Jim Cooper (D)
    • 5. Bob Clement (D)
    • 6. Bart Gordon (D)
    • 7. Don Sundquist (R)
    • 8. John Tanner (D)
    • 9. Harold E. Ford (D)
    TEXAS
    • 1. Jim Chapman (D)
    • 2. Charles Wilson (D)
    • 3. Steve Bartlett (R) (resigned March 11, 1991)
    • Sam Johnson (R) (sworn in May 22, 1991)
    • 4. Ralph M. Hall (D)
    • 5. John Bryant (D)
    • 6. Joe L. Barton (R)
    • 7. Bill Archer (R)
    • 8. Jack Fields (R)
    • 9. Jack Brooks (D)
    • 10. J. J. Pickle (D)
    • 11. Chet Edwards (D)
    • 12. Pete Geren (D)
    • 13. Bill Sarpalius (D)
    • 14. Greg Laughlin (D)
    • 15. E.
      Kika
      de la Garza (D)
    • 16. Ronald D. Coleman (D)
    • 17. Charles W. Stenholm (D)
    • 18. Craig Washington (D)
    • 19. Larry Combest (R)
    • 20. Henry B. Gonzalez (D)
    • 21. Lamar Smith (R)
    • 22. Tom DeLay (R)
    • 23. Albert G. Bustamante (D)
    • 24. Martin Frost (D)
    • 25. Michael A. Andrews (D)
    • 26. Dick Armey (R)
    • 27. Solomon P. Ortiz (D)
    UTAH
    • 1. James V. Hansen (R)
    • 2. Wayne Owens (D)
    • 3. Bill Orton (D)
    VERMONT
    • AL Bernard Sanders (I)
    VIRGINIA
    • 1. Herbert H. Bateman (R)
    • 2. Owen B. Pickett (D)
    • 3. Thomas J. Bliley Jr. (R)
    • 4. Norman Sisisky (D)
    • 5. Lewis F. Payne Jr. (D)
    • 6. Jim Olin (D)
    • 7. D. French Slaughter Jr. (R) (resigned Nov. 5, 1991)
    • George F. Allen (R) (sworn in Nov. 12, 1991)
    • 8. James P. Moran Jr. (D)
    • 9. Rick Boucher (D)
    • 10. Frank R. Wolf (R)
    WASHINGTON
    • 1. John Miller (R)
    • 2. Al Swift (D)
    • 3. Jolene Unsoeld (D)
    • 4. Sid Morrison (R)
    • 5. Thomas S. Foley (D)
    • 6. Norm Dicks (D)
    • 7. Jim McDermott (D)
    • 8. Rod Chandler (R)
    WEST VIRGINIA
    • 1. Alan B. Mollohan (D)
    • 2. Harley O. Staggers Jr. (D)
    • 3. Bob Wise (D)
    • 4. Nick J. Rahall II (D)
    WISCONSIN
    • 1. Les Aspin (D)
    • 2. Scott L. Klug (R)
    • 3. Steve Gunderson (R)
    • 4. Gerald D. Kleczka (D)
    • 5. Jim Moody (D)
    • 6. Thomas E. Petri (R)
    • 7. David R. Obey (D)
    • 8. Toby Roth (R)
    • 9. F. James Sensenbrenner Jr. (R)
    WYOMING
    • AL Craig Thomas (R)
    Note

    Members of the 102nd Congress also included delegates Ben Blaz, R-Guam; Ron de Lugo, D-Virgin Islands; Eni F. H. Faleomavaega, D-Am. Samoa; Eleanor Holmes Norton, D-D.C.; and resident commissioner Jaime B. Fuster, Pop. Dem.-Puerto Rico.

    Members of Congress: 1989-92

    The names in this list include, alphabetically, all senators, representatives, resident commissioners and territorial delegates who served in the 101st and 102nd Congresses — from 1989 to 1992.

    The material is organized as follows: name; relationship to other members and presidents and vice presidents; party; state (of service); date of birth; date of death (if applicable); congressional service; service as president, vice president, member of the Cabinet or Supreme Court, governor, Speaker of the House, president pro tempore of the Senate, majority leader, minority leader and chairman of the Democratic or Republican National Committee.

    If the member changed parties during his or her congressional service, the party designation appearing after the member's name is that which applied at the end of such service and further breakdown is included after the dates of congressional service. Where the service date is left open, the member was still serving in the 103rd Congress (as of August 1993).

    Dates of service are inclusive, starting in year of service and ending when service ends. Under the Constitution, terms of service since 1934 have been from Jan. 3 to Jan. 3. In actual practice, members often have been sworn in on other dates at the beginning of a Congress. The exact date is shown (where available) if a member began or ended his or her service in mid-term.

    The major sources for the following list were the Congressional Directory and Congressional Quarterly's Almanac, Guide to Congress, Guide to U.S. Elections and Weekly Report.

    In the list, D stands for Democrat; I, Independent; Pop. Dem., Popular Democrat; and R, Republican.

    A
    ABERCROMBIE

    Neil (D Hawaii) June 26, 1938-—; House Sept. 23, 1986-87, 1991-—.

    ACKERMAN

    Gary L. (D N.Y.) Nov. 19, 1942-—; House March 1, 1983-—.

    ADAMS

    Brock (D Wash.) Jan. 13, 1927-—; House 1965-Jan. 22, 1977; Senate 1987-93; Secy. of Transportation 1977-79.

    AKAKA

    Daniel K. (D Hawaii) Sept. 11, 1924-—; House 1977-May 16, 1990; Senate May 16, 1990-—.

    ALEXANDER

    Bill (D Ark.) Jan. 16, 1934-—; House 1969-93.

    ALLARD

    Wayne (R Colo.) Dec. 2, 1943-—; House 1991-—.

    ALLEN

    George F. (R Va.) March 8, 1952-—; House Nov. 12, 1991-93.

    ANDERSON

    Glenn M. (D Calif.) Feb. 21, 1913-—; House 1969-93.

    ANDREWS

    Michael A. (D Texas) Feb. 7, 1944-—; House 1983-—.

    ANDREWS

    Robert E. (D N.J.) Aug. 4, 1957-—; House 1991-—.

    ANDREWS

    Thomas H. (D Maine) March 22, 1953-—; House 1991-—.

    ANNUNZIO

    Frank (D Ill.) Jan. 12, 1915-—; House 1965-93.

    ANTHONY

    Beryl Jr. (D Ark.) Feb. 21, 1938-—; House 1979-93.

    APPLEGATE

    Doug (D Ohio) March 27, 1928-—; House 1977-—.

    ARCHER

    Bill (R Texas) March 22, 1928-—; House 1971-—.

    ARMEY

    Dick (R Texas) July 7, 1940-—; House 1985-—.

    ARMSTRONG

    William L. (R Colo.) March 16, 1937-—; House 1973-79; Senate 1979-91.

    ASPIN

    Les (D Wis.) July 21, 1938-—; House 1971-Jan. 21, 1993; Secy. of Defense 1993-—.

    ATKINS

    Chester G. (D Mass.) April 14, 1948-—; House 1985-93.

    AuCOIN

    Les (D Ore.) Oct. 21, 1942-—; House 1975-93.

    B
    BACCHUS

    Jim (D Fla.) June 21, 1949-—; House 1991-—.

    BAKER

    Richard H. (R La.) May 22, 1948-—; House 1987-—.

    BALLENGER

    Cass (great-great grandson of Lewis Cass) (R N.C.) Dec. 6, 1926-—; House Nov. 4, 1986-—.

    BARNARD

    Doug Jr. (D Ga.) March 20, 1922-—; House 1977-93.

    BARRETT

    Bill (R Neb.) Feb. 9, 1929-—; House 1991-—.

    BARTLETT

    Steve (R Texas) Sept. 19, 1947-—; House 1983-March 11, 1991.

    BARTON

    Joe L. (R Texas) Sept. 15, 1949-—; House 1985-—.

    BATEMAN

    Herbert H. (R Va.) Aug. 7, 1928-—; House 1983-—.

    BATES

    Jim (D Calif.) July 21, 1941-—; House 1983-91.

    BAUCUS

    Max (D Mont.) Dec. 11, 1941-—; House 1975-Dec. 14, 1978; Senate Dec. 15, 1978-—.

    BEILENSON

    Anthony C. (D Calif.) Oct. 26, 1932-—; House 1977-—.

    BENNETT

    Charles E. (D Fla.) Dec. 2, 1910-—; House 1949-93.

    BENTLEY

    Helen Delich (R Md.) Nov. 28, 1923-—; House 1985-—.

    BENTSEN

    Lloyd (D Texas) Feb. 11, 1921-—; House Dec. 4, 1948-55; Senate 1971-Jan. 20, 1993; Secy. of Treasury 1993-—.

    BEREUTER

    Doug (R Neb.) Oct. 6, 1939-—; House 1979-—.

    BERMAN

    Howard L. (D Calif.) April 15, 1941-—; House 1983-—.

    BEVILL

    Tom (D Ala.) March 27, 1921-—; House 1967-—.

    BIDEN

    Joseph R. Jr. (D Del.) Nov. 20, 1942-—; Senate 1973-—.

    BILBRAY

    James (D Nev.) May 19, 1938-—; House 1987-—.

    BILIRAKIS

    Michael (R Fla.) July 16, 1930-—; House 1983-—.

    BINGAMAN

    Jeff (D N.M.) Oct. 3, 1943-—; Senate 1983-—.

    BLACKWELL

    Lucien E. (D Pa.) Aug. 1, 1931-—; House Nov. 13, 1991-—.

    BLAZ

    Ben (R Guam) Feb. 14, 1928-—; House (Delegate) 1985-93.

    BLILEY

    Thomas J. Jr. (R Va.) Jan. 28, 1932-—; House 1981-—.

    BOEHLERT

    Sherwood (R N.Y.) June 28, 1936-—; House 1983-—.

    BOEHNER

    John A. (R Ohio) Nov. 17, 1949-—; House 1991-—.

    BOGGS

    Lindy (Mrs. Hale) (widow of Thomas Hale Boggs Sr.) (D La.) March 13, 1916-—; House March 20, 1973-91.

    BOND

    Christopher S.

    Kit
    (R Mo.) March 6, 1939-—; Senate 1987-—; Gov. 1973-77, 1981-85.

    BONIOR

    David E. (D Mich.) June 6, 1945-—; House 1977-—.

    BOREN

    David L. (son of Lyle H. Boren) (D Okla.) April 21, 1941-—; Senate 1979-—; Gov. 1975-79.

    BORSKI

    Robert A. (D Pa.) Oct. 20, 1948-—; House 1983-—.

    BOSCHWITZ

    Rudy (R Minn.) Nov. 7, 1930-—; Senate Dec. 30, 1978-91.

    BOSCO

    Douglas H. (D Calif.) July 28, 1946-—; House 1983-91.

    BOUCHER

    Rick (D Va.) Aug. 1, 1946-—; House 1983-—.

    BOXER

    Barbara (D Calif.) Nov. 11, 1940-—; House 1983-93; Senate 1993-—.

    BRADLEY

    Bill (D N.J.) July 28, 1943-—; Senate 1979-—.

    BREAUX

    John B. (D La.) March 1, 1944-—; House Sept. 30, 1972-87; Senate 1987-—.

    BRENNAN

    Joseph E. (D Maine) Nov. 2, 1934-—; House 1987-91; Gov. 1979-87.

    BREWSTER

    Bill (D Okla.) Nov. 8, 1941-—; House 1991-—.

    BROOKS

    Jack (D Texas) Dec. 18, 1922-—; House 1953-—.

    BROOMFIELD

    William S. (R Mich.) April 28, 1922-—; House 1957-93.

    BROWDER

    Glen (D Ala.) Jan. 15, 1943-—; House April 18, 1989-—.

    BROWN

    George E. Jr. (D Calif.) March 6, 1920-—; House 1963-71, 1973-—.

    BROWN

    Hank (R Colo.) Feb. 12, 1940-—; House 1981-91; Senate 1991-—.

    BRUCE

    Terry L. (D Ill.) March 25, 1944-—; House 1985-93.

    BRYAN

    Richard H. (D Nev.) July 16, 1937-—; Senate 1989-—; Gov. 1983-89.

    BRYANT

    John (D Texas) Feb. 22, 1947-—; House 1983-—.

    BUECHNER

    Jack (R Mo.) June 6, 1940-—; House 1987-91.

    BUMPERS

    Dale (D Ark.) Aug. 12, 1925-—; Senate 1975-—; Gov. 1971-75.

    BUNNING

    Jim (R Ky.) Oct. 23, 1931-—; House 1987-—.

    BURDICK

    Jocelyn Birch (widow of Quentin N. Burdick, daughter-in-law of Usher Lloyd Burdick) (D N.D.) Feb. 6, 1922-—; Senate Sept. 16-Dec. 14, 1992.

    BURDICK

    Quentin N. (son of Usher Lloyd Burdick, brother-in-law of Robert Woodrow Levering) (D N.D.) June 19, 1908-Sept. 8, 1992; House 1959-Aug. 8, 1960; Senate Aug. 8, 1960-Sept. 8, 1992.

    BURNS

    Conrad (R Mont.) Jan. 25, 1935-—; Senate 1989-—.

    BURTON

    Dan (R Ind.) June 21, 1938-—; House 1983-—.

    BUSTAMANTE

    Albert G. (D Texas) April 8, 1935-—; House 1985-93.

    BYRD

    Robert C. (D W.Va.) Nov. 20, 1917-—; House 1953-59; Senate 1959-—; Senate minority leader, 1981-87; Senate majority leader 1977-81, 1987-89; Pres. pro tempore 1989-—.

    BYRON

    Beverly B. (widow of Goodloe Edgar Byron) (D Md.) July 26, 1932-—; House 1979-93.

    C
    CALLAHAN

    Sonny (R Ala.) Sept. 11, 1932-—; House 1985-—.

    CAMP

    Dave (R Mich.) July 9, 1953-—; House 1991-—.

    CAMPBELL

    Ben Nighthorse (D Colo.) April 13, 1933-—; House 1987-93; Senate 1993-—.

    CAMPBELL

    Tom (R Calif.) Aug. 14, 1952-—; House 1989-93.

    CARDIN

    Benjamin L. (D Md.) Oct. 5, 1943-—; House 1987-—.

    CARPER

    Thomas R. (D Del.) Jan. 23, 1947-—; House 1983-93; Gov. 1993-—.

    CARR

    Bob (D Mich.) March 27, 1943-—; House 1975-81, 1983-—.

    CHAFEE

    John H. (R R.I.) Oct. 22, 1922-—; Senate Dec. 29, 1976-—; Gov. 1963-69.

    CHANDLER

    Rod (R Wash.) July 13, 1942-—; House 1983-93.

    CHAPMAN

    Jim (D Texas) March 8, 1945-—; House Sept. 4, 1985-—.

    CHENEY

    Dick (R Wyo.) Jan. 30, 1941-—; House 1979-March 17, 1989; Secy. of Defense 1989-93.

    CLARKE

    James McClure (D N.C.) June 12, 1917-—; House 1983-85, 1987-91.

    CLAY

    William L. (D Mo.) April 30, 1931-—; House 1969-—.

    CLEMENT

    Bob (D Tenn.) Sept. 23, 1943-—; House Jan. 25, 1988-—.

    CLINGER

    William F. Jr. (R Pa.) April 4, 1929-—; House 1979-—.

    COATS

    Daniel R. (R Ind.) May 16, 1943-—; House 1981-Jan. 1, 1989; Senate Jan. 3, 1989-—.

    COBLE

    Howard (R N.C.) March 18, 1931-—; House 1985-—.

    COCHRAN

    Thad (R Miss.) Dec. 7, 1937-—; House 1973-Dec. 26, 1978; Senate Dec. 27, 1978-—.

    COELHO

    Tony (D Calif.) June 15, 1942-—; House 1979-June 15, 1989.

    COHEN

    William S. (R Maine) Aug. 28, 1940-—; House 1973-79; Senate 1979-—.

    COLEMAN

    E. Thomas (R Mo.) May 29, 1943-—; House Nov. 2, 1976-93.

    COLEMAN

    Ronald D. (D Texas) Nov. 29, 1941-—; House 1983-—.

    COLLINS

    Barbara-Rose (D Mich.) April 13, 1939-—; House 1991-—.

    COLLINS

    Cardiss (widow of George Washington Collins) (D Ill.) Sept. 24, 1931-—; House June 5, 1973-—.

    COLORADO

    Antonio J. (Pop. Dem. Puerto Rico) Aug. 8, 1939-—; House (Res. Comm.) March 4, 1992-93.

    COMBEST

    Larry (R Texas) March 20, 1945-—; House 1985-—.

    CONDIT

    Gary (D Calif.) April 21, 1948-—; House Sept. 20, 1989-—.

    CONRAD

    Kent (D N.D.) March 12, 1948-—; Senate 1987-Dec. 14, 1992, Dec. 14, 1992-—.

    CONTE

    Silvio O. (R Mass.) Nov. 9, 1921-Feb. 8, 1991; House 1959-Feb. 8, 1991.

    CONYERS

    John Jr. (D Mich.) May 16, 1929-—; House 1965-—.

    COOPER

    Jim (D Tenn.) June 19, 1954-—; House 1983-—.

    COSTELLO

    Jerry F. (D Ill.) Sept. 25, 1949-—; House Aug. 11, 1988-—.

    COUGHLIN

    Lawrence (nephew of Clarence Dennis Coughlin) (R Pa.) April 11, 1929-—; House 1969-93.

    COURTER

    Jim (R N.J.) Oct. 14, 1941-—; House 1979-91.

    COX

    C. Christopher (R Calif.) Oct. 16, 1952-—; House 1989-—.

    COX

    John W. Jr. (D Ill.) July 10, 1947-—; House 1991-93.

    COYNE

    William J. (D Pa.) Aug. 24, 1936-—; House 1981-—.

    CRAIG

    Larry E. (R Idaho) July 20, 1945-—; House 1981-91; Senate 1991-—.

    CRAMER

    Bud (D Ala.) Aug. 22, 1947-—; House 1991-—.

    CRANE

    Philip M. (brother of Daniel Bever Crane) (R Ill.) Nov. 3, 1930-—; House Nov. 25, 1969-—.

    CRANSTON

    Alan (D Calif.) June 19, 1914-—; Senate 1969-93.

    CROCKETT

    George W. Jr. (D Mich.) Aug. 10, 1909-—; House Nov. 12, 1980-91.

    CUNNINGHAM

    Randy

    Duke
    (R Calif.) Dec. 8, 1941-—; House 1991-—.

    D
    D'AMATO

    Alfonse M. (R N.Y.) Aug. 1, 1937-—; Senate 1981-—.

    DANFORTH

    John C. (R Mo.) Sept. 5, 1936-—; Senate Dec. 27, 1976-—.

    DANNEMEYER

    William E. (R Calif.) Sept. 22, 1929-—; House 1979-93.

    DARDEN

    George

    Buddy
    (D Ga.) Nov. 22, 1943-—; House Nov. 8, 1983-—.

    DASCHLE

    Thomas A. (D S.D.) Dec. 9, 1947-—; House 1979-87; Senate 1987-—.

    DAVIS

    Robert W. (R Mich.) July 31, 1932-—; House 1979-93.

    DeCONCINI

    Dennis (D Ariz.) May 8, 1937-—; Senate 1977-—.

    DeFAZIO

    Peter A. (D Ore.) May 27, 1947-—; House 1987-—.

    de la GARZA

    E.

    Kika
    (D Texas) Sept. 22, 1927-—; House 1965-—.

    DeLAURO

    Rosa (D Conn.) March 2, 1943-—; House 1991-—.

    DeLAY

    Thomas D. (R Texas) April 8, 1947-—; House 1985-—.

    DELLUMS

    Ronald V. (D Calif.) Nov. 24, 1935-—; House 1971-—.

    de LUGO

    Ron (D V.I.) Aug. 2, 1930-—; House (Delegate) 1973-79, 1981-—.

    DERRICK

    Butler (D S.C.) Sept. 30, 1936-—; House 1975-—.

    DeWINE

    Michael (R Ohio) Jan. 5, 1947-—; House 1983-91.

    DICKINSON

    William L. (R Ala.) June 5, 1925-—; House 1965-93.

    DICKS

    Norman D. (D Wash.) Dec. 16, 1940-—; House 1977-—.

    DINGELL

    John D. (son of John David Dingell) (D Mich.) July 8, 1926-—; House Dec. 13, 1955-—.

    DIXON

    Alan J. (D Ill.) July 7, 1927-—; Senate 1981-93.

    DIXON

    Julian C. (D Calif.) Aug. 8, 1934-—; House 1979-—.

    DODD

    Christopher J. (son of Thomas Joseph Dodd) (D Conn.) May 27, 1944-—; House 1975-81; Senate 1981-—.

    DOLE

    Robert (R Kan.) July 22, 1923-—; House 1961-69; Senate 1969-—; Chrmn. Rep. Nat. Comm. 1971-73; Senate majority leader 1985-87; Senate minority leader 1987-—.

    DOMENICI

    Pete V. (R N.M.) May 7, 1932-—; Senate 1973-—.

    DONNELLY

    Brian J. (D Mass.) March 2, 1946-—; House 1979-93.

    DOOLEY

    Calvin (D Calif.) Jan. 11, 1954-—; House 1991-—.

    DOOLITTLE

    John T. (R Calif.) Oct. 30, 1950-—; House 1991-—.

    DORGAN

    Byron L. (D N.D.) May 14, 1942-—; House 1981-93; Senate Dec. 15, 1992-—.

    DORNAN

    Robert K. (R Calif.) April 3, 1933-—; House 1977-83, 1985-—.

    DOUGLAS

    Chuck (R N.H.) Dec. 2, 1942-—; House 1989-91.

    DOWNEY

    Thomas J. (D N.Y.) Jan. 28, 1949-—; House 1975-93.

    DREIER

    David (R Calif.) July 5, 1952-—; House 1981-—.

    DUNCAN

    John J.

    Jimmy
    Jr. (son of John J. Duncan) (R Tenn.) July 21, 1947-—; House Nov. 8, 1988-—.

    DURBIN

    Richard J. (D Ill.) Nov. 21, 1944-—; House 1983-—.

    DURENBERGER

    Dave (R Minn.) Aug. 19, 1934-—; Senate Nov. 8, 1978-—.

    DWYER

    Bernard J. (D N.J.) Jan. 24, 1921-—; House 1981-93.

    DYMALLY

    Mervyn M. (D Calif.) May 12, 1926-—; House 1981-93.

    DYSON

    Roy (D Md.) Nov. 15, 1948-—; House 1981-91.

    E
    EARLY

    Joseph D. (D Mass.) Jan. 31, 1933-—; House 1975-93.

    ECKART

    Dennis E. (D Ohio) April 6, 1950-—; House 1981-93.

    EDWARDS

    Chet (D Texas) Nov. 24, 1951-—; House 1991-—.

    EDWARDS

    Don (D Calif.) Jan. 6, 1915-—; House 1963-—.

    EDWARDS

    Mickey (R Okla.) July 12, 1937-—; House 1977-93.

    EMERSON

    Bill (R Mo.) Jan. 1, 1938-—; House 1981-—.

    ENGEL

    Eliot L. (D N.Y.) Feb. 18, 1947-—; House 1989-—.

    ENGLISH

    Glenn (D Okla.) Nov. 30, 1940-—; House 1975-—.

    ERDREICH

    Ben (D Ala.) Dec. 9, 1938-—; House 1983-93.

    ESPY

    Mike (D Miss.) Nov. 30, 1953-—; House 1987-Jan. 22, 1993; Secy. of Agriculture 1993-—.

    EVANS

    Lane (D Ill.) Aug. 4, 1951-—; House 1983-—.

    EWING

    Thomas W. (R Ill.) Sept. 19, 1935-—; House July 10, 1991-—.

    EXON

    J. James (D Neb.) Aug. 9, 1921-—; Senate 1979-—; Gov. 1971-79.

    F
    FALEOMAVAEGA

    Eni F. H. (D Am. Samoa) Aug. 15, 1943-—; House (Delegate) 1989-—.

    FASCELL

    Dante B. (D Fla.) March 9, 1917-—; House 1955-93.

    FAUNTROY

    Walter E. (D D.C.) Feb. 6, 1933-—; House (Delegate) March 23, 1971-91.

    FAWELL

    Harris W. (R Ill.) March 25, 1929-—; House 1985-—.

    FAZIO

    Vic (D Calif.) Oct. 11, 1942-—; House 1979-—.

    FEIGHAN

    Edward F. (nephew of Michael Aloysius Feighan) (D Ohio) Oct. 22, 1947-—; House 1983-93.

    FEINSTEIN

    Dianne (D Calif.) June 22, 1933-—; Senate Nov. 10, 1992-—.

    FIELDS

    Jack (R Texas) Feb. 3, 1952-—; House 1981-—.

    FISH

    Hamilton Jr. (son of Hamilton Fish Jr. born in 1888, grandson of Hamilton Fish born in 1849, great grandson of Hamilton Fish born in 1808) (R N.Y.) June 3, 1926-—; House 1969-—.

    FLAKE

    Floyd H. (D N.Y.) Jan. 30, 1945-—; House 1987-—.

    FLIPPO

    Ronnie G. (D Ala.) Aug. 15, 1937-—; House 1977-91.

    FLORIO

    James J. (D N.J.) Aug. 29, 1937-—; House 1975-Jan. 16, 1990; Gov. 1990-—.

    FOGLIETTA

    Thomas M. (D Pa.) Dec. 3, 1928-—; House 1981-— (1981-82, Independent).

    FOLEY

    Thomas S. (D Wash.) March 6, 1929-—; House 1965-—; House majority leader 1987- June 6, 1989; Speaker June 6, 1989-—.

    FORD

    Harold E. (D Tenn.) May 20, 1945-—; House 1975-—.

    FORD

    Wendell H. (D Ky.) Sept. 8, 1924-—; Senate Dec. 28, 1974-—; Gov. 1971-74.

    FORD

    William D. (D Mich.) Aug. 6, 1927-—; House 1965-—.

    FOWLER

    Wyche Jr. (D Ga.) Oct. 6, 1940-—; House April 6, 1977-87; Senate 1987-93.

    FRANK

    Barney (D Mass.) March 31, 1940-—; House 1981-—.

    FRANKS

    Gary (R Conn.) Feb. 9, 1953-—; House 1991-—.

    FRENZEL

    Bill (R Minn.) July 31, 1928-—; House 1971-91.

    FROST

    Martin (D Texas) Jan. 1, 1942-—; House 1979-—.

    FUSTER

    Jaime B. (Pop. Dem. Puerto Rico) Jan. 12, 1941-—; House (Res. Comm.) 1985- March 3, 1992.

    G
    GALLEGLY

    Elton (R Calif.) March 7, 1944-—; House 1987-—.

    GALLO

    Dean A. (R N.J.) Nov. 23, 1935-—; House 1985-—.

    GARCIA

    Robert (D N.Y.) Jan. 9, 1933-—; House Feb. 21, 1978-Jan. 7, 1990.

    GARN

    Jake (R Utah) Oct. 12, 1932-—; Senate Dec. 21, 1974-93.

    GAYDOS

    Joseph M. (D Pa.) July 3, 1926-—; House Nov. 5, 1968-93.

    GEJDENSON

    Sam (D Conn.) May 20, 1948-—; House 1981-—.

    GEKAS

    George W. (R Pa.) April 14, 1930-—; House 1983-—.

    GEPHARDT

    Richard A. (D Mo.) Jan. 31, 1941-—; House 1977-—; House majority leader June 14, 1989-—.

    GEREN

    Pete (D Texas) Jan. 29, 1952-—; House Sept. 20, 1989-—.

    GIBBONS

    Sam (D Fla.) Jan. 20, 1920-—; House 1963-—.

    GILCHREST

    Wayne T. (R Md.) April 15, 1946-—; House 1991-—.

    GILLMOR

    Paul E. (R Ohio) Feb. 1, 1939-—; House 1989-—.

    GILMAN

    Benjamin A. (R N.Y.) Dec. 6, 1922-—; House 1973-—.

    GINGRICH

    Newt (R Ga.) June 17, 1943-—; House 1979-—.

    GLENN

    John (D Ohio) July 18, 1921-—; Senate Dec. 24, 1974-—.

    GLICKMAN

    Dan (D Kan.) Nov. 24, 1944-—; House 1977-—.

    GONZALEZ

    Henry B. (D Texas) May 3, 1916-—; House Nov. 4, 1961-—.

    GOODLING

    Bill (son of George Atlee Goodling) (R Pa.) Dec. 5, 1927-—; House 1975-—.

    GORDON

    Bart (D Tenn.) Jan. 24, 1949-—; House 1985-—.

    GORE

    Albert Jr. (son of Albert Arnold Gore) (D Tenn.) March 31, 1948-—; House 1977-85; Senate 1985-Jan. 2, 1993; Vice President 1993-—.

    GORTON

    Slade (R Wash.) Jan. 8, 1928-—; Senate 1981-87, 1989-—.

    GOSS

    Porter J. (R Fla.) Nov. 26, 1938-—; House 1989-—.

    GRADISON

    Bill (R Ohio) Dec. 28, 1928-—; House 1975-Jan. 31, 1993.

    GRAHAM

    Bob (D Fla.) Nov. 9, 1936-—; Senate 1987-—; Gov. 1979-87.

    GRAMM

    Phil (R Texas) July 8, 1942-—; House 1979-Jan. 5, 1983, Feb. 22, 1983-85 (1979-Jan. 5, 1983, Democrat); Senate 1985-—.

    GRANDY

    Fred (R Iowa) June 29, 1948-—; House 1987.—.

    GRANT

    Bill (R Fla.) Feb. 21, 1943-—; House 1987-91 (1987-Feb. 21, 1989, Democrat).

    GRASSLEY

    Charles E. (R Iowa) Sept. 17, 1933-—; House 1975-81; Senate 1981-—.

    GRAY

    William H. III (D Pa.) Aug. 20, 1941-—; House 1979-Sept. 11, 1991.

    GREEN

    Bill (R N.Y.) Oct. 16, 1929-—; House Feb. 21, 1978-93.

    GUARINI

    Frank J. (D N.J.) Aug. 20, 1924-—; House 1979-93.

    GUNDERSON

    Steve (R Wis.) May 10, 1951-—; House 1981-—.

    H
    HALL

    Ralph M. (D Texas) May 3, 1923-—; House 1981-—.

    HALL

    Tony P. (D Ohio) Jan. 16, 1942-—; House 1979-—.

    HAMILTON

    Lee H. (D Ind.) April 20, 1931-—; House 1965-—.

    HAMMERSCHMIDT

    John Paul (R Ark.) May 4, 1922-—; House 1967-93.

    HANCOCK

    Mel (R Mo.) Sept. 14, 1929-—; House 1989-—.

    HANSEN

    James V. (R Utah) Aug. 14, 1932-—; House 1981-—.

    HARKIN

    Tom (D Iowa) Nov. 19, 1939-—; House 1975-85; Senate 1985-—.

    HARRIS

    Claude (D Ala.) June 29, 1940-—; House 1987-93.

    HASTERT

    Dennis (R Ill.) Jan. 2, 1942-—; House 1987-—.

    HATCH

    Orrin G. (R Utah) March 22, 1934-—; Senate 1977-—.

    HATCHER

    Charles (D Ga.) July 1, 1939-—; House 1981-93.

    HATFIELD

    Mark O. (R Ore.) July 12, 1922-—; Senate Jan. 10, 1967-—; Gov. 1959-67.

    HAWKINS

    Augustus F. (D Calif.) Aug. 31, 1907-—; House 1963-91.

    HAYES

    Charles A. (D Ill.) Feb. 17, 1918-—; House Aug. 23, 1983-93.

    HAYES

    Jimmy (D La.) Dec. 21, 1946-—; House 1987-—.

    HEFLEY

    Joel (R Colo.) April 18, 1935-—; House 1987-—.

    HEFLIN

    Howell (D Ala.) June 19, 1921-—; Senate 1979-—.

    HEFNER

    W. G.

    Bill
    (D N.C.) April 11, 1930-—; House 1975-—.

    HEINZ

    John (R Pa.) Oct. 23, 1938-April 4, 1991; House Nov. 2, 1971-77; Senate 1977-April 4, 1991.

    HELMS

    Jesse (R N.C.) Oct. 18, 1921-—; Senate 1973-—.

    HENRY

    Paul B. (R Mich.) July 9, 1942-July 31, 1993; House 1985-July 31, 1993.

    HERGER

    Wally (R Calif.) May 20, 1945-—; House 1987-—.

    HERTEL

    Dennis M. (D Mich.) Dec. 7, 1938-—; House 1981-93.

    HILER

    John (R Ind.) April 24, 1953-—; House 1981-91.

    HOAGLAND

    Peter (D Neb.) Nov. 17, 1941-—; House 1989-—.

    HOBSON

    David L. (R Ohio) Oct. 17, 1936; House 1991-—.

    HOCHBRUECKNER

    George J. (D N.Y.) Sept. 20, 1938-—; House 1987-—.

    HOLLINGS

    Ernest F. (D S.C.) Jan. 1, 1922-—; Senate Nov. 9, 1966-—; Gov. 1959-63.

    HOLLOWAY

    Clyde C. (R La.) Nov. 28, 1943-—; House 1987-93.

    HOPKINS

    Larry J. (R Ky.) Oct. 25, 1933-—; House 1979-93.

    HORN

    Joan Kelly (D Mo.) Oct. 18, 1936-—; House 1991-93.

    HORTON

    Frank (R N.Y.) Dec. 12, 1919-—; House 1963-93.

    HOUGHTON

    Amo (grandson of Alanson Bigelow Houghton) (R N.Y.) Aug. 7, 1926-—; House 1987-—.

    HOYER

    Steny H. (D Md.) June 14, 1939-—; House June 3, 1981-—.

    HUBBARD

    Carroll Jr. (D Ky.) July 7, 1937-—; House 1975-93.

    HUCKABY

    Jerry (D La.) July 19, 1941-—; House 1977-93.

    HUGHES

    William J. (D N.J.) Oct. 17, 1932-—; House 1975-—.

    HUMPHREY

    Gordon J. (R N.H.) Oct. 9, 1940-—; Senate 1979-Dec. 4, 1990.

    HUNTER

    Duncan (R Calif.) May 31, 1948-—; House 1981-—.

    HUTTO

    Earl (D Fla.) May 12, 1926-—; House 1979-—.

    HYDE

    Henry J. (R Ill.) April 18, 1924-—; House 1975-—.

    I
    INHOFE

    James M. (R Okla.) Nov. 17, 1934-—; House 1987-—.

    INOUYE

    Daniel K. (D Hawaii) Sept. 7, 1924-—; House Aug. 21, 1959-63; Senate 1963-—.

    IRELAND

    Andy (R Fla.) Aug. 23, 1930-—; House 1977-93 (1977-July 5, 1984, Democrat).

    J
    JACOBS

    Andrew Jr. (son of Andrew Jacobs Sr., husband of Martha Elizabeth Keys) (D Ind.) Feb. 24, 1932-—; House 1965-73, 1975-—.

    JAMES

    Craig T. (R Fla.) May 5, 1941-—; House 1989-93.

    JEFFERSON

    William J. (D La.) March 14, 1947-—; House 1991-—.

    JEFFORDS

    James M. (R Vt.) May 11, 1934-—; House 1975-89; Senate 1989-—.

    JENKINS

    Ed (D Ga.) Jan. 4, 1933-—; House 1977-93.

    JOHNSON

    Nancy L. (R Conn.) Jan. 5, 1935-—; House 1983-—.

    JOHNSON

    Sam (D Texas) Oct. 11, 1930-—; House May 22, 1991-—.

    JOHNSON

    Tim (D S.D.) Dec. 28, 1946-—; House 1987-—.

    JOHNSTON

    Harry A. (D Fla.) Dec. 2, 1931-—; House 1989-—.

    JOHNSTON

    J. Bennett (father-in-law of Tim Roemer) (D La.) June 10, 1932-—; Senate Nov. 14, 1972-—.

    JONES

    Ben (D Ga.) Aug. 30, 1941-—; House 1989-93.

    JONES

    Walter B. (D N.C.) Aug. 19, 1913-Sept. 15, 1992; House Feb. 5, 1966-Sept. 15, 1992.

    JONTZ

    Jim (D Ind.) Dec. 18, 1951-—; House 1987-93.

    K
    KANJORSKI

    Paul E. (D Pa.) April 2, 1937-—; House 1985-—.

    KAPTUR

    Marcy (D Ohio) June 17, 1946-—; House 1983-—.

    KASICH

    John R. (R Ohio) May 13, 1952-—; House 1983-—.

    KASSEBAUM

    Nancy Landon (R Kan.) July 29, 1932-—; Senate Dec. 23, 1978-—.

    KASTEN

    Bob (R Wis.) June 19, 1942-—; House 1975-79; Senate 1981-93.

    KASTENMEIER

    Robert W. (D Wis.) Jan. 24, 1924-—; House 1959-91.

    KENNEDY

    Edward M. (brother of John Fitzgerald Kennedy and Robert Francis Kennedy, grandson of John Francis Fitzgerald, uncle of Joseph P. Kennedy II) (D Mass.) Feb. 22, 1932-—; Senate Nov. 7, 1962-—.

    KENNEDY

    Joseph P. II (son of Robert Francis Kennedy, great grandson of John Francis Fitzgerald, nephew of Edward Moore Kennedy and John Fitzgerald Kennedy) (D Mass.) Sept. 24, 1952-—; House 1987-—.

    KENNELLY

    Barbara B. (D Conn.) July 10, 1936-—; House Jan. 25, 1982-—.

    KERREY

    Bob (D Neb.) Aug. 27, 1943-—; Senate 1989-—; Gov. 1983-89.

    KERRY

    John (D Mass.) Dec. 22, 1943-—; Senate 1985-—.

    KILDEE

    Dale E. (D Mich.) Sept. 16, 1929-—; House 1977-—.

    KLECZKA

    Gerald D. (D Wis.) Nov. 26, 1943-—; House April 10, 1984-—.

    KLUG

    Scott L. (R Wis.) Jan. 16, 1953-—; House 1991-—.

    KOHL

    Herb (D Wis.) Feb. 7, 1935-—; Senate 1989-—.

    KOLBE

    Jim (R Ariz.) June 28, 1942-—; House 1985-—.

    KOLTER

    Joe (D Pa.) Sept. 3, 1926-—; House 1983-93.

    KOPETSKI

    Mike (D Ore.) Oct. 27, 1949-—; House 1991-—.

    KOSTMAYER

    Peter H. (D Pa.) Sept. 27, 1946-—; House 1977-81, 1983-93.

    KYL

    Jon (son of John Henry Kyl) (R Ariz.) April 25, 1942-—; House 1987-—.

    L
    LaFALCE

    John J. (D N.Y.) Oct. 6, 1939-—; House 1975-—.

    LAGOMARSINO

    Robert J. (R Calif.) Sept. 4, 1926-—; House March 5, 1974-93.

    LANCASTER

    H. Martin (D N.C.) March 24, 1943-—; House 1987-—.

    LANTOS

    Tom (father-in-law of Dick Swett) (D Calif.) Feb. 1, 1928-—; House 1981-—.

    LaROCCO

    Larry (D Idaho) Aug. 25, 1946-—; House 1991-—.

    LAUGHLIN

    Greg (D Texas) Jan. 21, 1942-—; House 1989-—.

    LAUTENBERG

    Frank R. (D N.J.) Jan. 23, 1924-—; Senate Dec. 27, 1982-—.

    LEACH

    Jim (R Iowa) Oct. 15, 1942-—; House 1977-—.

    LEAHY

    Patrick J. (D Vt.) March 31, 1940-—; Senate 1975-—.

    LEATH

    Marvin (D Texas) May 6, 1931-—; House 1979-91.

    LEHMAN

    Richard H. (D Calif.) July 20, 1948-—; House 1983-—.

    LEHMAN

    William (D Fla.) Oct. 4, 1913-—; House 1973-93.

    LELAND

    Mickey (D Texas) Nov. 27, 1944-Aug. 7, 1989; House 1979-Aug. 7, 1989.

    LENT

    Norman F. (R N.Y.) March 23, 1931-—; House 1971-93.

    LEVIN

    Carl (brother of Sander M. Levin) (D Mich.) June 28, 1934-—; Senate 1979-—.

    LEVIN

    Sander M. (brother of Carl Levin) (D Mich.) Sept. 6, 1931-—; House 1983-—.

    LEVINE

    Mel (D Calif.) June 7, 1943-—; House 1983-93.

    LEWIS

    Jerry (R Calif.) Oct. 21, 1934-—; House 1979-—.

    LEWIS

    John (D Ga.) Feb. 21, 1940-—; House 1987-—.

    LEWIS

    Tom (R Fla.) Oct. 26, 1924-—; House 1983-—.

    LIEBERMAN

    Joseph I. (D Conn.) Feb. 24, 1942-—; Senate 1989-—.

    LIGHTFOOT

    Jim Ross (R Iowa) Sept. 27, 1938-—; House 1985-—.

    LIPINSKI

    William O. (D Ill.) Dec. 22, 1937-—; House 1983-—.

    LIVINGSTON

    Robert L. (R La.) April 30, 1943-—; House Sept. 7, 1977-—.

    LLOYD

    Marilyn (D Tenn.) Jan. 3, 1929-—; House 1975-—.

    LONG

    Jill L. (D Ind.) July 15, 1952-—; House April 5, 1989-—.

    LOTT

    Trent (R Miss.) Oct. 9, 1941-—; House 1973-89; Senate 1989-—.

    LOWERY

    Bill (R Calif.) May 2, 1947-—; House 1981-93.

    LOWEY

    Nita M. (D N.Y.) July 5, 1937-—; House 1989-—.

    LUGAR

    Richard G. (R Ind.) April 4, 1932-—; Senate 1977-—.

    LUKEN

    Charles (son of Thomas A. Luken) (D Ohio) July 18, 1951-—; House 1991-93.

    LUKEN

    Thomas A. (father of Charles Luken) (D Ohio) July 9, 1925-—; House March 5, 1974-75, 1977-91.

    LUKENS

    Donald E.

    Buz
    (R Ohio) Feb. 11, 1931-—; House 1967-71, 1987-Oct. 24, 1990.

    M
    MACHTLEY

    Ronald K. (R R.I.) July 13, 1948-—; House 1989-—.

    MACK

    Connie (R Fla.) Oct. 29, 1940-—; House 1983-89; Senate 1989-—.

    MADIGAN

    Edward R. (R Ill.) Jan. 13, 1936-—; House 1973-March 8, 1991; Secy. of Agriculture March 8, 1991-93.

    MANTON

    Thomas J. (D N.Y.) Nov. 3, 1932-—; House 1985-—.

    MARKEY

    Edward J. (D Mass.) July 11, 1946-—; House Nov. 2, 1976-—.

    MARLENEE

    Ron (R Mont.) Aug. 8, 1935-—; House 1977-93.

    MARTIN

    David O'B. (R N.Y.) April 26, 1944-—; House 1981-93.

    MARTIN

    Lynn (R Ill.) Dec. 26, 1939-—; House 1981-91; Secy. of Labor Feb. 22, 1991-93.

    MARTINEZ

    Matthew G. (D Calif.) Feb. 14, 1929-—; House July 15, 1982-—.

    MATSUI

    Robert T. (D Calif.) Sept. 17, 1941-—; House 1979-—.

    MATSUNAGA

    Spark M. (D Hawaii) Oct. 8, 1916-April 15, 1990; House 1963-77; Senate 1977-April 15, 1990.

    MAVROULES

    Nicholas (D Mass.) Nov. 1, 1929-—; House 1979-93.

    MAZZOLI

    Romano L. (D Ky.) Nov. 2, 1932-—; House 1971-—.

    McCAIN

    John (R Ariz.) Aug. 29, 1936-—; House 1983-1987; Senate 1987-—.

    McCANDLESS

    Al (R Calif.) July 23, 1927-—; House 1983-—.

    McCLOSKEY

    Frank (D Ind.) June 12, 1939-—; House 1983-85; May 1, 1985-—.

    McCLURE

    James A. (R Idaho) Dec. 27, 1924-—; House 1967-73; Senate 1973-91.

    McCOLLUM

    Bill (R Fla.) July 12, 1944-—; House 1981-—.

    McCONNELL

    Mitch (R Ky.) Feb. 20, 1942-—; Senate 1985-—.

    McCRERY

    Jim (R La.) Sept. 18, 1949-—; House April 26, 1988-—.

    McCURDY

    Dave (D Okla.) March 30, 1950-—; House 1981-—.

    McDADE

    Joseph M. (R Pa.) Sept. 29, 1931-—; House 1963-—.

    McDERMOTT

    Jim (D Wash.) Dec. 28, 1936-—; House 1989-—.

    McEWEN

    Bob (R Ohio) Jan. 12, 1950-—; House 1981-93.

    McGRATH

    Raymond J. (R N.Y.) March 27, 1942-—; House 1981-93.

    McHUGH

    Matthew F. (D N.Y.) Dec. 6, 1938-—; House 1975-93.

    McMILLAN

    J. Alex (R N.C.) May 9, 1932-—; House 1985-—.

    McMILLEN

    Tom (D Md.) May 26, 1952-—; House 1987-93.

    McNULTY

    Michael R. (D N.Y.) Sept. 16, 1947-—; House 1989-—.

    METZENBAUM

    Howard M. (D Ohio) June 4, 1917-—; Senate Jan. 4-Dec. 23, 1974, Dec. 29, 1976-—.

    MEYERS

    Jan (R Kan.) July 20, 1928-—; House 1985-—.

    MFUME

    Kweisi (D Md.) Oct. 24, 1948-—; House 1987-—.

    MICHEL

    Robert H. (R Ill.) March 2, 1923-—; House 1957-—; House minority leader 1981-—.

    MIKULSKI

    Barbara A. (D Md.) July 20, 1936-—; House 1977-87; Senate 1987-—.

    MILLER

    Clarence E. (R Ohio) Nov. 1, 1917-—; House 1967-93.

    MILLER

    George (D Calif.) May 17, 1945-—; House 1975-—.

    MILLER

    John R. (R Wash.) May 23, 1938-—; House 1985-93.

    MINETA

    Norman Y. (D Calif.) Nov. 12, 1931-—; House 1975-—.

    MINK

    Patsy T. (D Hawaii) Dec. 6, 1927-—; House 1965-77, Sept. 27, 1990-—.

    MITCHELL

    George J. (D Maine) Aug. 20, 1933-—; Senate May 19, 1980-—; Senate majority leader 1989-—.

    MOAKLEY

    Joe (D Mass.) April 27, 1927-—; House 1973-— (elected as an Independent Democrat; changed affiliation to Democrat Jan. 2, 1973).

    MOLINARI

    Guy V. (father of Susan Molinari) (R N.Y.) Nov. 23, 1928-—; House 1981-Jan. 1, 1990.

    MOLINARI

    Susan (daughter of Guy V. Molinari) (R N.Y.) March 27, 1958-—; House March 27, 1990-—.

    MOLLOHAN

    Alan B. (son of Robert Homer Mollohan) (D W.Va.) May 14, 1943-—; House 1983-—.

    MONTGOMERY

    G. V.

    Sonny
    (D Miss.) Aug. 5, 1920-—; House 1967-—.

    MOODY

    Jim (D Wis.) Sept. 2, 1935-—; House 1983-93.

    MOORHEAD

    Carlos J. (R Calif.) May 6, 1922-—; House 1973-—.

    MORAN

    James P. Jr. (D Va.) May 16, 1945-—; House 1991-—.

    MORELLA

    Constance A. (R Md.) Feb. 12, 1931-—; House 1987-—.

    MORRISON

    Bruce A. (D Conn.) Oct. 8, 1944-—; House 1983-91.

    MORRISON

    Sid (R Wash.) May 13, 1933-—; House 1981-93.

    MOYNIHAN

    Daniel Patrick (D N.Y.) March 16, 1927-—; Senate 1977-—.

    MRAZEK

    Robert J. (D N.Y.) Nov. 6, 1945-—; House 1983-93.

    MURKOWSKI

    Frank H. (R Alaska) March 28, 1933-—; Senate 1981-—.

    MURPHY

    Austin J. (D Pa.) June 17, 1927-—; House 1977-—.

    MURTHA

    John P. (D Pa.) Jan. 17, 1932-—; House Feb. 5, 1974-—.

    MYERS

    John T. (R Ind.) Feb. 8, 1927-—; House 1967-—.

    N
    NAGLE

    David R. (D Iowa) April 15, 1943-—; House 1987-93.

    NATCHER

    William H. (D Ky.) Sept. 11, 1909-—; House Aug. 1, 1953-—.

    NEAL

    Richard E. (D Mass.) Feb. 14, 1949-—; House 1989-—.

    NEAL

    Stephen L. (D N.C.) Nov. 7, 1934-—; House 1975-—.

    NELSON

    Bill (D Fla.) Sept. 29, 1942-—; House 1979-91.

    NICHOLS

    Dick (R Kan.) April 29, 1926-—; House 1991-93.

    NICKLES

    Don (R Okla.) Dec. 6, 1948-—; Senate 1981-—.

    NIELSON

    Howard C. (R Utah) Sept. 12, 1924-—; House 1983-91.

    NORTON

    Eleanor Holmes (D D.C.) June 13, 1937-—; House (Delegate) 1991-—.

    NOWAK

    Henry J. (D N.Y.) Feb. 21, 1935-—; House 1975-93.

    NUNN

    Sam (D Ga.) Sept. 8, 1938-—; Senate Nov. 8, 1972-—.

    NUSSLE

    Jim (R Iowa) June 27, 1960-—; House 1991-—.

    O
    OAKAR

    Mary Rose (D Ohio) March 5, 1940-—; House 1977-93.

    OBERSTAR

    James L. (D Minn.) Sept. 10, 1934-—; House 1975-—.

    OBEY

    David R. (D Wis.) Oct. 3, 1938-—; House April 1, 1969-—.

    OLIN

    Jim (D Va.) Feb. 28, 1920-—; House 1983-93.

    OLVER

    John W. (D Mass.) Sept. 3, 1936-—; House June 18, 1991-—.

    ORTIZ

    Solomon P. (D Texas) June 3, 1937-—; House 1983-—.

    ORTON

    Bill (D Utah) Sept. 22, 1949-—; House 1991-—.

    OWENS

    Major R. (D N.Y.) June 28, 1936-—; House 1983-—.

    OWENS

    Wayne (D Utah) May 2, 1937-—; House 1973-75, 1987-93.

    OXLEY

    Michael G. (R Ohio) Feb. 11, 1944-—; House June 25, 1981-—.

    P
    PACKARD

    Ron (R Calif.) Jan. 19, 1931-—; House 1983-—.

    PACKWOOD

    Bob (R Ore.) Sept. 11, 1932-—; Senate 1969-—.

    PALLONE

    Frank Jr. (D N.J.) Oct. 30, 1951-—; House Nov. 8, 1988-—.

    PANETTA

    Leon E. (D Calif.) June 28, 1938-—; House 1977-Jan. 21, 1993.

    PARKER

    Mike (D Miss.) Oct. 31, 1949-—; House 1989-—.

    PARRIS

    Stan (R Va.) Sept. 9, 1929-—; House 1973-75, 1981-91.

    PASHAYAN

    Charles

    Chip
    Jr. (R Calif.) March 27, 1941-—; House 1979-91.

    PASTOR

    Ed (D Ariz.) June 28, 1943-—; House Oct. 3, 1991-—.

    PATTERSON

    Liz J. (daughter of Olin D. Johnston) (D S.C.) Nov. 18, 1939-—; House 1987-93.

    PAXON

    Bill (R N.Y.) April 29, 1954-—; House 1989-—.

    PAYNE

    Donald M. (D N.J.) July 16, 1934-—; House 1989-—.

    PAYNE

    Lewis F. Jr. (D Va.) July 9, 1945-—; House June 21, 1988-—.

    PEASE

    Don J. (D Ohio) Sept. 26, 1931-—; House 1977-93.

    PELL

    Claiborne (son of Herbert Claiborne Pell Jr.) (D R.I.) Nov. 22, 1918-—; Senate 1961-—.

    PELOSI

    Nancy (daughter of Thomas D'Alesandro Jr.) (D Calif.) March 26, 1940-—; House June 9, 1987-—.

    PENNY

    Timothy J. (D Minn.) Nov. 19, 1951-—; House 1983-—.

    PEPPER

    Claude (D Fla.) Sept. 8, 1900-May 30, 1989; Senate Nov. 4, 1936-51; House 1963-May 30, 1989.

    PERKINS

    Carl C. (son of Carl Dewey Perkins) (D Ky.) Aug. 6, 1954-—; House 1985-93.

    PETERSON

    Collin C. (D Minn.) June 29, 1944-—; House 1991-—.

    PETERSON

    Pete (D Fla.) June 26, 1935-—; House 1991-—.

    PETRI

    Thomas E. (R Wis.) May 28, 1940-—; House April 3, 1979-—.

    PICKETT

    Owen B. (D Va.) Aug. 31, 1930-—; House 1987-—.

    PICKLE

    J. J. (D Texas) Oct. 11, 1913-—; House Dec. 21, 1963-—.

    PORTER

    John Edward (R Ill.) June 1, 1935-—; House Jan. 22, 1980-—.

    POSHARD

    Glenn (D Ill.) Oct. 30, 1945-—; House 1989-—.

    PRESSLER

    Larry (R S.D.) March 29, 1942-—; House 1975-79; Senate 1979-—.

    PRICE

    David E. (D N.C.) Aug. 17, 1940-—; House 1987-—.

    PRYOR

    David (D Ark.) Aug. 29, 1934-—; House Nov. 8, 1966-73; Senate 1979-—; Gov. 1975-79.

    PURSELL

    Carl D. (R Mich.) Dec. 19, 1932-—; House 1977-93.

    Q
    QUILLEN

    James H. (R Tenn.) Jan. 11, 1916-—; House 1963-—.

    R
    RAHALL

    Nick J. II (D W.Va.) May 20, 1949-—; House 1977-—.

    RAMSTAD

    Jim (R Minn.) May 6, 1946-—; House 1991-—.

    RANGEL

    Charles B. (D N.Y.) June 1, 1930-—; House 1971-—.

    RAVENEL

    Arthur Jr. (R S.C.) March 29, 1927-—; House 1987-—.

    RAY

    Richard (D Ga.) Feb. 2, 1927-—; House 1983-93.

    REED

    Jack (D R.I.) Nov. 12, 1949-—; House 1991-—.

    REGULA

    Ralph (R Ohio) Dec. 3, 1924-—; House 1973-—.

    REID

    Harry (D Nev.) Dec. 2, 1939-—; House 1983-87; Senate 1987-—.

    RHODES

    John J. III (son of John Jacob Rhodes) (R Ariz.) Sept. 8, 1943-—; House 1987-93.

    RICHARDSON

    Bill (D N.M.) Nov. 15, 1947-—; House 1983-—.

    RIDGE

    Tom (R Pa.) Aug. 26, 1945-—; House 1983-—.

    RIEGLE

    Donald W. Jr. (D Mich.) Feb. 4, 1938-—; House 1967-Dec. 30, 1976 (1967-Feb. 27, 1973, Republican); Senate Dec. 30, 1976-—.

    RIGGS

    Frank (R Calif.) Sept. 5, 1950-—; House 1991-93.

    RINALDO

    Matthew J. (R N.J.) Sept. 1, 1931-—; House 1973-93.

    RITTER

    Don (R Pa.) Oct. 21, 1940-—; House 1979-93.

    ROBB

    Charles S. (D Va.) June 26, 1939-—; Senate 1989-—; Gov. 1982-86.

    ROBERTS

    Pat (R Kan.) April 20, 1936-—; House 1981-—.

    ROBINSON

    Tommy F. (R Ark.) March 7, 1942-—; House 1985-91 (1985-July 28, 1989, Democrat).

    ROCKEFELLER

    John D. IV (nephew of Nelson Aldrich Rockefeller and great-grandson of Nelson Aldrich) (D W.Va.) June 18, 1937-—; Senate Jan. 15, 1985-—; Gov. 1977-85.

    ROE

    Robert A. (D N.J.) Feb. 28, 1924-—; House Nov. 4, 1969-93.

    ROEMER

    Tim (son-in-law of J. Bennett Johnston) (D Ind.) Oct. 30, 1956-—; House 1991-—.

    ROGERS

    Harold (R Ky.) Dec. 31, 1937-—; House 1981-—.

    ROHRABACHER

    Dana (R Calif.) June 21, 1947-—; House 1989-—.

    ROSE

    Charlie (D N.C.) Aug. 10, 1939-—; House 1973-—.

    ROS-LEHTINEN

    Ileana (R Fla.) July 15, 1952-—; House Sept. 6, 1989-—.

    ROSTENKOWSKI

    Dan (D Ill.) Jan. 2, 1928-—; House 1959-—.

    ROTH

    Toby (R Wis.) Oct. 10, 1938-—; House 1979-—.

    ROTH

    William V. Jr. (R Del.) July 22, 1921-—; House 1967-Dec. 31, 1970; Senate Jan. 1, 1971-—.

    ROUKEMA

    Marge (R N.J.) Sept. 19, 1929-—; House 1981-—.

    ROWLAND

    J. Roy (D Ga.) Feb. 3, 1926-—; House 1983-—.

    ROWLAND

    John G. (R Conn.) May 24, 1957-—; House 1985-91.

    ROYBAL

    Edward R. (D Calif.) Feb. 10, 1916-—; House 1963-93.

    RUDMAN

    Warren B. (R N.H.) May 13, 1930-—; Senate Dec. 29, 1980-93.

    RUSSO

    Marty (D Ill.) Jan. 23, 1944-—; House 1975-93.

    S
    SABO

    Martin Olav (D Minn.) Feb. 28, 1938-—; House 1979-—.

    SAIKI

    Patricia F. (R Hawaii) May 28, 1930-—; House 1987-91.

    SANDERS

    Bernard (I Vt.) Sept. 8, 1941-—; House 1991-—.

    SANFORD

    Terry (D N.C.) Aug. 20, 1917-—; Senate Dec. 10, 1987-93; Gov. 1961-65.

    SANGMEISTER

    George E. (D Ill.) Feb. 16, 1931-—; House 1989-—.

    SANTORUM

    Rick (R Pa.) May 10, 1958-—; House 1991-—.

    SARBANES

    Paul S. (D Md.) Feb. 3, 1933-—; House 1971-77; Senate 1977-—.

    SARPALIUS

    Bill (D Texas) Jan. 10, 1948-—; House 1989-—.

    SASSER

    Jim (D Tenn.) Sept. 30, 1936-—; Senate 1977-—.

    SAVAGE

    Gus (D Ill.) Oct. 30, 1925-—; House 1981-93.

    SAWYER

    Thomas C. (D Ohio) Aug. 15, 1945-—; House 1987-—.

    SAXTON

    H. James (R N.J.) Jan. 22, 1943-—; House 1985-—.

    SCHAEFER

    Dan (R Colo.) Jan. 25, 1936-—; House April 7, 1983-—.

    SCHEUER

    James H. (D N.Y.) Feb. 6, 1920-—; House 1965-73, 1975-93.

    SCHIFF

    Steven H. (R N.M.) March 18, 1947-—; House 1989-—.

    SCHNEIDER

    Claudine (R R.I.) March 25, 1947-—; House 1981-91.

    SCHROEDER

    Patricia (D Colo.) July 30, 1940-—; House 1973-—.

    SCHUETTE

    Bill (R Mich) Oct. 13, 1953-—; House 1985-91.

    SCHULZE

    Richard T. (R Pa.) Aug. 7, 1929-—; House 1975-93.

    SCHUMER

    Charles E. (D N.Y.) Nov. 23, 1950-—; House 1981-—.

    SENSENBRENNER

    F. James Jr. (R Wis.) June 14, 1943-—; House 1979-—.

    SERRANO

    Jose E. (D N.Y.) Oct. 24, 1943-—; House March 28, 1990-—.

    SEYMOUR

    John (R Calif.) Dec. 3, 1937-—; Senate Jan. 10, 1991-Nov. 3, 1992.

    SHARP

    Philip R. (D Ind.) July 15, 1942-—; House 1975-—.

    SHAW

    E. Clay Jr. (R Fla.) April 19, 1939-—; House 1981-—.

    SHAYS

    Christopher (R Conn.) Oct. 18, 1945-—; House Sept. 9, 1987-—.

    SHELBY

    Richard C. (D Ala.) May 6, 1934-—; House 1979-87; Senate 1987-—.

    SHUMWAY

    Norman D. (R Calif.) July 28, 1934-—; House 1979-91.

    SHUSTER

    Bud (R Pa.) Jan. 23, 1932-—; House 1973-—.

    SIKORSKI

    Gerry (D Minn.) April 26, 1948-—; House 1983-93.

    SIMON

    Paul (D Ill.) Nov. 29, 1928-—; House 1975-85; Senate 1985-—.

    SIMPSON

    Alan K. (son of Milward Lee Simpson) (R Wyo.) Sept. 2, 1931-—; Senate Jan. 1, 1979-—.

    SISISKY

    Norman (D Va.) June 9, 1927-—; House 1983-—.

    SKAGGS

    David E. (D Colo.) Feb. 22, 1943-—; House 1987-—.

    SKEEN

    Joe (R N.M.) June 30, 1927-—; House 1981-—.

    SKELTON

    Ike (D Mo.) Dec. 20, 1931-—; House 1977-—.

    SLATTERY

    Jim (D Kan.) Aug. 4, 1948-—; House 1983-—.

    SLAUGHTER

    D. French Jr. (R Va.) May 20, 1925-—; House 1985-Nov. 5, 1991.

    SLAUGHTER

    Louise M. (D N.Y.) Aug. 14, 1929-—; House 1987-—.

    SMITH

    Christopher H. (R N.J.) March 4, 1953-—; House 1981-—.

    SMITH

    Denny (cousin of Steve Symms) (R Ore.) Jan. 19, 1938-—; House 1981-91.

    SMITH

    Lamar (R Texas) Nov. 19, 1947-—; House 1987-91.

    SMITH

    Larkin (R Miss.) June 26, 1944-Aug. 13, 1989; House 1989-Aug. 13, 1989.

    SMITH

    Lawrence J. (D Fla.) April 25, 1941-—; House 1983-93.

    SMITH

    Neal (D Iowa) March 23, 1920-—; House 1959-—.

    SMITH

    Peter (R Vt.) Oct. 31, 1945-—; House 1989-91.

    SMITH

    Robert C. (R N.H.) March 30, 1941-—; House 1985-Dec. 7, 1990; Senate Dec. 7, 1990-—.

    SMITH

    Robert F. (R Ore.) June 16, 1931-—; House 1983-—.

    SMITH

    Virginia (R Neb.) June 30, 1911-—; House 1975-91.

    SNOWE

    Olympia J. (wife of John R. McKernan Jr.) (R Maine) Feb. 21, 1947-—; House 1979-—.

    SOLARZ

    Stephen J. (D N.Y.) Sept. 12, 1940-—; House 1975-93.

    SOLOMON

    Gerald B. H. (R N.Y.) Aug. 14, 1930-—; House 1979-—.

    SPECTER

    Arlen (R Pa.) Feb. 12, 1930-—; Senate 1981-—.

    SPENCE

    Floyd D. (R S.C.) April 9, 1928-—; House 1971-—.

    SPRATT

    John M. Jr. (D S.C.) Nov. 1, 1942-—; House 1983-—.

    STAGGERS

    Harley O. Jr. (son of Harley Orrin Staggers) (D W.Va.) Feb. 22, 1951-—; House 1983-93.

    STALLINGS

    Richard H. (D Idaho) Oct. 7, 1940-—; House 1985-93.

    STANGELAND

    Arlan (R Minn.) Feb. 8, 1930-—; House March 1, 1977-91.

    STARK

    Fortney H.

    Pete
    (D Calif.) Nov. 11, 1931-—; House 1973-—.

    STEARNS

    Cliff (R Fla.) April 16, 1941-—; House 1989-—.

    STENHOLM

    Charles W. (D Texas) Oct. 26, 1938-—; House 1979-—.

    STEVENS

    Ted (R Alaska) Nov. 18, 1923-—; Senate Dec. 24, 1968-—.

    STOKES

    Louis (D Ohio) Feb. 23, 1925-—; House 1969-—.

    STUDDS

    Gerry E. (D Mass.) May 12, 1937-—; House 1973-—.

    STUMP

    Bob (R Ariz.) April 4, 1927-—; House 1977-— (1977-June 11, 1982, Democrat).

    SUNDQUIST

    Don (R Tenn.) March 15, 1936-—; House 1983-—.

    SWETT

    Dick (son-in-law of Tom Lantos) (D N.H.) May 1, 1957-—; House 1991-—.

    SWIFT

    Al (D Wash.) Sept. 12, 1935-—; House 1979-—.

    SYMMS

    Steve (cousin of Denny Smith) (R Idaho) April 23, 1938-—; House 1973-81; Senate 1981-93.

    SYNAR

    Mike (D Okla.) Oct. 17, 1950-—; House 1979-—.

    T
    TALLON

    Robin (D S.C.) Aug. 8, 1946-—; House 1983-93.

    TANNER

    John (D Tenn.) Sept. 22, 1944-—; House 1989-—.

    TAUKE

    Tom (R Iowa) Oct. 11, 1950-—; House 1979-91.

    TAUZIN

    W. J.

    Billy
    (D La.) June 14, 1943-—; House May 17, 1980-—.

    TAYLOR

    Charles H. (R N.C.) Jan. 23, 1941-—; House 1991-—.

    TAYLOR

    Gene (D Miss.) Sept. 17, 1953-—; House Oct. 24, 1989-—.

    THOMAS

    Craig (R Wyo.) Feb. 17, 1933-—; House May 2, 1989-—.

    THOMAS

    Robert Lindsay (D Ga.) Nov. 20, 1943-—; House 1983-93.

    THOMAS

    William M. (R Calif.) Dec. 6, 1941-—; House 1979-—.

    THORNTON

    Ray (D Ark.) July 16, 1928-—; House 1973-79, 1991-—.

    THURMOND

    Strom (R S.C.) Dec. 5, 1902-—; Senate Dec. 24, 1954-April 4, 1956, Nov. 7, 1956-— (1947-Sept. 16, 1964, Democrat); Pres. pro tempore 1981-87; Gov. 1947-51.

    TORRES

    Esteban Edward (D Calif.) Jan. 27, 1930-—; House 1983-—.

    TORRICELLI

    Robert G. (D N.J.) Aug. 26, 1951-—; House 1983-—.

    TOWNS

    Edolphus (D N.Y.) July 21, 1934-—; House 1983-—.

    TRAFICANT

    James A. Jr. (D Ohio) May 8, 1941-—; House 1985-—.

    TRAXLER

    Bob (D Mich.) July 21, 1931-—; House April 16, 1974-93.

    U
    UDALL

    Morris K. (brother of Stewart Lee Udall) (D Ariz.) June 15, 1922-—; House May 2, 1961-May 4, 1991.

    UNSOELD

    Jolene (D Wash.) Dec. 3, 1931-—; House 1989-—.

    UPTON

    Fred (R Mich.) April 23, 1953-—; House 1987-—.

    V
    VALENTINE

    Tim (D N.C.) March 15, 1926-—; House 1983-—.

    VANDER JAGT

    Guy (R Mich.) Aug. 26, 1931-—; House Nov. 8, 1966-93.

    VENTO

    Bruce F. (D Minn.) Oct. 7, 1940-—; House 1977-—.

    VISCLOSKY

    Peter J. (D Ind.) Aug. 13, 1949-—; House 1985-—.

    VOLKMER

    Harold L. (D Mo.) April 4, 1931-—; House 1977-—.

    VUCANOVICH

    Barbara F. (R Nev.) June 22, 1921-—; House 1983-—.

    W
    WALGREN

    Doug (D Pa.) Dec. 28, 1940-—; House 1977-91.

    WALKER

    Robert S. (R Pa.) Dec. 23, 1942-—; House 1977-—.

    WALLOP

    Malcolm (R Wyo.) Feb. 27, 1933-—; Senate 1977-—.

    WALSH

    James T. (R N.Y.) June 19, 1947-—; House 1989-—.

    WARNER

    John W. (R Va.) Feb. 18, 1927-—; Senate Jan. 2, 1979-—.

    WASHINGTON

    Craig (D Texas) Oct. 12, 1941-—; House Jan. 23, 1990-—.

    WATERS

    Maxine (D Calif.) Aug. 31, 1938-—; House 1991-—.

    WATKINS

    Wes (D Okla.) Dec. 15, 1938-—; House 1977-91.

    WAXMAN

    Henry A. (D Calif.) Sept. 12, 1939-—; House 1975-—.

    WEBER

    Vin (R Minn.) July 24, 1952-—; House 1981-93.

    WEISS

    Ted (D N.Y.) Sept. 17, 1927-Sept. 14, 1992; House 1977-Sept. 14, 1992.

    WELDON

    Curt (R Pa.) July 22, 1947-—; House 1987-—.

    WELLSTONE

    Paul (D Minn.) July 21, 1944-—; Senate 1991-—.

    WHEAT

    Alan (D Mo.) Oct. 16, 1951-—; House 1983-—.

    WHITTAKER

    Bob (R Kan.) Sept. 18, 1939-—; House 1979-91.

    WHITTEN

    Jamie L. (D Miss.) April 18, 1910-—; House Nov. 4, 1941-—.

    WILLIAMS

    Pat (D Mont.) Oct. 30, 1937-—; House 1979-—.

    WILSON

    Charles (D Texas) June 1, 1933-—; House 1973-—.

    WILSON

    Pete (R Calif.) Aug. 23, 1933-—; Senate 1983-Jan. 7, 1991; Gov. 1991-—.

    WIRTH

    Timothy E. (D Colo.) Sept. 22, 1939-—; House 1975-87; Senate 1987-93.

    WISE

    Bob (D W.Va.) Jan. 6, 1948-—; House 1983-—.

    WOFFORD

    Harris (D Pa.) April 9, 1926-—; Senate May 9, 1991-—.

    WOLF

    Frank R. (R Va.) Jan. 30, 1939-—; House 1981-—.

    WOLPE

    Howard (D Mich.) Nov. 2, 1939-—; House 1979-93.

    WRIGHT

    Jim (D Texas) Dec. 22, 1922-—; House 1955-June 30, 1989; House majority leader 1977-87; Speaker 1987-June 6, 1989.

    WYDEN

    Ron (D Ore.) May 3, 1949-—; House 1981-—.

    WYLIE

    Chalmers P. (R Ohio) Nov. 23, 1920-—; House 1967-93.

    Y
    YATES

    Sidney R. (D Ill.) Aug. 27, 1909-—; House 1949-63, 1965-—.

    YATRON

    Gus (D Pa.) Oct. 16, 1927-—; House 1969-93.

    YOUNG

    C. W. Bill (R Fla.) Dec. 16, 1930-—; House 1971-—.

    YOUNG

    Don (R Alaska) June 9, 1933-—; House March 6, 1973-—.

    Z
    ZELIFF

    Bill (R N.H.) June 12, 1936-—; House 1991-—.

    ZIMMER

    Dick (R N.J.) Aug. 16, 1944-—; House 1991-—.

    Congressional Committees, 101st and 102nd Congresses

    Following is a list of congressional committees and subcommittees as of the start of the 101st and 102nd Congresses. Committee jurisdictions, party ratios, committee chairmen and the dates of their service in that capacity, ranking minority members (in italics) and subcommittee chairmen are included. Political and joint committees also are listed.

    In both the Senate and House, committee and subcommittee chairmen are Democrats and ranking minority members are Republicans in the 101st and 102nd Congresses. Ranking minority members and subcommittee chairmen served during both Congresses unless otherwise noted. Party ratios for House committees do not include delegates or the resident commissioner.

    Senate Committees

    Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry

    Agriculture in general; animal industry and diseases; crop insurance and soil conservation; farm credit and farm security; food from fresh waters; food stamp programs; forestry in general; home economics; human nutrition; inspection of livestock, meat and agricultural products; pests and pesticides; plant industry, soils and agricultural engineering; rural development, rural electrification and watersheds; school nutrition programs; matters relating to food, nutrition, hunger and rural affairs.

    • D 10 - R 9(101st Congress)
    • D 10 - R 8(102nd Congress)
    • Patrick J. Leahy, Vt. (1987-93)
    • Richard G. Lugar, Ind.
    Agricultural Credit

    Kent Conrad, N.D.

    Agricultural Production and Stabilization of Prices

    David Pryor, Ark.

    Agricultural Research and General Legislation

    Tom Daschle, S.D.

    Conservation and Forestry

    Wyche Fowler Jr., Ga.

    Domestic and Foreign Marketing and Product Promotion

    David L. Boren, Okla.

    Nutrition and Investigations

    Tom Harkin, Iowa

    Rural Development and Rural Electrification

    Howell Heflin, Ala.

    Appropriations

    Appropriation of revenue; rescission of appropriations; new spending authority under the Congressional Budget Act.

    • D 16 - R 13
    • Robert C. Byrd, W.Va. (1989-93)
    • Mark O. Hatfield, Ore.
    Agriculture, Rural Development and Related Agencies

    Quentin N. Burdick, N.D. (died Sept. 8, 1992); Dale Bumpers, Ark. (through 102nd Congress)

    Commerce, Justice, State and Judiciary (102nd Congress)

    Ernest F. Hollings, S.C.

    Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies (101st Congress)

    Ernest F. Hollings, S.C.

    Defense

    Daniel K. Inouye, Hawaii

    District of Columbia

    Brock Adams, Wash.

    Energy and Water Development

    J. Bennett Johnston, La.

    Foreign Operations

    Patrick J. Leahy, Vt.

    HUD - Independent Agencies (101st Congress)

    Barbara A. Mikulski, Md.

    Interior (102nd Congress)

    Robert C. Byrd, W.Va.

    Interior and Related Agencies (101st Congress)

    Robert C. Byrd, W.Va.

    Labor, Health and Human Services, Education (102nd Congress)

    Tom Harkin, Iowa

    Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and Related Agencies (101st Congress)

    Tom Harkin, Iowa

    Legislative Branch

    Harry Reid, Nev.

    Military Construction

    Jim Sasser, Tenn.

    Transportation (102nd Congress)

    Frank R. Lautenberg, N.J.

    Transportation and Related Agencies (101st Congress)

    Frank R. Lautenberg, N.J.

    Treasury, Postal Service and General Government

    Dennis DeConcini, Ariz.

    VA, HUD and Independent Agencies (102nd Congress)

    Barbara A. Mikulski, Md.

    Armed Services

    Defense and defense policy generally; aeronautical and space activities peculiar to or primarily associated with the development of weapons systems or military operations; maintenance and operation of the Panama Canal, including the Canal Zone; military research and development; national security aspects of nuclear energy; naval petroleum reserves (except Alaska); armed forces generally; Selective Service System; strategic and critical materials.

    • D 11 - R 9
    • Sam Nunn, Ga. (1987-93)
    • John W. Warner, Va.
    Conventional Forces and Alliance Defense

    Carl Levin, Mich.

    Defense Industry and Technology

    Jeff Bingaman, N.M.

    Manpower and Personnel

    John Glenn, Ohio

    Projection Forces and Regional Defense

    Edward M. Kennedy, Mass.

    Readiness, Sustainability and Support

    Alan J. Dixon, Ill.

    Strategic Forces and Nuclear Deterrence

    Jim Exon, Neb.

    Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs

    Banks, banking and financial institutions; price controls; deposit insurance; economic stabilization and growth; defense production; export and foreign trade promotion; export controls; federal monetary policy, including Federal Reserve System; financial aid to commerce and industry; issuance and redemption of notes; money and credit, including currency and coinage; nursing home construction; public and private housing, including veterans' housing; renegotiation of government contracts; urban development and mass transit; international economic policy.

    • D 12 - R 9
    • Donald W. Riegle Jr., Mich. (1989-93)
    • Jake Garn, Utah
    Consumer and Regulatory Affairs

    Alan J. Dixon, Ill.

    Housing and Urban Affairs

    Alan Cranston, Calif.

    International Finance and Monetary Policy

    Paul S. Sarbanes, Md.

    Securities

    Christopher J. Dodd, Conn.

    Budget

    Federal budget generally; concurrent budget resolutions; Congressional Budget Office.

    • D 13 - R 10(101st Congress)
    • D 12 - R 9(102nd Congress)
    • Jim Sasser, Tenn. (1989-93)
    • Pete V. Domenici, N.M.

    No standing subcommittees.

    Commerce, Science and Transportation

    Interstate commerce and transportation generally; Coast Guard; coastal zone management; communications; highway safety; inland waterways, except construction; marine fisheries; Merchant Marine and navigation; non-military aeronautical and space sciences; oceans, weather and atmospheric activities; interoceanic canals generally; regulation of consumer products and services; science, engineering and technology research, development and policy; sports; standards and measurement; transportation and commerce aspects of Outer Continental Shelf lands.

    • D 11 - R 9
    • Ernest F. Hollings, S.C. (1987-93)
    • John C. Danforth, Mo.
    Aviation

    Wendell H. Ford, Ky.

    Communications

    Daniel K. Inouye, Hawaii

    Consumer

    Richard H. Bryan, Nev.

    Foreign Commerce and Tourism

    John D. Rockefeller IV, W.Va.

    Merchant Marine

    John B. Breaux, La.

    National Ocean Policy Study

    Ernest F. Hollings, S.C.

    Science, Technology and Space

    Al Gore, Tenn.

    Surface Transportation

    Jim Exon, Neb.

    Energy and Natural Resources

    Energy policy, regulation, conservation, research and development; coal; energy-related aspects of deep-water ports; hydroelectric power, irrigation and reclamation; mines, mining and minerals generally; national parks, recreation areas, wilderness areas, wild and scenic rivers, historic sites, military parks and battlefields; naval petroleum reserves in Alaska; non-military development of nuclear energy; oil and gas production and distribution; public lands and forests; solar energy systems; territorial possessions of the United States.

    • D 10 - R 9(101st Congress)
    • D 11 - R 9(102nd Congress)
    • J. Bennett Johnston, La. (1987-93)
    • James A. McClure, Idaho (101st Congress)
    • Malcolm Wallop, Wyo. (102nd Congress)
    Energy Regulation and Conservation

    Howard M. Metzenbaum, Ohio (101st Congress); Tim Wirth, Colo. (102nd Congress)

    Energy Research and Development

    Wendell H. Ford, Ky.

    Mineral Resources Development and Production

    Jeff Bingaman, N.M.

    Public Lands, National Parks and Forests

    Dale Bumpers, Ark.

    Water and Power

    Bill Bradley, N.J.

    Environment and Public Works

    Environmental policy, research and development; air, water and noise pollution; construction and maintenance of highways; environmental aspects of Outer Continental Shelf lands; environmental effects of toxic substances, other than pesticides; fisheries and wildlife; flood control and improvements of rivers and harbors; non-military environmental regulation and control of nuclear energy; ocean dumping; public buildings and grounds; public works, bridges and dams; regional economic development; solid waste disposal and recycling; water resources.

    • D 9 - R 7
    • Quentin N. Burdick, N.D. (1987-92; died Sept. 8, 1992)
    • Daniel Patrick Moynihan, N.Y. (through 102nd Congress)
    • John H. Chafee, R.I.
    Environmental Protection

    Max Baucus, Mont.

    Gulf Pollution (102nd Congress)

    Joseph I. Lieberman, Conn.

    Nuclear Regulation

    John B. Breaux, La. (101st Congress); Bob Graham, Fla. (102nd Congress)

    Superfund, Ocean and Water Protection

    Frank R. Lautenberg, N.J.

    Toxic Substances, Environmental Oversight, Research and Development

    Harry Reid, Nev.

    Water Resources, Transportation and Infrastructure

    Daniel Patrick Moynihan, N.Y.

    Finance

    Revenue measures generally; taxes; tariffs and import quotas; foreign trade agreements; customs; revenue sharing; federal debt limit; Social Security; health programs financed by taxes or trust funds.

    • D 11 - R 9
    • Lloyd Bentsen, Texas (1987-93)
    • Bob Packwood, Ore.
    Deficits, Debt Management and International Debt (102nd Congress)

    Bill Bradley, N.J.

    Energy and Agricultural Taxation

    David L. Boren, Okla. (101st Congress); Tom Daschle, S.D. (102nd Congress)

    Health for Families and the Uninsured

    Donald W. Riegle Jr., Mich.

    International Debt (101st Congress)

    Bill Bradley, N.J.

    International Trade

    Max Baucus, Mont.

    Medicare and Long-Term Care

    John D. Rockefeller IV, W.Va.

    Private Retirement Plans and Oversight of the Internal Revenue Service

    David Pryor, Ark.

    Social Security and Family Policy

    Daniel Patrick Moynihan, N.Y.

    Taxation (102nd Congress)

    David L. Boren, Okla.

    Taxation and Debt Management (101st Congress)

    Spark M. Matsunaga, Hawaii (died April 15, 1990); Tom Daschle, S.D. (through 101st Congress)

    Foreign Relations

    Relations of the United States with foreign nations generally; treaties; foreign economic, military, technical and humanitarian assistance; foreign loans; diplomatic service; International Red Cross; international aspects of nuclear energy; International Monetary Fund; intervention abroad and declarations of war; foreign trade; national security; oceans and international environmental and scientific affairs; protection of U.S. citizens abroad; United Nations; World Bank and other development assistance organizations.

    • D 10 - R 9(101st Congress)
    • D 10 - R 8(102nd Congress)
    • Claiborne Pell, R.I. (1987-93)
    • Jesse Helms, N.C.
    African Affairs

    Paul Simon, Ill.

    East Asian and Pacific Affairs

    Alan Cranston, Calif.

    European Affairs

    Joseph R. Biden Jr., Del.

    International Economic Policy, Trade, Oceans and Environment

    Paul S. Sarbanes, Md.

    Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

    Daniel Patrick Moynihan, N.Y. (101st Congress); Terry Sanford, N.C. (102nd Congress)

    Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations

    John Kerry, Mass.

    Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs

    Christopher J. Dodd, Conn.

    Governmental Affairs

    Budget and accounting measures; census and statistics; federal civil service; congressional organization; intergovernmental relations; government information; District of Columbia; organization and management of nuclear export policy; executive branch reorganization; Postal Service; efficiency, economy and effectiveness of government.

    • D 8 - R 6
    • John Glenn, Ohio (1987-93)
    • William V. Roth Jr., Del.
    Federal Services, Post Office and Civil Service

    David Pryor, Ark.

    General Services, Federalism and the District of Columbia

    Jim Sasser, Tenn.

    Government Information and Regulation

    Jeff Bingaman, N.M. (101st Congress); Herb Kohl, Wis. (102nd Congress)

    Oversight of Government Management

    Carl Levin, Mich.

    Permanent Investigations (102nd Congress)

    Sam Nunn, Ga.

    Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (101st Congress)

    Sam Nunn, Ga.

    Judiciary

    Civil and criminal judicial proceedings generally; penitentiaries; bankruptcy, mutiny, espionage and counterfeiting; civil liberties; constitutional amendments; apportionment of representatives; government information; immigration and naturalization; interstate compacts generally; claims against the United States; patents, copyrights and trademarks; monopolies and unlawful restraints of trade; holidays and celebrations.

    • D 8 - R 6
    • Joseph R. Biden Jr., Del. (1987-93)
    • Strom Thurmond, S.C.
    Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights

    Howard M. Metzenbaum, Ohio

    Constitution

    Paul Simon, Ill.

    Courts and Administrative Practice

    Howell Heflin, Ala.

    Immigration and Refugee Affairs

    Edward M. Kennedy, Mass.

    Juvenile Justice (102nd Congress)

    Herb Kohl, Wis.

    Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks

    Dennis DeConcini, Ariz.

    Technology and the Law

    Patrick J. Leahy, Vt.

    Labor and Human Resources

    Education, labor, health and public welfare generally; aging; arts and humanities; biomedical research and development; child labor; convict labor; American National Red Cross; equal employment opportunity; handicapped individuals; labor standards and statistics; mediation and arbitration of labor disputes; occupational safety and health; private pension plans; public health; railway labor and retirement; regulation of foreign laborers; student loans; wages and hours.

    • D 9 - R 7(101st Congress)
    • D 10 - R 7(102nd Congress)
    • Edward M. Kennedy, Mass. (1987-93)
    • Orrin G. Hatch, Utah
    Aging

    Spark M. Matsunaga, Hawaii (101st Congress; died April 15, 1990); Brock Adams (through 102nd Congress)

    Children, Family, Drugs and Alcoholism

    Christopher J. Dodd, Conn.

    Disability Policy (102nd Congress)

    Tom Harkin, Iowa

    Education, Arts and the Humanities

    Claiborne Pell, R.I.

    Employment and Productivity

    Paul Simon, Ill.

    Handicapped (101st Congress)

    Tom Harkin, Iowa

    Labor

    Howard M. Metzenbaum, Ohio

    Rules and Administration

    Senate administration generally; corrupt practices; qualifications of senators; contested elections; federal elections generally; Government Printing Office; Congressional Record; meetings of Congress and attendance of members; presidential succession; the Capitol, congressional office buildings, the Library of Congress, the Smithsonian Institution and the Botanic Garden.

    • D 9 - D 7
    • Wendell H. Ford, Ky. (1987-93)
    • Ted Stevens, Alaska

    No standing subcommittees.

    Select Ethics

    Studies and investigates standards and conduct of Senate members and employees and may recommend remedial action.

    • D 3 - R 3
    • Howell Heflin, Ala. (1987-91)
    • Terry Sanford, N.C. (1991-93)
    • Warren B. Rudman, N.H. (vice chairman)

    No standing subcommittees.

    Select Indian Affairs

    Problems and opportunities of Indians, including Indian land management and trust responsibilities, education, health, special services, loan programs and Indian claims against the United States.

    • D 5 - R 3(101st Congress)
    • D 9 - R 7(102nd Congress)
    • Daniel K. Inouye, Hawaii (1987-93)
    • John McCain, Ariz. (vice chairman)

    No standing subcommittees.

    Select Intelligence

    Legislative and budgetary authority over the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency and intelligence activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other components of the federal intelligence community.

    • D 8 - R 7
    • David L. Boren, Okla. (1987-93)
    • William S. Cohen, Maine (vice chairman, 101st Congress)
    • Frank H. Murkowski, Alaska (vice chairman, 102nd Congress)

    No standing subcommittees.

    Select POW/MIA Affairs

    All messages, petitions, memorials and other matters relating to United States military personnel unaccounted for from military conflicts.

    • D 6 - R 6(102nd Congress)
    • John Kerry, Mass. (1991-93)
    • Robert C. Smith, N.H. (vice chairman)

    No standing subcommittees.

    Small Business

    Problems of small business; Small Business Administration.

    • D 10 - R 9(101st Congress)
    • D 10 - R 8(102nd Congress)
    • Dale Bumpers, Ark. (1987-93)
    • Rudy Boschwitz, Minn. (101st Congress)
    • Bob Kasten, Wis. (102nd Congress)
    Competition and Antitrust Enforcement (101st Congress)

    Tom Harkin, Iowa

    Competitiveness and Economic Opportunity (102nd Congress)

    Joseph I. Lieberman, Conn.

    Export Expansion

    Barbara A. Mikulski, Md.

    Government Contracting and Paperwork Reduction

    Alan J. Dixon, Ill.

    Innovation, Technology and Productivity

    Carl Levin, Mich.

    Rural Economy and Family Farming

    Max Baucus, Mont.

    Urban and Minority-Owned Business Development

    John Kerry, Mass.

    Special Aging

    Problems and opportunities of older people including health, income, employment, housing and care and assistance. Reports findings and makes recommendations to the Senate but cannot report legislation.

    • D 10 - R 9(101st Congress)
    • D 11 - R 10(102nd Congress)
    • David Pryor, Ark. (1989-93)
    • John Heinz, Pa. (died April 4, 1991)
    • William S. Cohen, Maine (through 102nd Congress)

    No standing subcommittees.

    Veterans' Affairs

    Veterans' measures generally; compensation; armed forces life insurance; national cemeteries; pensions; readjustment benefits; veterans' hospitals, medical care and treatment; vocational rehabilitation and education.

    • D 6 - D 5(101st Congress)
    • D 7 - R 5(102nd Congress)
    • Alan Cranston, Calif. (1977-81, 1987-93)
    • Frank H. Murkowski, Alaska (101st Congress)
    • Arlen Specter, Pa. (102nd Congress)

    No standing subcommittees.

    Political Committees

    Democratic Policy Committee (schedules legislation; reviews legislative proposals and provides recommendations)

    George J. Mitchell, Maine

    Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (provides campaign support for Democratic senatorial candidates)

    John B. Breaux, La. (101st Congress); Charles S. Robb, Va. (102nd Congress)

    Democratic Steering Committee (makes Democratic committee assignments)

    Daniel K. Inouye, Hawaii

    Republican Committee on Committees (makes Republican committee assignments)

    Larry Pressler, S.D. (101st Congress); Trent Lott, Miss. (102nd Congress)

    Republican Policy Committee (advises on party action and policy in the 101st Congress; schedules legislation, reviews legislative proposals and provides recommendations in the 102nd Congress)

    William L. Armstrong, Colo. (101st Congress); Don Nickles, Okla. (102nd Congress)

    National Republican Senatorial Committee (provides campaign support for Republican senatorial candidates)

    Don Nickles, Okla. (101st Congress); Phil Gramm, Texas (102nd Congress)

    House Committees

    Agriculture

    Agriculture generally; production, marketing and stabilization of agricultural prices; animal industry and diseases of animals; crop insurance and soil conservation; dairy industry; farm credit and security; forestry in general; human nutrition; home economics; inspection of livestock and meat products; plant industry, soils and agricultural engineering; rural electrification; commodities exchanges; rural development.

    • D 27 - R 18
    • E.
      Kika
      de la Garza, Texas (1981-93)
    • Edward R. Madigan, Ill. (resigned March 8, 1991)
    • Tom Coleman, Mo. (through 102nd Congress)
    Conservation, Credit and Rural Development

    Glenn English, Okla.

    Cotton, Rice and Sugar

    Jerry Huckaby, La.

    Department Operations, Research and Foreign Agriculture

    George E. Brown Jr., Calif. (101st Congress); Charlie Rose, N.C. (102nd Congress)

    Domestic Marketing, Consumer Relations and Nutrition

    Charles Hatcher, Ga. (101st Congress); Robin Tallon, S.C. (102nd Congress)

    Forests, Family Farms and Energy

    Harold L. Volkmer, Mo.

    Livestock, Dairy and Poultry

    Charles W. Stenholm, Texas

    Peanuts and Tobacco (102nd Congress)

    Charles Hatcher, Ga.

    Tobacco and Peanuts (101st Congress)

    Charlie Rose, N.C.

    Wheat, Soybeans and Feed Grains

    Dan Glickman, Kan.

    Appropriations

    Appropriation of revenue for support of the federal government; rescissions of appropriations; transfers of unexpended balances; new spending authority under t